





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


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RUINS OF RICHMOND, VA.

BATTLES AND LEADERS OF THE CIVIL WAR

Grant-Lee Edition




PART II

BEING FOR THE MOST PART CONTRIBUTIONS
BY UNION AND CONFEDERATE OFFICERS.
BASED UPON "THE CENTURY WAR SERIES."
EDITED BY ROBERT UNDERWOOD JOHNSON
AND CLARENCE CLOUGH BUEL, OF THE EDI-
TORIAL STAFF OF "THE CENTURY MAGAZINE."

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HAND-TO-HAND FOR RICKETTS'S GUNS ON
THE EVENING OF THE SECOND DAY.
SEE P. 313.

THE THIRD DAY AT GETTYSBURG.†

BY HENRY J. HUNT, BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL, U. S. A., CHIEF OF ARTILLERY, A. P.

IN view of the successes gained on the second day, General Lee resolved to renew his efforts. These successes were :

1st. *On the right*, the lodgment at the bases of the Round Tops, the possession of Devil's Den and its woods, and the ridges on the Emmitsburg road, which gave him the coveted positions for his artillery.

2d. *On the left*, the occupation of part of the intrenchments of the Twelfth Corps, with an outlet to the Baltimore pike, by which all our lines could be taken in reverse.

3d. *At the center*, the partial success of three of Anderson's brigades in penetrating our lines, from which they were expelled only because they lacked proper support. It was thought that better concert of action might have made good a lodgment here also.

Both armies had indeed lost heavily, but the account in that respect seemed in favor of the Confederates, or at worst, balanced. Pickett's and Edward Johnson's divisions were fresh, as were Posey's and Mahone's brigades of R. H. Anderson's, and William Smith's brigade of Early's division. These could be depended upon for an assault ; the others could be used as supports, and to follow up a success. The artillery was almost intact. Stuart had arrived with his cavalry, excepting the brigades of Jones and Robertson, guarding the communications ; and Imboden had also come up. General Lee, therefore, directed the renewal of operations both on the right and left. Ewell had been ordered to attack at daylight on July 3d, and during the night reënforced Johnson with Smith's, Daniel's, and O'Neal's brigades. Johnson had made his preparations, and was about moving, when at dawn Williams's artillery opened upon him, preparatory to an assault by Geary and Ruger for the recovery of their works. The suspension of this fire was followed by an immediate advance by both sides. A conflict ensued which lasted with varying success until near 11 o'clock, during which the Confederates were driven

† Continued from p. 313.*—EDITORS.

out of the Union intrenchments by Geary and Ruger, aided by Shaler's brigade of the Sixth Corps. They made one or two attempts to regain possession, but were unsuccessful, and a demonstration to turn Johnson's left caused him to withdraw his command to Rock Creek. At the close of the war the scene of this conflict was covered by a forest of dead trees, leaden bullets proving as fatal to them as to the soldiers whose bodies were thickly strewn beneath them.

Longstreet's arrangements had been made to attack Round Top, and his orders issued with a view to turning it, when General Lee decided that the assault should be made on Cemetery Ridge by Pickett's and Pettigrew's divisions, with part of Trimble's. Longstreet formed these in two lines—Pickett on the right, supported by Wilcox; Pettigrew on the left, with Lane's and Scales's brigades under Trimble in the second line. Hill was ordered to hold his line with the remainder of his corps,—six brigades,—give Longstreet assistance if required, and avail himself of any success that might be gained. Finally a powerful artillery force, about one hundred and fifty guns, was ordered to prepare the way for the assault by cannonade. The necessary arrangements caused delay, and before notice of this could be received by Ewell, Johnson, as we have seen, was attacked, so that the contest was over on the left before that at the center was begun. The hoped-for concert of action in the Confederate attacks was lost from the beginning.

On the Federal side Hancock's corps held Cemetery Ridge with Robinson's division, First Corps, on Hays's right in support, and Doubleday's at the




STEWART'S BRIGADE RENEWING THE CONFEDERATE ATTACK ON CULP'S HILL, MORNING OF THE THIRD DAY.



THE 29TH PENNSYLVANIA FORMING LINE OF BATTLE ON CULP'S HILL AT 10 A. M., JULY 3.

angle between Gibbon and Caldwell. General Newton, having been assigned to the command of the First Corps, *vice* Reynolds, was now in charge of the ridge held by Caldwell. Compactly arranged on its crest was McGilvery's artillery, forty-one guns, consisting of his own batteries, reënforced by others from the Artillery Reserve. Well to the right, in front of Hays and Gibbon, was the artillery of the Second Corps under its chief, Captain Hazard. Woodruff's battery was in front of Ziegler's Grove; on his left, in succession, Arnold's Rhode Island, Cushing's United States, Brown's Rhode Island, and Rorty's New York. In the fight of the preceding day the two last-named batteries had been to the front and suffered severely. Lieutenant T. Fred Brown was severely wounded, and his command devolved on Lieutenant Perrin. So great had been the loss in men and horses that they were now of four guns each, reducing the total number in the corps to twenty-six. Daniels's battery of horse artillery, four guns, was at the angle. Cowan's 1st New York battery, six rifles, was placed on the left of Rorty's soon after the cannonade commenced. In addition, some of the guns on Cemetery Hill, and Rittenhouse's on Little Round Top, could be brought to bear, but these were offset by batteries similarly placed on the flanks of the enemy, so that on the Second Corps line, within the space of a mile, were 77 guns to oppose nearly 150. They were on an open crest plainly visible from all parts of the opposite line. Between 10 and 11 A. M., everything looking favorable at Culp's Hill, I crossed over to Cemetery Ridge, to see what might be going on at other points. Here a magnificent display greeted my eyes. Our whole front for

two miles was covered by batteries already in line or going into position. They stretched — apparently in one unbroken mass — from opposite the town to the Peach Orchard, which bounded the view to the left, the ridges of which were planted thick with cannon. Never before had such a sight been witnessed on this continent, and rarely, if ever, abroad. What did it mean? It might possibly be to hold that line while its infantry was sent to aid Ewell, or to guard against a counter-stroke from us, but it most probably meant an assault on our center, to be preceded by a cannonade in order to crush our



BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE S. GREENE.
FROM AN AMBROTYPE.

batteries and shake our infantry; at least to cause us to exhaust our ammunition in reply, so that the assaulting troops might pass in good condition over the half mile of open ground which was beyond our effective musketry fire. With such an object the cannonade would be long and followed immediately by the assault, their whole army being held in readiness to follow up a success. From the great extent of ground occupied by the enemy's batteries, it was evident that all the artillery on our west front, whether of the army corps or the reserve, must concur as a *unit*, under the chief of artillery, in the defense. This is provided for in all well-organized armies by special


rules, which formerly were contained in our own army regulations, but they had been condensed in successive editions into a few short lines, so obscure as to be virtually worthless, because, like the rudimentary toe of the dog's paw, they had become, from lack of use, mere survivals — unintelligible except to the specialist. It was of the first importance to subject the enemy's infantry, from the first moment of their advance, to such a cross-fire of our artillery as would break their formation, check their impulse, and drive them back, or at least bring them to our lines in such condition as to make them an easy prey. There was neither time nor necessity for reporting this to General Meade, and beginning on the right, I instructed the chiefs of artillery and battery commanders to withhold their fire for fifteen or twenty minutes after the cannonade commenced, then to concentrate their fire with all possible accuracy on those batteries which were most destructive to us — but slowly, so that when the enemy's ammunition was exhausted, we should have sufficient left to meet the assault. I had just given these orders to the last battery on Little Round Top, when the signal-gun was fired, and the enemy opened with all his guns. From that point the scene was indescribably grand. All their batteries were soon covered with smoke, through which the flashes were incessant, whilst the air seemed filled with shells, whose sharp explosions, with the hurtling of their fragments, formed a running accom-



GETTYSBURG FROM CULP'S HILL. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN ABOUT 1886.

paniment to the deep roar of the guns. Thence I rode to the Artillery Reserve to order fresh batteries and ammunition to be sent up to the ridge as soon as the cannonade ceased; but both the reserve and the train had gone to a safer place. Messengers, however, had been left to receive and convey orders, which I sent by them; then I returned to the ridge. Turning into the Taneytown pike, I saw evidence of the necessity under which the reserve had "decamped," in the remains of a dozen exploded caissons, which had been placed under cover of a hill, but which the shells had managed to search out. In fact, the fire was more dangerous behind the ridge than on its crest, which I soon reached at the position occupied by General Newton behind McGilvery's batteries, from which we had a fine view as all our own guns were now in action.

Most of the enemy's projectiles passed overhead, the effect being to sweep all the open ground in our rear, which was of little benefit to the Confederates—a mere waste of ammunition, for everything here could seek shelter. And just here an incident already published may be repeated, as it illustrates a peculiar feature of civil war. Colonel Long, who was at the time on General Lee's staff, had a few years before served in my mounted battery expressly to receive a course of instruction in the use of field-artillery. At Appomattox we spent several hours together, and in the course of conversation I told him I was not satisfied with the conduct of this cannonade which I had heard was under his direction, inasmuch as he had not done justice to his instruction; that his fire, instead of being concentrated on the point of attack, as it ought to have been, and as I expected it would be, was scattered over




MONUMENT OF THE 2D MASSACHUSETTS INFANTRY, FACING THE EAST BASE OF CULP'S HILL.

ing him "over and over." He fell behind the rear rank, apparently dead, and a ridge of earth where he had been lying reminded me of the backwoods practice of "barking" squirrels. Our fire was deliberate, but on inspecting the chests I found that the ammunition was running low, and hastened to General Meade to advise its immediate cessation and preparation for the assault which would certainly follow. The headquarters building, immediately behind the ridge, had been abandoned, and many of the horses of the staff lay dead. Being told that the general had gone to the cemetery, I proceeded thither. He was not there, and on telling General Howard my object, he concurred in its propriety, and I rode back along the ridge, ordering the fire to cease. This was followed by a cessation of that of the enemy, under the mistaken impression that he had silenced our guns, and almost immediately his infantry came out of the woods and formed for the assault. On my way to the Taneytown road to meet the fresh batteries which I had ordered up, I met Major Bingham, of Hancock's staff, who informed me that General Meade's aides were seeking me with orders to "cease firing"; so I had only anticipated his wishes. The batteries were brought up, and Fitzhugh's, Weir's, Wheeler's, and Parsons's were put in near the clump of trees. Brown's and Arnold's batteries had been so crippled that they were now withdrawn, and Brown's was replaced by Cowan's. Meantime the enemy advanced, and McGilvery opened a destructive oblique fire, reënforced by that of Rittenhouse's six rifle-guns from Round Top, which were served with remarkable accuracy, enfilading Pickett's lines. The Confederate approach was magnificent, and excited our admiration; but the story of that charge is so well


the whole field. He was amused at the criticism and said: "I remembered my lessons at the time, and when the fire became so scattered, wondered what you would think about it!"

I now rode along the ridge to inspect the batteries. The infantry were lying down on its reverse slope, near the crest, in open ranks, waiting events. As I passed along, a bolt from a rifle-gun struck the ground just in front of a man of the front rank, penetrated the surface and passed under him, throw-



SLOCUM'S HEADQUARTERS, POWER'S HILL.

known that I need not dwell upon it further than as it concerns my own command. The steady fire from McGilvery and Rittenhouse, on their right, caused Pickett's men to "drift" in the opposite direction, so that the weight of the assault fell upon the positions occupied by Hazard's batteries. I had counted on an artillery cross-fire that would stop it before it reached our lines, but, except a few shots here and there, Hazard's batteries were silent until the enemy came within canister range. They had unfortunately exhausted their long range projectiles during the cannonade, under the orders of their corps commander, and it was too late to replace them. Had my



MENCIEN'S SPRING, BETWEEN CULP'S HILL AND THE CEMETERY GATE.

instructions been followed here, as they were by McGilvery, I do not believe that Pickett's division would have reached our line. We lost not only the fire of one-third of our guns, but the resulting cross-fire, which would have doubled its value. The prime fault was in the obscurity of our army regulations as to the artillery, and the absence of all regulations as to the proper relations of the different arms of service to one another. On this occasion it cost us much blood, many lives, and for a moment endangered the integrity of our line if not the success of the battle.


Soon after Pickett's repulse, Wilcox's, Wright's, and Perry's brigades were moved forward, but under the fire of the fresh batteries in Gibbon's front, of McGilvery's and Rittenhouse's guns and the advance of two regiments of Stannard's Vermont brigade, they soon fell back. The losses in the batteries of the Second Corps were very heavy. Of the five battery commanders and their successors on the field, Rorty, Cushing, and Woodruff were killed, and Milne was mortally and Sheldon severely wounded at their guns. So great was the destruction of men and horses, that Cushing's and Woodruff's United States, and Brown's and Arnold's Rhode Island batteries were consolidated to form two serviceable ones.

The advance of the Confederate brigades to cover Pickett's retreat showed that the enemy's line opposite Cemetery Ridge was occupied by infantry.



SPANGLER'S SPRING, EAST OF CULP'S HILL.

Our own line on the ridge was in more or less disorder, as the result of the conflict, and in no condition to advance a sufficient force for a counter-assault. The largest bodies of organized troops available were on the left, and General Meade now proceeded to Round Top and pushed out skirmishers to feel the enemy in its front. An advance to the Plum Run line, of the troops behind it, would have brought them directly in front of the numerous batteries which crowned the Emmitsburg Ridge, commanding that line and all the intervening ground; a farther advance, to the attack, would have brought them under additional heavy flank fires. McCandless's brigade,



COLONEL ELIAKIM SHERRILL, COMMANDING
THE THIRD BRIGADE OF HAYS'S DIVISION,
SECOND CORPS KILLED JULY 3, 1863.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

supported by Nevin's, was, however, pushed forward, under cover of the woods, which protected them from the fire of all these batteries; it crossed the Wheat-field, cleared the woods, and had an encounter with a portion of Benning's brigade, which was retiring. Hood's and McLaws's divisions were falling back under Longstreet's orders to their strong position, resting on Peach Orchard and covering Hill's line. It needs but a moment's examination of the official map to see that our troops on the left were locked up. As to the center, Pickett's and Pettigrew's assaulting divisions had formed no part of A. P. Hill's line, which was virtually intact. The idea that there must have been "a gap of at least a mile" in that line, made by throwing forward these divisions, and that a prompt advance

from Cemetery Ridge would have given us the line, or the artillery in front of it, was a delusion. A prompt counter-charge after a combat between two small bodies of men is one thing; the change from the defensive to the offensive of an army, after an engagement at a single *point*, is quite another. *This* was not a "Waterloo defeat" with a fresh army to follow it up, and to have made such a change to the offensive, on the assumption that Lee had made no provision against a reverse, would have been rash in the extreme. An advance of 20,000 men from Cemetery Ridge in the face of the 140 guns then in position would have been stark madness; an immediate advance from any point, in force, was simply impracticable, and before due preparation could have been made for a change to the offensive, the favorable moment — had any resulted from the repulse — would have passed away.

Whilst the main battle was raging, sharp cavalry combats took place on both flanks of the army. On the left the principal incident was an attack made by order of General Kilpatrick on infantry and artillery in woods and behind stone fences, which resulted in considerable losses, and especially in the death of General Farnsworth, a gallant and promising officer who had but a few days before been appointed brigadier-general and had not yet received his commission. On the right an affair of some magnitude took



PICKETT'S CHARGE, I.—LOOKING DOWN THE UNION LINES FROM THE "CLUMP OF TREES."

General Hancock and staff are seen in the left center of the picture.—This and the two pictures that follow are from the Cyclorama of Gettysburg, by permission of the National Panorama Company.

place between Stuart's command of four and Gregg's of three brigades; but Jenkins's Confederate brigade was soon thrown out of action from lack of ammunition, and two only of Gregg's were engaged. Stuart had been ordered to cover Ewell's left and was proceeding toward the Baltimore pike, where he hoped to create a diversion in aid of the Confederate infantry, and in case of Pickett's success to fall upon the retreating Federal troops. From near Cress's Ridge, two and a half miles east of Gettysburg, Stuart commanded a view of the roads in rear of the Federal lines. On its northern wooded end he posted Jackson's battery, and took possession of the Rummel



PICKETT'S CHARGE, II.—THE MAIN COLLISION TO THE RIGHT OF THE "CLUMP OF TREES,"
FROM THE CYCLORAMA OF GETTYSBURG.

In this hand-to-hand conflict General Armistead, of Pickett's Division, was killed, and General Webb, of Gibbon's Division, was wounded.

farm-buildings, a few hundred yards distant. Hampton and Fitzhugh Lee were on his left, covered by the wood, Jenkins and Chambliss on the right, along the ridge. Half a mile east on a low parallel ridge, the southern part of which bending west toward Cress's Ridge furnished excellent positions for artillery, was the Federal cavalry brigade of McIntosh, who now sent a force toward Rummel's, from which a strong body of skirmishers was thrown to meet them, and the battery opened. McIntosh now demanded reënforcements, and Gregg, then near the Baltimore pike, brought him Custer's brigade and Pennington's and Randol's batteries. The artillery soon drove the Confederates out of Rummel's, and compelled Jackson's Virginia battery to leave the ridge. Both sides brought up reënforcements and the battle swayed from side to side of the interval. Finally the Federals were pressed back, and Lee and Hampton, emerging from the wood, charged, sword in hand, facing a destructive artillery fire—for the falling back of the cavalry had uncovered our batteries. The assailants were met by Custer's and such other mounted squadrons as could be thrown in; a *mêlée* ensued, in which Hampton was severely wounded and the charge repulsed. Breathed's and McGregor's Confederate batteries had replaced Jackson's, a sharp artillery duel took place, and at nightfall each side held substantially its original ground. Both sides claim to have held the Rummel house. The advantage was decidedly with the Federals, who had foiled Stuart's plans.




PICKETT'S CHARGE, III.—(CONTINUATION OF THE PICTURE ON P. 378.)
FROM THE GETTYSBURG CYCLORAMA.

Thus the battle of Gettysburg closed as it had opened, with a very creditable cavalry battle.

General Lee now abandoned the attempt to dislodge Meade, intrenched a line from Oak Hill to Peach Orchard, started all his *impedimenta* to the Potomac in advance, and followed with his army on the night of July 4th, via Fairfield. This compelled Meade to take the circuitous routes through the lower passes; and the strategic advantage to Lee and disadvantage to Meade of Gettysburg were made manifest.







General Meade has been accused of slowness in the pursuit. The charge is not well founded; he lost no time in commencing, or vigor in pushing, it. As early as the morning of the 4th he ordered French at Frederick to seize and hold the lower passes, and he put all the cavalry except Gregg's and McIntosh's brigades in motion to harass the enemy's anticipated retreat, and to destroy his trains and bridges at Williamsport. It stormed heavily that day, and the care of the wounded and burial of the dead proceeded whilst the enemy's line was being reconnoitered. As soon, on the 5th, as it was certain that Lee was retreating, Gregg was started in pursuit on the Chambersburg pike, and the infantry—now reduced to a little over 47,000 effectives, short of ammunition and supplies—by the lower passes. The Sixth Corps taking the Hagerstown road, Sedgwick reported the Fairfield pass fortified, a large force present, and that a fight could be had; upon which, on the 6th, Meade halted the rest of the infantry and ordered two corps to his support, but soon learning that although the pass could be carried it would cause too much delay, he resumed the march, leaving McIntosh and a brigade of the Sixth



INSIDE EVERGREEN CEMETERY, CEMETERY HILL. FROM A WAR-TIME SKETCH.

Corps to follow the enemy through the Fairfield pass. On the evening of the 4th — both armies being still in position at Gettysburg — Kilpatrick had a sharp encounter with the enemy in Monterey pass, and this was followed by daily cavalry combats on the different routes, in which much damage was done to trains and many captures of wagons, caissons, and prisoners effected. On the 5th, whilst Lee was moving through the passes, French destroyed the pontoon-bridge at Falling Waters. On the 6th — as Meade was leaving Gettysburg — Buford attacked at Williamsport and Kilpatrick toward Hagerstown, on his right, but as Imboden's train guard was strong, Stuart was up, and Longstreet close by, they had to withdraw. [See p. 427.] The enemy proceeded to construct a new bridge and intrench a strong line covering Williamsport and Falling Waters. There were heavy rains on the 7th and 8th, but the infantry corps reached Middletown on the morning of the 9th, received supplies, crossed the mountains that day, and at its close the right was at Boonsboro', and the left at Rohrerstown, on the roads to Hagerstown and Williamsport. By this time the Potomac was swollen and impassable. On the 10th Meade continued his advance, and received information that the enemy had occupied a line extending from near Falling Waters, through Downsville to Funkstown, which he was intrenching. This at 1 P. M. he reported to Halleck, informing him at the same time that his cavalry had driven that of Lee to within a mile of Funkstown, and that he would next day move cautiously until he had developed the enemy's force and position. Halleck, at 9 P. M., sent him a cipher dispatch as follows:

"I think it will be best for you to postpone a general battle till you can concentrate all your forces and get up your reserves and reinforcements; I will push on the troops as fast as they arrive. It would be well to have staff-officers at the Monocacy, to direct the troops arriving where to go, and to see that they are properly fitted out. They should join you by forced marches. Beware of partial combats. Bring up and hurl upon the enemy all your forces, good and bad."



REFERENCES.

Confederate.	Infantry.	Union.
Cavalry.	Cavalry.	
Longstreet's Cps.	L.	1st Corps.
Ewell's Corps.	B.	2d Corps.
A. P. Hill's Cps.	H.	3d Corps.
Smith's Cavalry.	S.	4th Corps.
		5th Corps.
		6th Corps.
		7th Corps.
		8th Corps.
		9th Corps.
		10th Corps.
		11th Corps.
		12th Corps.
		13th Corps.

SCALE OF MILES

pointment that followed the "escape" of Lee's army. It was promptly manifested, too, and in a manner which indicates how harshly and unjustly the Army of the Potomac and its commanders were usually judged and treated; and what trials the latter had to undergo whilst subjected to the meddling and hectoring of a distant superior, from which they were not freed until the general-in-chief accompanied them in the field. On the day following Lee's withdrawal, before it was possible that all the circumstances could be known, three dispatches passed between the respective headquarters.

First. Halleck to Meade July 14th (in part):

"I need hardly say to you that the escape of Lee's army without another battle has created great dissatisfaction in the mind of the President, and it will require an active and energetic pursuit on your part to remove the impression that it has not been sufficiently active heretofore."

Second. Meade to Halleck July 14th:

"Having performed my duty conscientiously and to the best of my ability, the censure of the President conveyed in your dispatch of 1 P. M. this day, is, in my judgment, so undeserved that I feel compelled most respectfully to ask to be immediately relieved from the command of this army."

Third. Halleck to Meade July 14th:

"My telegram stating the disappointment of the President at the escape of Lee's army was not intended as a censure, but as a stimulus to an active pursuit. It is not deemed a sufficient cause for your application to be relieved." ☆

Whatever the object of these dispatches of General Halleck, they are perfectly consistent with a determination on the part of the War Department to

☆ At the end of July the following letters passed between Halleck and Meade:

"[UNOFFICIAL.] HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, WASHINGTON, July 28th, 1863. MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, WARRENTON, VA. GENERAL: I take this method of writing you a few words which I could not well communicate in any other way. Your fight at Gettysburg met with universal approbation of all military men here. You handled your troops in that battle as well, if not better, than any general has handled his army during the war. You brought all your forces into action at the right time and place, which no commander of the Army of the Potomac has done before. You may well be proud of that battle. The President's order or proclamation of July 4th showed how much he appreciated your success. And now a few words in regard to subsequent events. You should not have been surprised or vexed at the President's disappointment at the escape of Lee's army. He had examined into all the details of sending you reinforcements to satisfy himself that every man who could possibly be spared from other places had been sent to your army. He thought that Lee's defeat was so certain that he felt no little impatience at his unexpected escape. I have no doubt, General, that you felt the disappointment as keenly as any one else. Such things sometimes occur to us without any fault of our own. Take it all together, your short campaign has proved your superior generalship, and you merit, as you will receive, the confidence of the Government and the gratitude of the country. I need not assure you, General, that I have lost none of the confidence which I felt in you when I recommended you for the command. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, H. W. HALLECK."

"[UNOFFICIAL.] HEADQUARTERS, A. P., July 31, 1863. MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, General-in-Chief. MY DEAR

GENERAL: I thank you most sincerely and heartily for your kind and generous letter of the 28th inst., received last evening. It would be wrong in me to deny that I feared there existed in the minds both of the President and yourself an idea that I had failed to do what another would and could have done in the withdrawal of Lee's army. The expression you have been pleased to use in a letter, *to wit*, a feeling of disappointment, is one that I cheerfully accept and readily admit was as keenly felt by myself as any one. But permit me, dear General, to call your attention to the distinction between disappointment and dissatisfaction. The one was a natural feeling in view of the momentous consequences that would have resulted from a *successful* attack, but does not necessarily convey with it any censure. I could not view the use of the latter expression in any other light than as intending to convey an expression of opinion on the part of the President, that I had failed to do what I might and should have done. Now let me say in the frankness which characterizes your letter, that perhaps the President was right. If such was the case, it was my duty to give him an opportunity to replace me by one better fitted for the command of the army. It was, I assure you, with such feelings that I applied to be relieved. It was not from any personal considerations, for I have tried in this whole war to forget all personal considerations, and I have always maintained they should not for an instant influence any one's action. Of course you will understand that I do not agree that the President was right — and I feel sure when the true state of the case comes to be known, however natural and great may be the feeling of disappointment, that no blame will be attached to any one. Had I attacked Lee the day I proposed to do so, and in the ignorance that then existed of his position, I have every reason to believe the attack would have been unsuccessful and would have resulted disastrously. This opinion is founded on the judgment of numerous



CONFEDERATE PRISONERS ON THE BALTIMORE PIKE. FROM A WAR-TIME SKETCH.

discredit under all circumstances the Army of the Potomac and any commander identified with it,—and that was the effect in this case.

The losses of both armies were very large. The revised returns show for the Army of the Potomac: killed, 3072; wounded, 14,497; missing, 5434,—total, 23,003; and for the Army of Northern Virginia: killed, 2592; wounded, 12,709; missing, 5150,—total, 20,451. But the returns for the latter army are not complete; some commands are not reported, and in others the regimental show larger losses than do the brigade returns from which the foregoing numbers are compiled.

As to the comparative strength of the two armies on the field of battle, we have no satisfactory data. The last Confederate return was for May 31st, showing "Present for duty, under arms," 59,484, infantry. The morning report of the Army of the Potomac for June 30th shows "Present for duty, equipped," 77,208, infantry. Neither return is worth much except as a basis

distinguished officers, after inspecting Lee's vacated works and position. Among these officers I could name Generals Sedgwick, Wright, Slocum, Hays, Sykes, and others.

"The idea that Lee had abandoned his lines early in the day that he withdrew, I have positive intelligence is not correct, and that not a man was withdrawn until after dark. I mention these facts to remove the impression which newspaper correspondents have given the public: that it was only necessary to advance to secure an easy victory. I had great responsibility thrown on me: on one side were the known and important fruits of victory, and on the other, the equally important and terrible consequences of a defeat. I considered my position at Williamsport very different from that at Gettysburg. When I left Frederick it was with the firm determination to attack and fight Lee without regard to time or place as soon as I could come in contact with him. But, after defeating him and requiring him to abandon his schemes of invasion, I did

not think myself justified in making a blind attack, simply to prevent his escape, and running all the risks attending such a venture. Now, as I said before, in this perhaps I erred in judgment, for I take this occasion to say to you, and through you to the President—that I have no pretensions to any superior capacity for the post he has assigned me to—that all I can do is to exert my utmost efforts and do the best I can; but that the moment those who have a right to judge my actions think or feel satisfied either that I am wanting, or that another would do better, that moment I earnestly desire to be relieved, not on my own account, but on account of the country and the cause. You must excuse so much egotism, but your kind letter in a measure renders it necessary. I feel, General, very proud of your good opinion, and assure you I shall endeavor in the future to continue to merit it. Reciprocating the kind feeling you have expressed, I remain, General, most truly and respectfully yours, GEORGE G. MEADE, Major-General."

EDITORS.

for guessing; the long marches, followed by the forced ones of July 1-2, of the Army of the Potomac left thousands of stragglers on the roads. These totals are of little importance; they would have been of some significance had the larger army been defeated; but it was not. At the "points of contact" the Confederates were almost always the stronger. On July 1st 18,000 Federal combatants contended against at least 25,000 Confederates, and got the worst of it. On July 2d Longstreet's 15,000 overcame Sickles's 10,000, and had to halt when a larger force was opposed to them. Williams's Twelfth Corps retook its works from a larger body of Ewell's troops, for at the contested point they were opposed by an inferior number; and then held them, for Johnson's superior force was as much hampered here by the nature of the ground as was Meade's on the left, the evening before. In many respects the Confederates had the advantage: they had much better ground for their artillery; they were fresher; they were all veterans; they were better organized; they were commanded by officers who had been selected for their experience and abilities, and in whom they had implicit confidence. These were enormous advantages, sufficient to counterbalance the difference of numbers, which, if any existed, was small; and whilst all the Confederate army, except here and there a brigade, were fought to the utmost, the strongest Federal corps (the Sixth) was hardly in action, the total loss of its eight brigades being but two hundred and forty-two killed, wounded, and missing. But the Southerners were subjected here to the disadvantages that the Northerners had to contend with in Virginia: they were surrounded by enemies, not friends who supplied them with aid and information; and they were not by choice, but by necessity, the assailants on the chosen ground of their opponents.

Right gallantly did they act their part, and their failure carried no discredit with it. Their military honor was not tarnished by their defeat, nor their spirit lowered, but their respect for their opponents was restored to what it had been before Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville.

GENERAL HANCOCK AND THE ARTILLERY AT GETTYSBURG.

I. BY FRANCIS A. WALKER, BREVET BRIGADIER-GENERAL, U. S. V.

GENERAL HUNT, in his article on "The Third Day at Gettysburg" [see p. 375], criticises General Hancock's conduct of his artillery, on the ground that his directing the Second Corps batteries to continue firing throughout the Confederate cannonade was both an encroachment upon his own (General Hunt's) proper authority, as chief of artillery of the Army of the Potomac, and an act of bad policy. On the latter point he says:

"Had my instructions been followed here, as they were by McGilvery, I do not believe that Pickett's division would have reached our line. We lost not only the fire of one-third of our guns, but the resulting cross-fire, which would have doubled its value."

This, it will be seen, constitutes a very severe impeachment. I have had much correspondence and conversation with General Hancock on the subject; and, as the heroic leader of the Second

Corps can no longer reply for himself, I beg leave to speak on his behalf.

In the first place, two antagonistic theories of authority are advanced. General Hancock claimed that he commanded *the line of battle* along Cemetery Ridge. General Hunt, in substance, alleges that General Hancock commanded the infantry of that line, and that he himself commanded the artillery. Winfield S. Hancock did not read his commission as constituting him a major-general of infantry, nor did he believe that a line of battle was to be ordered by military specialists. He knew that by both law and reason the defense of Cemetery Ridge was intrusted to him, subject to the actual, authentic orders of the commander of the Army of the Potomac, but not subject to the discretion of one of General Meade's staff-officers. General Meade could, under the President's order, have

placed a junior at the head of the Second Corps, but whomsoever he did place over the corps became thereby invested with the whole undiminished substance, and with all the proper and ordinary incidents of command.

So much for the question of authority. On the question of policy there is only to be said that a difference of opinion appears between two highly meritorious officers—one, the best artillerist of the army, the other, one of the best, if not the best, commander of troops in the army—as to what was most expedient in a given emergency. Unquestionably it would have been a strong point for us if, other things being equal, the limber chests of the artillery had been full when Pickett's and Pettigrew's divisions began their great charge. But would other things have been equal? Would the advantage so obtained have compensated for the loss of *morale* in the infantry which might have resulted from allowing them to be scourged, at will, by the hostile artillery? Every soldier knows how trying and often how demoralizing it is to endure artillery fire without reply.

Now, on the question thus raised, who was the better judge, General Hunt or General Hancock? Had Henry J. Hunt taken command of a brigade

of infantry in 1861, had he for nearly two years lived with the infantry, marching with them, camping among them, commanding them in numerous actions, keeping close watch of their temper and spirit, observing their behavior under varying conditions and trials, I believe that by the 3d of July, 1863, he would have become one of the most capable and judicious corps commanders of the army. But in so doing he would necessarily have forfeited nearly all of that special experience which combined with his high intelligence and great spirit to make him one of the best artillerists whom the history of war has known. Certainly a service almost wholly in the artillery could not yield that intimate knowledge of the temper of troops which should qualify him, equally with Hancock, to judge what was required to keep them in heart and courage under the Confederate cannonade at Gettysburg, and to bring them up to the final struggle, prepared in spirit to meet the fearful ordeal of Longstreet's charge. Hancock had full authority over that line of battle; he used that authority according to his own best judgment, and he beat off the enemy. That is the substance of it.

Boston, January 12th, 1887.

II. REJOINDER BY HENRY J. HUNT, BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL, U. S. A.

GENERAL F. A. WALKER, of General Hancock's staff, comments on my expressed belief that, had my instructions for the cannonade of July 3d been carried out by Captain Hazard, commander of the artillery of the Second Corps, the Confederate assault would not have reached our lines, and considers this "a very severe impeachment" of General Hancock's conduct of his artillery. I fully appreciate and honor the motive of General Walker's courteous criticism, and his very kind references to myself, but he writes under misapprehensions which are widespread and misleading, and which, as they place me in a false position, I beg leave to explain.

General Hancock's claim that he commanded all the troops of every description posted on his part of Cemetery Ridge is perfectly valid. It cannot be disputed, and I never questioned it; but all commands must be exercised subject to the established principles for the government of armies. Under these, commanders of special arms issue their own orders direct to their subordinates serving with army corps, who must submit them to the corps commanders with whom they serve. The latter, being supreme on their own lines, can modify or countermand these orders, but by doing so they make themselves responsible for the result. Thus all conflicts or theories as to authority are avoided. Our "Regulations" (Scott's), adopted in 1821, read:

"The superior officer of the corps of engineers, or of the artillery, serving with one of the army corps . . . will receive the orders of the commandant thereof, to whom the said superior officer of engineers or of artillery will communicate any orders he may receive from his own particular commandant-in-chief, attached to general headquarters."

Separate paragraphs provided rules for the military "staff" and administration,—the latter including the supply departments. "Staff-officers" are forbidden to give orders except in the names of their generals. From this rule administrative officers are specially exempted, their chiefs directing their respective departments in their own names, but subject to the control of the generals under whom they serve.

All these regulations are essential to the management of a large army, but are only partly applicable to a two-company post, the school in which most of our officers, both of the war office and of the regiments, were trained. So in the "Regulations" of 1861-3, they were all condensed into one short paragraph:

"Staff-officers and commanders of artillery, engineers, and ordnance, report to their immediate commanders the state of the supplies and whatever concerns the service under their direction, and receive their orders, and communicate to them the orders they receive from their superiors in their own corps."

Closely examined, this is correct, but it is obscure and misleading. It lumps together officers of the staff and of administration as "staff-officers," and so connects them with those of the special arms as seemingly to confirm the erroneous idea that engineer officers are staff-officers, and of course that artillery officers must be the same. It is an odd notion, which could not find a lodgment in any other army than our own, that an artillery commandant-in-chief, himself a "corps commander," and provided with a staff of his own, is "one of the staff-officers" who runs about a battle-field carrying "the actual and authentic orders" of the general-in-chief to *other* corps com-

manders. A "staff-officer" is an officer attached to the person or headquarters of a general as his aide or assistant.

To illustrate the general principle as to the service of the special arms, I quote from the "Instructions of Frederick the Great" to his artillery. He was himself, by the way, an "artillery specialist" of the highest order, yet I have never heard it suggested that this unfitted him for "ordering a line of battle." He was also a disciplinarian of the sternest school, yet he "almost preached insubordination" in order to reduce to a minimum the mischief that meddling with the artillery by any general, even the general-in-chief, might occasion. He says:

"It sometimes happens that the general in command, or some other general, is himself forgetful, and orders the fire to be opened too soon, without considering what injurious consequences may result from it. In such case the artillery officer must certainly obey, but he should fire as slowly as possible, and point the pieces with the utmost accuracy, in order that his shots may not be thrown away."

As to the other question, that of policy, each general must decide it for himself, and General Hancock presumably acted according to his best judgment in the emergency suddenly presented to him when the cannonade opened. I do not know his reasons for countermanding my orders, and therefore cannot discuss them, even were I disposed to do so. As to the hypothetical case presented by General Walker, the possible effect of the enemy's cannonade on the *morale* of our troops, and his question, "Who was the better judge, General Hunt or General Hancock?" I may be permitted to reply, that a corps commander ought to be, so far as his own corps is concerned. It is, however, one of the necessary duties of an

artillery commander to study the qualities of the other arms, for these must be considered in organizing and distributing the artillery, and are, as we see in this very case, important elements in determining its service. I had studied the Army of the Potomac, believed in its high qualities, and when, for special reasons, I instructed our batteries to withhold their fire for a given period, I knew the severity of the trial to which I was subjecting all the troops. I knew, also, that while the batteries would be the direct object of the enemy's fire, their men must stand idle at the guns and bear its full fury, while the infantry, lying on the reverse slope of the ridge and out of the enemy's sight, would be partly sheltered from it. Yet I felt no misgiving as to the fortitude of my cannoneers, and no doubt as to that of the infantry. I think I was justified by the event, for the troops on General Hancock's line, where my instructions were not followed, and those on General Newton's line (on Hancock's immediate left), where they *were* followed, were equal in "heart and courage" for the "fearful ordeal of Longstreet's charge." The object of my orders, however, was to spare them this ordeal altogether by breaking up the charge before it reached our lines. Had my orders been fully carried out, I think their whole line would have been—as half of it was—driven back before reaching our position, and this would have given us our only chance for a successful counter-attack. As it was, the splendid valor of Pickett's division alone enabled the Confederates, although defeated, to preserve their *morale* intact. Had they been repulsed without coming into immediate contact with our infantry, their *morale* would have been seriously impaired, their sense of superiority humbled.

REPELLING LEE'S LAST BLOW AT GETTYSBURG.


I. BY EDMUND RICE, BREVET LIEUTENANT-COLONEL, U. S. A.

THE brigades of Harrow, Webb, and Hall, of Gibbon's division, Hancock's corps, occupied the crest on Cemetery Ridge on July 3d. The right of Hall's and the left of Webb's brigades were in a clump of trees, called by the enemy the salient of our position, and this grove was the focus of the most fearful cannonade that preceded Pickett's charge. One regiment, the 72d Pennsylvania, in Webb's command, was a little in rear of the left of its brigade; two regiments, the 19th Massachusetts and 42d New York, Colonel A. F. Devereux commanding, of Hall's brigade, were in rear of the right of their brigade.

From the opposite ridge, three-fourths of a mile away, a line of skirmishers sprang lightly forward out of the woods, and with intervals well kept moved rapidly down into the open fields, closely followed by a line of battle, then by another, and by yet a third. Both sides watched this never-to-be-forgotten scene,—the grandeur of attack of so many thousand men. Gibbon's division, which was to stand the brunt of the assault, looked with admiration on the different lines of Confederates,

marching forward with easy, swinging step, and the men were heard to exclaim: "Here they come!" "Here they come!" "Here comes the infantry!"

Soon little puffs of smoke issued from the skirmish line, as it came dashing forward, firing in reply to our own skirmishers in the plain below, and with this faint rattle of musketry the stillness was broken; never hesitating for an instant, but driving our men before it, or knocking them over by a biting fire as they rose up to run in, their skirmish line reached the fences of the Emmitsburg road. This was Pickett's advance, which carried a front of five hundred yards or more. I was just in rear of the right of the brigade, standing upon a large boulder, in front of my regiment, the 19th Massachusetts, where, from the configuration of the ground, I had an excellent view of the advancing lines, and could see the entire formation of the attacking column. Pickett's separate brigade lines lost their formation as they swept across the Emmitsburg road, carrying with them their chain of skirmishers. They pushed on toward the crest, and merged into one crowding, rushing line,



GROUND OVER WHICH PICKETT, PETTIGREW, AND TRIMBLE CHARGED. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN SINCE THE WAR.

On the left of the picture (which shows the view from the Union lines) is seen the clump of trees which was the point of direction for Pickett's men; also the monument of Webb's brigade of Gibbon's division (Second

Corps), near which General Alexander S. Webb was wounded. General Armistead, of Pickett's division, was killed in the middle foreground of the picture; Codori's house is seen on the right [see also map, p. 344].—EDITORS.

many ranks deep. As they crossed the road, Webb's infantry, on the right of the trees, commenced an irregular, hesitating fire, gradually increasing to a rapid file firing, while the shrapnel and canister from the batteries tore gaps through those splendid Virginia battalions.

The men of our brigade, with their muskets at the ready, lay in waiting. One could plainly hear the orders of the officers as they commanded, "Steady, men, steady! Don't fire!" and not a shot was fired at the advancing hostile line, now getting closer every moment. The heavy file firing on the right in Webb's brigade continued.

By an undulation of the surface of the ground to the left of the trees, the rapid advance of the dense line of Confederates was for a moment lost to view; an instant after they seemed to rise out of the earth, and so near that the expression on their faces was distinctly seen. Now our men knew that the time had come, and could wait no longer. Aiming low, they opened a deadly concentrated discharge upon the moving mass in their front. Nothing human could stand it. Staggered by the storm of lead, the charging line hesitated, answered with some wild firing which soon increased to a crashing roll of musketry, running down the whole length of their front, and then all that portion of Pickett's division which came within the zone of this terrible close musketry fire appeared to melt and drift away in the powder-smoke of both sides. At this juncture some one behind me gave the quick, impatient order: "Forward, men! Forward! Now is your chance!"

I turned and saw that it was General Hancock, who was passing the left of the regiment. He checked his horse and pointed toward the clump of trees to our right and front. I construed this into an order for both regiments—the 19th Massachusetts and the 42d New York—to run for the trees, to prevent the enemy from breaking

through. The men on the left of our regiment heard my command, and were up and on the run forward before the 42d New York, which did not hear Hancock's order until Colonel Devereux repeated it to Colonel Mallon, had a chance to rise. The line formation of the two regiments was partially broken, and the left of the 19th was brought forward, as though it had executed a right half-wheel. All the men who were now on their feet could see, to the right and front, Webb's wounded men with a few stragglers and several limbers leaving the line, as the battle-flags of Pickett's division were carried over it. With a cheer the two regiments left their position in rear of Hall's right, and made an impetuous dash, racing diagonally forward for the clump of trees. Many of Webb's men were still lying down in their places in ranks, and firing at those who followed Pickett's advance, which, in the meantime, had passed over them. This could be determined by the puffs of smoke issuing from their muskets, as the first few men in gray sprang past them toward the cannon, only a few yards away. But for a few moments only could such a fire continue, for Pickett's disorganized mass rolled over, beat down, and smothered it.

One battle-flag after another, supported by Pickett's infantry, appeared along the edge of the trees, until the whole copse seemed literally crammed with men. As the 19th and 42d passed along the brigade line, on our left, we could see the men prone in their places, unshaken, and firing steadily to their front, beating back the enemy. I saw one leader try several times to jump his horse over our line. He was shot by some of the men near me.

The two regiments, in a disorganized state, were now almost at right angles with the remainder of the brigade,—the left of the 19th Massachusetts being but a few yards distant,—and the officers

and men were falling fast from the enfilading fire of the hostile line in front, and from the direct fire of those who were crowded in among the trees. The advance of the two regiments became so thinned that for a moment there was a pause. Captain Farrell, of the 1st Minnesota, with his company, came in on my left. As we greeted each other he received his death-wound, and fell in front of his men, who now began firing. As I looked back I could see our men, intermixed with those who were driven out of the clump of trees a few moments before, coming rapidly forward, firing, some trying to shoot through the intervals and past those who were in front.

The gap in the line seemed to widen, for the enemy in front, being once more driven by a terrible musketry in their very faces, left to join those who had effected an entrance through Webb's line.

The men now suffered from the enfilading fire of the enemy who were in the copse. Seeing no longer an enemy in front, and annoyed by this galling fire from the flank, the 7th Michigan and 59th New York, followed directly by the 20th Massachusetts and the regiments of Harrow's brigade, left their line, faced to the right, and in groups, without regimental or other organization, joined in the rush with those already at the edge of the clump of trees, all cheering and yelling, "Hurrah! for the white trefoil!" "Clubs are trumps!" "Forward the white trefoil!" [The badge of Gibbon's division—the Second, of the Second Corps—was a white trefoil.—EDITORS.]

This was one of those periods in action which are measurable by seconds. The men near seemed to fire very slowly. Those in rear, though coming up at a run, seemed to drag their feet. Many were firing through the intervals of those in front, in their eagerness to injure the enemy. This manner of firing, although efficacious, sometimes tells on

friend instead of foe. A sergeant at my side received a ball in the back of his neck by this fire. All the time the crush toward the enemy in the copse was becoming greater. The men in gray were doing all that was possible to keep off the mixed bodies of men who were moving upon them swiftly and without hesitation, keeping up so close and continuous a fire that at last its effects became terrible. I could feel the touch of the men to my right and left, as we neared the edge of the copse. The grove was fairly jammed with Pickett's men, in all positions, lying and kneeling. Back from the edge were many standing and firing over those in front. By the side of several who were firing, lying down or kneeling, were others with their hands up, in token of surrender. In particular I noticed two men, not a musket-length away, one aiming so that I could look into his musket-barrel; the other, lying on his back, coolly ramming home a cartridge. A little farther on was one on his knees waving something white in both hands. Every foot of ground was occupied by men engaged in mortal combat, who were in every possible position which can be taken while under arms, or lying wounded or dead.

A Confederate battery, near the Peach Orchard, commenced firing, probably at the sight of Harrow's men leaving their line and closing to the right upon Pickett's column. A cannon-shot tore a horrible passage through the dense crowd of men in blue, who were gathering outside the trees; instantly another shot followed, and fairly cut a road through the mass. My thoughts were now to bring the men forward; it was but a few steps to the front, where they could at once extinguish that destructive musketry and be out of the line of the deadly artillery fire. Voices were lost in the uproar; so I turned partly toward them, raised my sword to attract their attention, and motioned to advance. They surged forward, and just



CEMETERY RIDGE AFTER PICKETT'S CHARGE. FROM A WAR-TIME SKETCH.

then, as I was stepping backward with my face to the men, urging them on, I felt a sharp blow as a shot struck me, then another; I whirled round, my sword torn from my hand by a bullet or shell splinter. My visor saved my face, but the shock stunned me. As I went down our

men rushed forward past me, capturing battle-flags and making prisoners.

Pickett's division lost nearly six-sevenths of its officers and men. Gibbon's division, with its leader wounded, and with a loss of half its strength, still held the crest.

II. FROM THE OFFICIAL REPORT OF NORMAN J. HALL, COLONEL, U. S. V.

"THE object [of the heavy cannonading] was evidently to destroy our batteries and drive the infantry from the slight crest which marked the line of battle, while the concentration of fire upon the hill occupied by the Second [Webb's] and the right of the Third [Hall's] brigades indicated where the real attack was to be made. The experience of the terrible grandeur of that rain of missiles and that chaos of strange and terror-spreading sounds, unexampled, perhaps, in history, must ever remain undescribed, but can never be forgotten by those who survived it. I cannot suffer this opportunity to pass without paying just tribute to the noble service of the officers and men of the batteries that were served within my sight. Never before during this war were so many batteries subjected to so terrible a test. Horses, men, and carriages were piled together, but the fire scarcely slackened for an instant so long as the guns were standing. Lieutenant [A. H.] Cushing, of Battery A, 4th U. S. Artillery, challenged the admiration of all who saw him.☆ Three of his limbers were blown up and changed with the caisson limbers under fire. Several wheels were shot off his guns and replaced, till at last, severely wounded himself, his officers all killed or wounded, and with but cannoneers enough to man a section, he pushed his gun to the fence in front, and was killed while serving his last canister into the ranks of the advancing enemy. Knowing that the enemy's infantry would attack soon, I sent Lieutenant [William R.] Driver, acting assistant adjutant-general, to the Artillery Reserve for batteries, with orders to conduct them to the crest, if they were granted, with all possible speed. He arrived with one, which, though too late for service in arresting the advance of the enemy, yet had the opportunity to do him much damage.

"At 3 o'clock exactly the fire of the enemy slackened, and his first line of battle advanced from the woods in front in beautiful order. About one hundred yards in rear came a second line, and opposite the main point of attack was what appeared to be a column of battalions. . . . The perfect order and steady but rapid advance of the enemy called forth praise from our troops, but gave their line an appearance of being fearfully irresistible. My line was single, the only support (the 72d Pennsylvania Volunteers) having been called away by General Webb before the action had fairly commenced. There was a disposition in the men to reserve their fire for close quarters, but when I observed the movement the enemy was endeavoring to execute, I caused the 7th Michi-

gan and 20th Massachusetts Volunteers to open fire at about two hundred yards. The deadly aim of the former regiment was attested by the line of slain within its range. This had a great effect upon the result, for it caused the enemy to move rapidly at one point, and consequently to crowd in front. Being occasioned at the point where his column was forming, he did not recover from this disorder. The remainder of our line reserved its fire until one hundred yards, some regiments waiting even until but fifty paces intervened between them and the enemy.

"There was but a moment of doubtful contest in front of the position of this brigade. The enemy halted to deliver his fire, wavered, and fled, while the line of the fallen perfectly marked the limit of his advance. The troops were pouring into the ranks of the fleeing enemy that rapid and accurate fire, the delivery of which victorious lines always so much enjoy, when I saw that a portion of the line of General Webb on my right had given way, and many men were making to the rear as fast as possible, while the enemy was pouring over the rails [surmounting a low stone wall.—EDITORS] that had been a slight cover for the troops.

"Having gained this apparent advantage, the enemy seemed to turn again and reëngage my whole line. Going to the left, I found two regiments that could be spared from some command there, and endeavored to move them by the right flank to the break; but, coming under a warm fire, they crowded to the slight cover of the rail fence, mixing with the troops already there. Finding it impossible to draw them out and re-form, and seeing no unengaged troops within reach, I was forced to order my own brigade back from the line, and move it by the flank under a heavy fire. The enemy was rapidly gaining a foothold; organization was mostly lost; in the confusion commands were useless, while a disposition on the part of the men to fall back a pace or two each time to load gave the line a retiring direction. With the officers of my staff and a few others, who seemed to comprehend what was required, the head of the line, still slowly moving by the flank, was crowded closer to the enemy, and the men obliged to load in their places. I did not see any man of my command who appeared disposed to run away, but the confusion first caused by the two regiments above spoken of so destroyed the formation in two ranks that in some places the line was several files deep. . . . During this time the 15th Massachusetts Volunteers, 1st Minnesota, and 19th Maine Volunteers from the

☆ Cushing was a brother of Lieutenant W. B. Cushing, famous for his destruction of the Confederate ram *Albatamarle*.—EDITORS.

First Brigade [Harrow's] of this division had joined the line, and are entitled to a full share in the credit of the final repulse.

"The line remained in this way for about ten minutes, rather giving way than advancing, when, by a simultaneous effort on the part of all the officers I could instruct, aided by the general advance of many of the colors, the line closed with the enemy, and after a few minutes of desperate, often hand-to-hand fighting, the crowd—for such

had become that part of the enemy's column that had passed the fence—threw down their arms and were taken prisoners of war, while the remainder broke and fled in great disorder. The Second Brigade had again joined the right of my line, which now occupied the position originally held by that command. Generals Garnett and Armistead [of Pickett's Division] were picked up near this point, together with many colonels and officers of other grades."

III. FROM THE REPORT OF ALEXANDER S. WEBB, BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL, U. S. A.

"ABOUT 1 P. M. the enemy opened with more than twenty batteries upon our line; by 2:45 o'clock had silenced the Rhode Island battery and all the guns but one of Cushing's battery, and had plainly shown by his concentration of fire on this and the Third Brigade that an important assault was to be expected. I had sent, at 2 P. M., Captain Banes, assistant adjutant-general of the brigade, for two batteries to replace Cushing's and Brown's. Just before the assault, Captain Wheeler's [Cowan's] battery, First New York Artillery [First New York Independent Battery], had gotten in position on the left, in the place occupied by the Rhode Island battery, which had retired with a loss of all its officers but one.

"At 3 o'clock the enemy's line of battle left the woods in our front, moved in perfect order across the Emmitsburg road, formed in the hollow in our immediate front several lines of battle, under a fire of spherical case from Wheeler's [Cowan's] battery and Cushing's gun, and advanced for the assault. The 71st Pennsylvania Volunteers were advanced to the wall on the right of the 69th Pennsylvania Volunteers. Three of Cushing's guns were run down to the fence, carrying with them their canister. The 72d Pennsylvania Volunteers were held in reserve under the crest of the hill. The enemy advanced steadily to the fence, driving out a portion of the 71st Pennsylvania Volunteers. General Armistead passed over the fence with probably over one hundred of his command, and with several battle-flags. The 72d Pennsylvania Volunteers were ordered up to hold the crest, and advanced to within forty paces of the enemy's line. Colonel R. P. Smith, commanding the 71st Pennsylvania Volunteers, threw two

companies of his command behind the stone wall on the right of Cushing's battery, fifty paces retired from the point of attack. This disposition of his troops was most important. Colonel Smith showed true military intelligence on the field. The 69th Pennsylvania Volunteers and most of the 71st Pennsylvania Volunteers, even after the enemy were in their rear, held their position. The 72d Pennsylvania Volunteers fought steadily and persistently, but the enemy would probably have succeeded in piercing our lines had not Colonel Hall advanced with several of his regiments to my support. Defeated, routed, the enemy fled in disorder. General Armistead was left, mortally wounded, within my lines, and forty-two of the enemy who crossed the fence lay dead.

"This [Webb's] brigade captured nearly 1000 prisoners, 6 battle-flags (4 have been turned in), and picked up 1400 stand of arms and 903 sets of accouterments. . . . The conduct of this brigade was most satisfactory; officers and men did their whole duty. The 69th Pennsylvania Volunteers lost all its field-officers, but held its ground; the cover in its front was not well built, and it lost many men lying on the ground; still, I saw none retire from the fence. A portion of the 106th Pennsylvania Volunteers, left behind the previous evening under Captain Ford, took part in repelling the assault. I lost gallant officers and men; they need no tribute from me; a nominal list has been sent in. . . . Lieutenant A. H. Cushing, 4th United States Artillery, fell, mortally wounded, at the fence by the side of his guns. Cool, brave, competent, he fought for an hour and a half after he had reported to me that he was wounded in both thighs."

IV. BY L. E. BICKNELL, LIEUTENANT, 1ST MASS. SHARP-SHOOTERS.

UPON the excursion of Massachusetts veterans to Gettysburg, I found a monument in Ziegler's Grove to the 88th Pennsylvania Volunteers. It marks the spot where our infantry were being rapidly cut down by the enemy's sharp-shooters in their front on the morning of the 3d of July, the third day's fight. In fact, when, with twenty of the 1st Company of Massachusetts sharp-shooters, I entered the grove, our infantry were virtually driven from it. We held the grove, to the right and left of the monument, until the heavy cannonading checked the sharp-shooting. A shattered remnant of some regiment, perhaps the one which had suf-

fered so in front of and in the grove, lay along the remnants of a stone wall in our rear, and during the heavy cannonading which preceded the many others sought the seeming shelter of the grove.

Just before the grand charge, at the request of General Alexander Hays, who commanded the Third Division, Second Corps, I gathered up all these men who lay in the grove, and General Hays formed them in line to the right of the Bryan House, which is the first house to the left of the monument on the line of battle as you go toward Round Top. At the time of the battle the grove extended to this house. I took position, with the

remnant of my squad of sharp-shooters, on the right of this line.

While the enemy were advancing to the Emmitsburg road, General Hays drilled the line in the manual of arms, allowed them to fire left oblique while the enemy were closing with our line to the left of the Bryan House, and then swung them down by a left wheel to the lane which then ran from the Bryan House to the Emmitsburg road, across which lane they then fired. The moment chosen for the left wheel or flanking movement was just as the last division of the charging column was crossing the Emmitsburg road, moving direct for Ziegler's Grove. As the entire front of the Second Corps to the left of the Bryan House was already covered, and in many places penetrated, this fresh division would probably have forced our line back and gained the shelter of Ziegler's Grove had it not been subjected to our flank fire, which destroyed its formation and sent its shattered and disordered masses along the other side of the lane and in front of the Third Division of the Second Corps.

I finally drew back our line a little from the fence to prevent our rear being gained by the enemy moving north on the Emmitsburg road, and also to uncover a gun (or two guns, I forget which) that had, during the melee, been got in position at the head of the lane near the Bryan House. As the enemy crowded forward into the lane, the fire of these guns ended the contest.

The "clump of trees" upon Bacheider's chart is near the point where Stannard struck the right flank. Ziegler's Grove, farther north, is the clump of trees where I was, and to which I refer, and to which General Longstreet refers in his letter to me mentioned further on. It is the blow upon the left flank, and not upon the right flank, to which we all refer.

That there might not be any mistake I sent General Longstreet a chart of the battle-field furnished me by the Gettysburg Battle-Field Memorial Association, on which I marked the lane running down from Ziegler's Grove to the Emmitsburg road.

I have not yet learned what regiments, or frag-

ments of regiments, composed the line swung down, but they were stragglers to me and I have just learned that the 39th, 111th, 125th, and 126th New-York were added to the Third Division, Second Corps, *on the march to Gettysburg*. I left the army after the battle, and so had no opportunity to learn afterward.

With regard to the blow struck on Pettigrew's left by the 8th Ohio Regiment, the Ohio men say that they lay *west* of the *Emmitsburg road*. If so, they must have been north and in front of the right of Ziegler's Grove, as we faced. }

After we had swung down on the left flank to the lane we were struck by A. P. Hill's men, who faced Ziegler's Grove upon our right and rear so forcibly that I had given the order to "Left wheel backwards, firing," and the order was being executed when Hill's men abandoned our rear. It is my strong impression that the Ohio regiment pitched into Hill's men, who were pitching into our flank and rear. I remember distinctly that our artillerists at our right, seeing our imminent danger, poured in the grape and canister upon our rear assailants in a lively manner.

General Longstreet writes to me from Atlanta, Georgia, January 4th, 1884:

"The move of which you speak I remember quite well, and my impression is that it was made against Pickett's men.

"At its first appearance I sent orders for a counter-move. I think the order was sent by Colonel Osman Latrobe, now of Baltimore. Colonel Latrobe can probably give you more definite information of the troops you may have struck.

"At the first appearance of the troops in this move I recognized it as one that would break up my assault, but I looked on the movements of the Third Corps — A. P. Hill's — as certain to break the intended flank move.

"Soon after the flank movement was disclosed, a severe fire from artillery, etc., coming in across our line from the right as we advanced, hurt our supporting columns badly.

"If you struck their left you may claim to have put in very heavy blows at the critical moment, for the breaking up of the supporting force broke up the attack or hope of success from it. We could not look for anything from Pickett except to break your line. The supports were to secure the fruits of that break."

{ General Franklin Sawyer, Lieutenant-Colonel of the 8th Ohio Volunteers, in the history of the regiment, gives the following description of Pettigrew's column in the assault:

"They moved up splendidly, deploying into column as they crossed the long, sloping interval between the Second Corps and their base. At first it looked as if their line of march would sweep our position, but as they advanced their direction lay considerably to our left; but soon a strong line, with flags, directed its march immediately upon us. . . . We changed our front, and, taking position by a fence, facing the left flank of the advancing column of rebels, the men were ordered to fire into their flank at will. Hardly a musket had been fired at this time. The front of the column was nearly up the slope, and within a few yards of the line of the Second Corps' front and its batteries, when suddenly a terrific fire from every available gun from the Cemetery to Round Top Mountain burst upon them. The distinct, graceful lines of the rebels underwent an instantaneous transformation. They were at once enveloped in a dense cloud of smoke and dust. Arms, heads, blankets, guns, and knapsacks were thrown and tossed into the clear air. Their track, as they

advanced, was strewn with dead and wounded. A moan went up from the field, distinctly to be heard amid the storm of battle; but, on they went, too much enveloped in smoke and dust now to permit us to distinguish their lines or movements, for the mass appeared more like a cloud of moving smoke and dust than a column of troops. Still it advanced amid the now deafening roar of artillery and storm of battle. Suddenly the column gave way, the sloping landscape appeared covered all at once with the scattered and retreating foe. A withering sheet of missiles swept after them, and they were torn and tossed and prostrated as they ran. It seemed as if not one would escape. Of the mounted officers who rode so grandly in the advance, not one was to be seen on the field; all had gone down. The 8th [Ohio] advanced and cut off three regiments, . . . as they passed us, taking their colors, and capturing many prisoners. The colors captured were those of the 34th North Carolina, 38th Virginia, [both taken by Sergeant Miller, Co. C], and one that was taken from the captor, Private James Richmond, Co. F, by a staff-officer, the number of the regiment not being remembered. The battle was now over. The field was covered with the slain and wounded, and everywhere were to be seen white handkerchiefs held up asking for quarter." EDITORS.



FARNSWORTH'S CHARGE.

FARNSWORTH'S CHARGE AND DEATH.

BY H. C. PARSONS, CAPTAIN, 1ST VERMONT CAVALRY.

ON the eve of the battle of Gettysburg Captain Elon J. Farnsworth, of the 8th Illinois Cavalry, an aide on General Pleasonton's staff, was promoted for gallantry to be brigadier-general and given command of a brigade in Kilpatrick's division, consisting of the 5th New York, 18th Pennsylvania, 1st Vermont, and 1st West Virginia regiments.

On the evening of the 2d of July we were on Meade's right wing, and by noon of the third day of the battle we went into position on his left wing, near the enemy's artillery line, on the south end of Seminary Ridge. When the cannonading which preceded Pickett's charge opened, General Farnsworth rode to the position marked "A" upon the map [p. 394], and I think Kilpatrick joined him. A long skirmish line of the enemy was at that moment moving toward us. I was commanded to take one squadron, charge as foragers, ride to cover of the stone house (Bushman's), and wait for orders. At our approach the enemy's skirmish line fell back. We rode to the house with the loss of two men. Captain Stone was sent with a squadron to my support. We remained some time at the Bushman house, near the enemy's batteries, and returned under fire without loss.

At 5 o'clock that afternoon we went into position, and were resting behind a battery on the low, wooded hill at the left of Round Top, and separated from it by a narrow valley. The enemy's picket line confronted our own near the base of the hill, but there was no firing. There was an oppressive stillness after the day's excitement. I rode out to the brow of the hill and had an excellent view of the field. Directly in front of us opened the valley toward Gettysburg, with its wheat-fields; at the right, and less than half a mile distant, rose Round Top; in the intervening valley lay the Snyder farm, with low, cross fences. Projecting from Round Top was a hill, perhaps one hundred feet high, on the top of which was a field surrounded by high stone

walls. The slopes of this hill were covered with immense granite boulders; a road or lane extended from the Emmitsburg pike to its base, and then turned to the left toward Devil's Den. Beyond this road ran a high rail fence, the only openings being at the right and left of the walled field on the hill. Above this, and along the rocky and wooded slopes of Round Top, Law's brigade was firmly intrenched, and pressing him in front and on the right was the Union army. Toward the openings described, the charge that was afterward made was directed. While I was looking out upon the field General Kilpatrick rode near, showing great impatience and eagerness for orders, and an orderly dashed by shouting, "We turned the charge; nine acres of prisoners!"

From this point the position of the troops on the Confederate right appeared to be full of peril. Law's brigade had held an almost untenable but essential position through two hard-fought days, while their batteries and support, nearly a mile in the rear, were at that moment turned upon Merritt's advancing squadrons. The gates to the valley behind Round Top, toward which Longstreet's eye turned so eagerly, were held by them, and the valley in the rear was protected by a single Texas regiment and a weak skirmish line. Kilpatrick had been given large discretion by General Pleasonton when he had been sent in the morning against Lee's right, with Merritt's and Farnsworth's brigades. (Custer had been detached and sent to General Gregg.) Kilpatrick's orders were to press the enemy, to threaten him at every point, and to strike at the first opportunity, with an emphatic intimation that the best battle news could be brought by the wind. His opportunity had now come. If he could bring on a battle, drive back the Texas regiment, and break the lines on the mountain, Meade's infantry on Round Top would surely drive them into the valley, and then the five thousand cavalry in reserve could strike the decisive blow.


The 1st West Virginia was selected to attack the Texas regiment. The Third Battalion of the 1st Vermont was thrown out as skirmishers; the First and Second battalions were held for the charge on the mountain. The 1st West Virginia charged at our left and front down the open valley, nearly in the direction but toward the right of the Bushman house, upon the 1st Texas regiment, which was in line behind a rail fence that had been staked and bound with withes. A thin line shot forward and attempted to throw the rails, tugging at the stakes, cutting with their sabers, and falling in the vain effort. The regiment came on in magnificent style, received a deadly volley, before which it recoiled, rallied, charged the second time, and fell back with great loss.

I was near Kilpatrick when he impetuously gave the order to Farnsworth to make the last charge. Farnsworth spoke with emotion: "General, do you mean it? Shall I throw my handful of men over rough ground, through timber, against a brigade of infantry? The 1st Vermont has already been fought half to pieces; these are too good men to kill." Kilpatrick said: "Do you refuse to obey my orders? If you are afraid to lead this charge, I will lead it." Farnsworth rose in his stirrups—he looked magnificent in his passion—and cried, "Take that back!" Kilpatrick returned his defiance, but, soon repenting, said, "I did not mean it; forget it." For a moment there was silence, when Farnsworth spoke calmly, "General,

if you order the charge, I will lead it, but you must take the responsibility." I did not hear the low conversation that followed, but as Farnsworth turned away he said, "I will obey your order." Kilpatrick said earnestly, "I take the responsibility."

I recall the two young generals at that moment in the shadow of the oaks and against the sunlight—Kilpatrick with his fine features, his blonde beard, his soft hat turned up jauntily, and his face lighted with the joy that always came into it when the charge was sounded; Farnsworth, tall, slight, stern, and pale, but rising with conscious strength and consecration. Kilpatrick was eager for the fray. He believed that cavalry could "fight anywhere except at sea." He was justified by his orders and by results, and he was brave enough to withdraw the hot imputation, even in the presence of a regiment. Farnsworth was courage incarnate, but full of tender regard for his men, and his protest was manly and soldierly.

The direction of our guns was changed; new guns were brought into position. A shell shrieked down the line of my front company a few feet above their heads, covering them with leaves and branches. We rode out in columns of fours with drawn sabers. General Farnsworth, after giving the order to me, took his place at the head of the Second Battalion. In this action I commanded the First Battalion and Major Wells commanded the Second. Captain Cushman and Lieutenant



Watson rode with me; General Farnsworth and Adjutant-General Estes rode with Major Wells.

As the First Battalion rode through the line of our dismounted skirmishers, who were falling back, they cried to us to halt. As we passed out from the cover of the woods the 1st West Virginia was retiring in disorder on our left. A frantic horse with one leg torn off by a cannon-ball rushed toward us as if for protection. We rode through the enemy's skirmish line across the fields, over the low fences, past the Snyder house, and down the road. The sun was blinding; Captain Cushman shaded his eyes with his hand and cried, "An ambuscade!" We were immediately upon the enemy, within thirty paces, and the deadly volley, which is referred to in the Confederate reports, was fired, but it passed over our heads; although they report that half our saddles were emptied, not a man was shot, yet the fire was the close and concentrated volley of a regiment. Captain (afterward Colonel) Jones, who commanded on the right of the 4th Alabama, says: "I was ordered to face about to resist cavalry; we marched rapidly to the rear over the rocks, and the Vermonters were upon us before we could form. They were within a few paces when we gave the order to fire. . . . The whole regiment fired, but when the smoke cleared I only saw one horse fall. A private at my left said, 'Captain, I shot that black.' I said, 'Why didn't you shoot his rider?' He replied, 'Oh, we'll get him anyhow; but I'm a hunter, and for three years I haven't looked at a deer's eye—I couldn't stand it.'"

Taken by surprise, they had shot over us; the next, a random volley, was effective. With the head of the column we cleared the wall at the right and formed under cover of the hill. The rear companies fell back and formed behind a cross fence and in the edge of timber. In the meantime the most important movement of the day was being made. The Second Battalion, under Major Wells,—a young officer who bore a charmed life and was destined to pass through many daring encounters to the rank of brigadier-general,—moved out in splendid form to the left of the First Battalion and swept in a great circle to the right, around the front of the hill and across our track; then, guiding to the left across the valley and up the side of the low hill at the base of Round Top, they charged along the wall, and between it and the mountain, directly in the rear of several Confederate regiments in position and between them and the 4th Alabama. It was a swift, resistless charge over rocks, through timber, under close enfilading fire. Colonel A. W. Preston had taken my Second Squadron and rode with part of the Third Battalion in support.† The direction was toward Devil's Den. At the foot of the declivity the column turned left and passed a battery, receiving the fire of its support, then divided into three parties. One swept across the open field and upon the rear of the Texas skirmish line, carrying

in a part of this line as prisoners, and one rode through into the Union lines. Farnsworth's horse had fallen; a trooper sprang from the saddle, gave the general his horse, and escaped on foot. Captain Cushman and a few others, with Farnsworth, turned back and rode at full gallop toward the point of entering. My First Squadron was again ordered forward. The enemy's sharpshooters appeared in the rocks above us and opened fire.



BRIGADIER-GENERAL ELON J. FARNSWORTH.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

We rode obliquely up the hill in the direction of Wells, then wheeling to the left, between the picket line and the wall. As we turned, Corporal Sperry fell at my side. Part of my men turned back with prisoners. The head of the column leapt the wall into the open field. Farnsworth, seeing our horsemen, raised his saber and charged as if with an army; at almost the same moment his followers, and what remained of the First Battalion, cut their way through the 15th Alabama, which was wheeling into position at a run and offered little resistance. We charged in the same general direction, but on opposite sides of the wall that runs parallel with the Round Top range, and within two hundred paces of each other. Sergeant Duncan, a black-eyed, red-cheeked boy, splendidly mounted, standing in his stirrups, flew past me with his saber raised, shouted, "I'm with you!" threw up his left arm, and fell. My horse recoiled over his dead body, my men swept past, and I was for a moment alone on the field. The enemy ran up crying "Surrender!" as if they did not want to shoot me, but as I raised my saber a gun was planted against my breast and fired; my horse was struck at the same moment and broke frantically through the men, over the wall, and down the hill. Corporal Waller overtook me from the left, and, riding close, supported me on my horse.

† Of his own charge Colonel Preston says: "I moved to the support of the Second Battalion, with the First under Captain Parsons and a part of the Third under Captain Grover."—EDITORS.

As we rode on, he told me how Farnsworth and Cushman had fallen together.

I have spoken of the battalions as distinct. They were not, nor were the companies. At the sharp turn at the top of the hill, Captain Cushman and Sergeant Stranahan, who commanded Company L after Watson's horse was shot, kept straight on with part of his company, and rode in the main charge. A number of my men had turned back with prisoners, so that not over fifty men, [†] including those with Farnsworth, cut their way through in the outward charge.

The whole number who rode with Farnsworth was about three hundred. Their casualties were sixty-five. They brought in over one hundred prisoners; they rode within the Confederate lines nearly two miles; they received at short range the direct or enfilading fire of three regiments of infantry and of a battery of artillery; they drew two regiments out of line and held them permanently in new positions, breaking the Confederate front and exposing it to an infantry charge if one had been immediately ordered. Their assault was so bold that the Confederates received it as the advance of a grand attack, and, finding themselves exposed to infantry in front and cavalry in the rear, they were uncertain of their position. Why no advantage was taken of this it is not for us to explain. Why the infantry, when they heard fighting in Law's rear, or when, afterward, we delivered to their skirmish line our prisoners, did not advance and drive his brigade into the valley where it would have been exposed to a general flank attack, has never been explained; but it was not "a charge of madmen with a mad leader." We believed, and yet believe, that Farnsworth's charge was wisely ordered, well timed, well executed, and effective. [‡]

The behavior of the horses in this action was admirable. Running low and swift, as in a race; in their terror surrendering to their masters, and guiding at the slightest touch on the neck; never

[†] The officers of the 15th Alabama say there were not over ten men with Farnsworth when he fell. His horse dashed through their lines riderless. Colonel Oates kept for a long time the star cut from Farnsworth's coat, hoping some time to return it to his family, but it was accidentally lost or destroyed.—H. C. P.

[‡] A strange story which appears in all the Confederate reports shows how a mistake may make history. It is stated that Farnsworth wore a linen coat and a havelock; that he fought desperately with his revolver after he was down, and that he blew out his brains rather than surrender.

When Farnsworth was notified of his promotion [¶] on the field it was impossible to secure a new uniform, but Pleasonton, as a token of esteem, divided his own wardrobe with him. Farnsworth wore in the action Pleasonton's blue coat, with a single star, and a soft black hat; he fell with his saber raised, and as if dead; and when his remains were taken from the field

refusing a fence or breaking from the column; crowding together and to the front, yet taking or avoiding the obstacles with intelligence, they carried their riders over rocks and fallen timber and fences that the boldest hunter would hardly attempt to-day; and I doubt if there was a single fall of man or horse, except from the shot of the enemy. I may be permitted a remorseful tribute. My powerful bay had been disabled in the action at Hanover, and I was riding my bugler's horse, a gentle sorrel, scared and stiff with long service. When I saw the work before us I condemned him, and would have ordered some trooper to change if it had not seemed like exposing another's life,—and yet, how he sprang into the charge! How he leaped the four walls! How he cleared Farrington's horse as it rolled over in the rocks! And how gently he carried me from the field, although blood spurted from his side at every step. Four better horses passed him in the race, but only to fall or carry their riders to death! And when I was lifted down into unconsciousness, my last recollection was of his great eyes turned upon me as in sympathy and reproof.

There was no charging of cannon, no sabering of men. Farnsworth and his troopers understood that they were to draw the enemy's fire, to create a diversion, preparatory to the main movement. They were to ride as deep into the enemy's lines as possible, to disclose his plan and force his positions. The taking of the prisoners on the return was the accident, not the order, of the charge. There was no encouragement of on-looking armies, no cheer, no bravado; and each man felt, as he tightened his saber belt, that he was summoned to a ride to death.

Farnsworth fell in the enemy's lines with his saber raised, dead with five mortal wounds, and without fame. So fell this typical volunteer soldier of America—a man without military training or ambition, yet born with a genius for war which carried him to high command and to the threshold of a great career.


by Doctors Edson and Wood there were five mortal wounds in his body and no wound in his head. Captain Cushman wore a white duck "fighting jacket," trimmed with yellow braid. To my objection, he answered, "A lady sent this to me, and said it was made with her own hands, and no rebel bullet could pierce it. It may be a good day to try magic mail." While we sat behind the guns in the heat he threw a silk handkerchief over his cap, pinning it to the visor. This he forgot to remove; he, and not Farnsworth, rode in the charge on the 4th Alabama; he rode with Farnsworth in the charge on the 15th Alabama; he fell at Farnsworth's side, terribly wounded in the face, and fought with his revolver until he fainted. He was a notably handsome officer, and it was clear that he was mistaken throughout the fight for General Farnsworth. Captain Cushman lay insensible and apparently dead until the next day, but finally revived, only to die in his next battle.—H. C. P.

[¶] Major Clifford Thomson, of General Pleasonton's staff, writes to the editors: "Farnsworth's commission was dated June 29th, four days before his death. As he had been on

detached service, it had not reached him, being carried among Pleasonton's headquarters papers until after the battle."—EDITORS.

THE CAVALRY BATTLE NEAR GETTYSBURG.☆

BY WILLIAM E. MILLER, CAPTAIN, 3D PENNSYLVANIA CAVALRY.



MONUMENT ON THE FIELD OF THE CAVALRY
FIGHT BETWEEN THE FORCES OF GREGG
AND STUART. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

THE 3d Pennsylvania Cavalry, after participating in the different cavalry engagements from Brandy Station to Upperville, was the last regiment to cross the Potomac into Maryland by the pontoon-bridge at Edwards's Ferry, except McCandless's brigade of the Pennsylvania Reserves. Well do the men of Gregg's cavalry command remember the evening of the 27th of June, 1863, while they were drawn up on the slope of the northern bank of the Potomac awaiting the crossing of McCandless's infantry, which was somewhat delayed on the opposite side. As soon as the band of McCandless's brigade placed foot on the bridge it began to play "Maryland, My Maryland."

The men took up the refrain, and it was echoed back by the cavalymen on the northern hillside. The scene formed one of the happy incidents that broke the monotony of the long march to Gettysburg.

About dusk "to horse" was sounded, and the division again put in motion. A tedious night's march along a road blockaded with wagons and other impediments brought us to Monocacy Junction, on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, between which place and Frederick we halted on Sunday morning, the 28th. A reorganization of the cavalry there took place. General Kilpatrick, who had commanded the Second Brigade of Gregg's division, was promoted to the command of Stahel's division, which was then added to the Cavalry Corps of the Army of the Potomac as the Third Division, and Colonel Pennoek Huey, with the 8th Pennsylvania Cavalry, was transferred from Buford's division to the Second Brigade of the Second Division, Huey succeeding Kilpatrick in command of the brigade. [For organization, see p. 437.]

Before leaving Frederick the 1st Pennsylvania Cavalry was ordered to report to General Meade's headquarters, where it remained until after the battle of Gettysburg; it did not rejoin its brigade before the 12th of July, at Boonsboro'. The 1st Massachusetts was also sent on detached service.

While we were halted near Frederick it was discovered that Stuart was making a detour around our army and had crossed the Potomac below Edwards's Ferry. Our cavalry was sent out on all the roads leading from Frederick to the north and east to prevent his gaining information, and to push him as far away as possible, so that he might be delayed in communicating with his chief. On the evening of the 28th McIntosh's brigade was sent eastward on the Baltimore pike, and passing New Market it halted at Ridgeville, and from there scouting parties were sent in every direction. On the morning of the 29th a portion of the 3d Pennsylvania was sent to Lisbon,

☆ From the Philadelphia "Weekly Press," revised and condensed.—EDITORS.

and from there one squadron went northward to Woodbine, on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. It was ascertained that Stuart was tearing up the tracks near Hood's Mill, the next station east of Woodbine, and that he was moving northward. Information was sent to headquarters, and by 4 o'clock P. M. Gregg's division was concentrated at Mount Airy, north of Ridgeville, where it was supplied with a scanty allowance of rations and forage. Five o'clock found it on the march for Westminster, with the 3d Pennsylvania of McIntosh's brigade in advance. Having been on almost continuous duty, night

and day, since the battle of Brandy Station, on the 9th, the prospect of another night march was, to say the least, discouraging.]

Our march to Westminster was one of unusual severity, for the night was very dark and both men and horses were worn out. The men fell asleep in their saddles, and whenever the column halted the horses would fall asleep too. As the officers were responsible for keeping the column closed up, they had to resort to all sorts of expedients to keep awake, such as pinching themselves, pounding their heads, and pricking themselves with pins. When within about five miles of Westminster it



BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL D. McM. GREGG.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

was discovered that the left of the line was not up. A halt was ordered, and, on sending back, the fact was disclosed that the artillerymen and battery horses were sound asleep, and that, whilst the portion of the column in front of them had been moving on, that in the rear was standing still. As soon as the latter was brought up the whole command moved forward, and at daylight on the 30th the advance, under Captain Charles Treichel, of the 3d Pennsylvania, charged into Westminster and captured a lot of Stuart's stragglers. Here we met with a cordial reception. The majority of the houses were thrown open, and the women, standing on their door-steps and at the windows, waved their handkerchiefs and cheered the old flag. It was noticed, however, that some of the houses remained closed, and upon inquiry it was

]To one not familiar with a cavalry night march in the face of the enemy it may be difficult to comprehend why it should differ materially from an advance by daylight, but to those who have had some experience this is easily understood. On a night march, in order to guard against surprise, flankers are thrown out on either side, who are supposed to keep abreast of the advance-guard. These flankers are under the supervision of the officer in charge of the advance, and no matter how dark the night is he must keep them sufficiently

deployed to protect the column, and yet always have them well in hand. These flankers encounter all sorts of obstacles, such as ditches, ravines, fences, underbrush, woods, etc., and necessarily make slow progress. The time thus occupied compels the main body in the rear to make innumerable stops and starts, which are not only tedious and wearying, but annoying and irksome, and hard upon the horses, often causing the men to grow impatient and the officers to become irritable.—W. E. M.

ascertained that these had in a similar manner been open the day before for the reception of Stuart and his men.

At Manchester a halt of a few hours was made, during which the men consumed what was left of the rations procured at Mount Airy, gave their horses the last grain of feed they had with them, and obtained a little sleep. Mounting again we moved north along the Carlisle pike for half a mile, and then by the Grove Mill road to Hanover Junction, Pennsylvania, on the Northern Central Railroad, where we arrived during the forenoon of July 1st. Our movements at this place illustrate to some extent the uncertainties of the campaign. After a short delay General Gregg received an order to proceed south toward Baltimore. Scarcely was the division drawn out on the road when a second order came directing him to turn about and move north as rapidly as possible toward York. Just as we were starting in the latter direction the final order came to send Huey's brigade back to Manchester, Maryland, and to march with McIntosh's and Irvin Gregg's brigades westward to Gettysburg. After losing some valuable time in consequence of these conflicting orders, we (McIntosh's and Gregg's brigades) advanced over a crooked road to Hanover, where we went into bivouac.

At Hanover we found the streets barricaded with boxes, old carriages and wagons, hay, ladders, barbers' poles, etc., the marks of Kilpatrick's encounter with Stuart on the previous day, for the Third Division, while we were making the detour on the right flank, had taken the direct road from Frederick, and at Hanover had intercepted the line of march of the Confederate cavalry while we had been following it up.

By this time we had become a sorry-looking body of men, having been in the saddle day and night almost continuously for over three weeks, without a change of clothing or an opportunity for a general wash; moreover we were much reduced by short rations and exhaustion, and mounted on horses, whose bones were plainly visible to the naked eye.‡


Leaving Hanover at 3 o'clock on the morning of July 2d we had proceeded along the Littlestown road for two miles when Dr. T. T. Tate, one of the assistant surgeons of the 3d Pennsylvania Cavalry, who was a citizen of Gettysburg and familiar with the country, advised General Gregg that the shortest route to Gettysburg was by way of the Bonaughtown or Hanover road. The doctor piloted the column across the fields and we reached the Bonaughtown road at McSherrystown. On reaching Geiselman's Woods, Colonel McIntosh, who had been suffering from exhaustion, became very sick. The column was halted, and Dr. Tate took him to Mr. Geiselman's house, where with careful medical attention he was in a short time restored and again

‡ As an evidence of how the division was reduced by hard marching and hard fighting it may be stated that the morning report of the 3d Pennsylvania on the 30th of June — one of the strongest regiments in the division — showed present for duty 29 officers, including field and staff, 365 enlisted men, and 322 serviceable horses. It will thus be manifest that we had seventy-two men whose horses had dropped from the ranks. Many

of these men were traveling along on foot and carrying their saddles in the hope of procuring remounts. The above report was made out at Westminster. Our march from there through the broiling sun and clouds of dust entailed a still larger loss of men and horses from exhaustion, so that by the time we reached Gettysburg the 3d Pennsylvania did not number three hundred officers and men all told. — W. E. M.

Map 19.
Cavalry Battle
July 3d, 2:30 P. M.

SCALE
1000 2000 3000 FEET



The west margin of this map coincides with the east margin of the map on p. 344.

ridge and were keeping up a skirmish fire with the enemy in their front. General Gregg took two guns, a section of Battery H, 3d Pennsylvania Heavy Artillery, Captain W. D. Rank (serving as Light Artillery), and placed them on the Hanover road opposite the Reeve house, about three miles east of Gettysburg. Near 6 o'clock some mounted men, who seemed to be making observations, appeared in the road on the top of Brink-


made his appearance at the head of his command. Resuming the march we arrived at the intersection of the Low Dutch (or Salem Church) and Hanover roads about noon on July 2d. The regiments were closed up, and we halted in a field to allow the men and horses some much-needed rest.

About 3 o'clock the 10th New York cavalry of the Third Brigade was ordered forward and directed to occupy Brinkerhoff's Ridge and relieve some infantry of the Eleventh Corps, who were in possession of the

Map 20.
Cavalry Battle
July 3d, 3:30 P. M.

Union. Confederate.

SCALE
1000 2000 FEET



erhoff's Ridge, about three-fourths of a mile distant, whereupon Gregg ordered Rank to send them a "feeler," which he did in the most approved style—the two shells bursting in their midst and scattering the party like chaff in a wind storm. The First Brigade was now ordered forward, and on passing beyond Rank's guns the 3d Pennsylvania, being in the advance, was ordered into Cress's Woods, on the right of the road. The squadron of Captain Hess and my own were directed to dismount and advance across Cress's Run to the top of Brinkerhoff's Ridge—Hess on the left, with his left resting on the road and deployed to the right, and Miller [the writer] deployed to the right of Hess. On the left side of the road, connecting with Hess, two battalions of the 1st New Jersey, under Major Janeway and Captain Boyd, and Duvall's Maryland troop were deployed—the whole supported by the Third Battalion of the 1st New Jersey, under Major Beaumont. After crossing Cress's Run and gaining the elevated ground beyond, it was discovered that a stone fence ran along the crest of the ridge, and that some Confederate infantry were advancing from the opposite direction. "Double quick" was ordered, and a race for the fence ensued. The men seeing the importance of the position quickened their steps and arrived at the wall about twenty paces in advance of the enemy. As soon as our men reached the wall they opened fire with their carbines, and drove back their opponents. They punched holes through the wall with their carbines, and behind this formidable breastwork they were enabled, though repeatedly charged, to hold their position until daylight disappeared. Rank's guns in the meantime kept up a lively fire and did effective work. After dark a charge was made against our right which was driven in, but the men, not being discouraged, made a counter-charge and regained their position. Our opponents proved to be Walker's brigade, of Johnson's division, of Ewell's corps, and it was our good fortune to hold them in check long enough to prevent them from participating in the assault on Culp's Hill.


About 10 o'clock the whole division was withdrawn and moved over a country cross-road to the Baltimore pike, where it bivouacked for the night along White Run.

Between 9 and 10 o'clock on the morning of the 3d "to horse" was sounded, and we were again in the saddle. Retracing our steps, we resumed our position on the right, but with a more extended line. Irvin Gregg connected with the right of the infantry line near Wolf's Hill and stretched his line to the Hanover road, while McIntosh moved to and halted at the crossing of the Low Dutch and Hanover roads. Custer's brigade occupied the ground to the right and front of McIntosh. After some delay McIntosh moved forward to relieve Custer, who had been ordered to report to his division commander (Kilpatrick) in the vicinity of Round Top. The 3d Pennsylvania and 1st Maryland were drawn up in column of squadrons in a clover-field in front of and across the road from Lott's house, while the 1st New Jersey was sent to relieve Custer's men on outpost.

General J. E. B. Stuart, who was in command of the Confederate cavalry, now occupied what is known as Cress's Ridge, about three-fourths of a mile

north of Lott's house. On the south-eastern slope of the ridge there were cultivated fields, while its summit was covered with heavy timber. North of this ridge there were open fields, almost surrounded by woods, through which ran a country cross-road leading from the York pike to the Low Dutch road. The place was most admirably adapted to the massing and screening of troops. Behind the woods Stuart, who had come out from the direction of Gettysburg along the York pike, concentrated his forces on what was known as the Stallsmith farm. Gregg's troops were not so favorably situated. Occupying a line about three miles long from Wolf's Hill to Lott's house, through an open country, they were in full view of the enemy. [See maps, pp. 344, 400.]

A party of Confederate skirmishers thrown out in front of Stuart's center occupied the Rummel farm buildings, which were situated in the plain about three-fourths of a mile north-west of the Lott house, and near the base of Cress's Ridge. About 2 o'clock McIntosh, who well understood Stuart's tactics, and had correctly discerned his position, dismounted the 1st New Jersey and moved it forward under Major Beaumont in the direction of Rummel's. To meet this advance the Confederates pushed out a line of skirmishers and occupied a fence south of Rummel's. The 1st New Jersey soon adjusted their line to correspond with that of their antagonists, and firing began. At the same time a Confederate battery appeared on the top of the ridge and commenced shelling. Lieutenant A. C. M. Pennington's battery (M, 2d U. S. Artillery), in position in front of Spangler's house on the Hanover road, instantly replied. The 3d Pennsylvania was ordered forward, and two squadrons under Captains Treichel and Rogers were moved across to Little's Run (which flowed southward from Rummel's spring-house) and placed to the left of the 1st New Jersey, while Duvall's troop was extended to their left. Captains Walsh and Hess were ordered out the Low Dutch road beyond Lott's woods, with instructions to hold the position and protect the right. My squadron was deployed along the edge of the woods north of Lott's house (near where the cavalry shaft now stands) and extended to the cross-roads running toward Stallsmith's, facing north-west. It will thus be seen that the 3d Pennsylvania was divided — one-half being on the left of the line, whilst the other occupied the right. The 1st Maryland was posted near the Lott house and held in reserve. Captain A. M. Randol's battery (E, 1st U. S. Artillery), stationed across the road from the Howard house, was also ordered forward, and a section under Lieutenant Chester placed in position a little south-west of Lott's house. Pennington and Chester soon silenced the Confederate battery, and finding Rummel's barn filled with sharp-shooters, who were picking off our men, they turned their guns on it and drove them out. In the meantime our front line was advanced and we drove back that of the Confederates, occupying their position. A lull in the firing now ensued, during which Custer's brigade returned. After the engagement had opened McIntosh had discovered that the force in his front was too strong for his command, and consequently he had sent word to General Gregg to that effect, requesting that Irvin Gregg's brigade be forwarded to his support. As this brigade was some distance to the rear, and therefore not immediately avail-



BATTLE BETWEEN THE UNION CAVALRY UNDER GREGG AND THE CONFEDERATE CAVALRY UNDER STUART.
FROM A SKETCH MADE AT THE TIME.

able, Gregg, meeting Custer, who was about to begin his march in the opposite direction, had ordered him to return, and at the same time had sent word to Irvin Gregg to concentrate as much of his command as possible in the vicinity of Spangler's house. Custer, eager for the fray, had wheeled about and was soon on the field.

Gregg at this juncture appeared and took command in person. Custer, as soon as he arrived, extended the left of the line along Little's Run with a portion of the 6th Michigan, dismounted, and at the same time Randol placed in position to the left and rear of Chester the second section of his battery under Lieutenant Kinney.

At this stage the ammunition of that portion of the 3d Pennsylvania which was on the left, and of the 1st New Jersey, began to run short, and the 5th Michigan was ordered to relieve them. The latter was dismounted, and whilst it was moving to the front a dismounted regiment from W. H. F. Lee's brigade came to the support of the Confederate skirmishers. A heated contest followed, in which the 1st New Jersey and the 3d Pennsylvania remained to take part. After the firing abated these regiments attempted to withdraw, but they were followed up so closely that they were obliged to face about and resume the conflict. However, they soon drove the enemy back, inflicting severe punishment. The short supply of ammunition of the 5th Michigan having by this time given out, and Major Noah H. Ferry, who was in command of the line, having been killed, the whole line was driven in. Improving this opportunity, Fitz. Lee sent forward the 1st Virginia, which charged our right and center. The 7th Michigan at once moved forward from the direction of the Reeve house in close column of squadrons and advanced to the attack. The right of the 5th Michigan swung back, and the 7th pressed forward to a stone-and-rail fence and opened fire with their carbines. The

1st Virginia advanced with steadiness, and soon the two regiments were face to face, the fence alone separating them. My squadron, which occupied the right center and which up to this time had not been engaged, opened a flank fire on the Virginians, which aided materially in holding them in check. The 1st North Carolina Cavalry and the Jeff Davis Legion coming up to their support, they crowded the 7th Michigan back, and it was obliged to give way, the Confederates following in close pursuit. A more determined and vigorous charge than that made by the 1st Virginia it was never my fortune to witness. But they became scattered by the flank fire they received, together with the shells from our artillery, and were in the end obliged to fall back on their main body.

About half a mile distant from the last-mentioned fence, where the cross-road passes through the woods on the Stallsmith farm, there appeared moving toward us a large mass of cavalry, which proved to be the remaining portions of Hampton's and Fitzhugh Lee's brigades. They were formed in close column of squadrons and directed their course toward the Spangler house. A grander spectacle than their advance has rarely been beheld. They marched with well-aligned fronts and steady reins. Their polished saber-blades dazzled in the sun. All eyes turned upon them. Chester on the right, Kinney in the center, and Pennington on the left opened fire with well-directed aim. Shell and shrapnel met the advancing Confederates and tore through their ranks. Closing the gaps as though nothing had happened, on they came. As they drew nearer, canister was substituted by our artillerymen for shell, and horse after horse staggered and fell. Still they came on. Our mounted skirmishers rallied and fell into line; the dismounted men fell back, and a few of them reached their horses. The 1st Michigan, drawn up in close column of squadrons near Pennington's battery, was ordered by Gregg to charge. Custer, who was near, placed himself at its head, and off they dashed. As the two columns approached each other the pace of each increased, when suddenly a crash, like the falling of timber, betokened the crisis. So sudden and violent was the collision that many of the horses were turned end over end and crushed their riders beneath them. The clashing of sabers, the firing of pistols, the demands for surrender and cries of the combatants now filled the air. As the columns were drawing nearer to each other McIntosh sent his adjutant-general, Captain Walter S. Newhall, to the left with orders to Treichel and Rogers to mount and charge, and also sent Captain S. C. Wagner, of his staff, to rally the headquarters staff, buglers, and orderlies, whilst he himself rode to the Lott house for the 1st Maryland. But Gregg, when he first arrived and looked over the field, had moved the 1st Maryland over to the Low Dutch road, just north of the Hanover road, in order to strengthen his right, and so failing to find this regiment where he had expected, McIntosh gathered up what loose men he could, joined them to his headquarters party and charged. My squadron was still deployed along the edge of Lott's woods. Standing in company with Lieutenant William Brooke-Rawle on a little rise of ground in front of his command, and seeing that the situation was becoming critical, I turned to him

and said: "I have been ordered to hold this position, but, if you will back me up in case I am court-martialed for disobedience, I will order a charge." The lieutenant, always ready to "pitch in," as he expressed it, with an energetic reply convinced me that I would not be deserted. I accordingly directed him to close in the left and Sergeant Heagy the right, while the former should select the proper place for the attack. As soon as his line had rallied, the men fired a volley from their carbines, drew their sabers, sent up a shout, and "sailed in," striking the enemy's left flank about two-thirds down the column. Hart, of the 1st New Jersey, whose squadron was in the woods on my left, soon followed, but directed his charge to the head of the enemy's column. Newhall, when he reached Treichel and Rogers, joined them in their charge, which struck the right flank of the enemy's column, near the color-guard. The standard-bearer, seeing that Newhall was about to seize the colors, lowered his spear, which caught his opponent on the chin, tearing and shattering his lower jaw, and sending him senseless to the earth. Every officer of the party was wounded. My command pressed through the Confederate column, cut off the rear portion and drove it back. In the charge my men became somewhat scattered. A portion of them, however, got into Rummel's lane, in front of the farm-buildings, and there encountered some of Jenkins's men, who seemed stubborn about leaving. † Breathed's battery, unsupported, was only one hundred yards away, but my men were so disabled and scattered that they were unable to take it back.

These flank attacks demoralized the Confederate column. Custer and McIntosh, whose tenacity had kept the head of the column at bay, now got the advantage. Many of the enemy had fallen, Wade Hampton was wounded, and at length the enemy turned. Their column was swept back to its starting-point, and the field was ours.

After the repulse of the enemy's grand charge, McIntosh took the 1st New Jersey and part of the 3d Pennsylvania and Duvall's troop, and established a skirmish line along Little's Run, by Rummel's spring-house and along his lane toward the cross-road, the field of the hand-to-hand contest thus remaining in our possession. The Confederates established their line along the edge of the woods on the summit of Cress's Ridge. Some artillery firing and light skirmishing was kept up until after dark. In the meantime Custer's brigade was relieved and sent to its division. ‡

† Since the war, while going over the field in company with Mr. Rummel, he told me that he had dragged thirty dead horses out of this lane.—W. E. M.

‡ The following incidents will illustrate in some degree with what desperation the men of both sides fought, as well as the character of the struggle. The first two incidents were related by Mr. Rummel, who aided in removing the dead. The last came under my personal notice. On going over the field, Mr. Rummel found two men—one a private in the 3d Pennsylvania, the other a Confederate—who had cut each other down with their sabers, and were lying with their feet together,

their heads in opposite directions, and the blood-stained saber of each still tightly in his grip. At another point he found two men—one a Virginian, the other a 3d Pennsylvania man—who fought on horseback with their sabers until they finally clinched and their horses ran from under them. Their heads and shoulders were severely cut, and when found, their fingers, though stiff in death, were so firmly imbedded in each other's flesh that they could not be removed without the aid of force.

In the midst of the engagement, and immediately in front of Rummel's house, E. G. Eyster of H Company, 3d Pennsylvania Cavalry, captured a

With the exception of the Rummel farm buildings, the Confederates held virtually the same line at dark that they held in the morning, but this did not include the field of the main engagement. This was no mere reconnoissance to develop the position or movements of the enemy. Stuart had with him the main strength and the flower of the Confederate cavalry, led by their most distinguished commanders. His force comprised 4 brigades with 20 regiments and battalions and 4 batteries. His avowed object was to strike the rear of the Federal army in coöperation with Pickett's grand attack upon its center. For this movement he succeeded in attaining a most commanding position, and, according to the surmise of Major H. B. McClellan, Stuart's adjutant-general, gave to Lee the preconcerted signal for the attack. The field of this cavalry fight was south of the Rummel buildings. To this field Stuart advanced his whole force, engaged in an obstinate and desperate struggle with the Federal cavalry, was driven back out of the field and forced to retire to his original position. At the opening of the engagement Gregg's outposts were on the southern side of the battle-field; at its close they were advanced to its northern side. The losses on both sides show the importance and determined character of the fight. ¶

dismounted Confederate and covered him with his carbine. Eyster's attention becoming drawn off by the firing around him, the Confederate drew his revolver, shot Eyster's horse, and held the rider a prisoner. Just then Sergeant Gregg of A Company came upon the scene, and with his saber cut the Confederate to the ground. Before Gregg had time to turn another Confederate came up, and, with a right cut, sliced off the top of Gregg's scalp. Gregg, who subsequently rose to a captaincy in his regiment, and who died in 1886, had only to remove his hat to show a head as neatly tonsured as a priest's.

A singular coincidence occurred in connection with the above circumstance. Eyster and Gregg were both taken prisoners in the fight. Gregg, being wounded, was removed in an ambulance, and Eyster, with other prisoners, was compelled

to walk. They were separated on the field. Eyster was sent to prison; Sergeant Gregg was taken to the hospital and was soon afterward exchanged. It so happened that when one came back to the regiment the other was absent, and *vice versa*, so that they never met again until sixteen years afterward at Gettysburg, where the regiment was holding a reunion. In going over the field Eyster was relating the story to Colonel John B. Bachelder, on the very spot where the above scene had occurred, when Gregg came up and they met for the first time since their separation on the ground.—W. E. M.

¶ The Union loss, July 3d, was 30, k; 149, w; 75, m,—total, 254. Confederate: 41, k; 50, w; 90 m,—total, 181. The loss in Jenkins's (Confederate) brigade is not included in this computation.—EDITORS.

MEADE AT GETTYSBURG.

BY FRANCIS A. WALKER, BREVET BRIGADIER-GENERAL, U. S. V.

THERE is probably no other battle of which men are so prone to think and speak without a conscious reference to the commanding general of the victorious party, as they are regarding Gettysburg. For this there are several reasons.

First, General Meade had been in command of the army but three days when the action began.

Second, the collision of the two armies on the 1st of July took place while headquarters were at a distance.

Third, the battle, on the Union side, was a defensive one. The sword is ever of higher honor than the shield.

Fourth, the fact that the Union army occupied a convex line, broke up the battles of the 2d and 3d of July into a series of actions, regarding which it was inevitable that attention should be fixed es-

pecially upon those who commanded at the points successively assaulted.

Fifth, the fact that so many eminent officers were killed or severely wounded during the action, had a tendency to concentrate interest upon them. Reynolds, the commander of the left wing, was killed at the first onset. Hancock, the commander of the left center; Sickles, the commander of the Third Corps, and Gibbon, commanding, in Hancock's absence, the Second, were desperately wounded. Such an unusual succession of casualties could not fail to have an effect in distracting attention from the commander-in-chief.

Sixth, the people of the North have ever loved to think of Gettysburg as a soldier's battle. In a great measure the wish has been father to the thought. But, indeed, there was something in the

change of tone in the Army of the Potomac, as it turned from the gloomy region of Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville to throw itself in the path of the invading army, which justifies that view.

Seventh, much of the effect we are considering was due to General Meade's disinclination to assert himself against hostile criticism. He did, indeed, show a proper resentment of the blame thrown upon him for allowing the retreat of Lee; but during the years of life which remained he took little pains to vindicate himself against aspersion and disparagement, or even to put upon record the orders and dispositions of the battle.

It is my purpose to show that at Gettysburg the Army of the Potomac had a commander in every sense; that, in spite of misadventures and miscarriages, the action was fought according to his plans and under his direction as nearly as usually happens in war; and that his presence and watchful care, his moral courage and tenacity of purpose, contributed largely to the result.

When, on the 28th of June, 1863, General Meade relieved General Hooker, who, since the 13th, had been moving northward, interposing the Army of the Potomac continually between the Confederate forces and Washington, the right wing of that army lay at Frederick, Maryland, while the left occupied Boonsboro' and Middletown, and held the passes of the South Mountain. One corps, however, had been detached, but was returning to Frederick. It is in the disposition General Meade made of this corps that we find the chief difference between his conception of the strategy suitable to the campaign then approaching its culmination and that which had been entertained by his predecessor. The absent corps was the Twelfth, under Slocum, which had been pushed toward Harper's Ferry, with a view to advancing thence upon Lee's line of supply, and even following up the rear of the Confederate army. This corps Hooker had desired to reinforce by the large garrison of Harper's Ferry, abandoning that post as useless for strategic purposes. This General Halleck, at Washington, positively refused to permit. Thereupon Hooker ordered the Twelfth Corps back, and requested to be relieved.

When, however, Meade had been placed in command, Halleck conceded to him the power of diminishing the garrison at Harper's Ferry to any extent consistent with holding that post. The new commander was thus in a position to prosecute the contemplated enterprise in Lee's rear. Instead of doing so, he included the Twelfth Corps in his plan for a forward movement of the whole army directly northward, to be undertaken on the 29th and pushed with the utmost vigor till the encounter should take place.

This abandonment of the projected movement

☆ "The wisdom of Hooker's policy in desiring to assail the rebel communications is demonstrated by the fact that Lee immediately turned back. The head of the serpent faced about as soon as its tail was trodden upon." (Doubleday's "Chancellorsville and Gettysburg.")

against Lee's line of communication has been severely criticised by General Doubleday. That writer assumes that it was intelligence of Slocum's enterprise which caused Lee to loose his hold upon the Susquehanna and concentrate his forces at Gettysburg. ☆ He adds the opinion that "if he (Lee) had known that Meade was about to withdraw all the troops acting against his line of retreat, he would probably have gone on and taken Harrisburg."

Whatever General Lee might have thought of the projected enterprise under Slocum, had he known of it, he, in fact, knew nothing whatever concerning it. The only intelligence that reached him was that the Union army had crossed the Potomac on the 25th, at Edwards's Ferry, moving toward Frederick and Boonsboro'. It was this, and only this, which determined his march upon Gettysburg. †

More remains to be said. Meade's movement northward from Frederick, with his whole army, was a severer threat to Lee than a persistence in Hooker's plan. The movement against the Confederate communications through Harper's Ferry was correct enough, provided the bulk of the army was to remain at Frederick; but had the army moved northward while Slocum followed up Lee's rear, on the other side of the river and the mountains, there would have been every reason to anticipate essentially the same result as that which followed Hooker's division of his forces at Chancellorsville. On the other hand, Meade, by marching northward, did not relinquish the opportunity of moving to the west against Lee's communications, which could at any time have been done through Mechanicsville (to Hagerstown) just as effectively as from Harper's Ferry. [See map, p. 246.]

How far Meade's better choice was a mere matter of military judgment; how far it was due to the accident that the new commander was himself a Pennsylvanian it is difficult to say. There can, I think, be no doubt that the special instincts of local patriotism had much to do with bringing on and fighting through to a successful conclusion the battle of Gettysburg. It is remarkable that, in the one Pennsylvania battle of the war, the men of that State should have borne so prominent a part. It was a Pennsylvanian who directed the movement on Gettysburg and commanded there in chief. It was a Pennsylvanian who hurried the left wing into action and lost his life in determining that the battle should be fought at Gettysburg, and not on any line more remote. It was a Pennsylvanian who came up to check the rout and hold Cemetery Hill for the Union arms, who commanded the left center in the great battle of the second day, and on the third received and repelled the attack of Pettigrew and Pickett.

For one, I entertain no doubt that the military

† General Lee's official report says: "The advance against Harrisburg was arrested by intelligence received from a scout, on the night of the 28th, to the effect that the army of General Hooker had crossed the Potomac and was approaching the South Mountain."

judgment of General Meade, which dictated his decision on the 28th of June to adopt the direct and more effective plan of moving straight northward from Frederick, instead of persisting in the division of the army which Hooker had initiated, was largely influenced by that intensity of feeling which actuated him as a Pennsylvanian. At such a crisis, stress of feeling drives the intellect to its highest work. So long as moral forces enter into the conduct of war, can we doubt that it was fortunate for the Union arms that they so largely were Pennsylvanians who hurried forward the troops in their long and painful marches northward, and who threw the veteran corps of the Potomac upon the invading army?

Widely spread as the Confederate army was when General Meade took command of the Union forces,—Longstreet at Chambersburg, Ewell at Carlisle and York,—it was a matter of course that the serious collision should be a surprise to one or the other party, and that accident should determine which should encounter its antagonist with the advantage in concentration. It turned out that the collision was a surprise to both commanders, and chance gave the advantage of greater concentration to the Confederates. Meade, leaving Frederick on the 29th, moved rapidly northward, extending his wings sufficiently to cover alike the road by which Lee might attempt to move to Washington and that by which he might march to Baltimore. He could not conjecture where, amid the fiery cloud of Southern raiders extending from the Cumberland Valley to the Susquehanna, was to be found the real nucleus of that formidable army; nor had the Confederate commander furnished any indication of his purpose. But on the same day, General Lee, having the evening before learned of the crossing of the Potomac by Hooker, recalled his advanced divisions from Carlisle and York, and threw forward Hill and Longstreet, with a view to a concentration at Gettysburg. During the 30th the two armies continued rapidly to approach each other, until, on the morning of the 1st of July, a stunning collision took place between the heads of Lee's columns and our left wing under Reynolds. In the two days that had passed, the Union forces had made nearly twice as long marches as the Confederates. The risk that one of Meade's columns would somewhere encounter the enemy in greater force, was an inevitable incident of so impetuous a forward movement.

But while Meade intended, by his rapid advance, to compel Lee to loose his hold upon the Susquehanna, he had wisely determined to fight a de-

fensive battle, and had selected the line of Pipe Creek as that most suitable for covering Washington and Baltimore.

It was the noble impetuosity of Reynolds, pushing forward to support Buford's hard-pressed but stubborn cavalry, which transformed the movement of the left wing from a reconnoissance into an attack upon Lee's advancing columns, and committed the Union army to battle at Gettysburg. The reports which, at noon of the 1st of July, reached the new commander at Taneytown, brought news that Reynolds had fallen, together with intimations of disaster to his adventurous column. The first act of General Meade, as commander-in-chief in the immediate presence of the enemy, was one which exhibited moral courage, insight into character, and rapidity of decision. This was to dispatch Hancock to the front, [¶] with full powers to take command and do whatever might be necessary to save the day, and with instructions to report upon the nature of the position. It is difficult for us, now, to appreciate what this decision meant, on the part of Meade. Himself but three days at the head of the army, he was sending an officer, who had but three weeks before left his division, to assume command of three corps, over two officers who were his seniors. When one remembers how strong is the respect for rank among the higher officers, and how greatly the oldest commander is subject to the public sentiment of his army,—when one recalls that even Grant recognized Burnside's claim to command at the Mine,—this act of General Meade becomes one of the boldest in the history of our war. That it was also one of the most judicious, is abundantly established. No other man except, perhaps, Sheridan, arriving on that field of disaster, could have done what Hancock did in checking the rout, in establishing order, in restoring confidence, and in making the dispositions which caused Lee to postpone his contemplated assault on Cemetery Hill.

The further news of the opening battle brought upon General Meade the necessity for a choice which might well have caused deep anxiety and protracted doubt to a veteran commander. The Fifth and Sixth corps were still far distant from the field; the former about twenty, the latter more than thirty miles away. The fighting of the day had shown the superior concentration of Lee's forces; and all night long his fast-marching divisions would, doubtless, be pressing down the roads leading to Gettysburg, and wheeling into their places in the Confederate line. Two of the

¶ The Comte de Paris says that Meade "should have gone in person to reconnoiter the localities around which the conflict was carried on, being only separated from it by about thirteen miles." He says that Meade was "unwilling to go," and "declined assuming the responsibility" of deciding whether it was expedient to deliver battle at Gettysburg or fall back to Pipe Creek; that, had he gone forward himself, "the concentration of the army would have been effected with more speed."

The last-indicated advantage certainly is fictitious. Why should the transmission of orders to the more distant points have been more rapid from Gettysburg than

from Taneytown? The manner in which the Fifth and Sixth corps were actually brought up showed no loss of time in effecting "the concentration of the army."

The charge that Meade, in remaining at Taneytown, declined to assume the proper responsibilities of his position, is unfounded and unjust. How could the Union commander know that he might not the very next hour hear of a collision at some other point? His true place, until he had made up his mind where to concentrate, was the most central point. To go to Gettysburg was to leave a position which was midway between his two wings, and was also between Gettysburg and the proposed line on Pipe Creek.—F. A. W.

Union corps, the First and Eleventh, had been put nearly *hors de combat*. With only three corps in fair fighting condition which could be upon the ground at daybreak, should the risks of an early morning battle be taken? General Meade's decision was here as brave as it proved fortunate; and his inspired rashness, like that of Reynolds in the morning, was of the kind which wins battles and saves states.

In his dispositions to meet the enemy's attack, on the 2d of July, it seems probable that General Meade, who had come upon the ground after midnight, and, in the cemetery, had met and conferred with Howard, anticipated that the weight of the Confederate force would be thrown upon Cemetery Hill, or else that the enemy would work around our right in order to get possession of the Baltimore pike. The fighting of the previous day had given undue emphasis to the importance of this end of the line. I am disposed to believe that General Meade's somewhat vague orders to Sickles, and his failure personally to inspect the left of the line after daybreak in the morning, were the result of a conviction that the battle was to be fought upon the center and right.

I have spoken of the orders to Sickles as somewhat vague. It would be more correct to speak of them as lacking emphasis rather than distinctness. Those orders were explicit enough to have been obeyed without difficulty, had proper care been taken to observe them. They were, that Sickles should take up the position from which Geary's division was to withdraw, in order to rejoin its own corps, the Twelfth, on the extreme right. Little Round Top, which forms a natural bastion, enfolding the low "curtain" known as Cemetery Ridge, strongly attracted the attention of Hancock on the afternoon of the 1st, and he dispatched that division, the first of the Twelfth Corps to arrive, with instructions to take position on the left of the First Corps and extend its own left to the hill. These instructions Geary had intelligently carried out, some of his regiments passing the night on Little Round Top. The slow development of Sickles's corps had allowed Geary, in pursuance of his own orders, to withdraw from his position of the night without being actually relieved therein; but a very little of good staff work would have sufficed to show where the line had been. Troops do not occupy ground without leaving palpable evidence of their presence. Meanwhile, the Second Corps had come up and taken position on Cemetery Ridge; the First Corps had been concentrated on the right; and Sickles's orders were repeated to him, by General Meade in person, to extend his command from the left of the Second Corps over the ground previously held

by Geary. Those instructions should have sufficed; and yet the presence of General Meade for but a few moments, at that time, upon that part of the line, would have added an assurance that his plans were being carried out. As it proved, it was left to Meade to ascertain, in the crisis of the battle, that Little Round Top was unoccupied and uncovered. The promptitude and energy of that brilliant young officer, General G. K. Warren, and his instantaneous acceptance of grave responsibility in detaching troops of the Fifth Corps on a hurried march to reinforce Sickles, finally secured that vitally important position.

It does not come within the scope of this paper, nor is it necessary, to comment on the action of General Sickles in advancing his troops to the Emmitsburg road, breaking connection with Hancock on the right, and leaving Little Round Top undefended on his left and rear. There can be no question that he both made a mistake in point of judgment and failed properly to subordinate his views and acts to the instructions of his commander. That he defended the position he had taken with courage and address, and that his splendid troops exhibited unsurpassed gallantry and resolution, must be admitted by even the severest critic. General Meade, who had sought to withdraw the Third Corps from its false position, was compelled to desist when the roar of musketry told that the conflict had begun, and had to content himself with reinforcing the widely extended lines and hastily stopping the gaps through which the Confederates streamed in continually swelling numbers. Few commanders ever showed more resolution in fighting a seemingly lost battle, advanced their reserves more promptly, or stripped other parts of their lines with less hesitation. The Fifth Corps was instantly sent forward; Caldwell's division and Willard's brigade, of the Second Corps, were thrown into the furious fight; General Meade himself brought up the reinforcements from the First and Twelfth corps, which finally completed the new line behind Plum Run, from which the exhausted Confederates fell back at nightfall. If one will compare the energy in which this action was conducted by General Meade with previous experiences of the Army of the Potomac, especially remembering the manner in which Porter was left to be overwhelmed at Gaines's Mill, the disconnected and desultory fighting at Antietam, and the conduct of affairs at Chancellorsville, one cannot fail to acknowledge that never before had the divisions of that army so closely supported each other or been so unreservedly thrown into the fight when and where most needed. ¶

The fall of night found the Potomac army in a situation that demanded the most grave and seri-

↓ General Meade did, indeed, ride over the line on the left, about 1 o'clock; but it was then too dark to see the whole field, or to get a very clear view of anything.—F. A. W.

¶ In his letter to Colonel Benedict, March 16th, 1870, General Meade states that Geary informed him that, "after waiting for some time to be relieved, he sent to General Sickles a staff-officer with instructions to explain the position and its importance, and to ask, if troops could not be sent to relieve him, that General

Sickles would send one of his staff to see the ground and to place troops there on their arrival. He received, for reply, that General Sickles would attend to it in due time. No officer or troops came."—F. A. W.

¶ "You handled your troops in that battle as well, if not better, than any general has handled his army during the war. You brought all your forces into action at the right time and place, which no commander of the Army of the Potomac has done before."—HALLECK to MEADE, July 28th, 1863.—F. A. W.



MONUMENT TO THE 1ST MASSACHUSETTS CAVALRY, ON THE SITE OF SEDGWICK'S HEADQUARTERS.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

ous consideration. We had repulsed the last assaults; but nearly twelve thousand men had fallen in the desperate battle of the afternoon; our whole left had been beaten back to the position assigned it in the morning; the two corps chiefly engaged, the Third and Fifth, had been shockingly depleted; the enemy had taken advantage of the absence of the greater portion of the Twelfth Corps to push around our right and seize a part of our line, holding, thus, an open gateway through which their troops could be advanced to seize the Baltimore pike. It was, indeed, a gloomy hour when General Meade assembled his corps commanders to consult upon the situation and to frame plans for the morrow. Fortunately, the spirit of the army was high and stern; the corps commanders were unanimous in the opinion that the battle should be fought out on existing lines; and the commander-in-chief remained resolute in the face of the terrible responsibilities confronting him.

It has been alleged, with much of circumstance, that General Meade sought to retreat from Gettysburg, and he carried to his grave this arrow rankling in his breast. Had that charge been substantiated it would have answered the double

purpose of diminishing the fame of the commander-in-chief, and of giving to the advance upon the left the high credit of a movement which held the army at Gettysburg and brought about the conflict from which its commander was disposed to slink away.

The day of the 2d of July divides itself, for the present purpose, into three periods: before, during, and after the battle of the afternoon. Regarding the first period, General Butterfield declares that General Meade directed him, as chief-of-staff, to prepare plans for the withdrawal of the army. Were this admitted, it would prove nothing, since every general is bound to consider the contingency of defeat. Moreover, at Gettysburg there was an especial reason for being prepared for a sudden movement to the rear, inasmuch as the position which the army occupied was liable to be turned on the left. There was another weakness of the position calling for special precautions, viz.: the roads by which the Union army would have had to retreat, if beaten, ran back from the line of battle at an acute angle. But Butterfield's statement was directly contradicted by General Meade, ☆ than whom no man was more truthful. It is, moreover, inconsistent with the dispatch sent to Halleck

☆ Before the Committee on the Conduct of the War General Meade testified as follows:

"I have understood that an idea has prevailed that I intended an order should be issued on the morning of the 2d of July, requiring the withdrawal of the army or the

retreat of the army from Gettysburg, which order was not issued owing simply to the attack of the enemy having prevented it. In reply to that, I have only to say that I have no recollection of ever having directed such an order to be issued, or ever having contemplated the issuing of such an order, and that it does seem to me that to any intelligent mind who

at 3 o'clock in the afternoon: "I have delayed attacking, to allow the Sixth Corps and parts of other corps to reach this place and rest the men. Expecting a battle, I ordered all my trains to the rear. If not attacked, and I can get any positive information of the position of the enemy which will justify me in so doing, I shall attack."

The charge that General Meade, *during* the battle of the afternoon, actually undertook to retreat from the presence of the enemy, is founded upon a statement of General Pleasanton, dated October 16th, 1865, that at 5 o'clock, which was be-

fore Sickles's line had given way, he was directed to collect what cavalry he could and prepare to cover a retreat. This, again, if admitted, would amount to no more than a measure of precaution. But that statement is not only wholly uncorroborated by the official reports of the battle, Pleasanton's included, but it is inconsistent with Pleasanton's own testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, in March, 1864, in the course of which, on being asked whether he knew of General Meade "ever having had any idea of retreating from Gettysburg," he replied that he "did not

is made acquainted with the great exertions I made to mass my army at Gettysburg on the night of July 1st, it must appear entirely incomprehensible that I should order it to retreat, after collecting all my army there, before the enemy had done anything to require me to make a movement of that kind."

At another time General Meade testified as follows:

"I deny under the full solemnity and sanctity of my oath, and in the firm conviction that the day will come when the secrets of all men shall be known—I utterly deny ever having intended or thought, for one instant, to withdraw that army, unless the military contingencies, which the future should develop during the course of the day, might render it a matter of necessity that the army should be withdrawn."

Of the witnesses referred to by General Meade, General Henry J. Hunt denied any knowledge of such an order or of such intention to retreat. See also p. 297.

That part of General Daniel Butterfield's testimony relating to the matter reads as follows:

"General Meade then directed me to prepare an order to withdraw the army from that position. I stated to him that it would be necessary that I should know the exact position of the troops."

Question: "What day of the fight was this?"

Answer: "This was in the morning of the 2d of July, before the battle of that day had commenced. I stated to General Meade that I could not prepare the order properly without first going over the field and ascertaining the positions of each division and corps of the army with relation to the roads. General Meade replied that he could not wait for that—that he could show me where the troops were. He then took a pencil and a piece of paper and made a rough sketch, showing the position of the different corps. I stated to him that the order was one requiring a great deal of care in its preparation; that it involved something more than logistics, as we were in the presence of the enemy, and that while preparing it I must not be interrupted by anybody coming to me with dispatches or orders. He said, 'Very well, you shall not be interrupted.' I told him I thought I could not prepare the order without a more accurate sketch, and I would have to send out to the corps commanders to give me a report of the position of their troops in regard to the various roads; that in the meanwhile I could be studying the maps. He said, 'Very well, do so.' I went upstairs, and, after carefully studying the maps, I prepared the order for the withdrawal of the army from the field of Gettysburg. After finishing it I presented it to General Meade, and it met his approval. I then stated to him that it would be a great deal better if that order was to be executed, as it might involve grave consequences if not properly executed, to submit it for careful examination to such general officers as were then present, with a view of giving them an opportunity of finding any fault with it then, so that no misunderstanding should arise from the manner in which it was worded or expressed. He said there was no objection to having it done. I called General Gibbon, who was present, and, I think, General Williams and General Ingalls, and stated to them that I had been directed to prepare this order, and that I would be very much obliged to any of them if they would look it over and point out any faults in it then, rather than after it was put into execution; that I desired it scrutinized carefully with a view of discovering anything in it which might be misunderstood. Some of these officers—I do not remember which; I am very sure General Gibbon was one—I think General Hancock was there, but whether he read it over or not I am not sure—some of

the officers read it over and said that they thought it was correctly prepared. The corps commanders were then sent for by General Meade to report to headquarters. The order which I had prepared was given to General Williams, and was copied by the clerks, or was in process of being copied by them. As General Sickles rode up to headquarters, in pursuance of the request of General Meade, the battle broke out in front of General Sickles's corps, and there was no council held. General Sickles returned immediately, and every corps commander then rode immediately to his command. Without my memoranda I cannot fix the hour of this occurrence, but it was during the 2d day of July. . . ."

Question: "Did this collision of General Sickles's corps with the enemy prevent the order being executed which you had prepared?"

Answer: "It is impossible for me to state that, because General Meade had not communicated to me his intention to execute the order regardless of the opinion of the corps commanders, or whether he intended to have the order submitted to them. He merely directed me to prepare such an order, which I did. It is for him to say whether he intended to execute it or not. He may have desired it prepared for an emergency without any view of executing it then, or he may have had it prepared with a full view of its execution."

Question: "The collision of Sickles's troops with the enemy broke up the council?"

Answer: "It prevented any consultation of corps commanders at that time. . . ."

General Seth Williams, assistant adjutant-general on Meade's staff, testified:

"In regard to the order of the 2d of July, to the best of my recollection and belief, the chief-of-staff either handed to me or to my clerk an order looking to a contingency which possibly might happen, of the army being compelled to assume a new position. To the best of my belief such an order was prepared, and I presume it may have been signed by me and possibly copies may have been prepared for the corps and other commanders. Orders of such character are usually made out in manifold in order to save time. The particular order in question, however, was never distributed; no vestige of it is to be found among any of the records of my office, and it must have been destroyed within a day or two after it was prepared. I have no reason to suppose other than the fact that the order was given to me or my chief clerk by the chief-of-staff, that General Meade had any knowledge of it. It was not for me to look beyond the orders of the chief-of-staff. Whether or not a copy of that order was given to Major-General Butterfield, who was then acting as chief-of-staff, I am unable to say, and I cannot certainly state whether the rough draft was ever handed back to him. I only know that there is nothing in relation to that order to be found among the records in my charge. The order was never recorded, or issued in any sense. I do not now remember the exact tenor of the order, but to the best of my belief it was an order which, if carried out, would have involved a retrograde movement of the army."

General John Gibbon testified that General Butterfield asked him to read the order for retreat and to compare it with a map. He added:

"General Butterfield did not say General Meade did intend to leave; he merely said something to the effect that it was necessary to be prepared in case it should be necessary to leave, or some remark of that kind. He then showed me the order, and either he read it over and I pointed out the places on the map, or I read it over and he pointed out the places to which each corps was to go. When he got through, I remarked that it was all correctly drawn up."

EDITORS.

remember." What is the degree of probability that a chief of cavalry, who had, on so important an occasion as this, been engaged from 5 until 12 o'clock in bringing up and disposing his troops to cover the retreat of his army, should, first, have omitted to mention it in his official report, and, secondly, have failed to remember it nine months later, in reply to a specific and highly suggestive inquiry?

That on the evening of the 2d, after the battle, General Meade was disinclined to await further attacks in his position, is an imputation which rests upon much higher authority, for it has the word of General Slocum, an officer of honor, dignity of character, and firmness of purpose. Referring to the council of war, General Slocum, in a letter dated February 19th, 1883, makes the following statement: "When each officer had expressed his views General Meade said: 'Well, gentlemen, the question is settled; we will remain here, but I wish to say I consider this no place to fight a battle.'"

I would not speak lightly of any word of General Slocum, but it is far more probable that, at such a distance of time, he was mistaken, than that General Sedgwick had forgotten the incidents of the council when he wrote, on March 10th, 1864, "At no time, in my presence, did the general commanding insist upon or advise a withdrawal of the army."

On the same point, General Gibbon wrote: "I never heard General Meade say one word in favor of a retreat, nor do I believe that he did so." General A. S. Williams testified: "I heard no expression from him which led me to think he was in favor of withdrawing the army from before Gettysburg." At a later date, General Howard wrote to Colonel George Meade, "I did not hear your father utter a word which made me think that he then favored a withdrawal of his troops."

Certainly, if General Meade had such a momentary feeling as General Slocum understood him to express, it was in direct contradiction to his acts and words and bearing throughout those three memorable days. At all other times his spirit was bold and martial. From first to last he bore himself as one who came to fight, who wanted to fight, and who could not have too much fighting on equal terms. Whatever opinion men may hold as to the grade of Meade's generalship, those do him a gross injustice who represent him as ever, in any case, timid, vacillating, or reluctant to encounter the enemy. On the contrary, he was a man in whom high military scholarship and a serious sense of responsibility were often in conflict with "creature pugnacity" and stubbornness of temper.

Of the battle of the third day, the purpose of this paper requires us to say but little. When the lines had been rectified upon the left, and the Round Tops had been made secure, when the

positions of the troops had been readjusted to secure due strength in every part, when all the points from which effective artillery fire could be obtained had been occupied, and when the intruding enemy upon the right had been driven out in the early morning by the energetic attack of the Twelfth Corps, reinforced from the Sixth,—when all this had been done, little remained but to await the assault which it was known General Lee must needs deliver, whether to prosecute his enterprise or to excuse his retreat. All that long morning, amid the dread silence, no man in the Potomac army could conjecture where that assault would be delivered; but no man in all that army doubted that it was to come.

At last the blow fell. As the spear of Menelaus pierced the shield of his antagonist, cut through the shining breastplate, but spared the life, so the division of Pickett, launched from Seminary Ridge, broke through the Union defense, and for the moment thrust its head of column within our lines, threatening destruction to the Army of the Potomac; then the broken brigades fled, with the loss of more than half their numbers, across the plain, which was shrieking with the fire of a hundred guns, and Gettysburg had been fought and won for the Union arms.

Into the questions, whether Meade should not have followed up the repulse of Pickett with a general advance of his own line, or, failing this, have attacked Lee at Falling Waters, on the 13th of July, we have no call to enter. General Meade was here entirely within his competence as the commander of an army. Any officer who is fit to be intrusted with such a charge is entitled to the presumption that, for decisions such as these, he had good and sufficient reasons, whatever may, at the time, have been the opinion of subordinates on whom did not rest the final responsibility of success or failure; yet in fact, in both these decisions General Meade was supported by a preponderance of authoritative opinion among his corps commanders and the staff-officers of greatest reputation.

I believe that, as time goes on and the events of the last days of June and the first days of July, 1863, are more and more carefully studied, in the light of all the facts, and with an impartial and dispassionate spirit, the weighty judgment of the illustrious chief of the Union artillery, General Henry J. Hunt, ¹ will be more and more fully approved. "He was right in his orders as to Pipe Creek; right, in his determination under certain circumstances to fall back to it; right, in pushing up to Gettysburg after the battle commenced; right, in remaining there; right, in making his battle a purely defensive one; right, therefore, in taking the line he did; right, in not attempting a counter-attack at any stage of the battle; right, as to his pursuit of Lee."

¹ In his letter to General A. S. Webb, January 19th, 1888, quoted by permission.—F. A. W.

THE MEADE-SICKLES CONTROVERSY.

I. A LETTER FROM GENERAL MEADE. †

HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY DIVISION OF THE ATLANTIC, PHILADELPHIA, March 16th, 1870.

[Private.]

[COLONEL] G. G. BENEDICT, Burlington, Vt.

DEAR SIR: I am in receipt of your letter of the 13th inst., as also the copies of the "Free Press," with editorials and comments on the address of Colonel [W. W.] Grout before the Officers' Society and Legislature of the State.‡

I have carefully read your articles and feel personally under great obligations to you for the clear and conclusive manner in which you have vindicated the truth of history. I find nothing to correct in your statements except a fact you mention, which is a misapprehension.

I did not invite General Humphreys to be my chief-of-staff till after the battle, because I did not see him after assuming command till I met him on the field, and besides I relied on him as a mainstay in handling the Third Corps, and did not wish to withdraw him from that position.↓

I did ask General [Seth] Williams to assume the duties in addition to those of adjutant-general, but he declined. I also asked General Warren, then my chief-of-engineers, to act temporarily as chief-of-staff, but he also declined taking on himself additional duties. Under these circumstances I asked General Butterfield to remain till I had time to make permanent arrangements [see p. 243]. On the third day General Butterfield, having been disabled by being struck with a fragment of a spent shell, left the army, and a few days afterward General Humphreys accepted my invitation.

My defense against the charges and insinuations of Generals Sickles and Butterfield is to be found in my testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War. I have avoided any controversy with either of these officers—though both have allowed no opportunity to pass unimproved which permitted them to circulate their ex-parte statements, and, as you justly say, to *distort* history for their purposes. Both perfectly understand what I meant by my ante-battle order, referring to Pipe Creek, also my instructions to Butterfield on the morning of the 2d, which he persists in calling an order for retreat, in the face of all my other acts, and of the fact that I did not retreat when I could have done so with perfect ease *at any moment*. Longstreet's advice to Lee [to move from his right upon General Meade's communications] was sound military sense; it was the step I feared Lee would take, and to meet which and be prepared for which was the object of my instructions to Butterfield, which he has so misrepresented. Now, let

me tell you another historical fact. Lieutenant-General Ewell, in a conversation held with me shortly after the war, asked what would have been the effect if at 4 P. M. on the 1st he had occupied Culp's Hill and established batteries on it. I told him that in my judgment, in the condition of the Eleventh and First corps, with their *morale* affected by their withdrawal to Cemetery Ridge with the loss of over half their numbers in killed, wounded, and missing (of the 6000 prisoners we lost in the field nearly all came from these corps



MONUMENT IN THE GETTYSBURG CEMETERY.

in the first day), his occupation of Culp's Hill, with batteries commanding the whole of Cemetery Ridge, would have produced the evacuation of that ridge and the withdrawal of the troops there by the Baltimore Pike and Taneytown and Emmitsburg roads. He then informed me that at 4 P. M. on the 1st he had his corps, 20,000 strong, in column of attack, and on the point of moving on Culp's Hill, which he saw was unoccupied and commanded Cemetery Ridge, when he received an order from General Lee directing him to assume the defensive and not to advance; that he sent to General Lee urging to be permitted to advance with his reserves, but the reply was a reiteration of the

to the Committee on the Conduct of the War, General Meade, on assuming command of the army at Frederick, expressed his desire to appoint General Humphreys his chief-of-staff, but that officer wishing to retain command of his division in the Third Corps during the impending battle, the decision was postponed.—EDITORS.

† From the Philadelphia "Weekly Press."—EDITORS

‡ The substance of these editorials in the Burlington "Free Press" will be found in the appendix to the second edition of Colonel Benedict's work, "Vermont at Gettysburg."—EDITORS.

↓ According to General A. A. Humphreys's statement

previous order. To my inquiry why Lee had restrained him, he said our troops coming up (Slocum's) were visible, and Lee was under the impression that the greater part of my army was on the ground and deemed it prudent to await the rest of his—as you quote from his report.

But suppose Ewell with 20,000 men had occupied Culp's Hill, and our brave soldiers had been compelled to evacuate Cemetery Ridge and withdraw on the roads above referred to, would the Pipe Creek order have been so very much out of place?

That order was to meet the very contingency here in question, to wit: A part of my army, overwhelmed by superior numbers, compelled to fall back, and a line of battle, formed to the rear of my most advanced position, thus necessitated.

As to General Sickles having by his advance brought on an attack, and thus compelled the battle which decided the war, you have completely answered—and it is a very favorite theory with the partisans of this officer. But these gentlemen ignore the fact that of the 18,000 men killed and wounded on the field during the whole battle more than two-thirds were lost on the second day, and but for the timely advance of the Fifth Corps and the prompt sending a portion on Round Top, where they met the enemy almost on the crest and had a desperate fight to secure the position—I say but for these circumstances, over which Sickles had neither knowledge nor control, the enemy would have secured Round Top, planted his artillery there, commanding the whole battle-field, and what the result would have been I leave you to judge. Now, when I wrote my report of the battle I honestly believed General Sickles did not know where I wished him to go, and that his error arose from a misapprehension of my orders; but I have recently learned from General Geary, who had the day before been sent by Hancock to hold the left, and who in doing so had seen the great importance of Round Top, and *posted a brigade on it*, that on the morning of the 2d, when he received my order that he would be relieved by the Third Corps and on being relieved would rejoin his own corps (Twelfth) on the right, after waiting for some

time to be relieved he sent to General Sickles a staff-officer with instructions to explain the position and its importance, and to ask, if troops could not be sent to relieve him, that General Sickles would send one of his staff to see the ground, and to place troops there on their arrival. He received for reply that General Sickles would attend to it in due time. No officer or troops came, and after waiting till his patience was exhausted General Geary withdrew and joined his corps. Now my first orders to General Sickles were to relieve the Twelfth Corps division (Geary's) and occupy their position. Here is evidence that he knew the position occupied by Geary's division, or could have known, and yet failed to occupy it. Furthermore, when he came to my headquarters at about noon and said he did not know where to go, I answered, "Why you were to relieve the Twelfth Corps." He said they had no position; they were massed, awaiting events. Then it was I told him his *right* was to be *Hancock's left*, his *left on Round Top, which I pointed out*. Now his right was three-quarters of a mile in front of Hancock's left and his left one-quarter of a mile in front of the base of Round Top, leaving that *key-point unoccupied*, which ought to have been occupied by Longstreet before we could get there with the Fifth Corps. Sickles's movement practically destroyed his own corps, the Third, caused a loss of 50 per cent. in the Fifth Corps, and very heavily damaged the Second Corps; as I said before, producing 66 per cent. of the loss of the whole battle; and with what result?—driving us back to the position he was ordered to hold originally. These losses of the first and second day affected greatly the efficiency and *morale* of the army and prevented my having the audacity in the offense that I might otherwise have had.

If this is an advantage—to be so crippled in battle without attaining an object—I must confess I cannot see it.

Pardon my writing with so much prolixity, but your generous defense and the clear view you have taken of the battle have led me to wander thus far.

Very truly yours, GEO. G. MEADE.

II. COMMENT BY DANIEL E. SICKLES, MAJOR-GENERAL, U. S. A. ¶

ONLY a cursory perusal of General Meade's letter suggests the reason why he wished it treated as confidential. It must have been written without deliberation, without revision, and without comparison with the official records. It contradicts his own official report of the battle made in October, 1863, and his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, in March, 1864.

General Meade is altogether mistaken in speaking of charges and insinuations and attacks upon him made by me. I have never spoken of his conduct at Gettysburg except in my testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, in February, 1864. General Meade's testimony was given in the following month and with full

knowledge of all my statements, none of which were contradicted by him when he testified. The report of the Committee on the Conduct of the War justified me and censured General Meade.

It must not be supposed that General Meade had a controversy with me only. Other corps commanders made protests when I was silent. I will only speak now of one or two as examples. Immediately after General Meade's report of the battle of Gettysburg, Major-General Slocum, commanding the right wing of the Army of the Potomac at Gettysburg, in an official communication to General Meade, arraigned him for a series of inaccuracies, to use the mildest phrase, in General Meade's official report of Gettysburg, by which

¶ From the "New York Times" of August 14th, 1886. Revised by General Sickles for this work, June 26th, 1888.—EDITORS.

grave injustice was done to Major-General Slocum and the corps under his command. After reciting so much of General Meade's report as relates to the operations of his command, General Slocum says: "Yet the facts in the case are very nearly the reverse of the above in every particular, and directly in contradiction to the facts as set forth in the reports of General Geary and General Williams."

Brigadier-General Williams, commanding the Twelfth Corps, in an official communication to Major-General Slocum, dated December 26th, 1863, points out four serious misstatements in General Meade's official report relating to the operations of the Twelfth Corps on the 2d of July. The character of these complaints will be understood when I quote from General Williams that they consist "in wholly ignoring the operations of the First Division" and "in repudiating most of the material statements of my report as temporary commander of this army corps"; also "in ignoring the splendid conduct of Greene's brigade, which held our intrenched line on the right," and in giving credit for Greene's fight to Geary's division, which was not in the fight at all, but got lost on the road to Two Taverns. General Williams concludes his protest in these words, referring to General Meade's official report of Gettysburg: "I confess to have read that part of his official report relating to the Twelfth Corps with a mixed feeling of astonishment and regret." ^λ

I could amplify similar proofs, showing the characteristic inaccuracy of General Meade in his official reports of his military operations, but will not now trespass upon your space in that direction. General Meade knew nothing of Gettysburg. He so stated to the Committee on the Conduct of the War. He speaks of Gettysburg in these words: "A place I had never seen in my life and had no more knowledge of than you have now" (addressing the committee). This is not said censoriously, for General Meade had only been in command three days and had already chosen another battle-field, on the line of Pipe Clay Creek, twenty miles distant. General Meade was drawn to Gettysburg in spite of his plans, because Lee had chosen Gettysburg as his place of concentration, and because Buford and Reynolds had accepted battle there, forcing General Meade to give up his Pipe Creek line and come to Gettysburg. I assisted in this, first, by moving my corps twelve miles from Emmitsburg to Gettysburg, on the afternoon of July 1st, to help Howard after Reynolds fell; also by my letter to General Meade, written at Gettysburg at 9 o'clock on the night of July 1st, asking his approval of my march, made without orders, and urging him to come to Gettysburg with his army, describing it as "a good place to fight a battle," and pointing out to him that its weak place would be "on his left," as it proved to be the next day, when I was unsupported for two hours in resisting Longstreet's assault. After General Meade had brought his forces up to Gettysburg and had reconnoitered the position, he was dissatisfied, and frequently

spoke of it, during the 2d, as "no place to fight a battle." He so expressed himself in the council of war held on the night of the 2d. After this council had decided to stay and fight it out, General Slocum thus describes what took place: General Meade said, "Well, gentlemen, the question is settled; we will remain here; but I wish to say that I consider this no place to fight a battle." This was after the combats of the 1st and 2d of July, and after twenty thousand Union soldiers had fallen on that field.

General Meade seemed to manifest resentment against every corps commander who had been instrumental in the choice of Gettysburg as our battle-field. He owed his splendid position there to Buford, Reynolds, and Howard, and the divisions of Wadsworth, Doubleday, and Robinson. Yet all of these officers, except Reynolds, who was killed, suffered marks of his displeasure or were mentioned with the scantiest recognition of their heroic conduct. In Howard's case Congress interposed to do him justice, when he received its formal vote of thanks for his choice of our position on Cemetery Ridge, the Gibraltar of Gettysburg.

General Meade was surprised by the attack of Longstreet, on the Union left, on the afternoon of the 2d of July. No preparations whatever were made by the commanding general to meet Longstreet's assault. There was no order of battle. General Meade had not personally reconnoitered the position, though frequently solicited by General Hunt, General Meade's chief of artillery, General Warren, his chief of engineers, and myself, to do so. This appears in the testimony of General Hunt and in the report of General Tremain, my senior aide-de-camp. Not only was no preparation made by General Meade to meet the attack upon his left,—the position I held,—but he deprived me and himself of the most effective support he had on his left flank by the unaccountable withdrawal of Buford's division of cavalry, which held the Emmitsburg road and covered our left flank, including Round Top, until a late hour on the morning of the 2d. Geary's division of infantry had been withdrawn from the left very early in the morning of the 2d. These dispositions imposed upon me, thus weakened by the withdrawal of two divisions, the sole responsibility of resisting the formidable attack of General Lee upon our left flank. The first support that reached me was Barnes's division of the Fifth Corps; it got into position after 5 o'clock in the afternoon, two hours after the battle opened.

The Comte de Paris, in his critical history of the war, incomparably the ablest yet written, thus speaks of the withdrawal of General Buford's division:

"One of those blunders that frequently occur on the battle-field was the means of compromising the safety of the Federal line just in that part which will be the first to be menaced."

This was my front. The Count continues:

"Buford alone covered this flank. Meade only learned this fact at 1 o'clock. He immediately directed Pleas-

ton not to strip him entirely, but it is too late. Buford is gone; Merritt, who is coming from Emmitsburg, is still far away, and Sickles has therefore only the skirmishers of his infantry to watch the movements of the enemy, whose numerous indications reveal his presence in force on that side. . . . when, shortly after, Sickles, being apprised of the untimely departure of Buford, decided, in order to ward off all surprise, to replace him by causing his whole line of skirmishers to advance as far as the Emmitsburg road. This general, whose military instinct has fathomed the enemy's intentions, justly suspecting that Lee's main effort would shortly be directed against that portion of the Federal line which has been intrusted to him, . . . has charged Colonel Berdan to push forward a reconnoissance. . . . This . . . has revealed the presence of a numerous enemy, who is masking his movements and seems disposed to turn the Federal left. In the meanwhile Sickles, thinking only of the attack with which he believes himself menaced, has requested Meade to send him fresh instructions: . . . receiving no reply, he repairs to headquarters for the purpose of obtaining them. . . . he immediately requests his chief either to ascertain for himself the necessity for making this movement, or to send General Warren to settle the matter in his place. Meade, being under the impression, no doubt, that the attack of the enemy would not be aimed at his left, . . . declined either to leave his headquarters or to separate himself from General Warren."

Unfortunately, General Meade's whole attention, tactically, was fixed upon his right flank. He did not believe that the enemy would attack his left, although Hancock and myself had both of us pointed out that his left was his vulnerable point for attack. Apart from this tactical preoccupation on his right, General Meade, as I have already said, did not like Gettysburg as a battle-field and wanted to get away from it. Hence we can understand, and in another way, the withdrawal of Geary and Buford from the left and his failure to send timely reinforcements to the almost uncovered left flank. At 3 o'clock in the afternoon of July 2d, a few moments before Longstreet opened his assault, Meade telegraphed to Halleck: "If satisfied the enemy is endeavoring to move to my rear, I shall fall back to my supplies at Westminster." He had already sent Buford there, two hours before. General Meade's chief-of-cavalry, Major-General Alfred Pleasonton, states that in the afternoon of the 2d of July General Meade "gave me the order to get what cavalry and artillery I could as soon as possible, and take up a position in the rear to cover the retreat of the army from Gettysburg. I was thus occupied until 10 o'clock at night, when I was recalled by an order from General Meade."

Meanwhile, although General Meade had no order of battle, although his chief-of-artillery, General Hunt, as he states in his testimony, knew nothing of the intentions of his commanding general, whether to stay or to go, or whether his tactics were offensive or defensive if he staid; while his left flank was being stripped of cavalry and of infantry vital to its protection; while the commander of the Third Corps, General Sickles, was left unsupported and without definite instructions, all was different on the side of the enemy. From early dawn on the morning of the 2d General Lee, with his lieutenants and his staff, was in the saddle carefully reconnoitering our left and making elaborate preparations for the assault made at a later hour. General Lee promulgated his order of battle. He

placed his infantry and his artillery in position. He designated the divisions of his center and left to support Longstreet's assault. These dispositions made by General Lee were disclosed by reconnoissances made by General Birney, one of the greatest soldiers produced by Pennsylvania. Birney commanded my left division. To his vigilance and unerring military intuition General Meade owed the timely warnings, again and again repeated by myself and General Tremain, my senior aide, of the enemy's movements imperiling the left flank of our army. All admonitions were unheeded, derided. General Meade declined to accept any suggestion that his left was in danger of attack.

It is a significant fact, never contradicted, that at the moment when the battle of the 2d began, General Meade was in consultation with his corps commanders, a consultation which I was called away from my front to attend. Finding myself in the presence of the enemy, I asked to be excused from attending the council of war. I was at once peremptorily ordered to repair to General Meade's headquarters. The report of my aide-de-camp that I was momentarily expecting to be engaged with the enemy was disregarded, and the order to leave my command and report to headquarters was made imperative. While I was on my way to headquarters the battle began on my front. General Meade met me at the door of his house, excused me from dismounting, authorized me to return to my command, and said he would follow immediately. This broke up the council, and the corps commanders repaired to their commands. This was at 3 in the afternoon. General Meade soon afterward met me at the front and witnessed the dispositions which I was making, and which he did not modify. And from that hour until 6 o'clock, when I was wounded, I did not receive any order or instruction whatever from General Meade as to the conduct of the battle.

The truth is that when I was summoned to headquarters at 3 o'clock in the afternoon to attend this council of war, I had become weary of so many visits to headquarters during the day. Besides my own repeated requests made in person to General Meade for instructions, General Tremain and Colonel Moore, my aides, had been sent again and again to General Meade with reports of the enemy's movements on his left and with urgent representations from me of the necessity of proper dispositions and of reinforcements.

General Meade states in his confidential letter to Colonel Benedict: "When Sickles came to my headquarters about noon and said he did not know where to go I answered, 'Why, you were to relieve the Twelfth Corps.' He said they had no position; they were massed awaiting events." To this I answer from the record: First, that the Twelfth Corps was never at any time, until the very close of the battle on the 2d of July, in position on the left. The position of the Twelfth Corps during all the day of the 2d was on the right flank, miles away from the left—as far away as Culp's Hill is from Round Top; second, that Geary's division of the Twelfth Corps was ordered by General Hancock, on the evening of July 1st, "to the high

ground to the right of and near Round Top mountain, commanding the Gettysburg and Emmitsburg road, as well as the Gettysburg and Taneytown road, to our rear" (see Hancock's Official Report); third, that Birney, "under orders from Major-General Sickles, relieved Geary's division and formed a line resting its left on the Sugar Loaf Mountain (Round Top), and the right thrown in a direct line toward the Cemetery, connecting on the right with the Second Division of this corps. My picket line was in the Emmitsburg road with sharp-shooters some three hundred yards in advance." (See Official Report of Major-General Birney, commanding First Division, Third Corps.)

These citations from the official reports of Hancock and Birney prove that only one division (Geary's) of the Twelfth Corps was temporarily on the left; that this division was ordered there by Hancock; that, pursuant to my orders, Birney relieved Geary's division and occupied a position identical with that indicated by Hancock,—to wit, "to the right of and near Round Top mountain, commanding the Gettysburg and Emmitsburg road," etc.

General Meade is as unfortunate in dealing with the Twelfth Corps, in his letter to Benedict seven years after the battle, as he was in dealing with the Twelfth Corps' movements in his official report of Gettysburg. I have already quoted General Williams, commanding the Twelfth Corps, when he exclaimed: "I have read General Meade's report of the operations of the Twelfth Corps with astonishment and regret." I may be permitted to share General Williams's astonishment and regret when I read General Meade's report of the operations of the Third Corps, my own.

General Meade proceeds in his confidential statement to Colonel Benedict: "Then it was I told him his right was to be Hancock's left; his left on Round Top, which I pointed out." To this I answer: First, that this statement is contradicted by General Meade's official report of the battle, and by his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War; second, it is contradicted by the report of his chief-of-artillery, General Hunt; third, it is absurd, topographically and tactically; fourth, my testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, in February, 1864, presented the facts, which are wholly different from General Meade's statement in the Benedict letter, and which were not denied by him when he testified in the following month. My statement in regard to the operations of the Third Corps at Gettysburg from the beginning to the end was never publicly contradicted by General Meade, so far as I have been informed. Certainly it was never contradicted by him or any one else officially. The War Department records have been ransacked and searched in vain for testimony to uphold these assertions of General Meade in regard to the position of the Third Corps. Failing to find any testimony from the records contradicting my declarations at Gettysburg on the 2d of July last, this confidential letter of General Meade, written in 1870, is brought to light, most impru-

dently, I think, to uphold a contention absolutely unsupported by anything in the official records of the battle.

You have not the space to give me for citations from the testimony of Meade, Hunt, and Sickles before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, nor for extracts from the official reports of Generals Meade, Birney, and Humphreys. It is enough for me to state distinctly, and this can be verified by any one who chooses to consult the record, that General Meade nowhere pretends in his official report, or in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, that I was to occupy Round Top. He states that he expected me to occupy Geary's position. Hancock's report proves that Geary was ordered to the right of Round Top,—precisely the ground I held, extending my left to the Devil's Den and my right toward the Emmitsburg road. General Tremain, my aide-de-camp, in compliance with my instructions, pointed out to General Meade, during the morning of the 2d, the importance of Round Top and the need of troops to occupy it; likewise the importance of the Emmitsburg road and the intersecting roads leading to our left, all of which positions, including Round Top, had been stripped of defense by the removal of Buford and his division of cavalry. Against this abandonment of Round Top and the Emmitsburg road I personally protested to General Meade at his headquarters, and so testified to the Committee on the Conduct of the War, uncontradicted by General Meade.

General Meade's statement, I repeat, is absurd, tactically and topographically, because it designates a line and positions for the Third Corps which it could not have occupied by reason of the great extension of the line and the number of troops required to hold Round Top. The distance from Hancock's left to Round Top is stated by the Comte de Paris to be a mile and a quarter, that is to say, 2200 yards. The front of the Second Corps, Hancock's, which was stronger than mine, was only twelve hundred yards, so that my line, if taken according to General Meade's confidential letter, from Hancock's left to and including Round Top, and the necessary force to hold that natural fortress, would have been a mere skirmish line utterly incapable of resisting assaulting columns. Moreover, the direct line from Hancock's left to Round Top was a line through swale, morass, swamp, bowlders, and forest and tangled undergrowth, unfit for infantry, impracticable for artillery, and hopelessly dominated by the ridge in front, which I would have surrendered to Lee without a blow if I had attempted to execute the impossible order General Meade confidentially states to his correspondent that he gave me. Nay, more, if I had occupied the line General Meade represents in 1870 that he told me to take, I would have had no positions whatever for my artillery over one half of my line, and would have surrendered to Lee the positions for his artillery which he states in his official report it was the object of his movement to gain. In other words, the line indicated by General Meade in his confidential letter is one that would have abandoned to the enemy all the vantage-ground he

sought and had to fight for all the afternoon. And this vantage-ground, by which I mean the Emmitsburg road ridge, the Devil's Den, the Emmitsburg road itself, and the intersecting roads leading to our left, once in possession of the enemy without loss, would have enabled him to deliver his assault upon me in the position indicated by General Meade, three hours before it was delivered, and with advantage of position and force that would have given Lee the victory.

General Meade proceeds: "Now, his right was three-quarters of a mile in front of Hancock's left and his left one-quarter of a mile in front of the base of Round Top, leaving that key-point unoccupied, which ought to have been occupied by Longstreet before we could get there with the Fifth Corps." To this I answer: First, that I was in the right place to defend Round Top when I put myself in front of it, and I staid there until after 5 o'clock, giving General Meade time to bring up the Fifth Corps from the right, where he had kept it all day; second, that if I had not put my troops in position in front of Round Top, Longstreet would have occupied it at any time during the two hours that elapsed before the Fifth Corps was brought over from the right to occupy it; third, my line was a good one, but there were not troops enough at hand early in the day to hold that line, or any other line, against the forces employed by Lee in the attack. If the reinforcements which came up from 5 o'clock to 6:30 had arrived three hours earlier, Longstreet's assault on the second would have been repulsed as promptly and decisively as on the third day; fourth, look at the ground occupied by my corps, and then compare its advantages over Meade's line, extending from Cemetery Ridge to Round Top,—and the discussion will not last long.

General Meade proceeds: "Sickles's movement practically destroyed his own corps, the Third; caused a loss of 50 per cent. in the Fifth Corps, and very heavily damaged the Second Corps, producing 66 per cent. of the loss of the whole battle." To this I answer: First, that the losses of the Fifth Corps in the entire Gettysburg campaign, killed, wounded, captured, and missing, were 2187, out of an aggregate of 12,000, by which it appears—I speak from the official record—that General Meade confidentially more than doubled the loss of the Fifth Corps, an inexcusable disregard of fact with the record before him; second, when General Meade says that the Third Corps was practically destroyed on the 2d of July he is contradicted by the two division commanders, Humphreys and Birney, and by Graham and Carr, and by De Trobriand, Ward, Burling, and Brewster. Not to weary the readers with extracts from the reports of all these distinguished Third Corps commanders, I will cite an example from the report of General Joseph B. Carr. General Carr, in his official report, states: "Notwithstanding my apparently critical position I could and would have maintained it but for an order received direct from Major-General Birney, commanding the corps, to fall back to the crest of the hill in my rear." This was between 6 and 7 o'clock in the evening, after I had been wounded. General Carr proceeds:

"At that time I have no doubt I could have charged on the rebels and driven them in confusion, for my line was still perfect and unbroken and my troops in the proper spirit for the performance of such a task. After I had reached the position designated by General Birney, the brigade was rallied by my assistant adjutant-general and aides and moved forward, driving the enemy and capturing many prisoners. I continued to advance until I again occupied the field I had a few moments before vacated. Here my command remained until morning." This was the right of my line.

General Meade declares that my movement produced "66 per cent. of the loss of the whole battle, and with what result? Driving us back to the position he [Sickles] was ordered to hold originally." To this I answer: First, that the position of the troops on our left at the close of the battle on the 2d of July, was not in any particular, in any part of the line on the left, as General Meade confidentially informs Colonel Benedict. On my extreme right, as I have just proved from Carr's report, the Third Corps held its advanced position. On my left, that is to say, on the left flank of the army, General Crawford's splendid division of Pennsylvania Reserves held my advanced position to the stone wall, south of the wheat-field, in advance of Round Top. The other divisions of the Fifth Corps occupied both Round Tops, Little and Big, with the Sixth Corps—the strongest corps in the army, under Sedgwick—in reserve to our left, and the Twelfth Corps, under Williams, brought over from the right, and the First Corps, under Newton, in support; making a total of over 40,000 infantry in position on the left to protect that flank against the assault which General Meade intimates he expected the Third Corps to repel alone. Second, General Meade, in his exaggerated estimate of his losses on July 2d, which he represents as 66 per cent. of the entire loss of his army during the three days of conflict, would seem to hold me not only responsible for the losses in my own corps and for the other corps moved up to save the left and rear of his army, but also for the losses on the right at Culp's Hill. In other words, General Meade's statement is difficult to reconcile with the respect due to his high position and the ample means of information always accessible to him.

The losses on the 2d of July, although large and serious, were inevitable. So far as my observation enabled me to judge, and I was on the line of battle until I was wounded, our losses are attributable only to the assaults, vigorous, persistent, and prolonged, from 3 o'clock until dark, of an ably led enemy, one who had staked everything upon the issue; and the official Confederate reports show that Lee's losses on the 2d of July, especially in the divisions of Hood, McLaws, and Anderson, and in their artillery, were quite as large as ours, and perhaps larger. As I have already shown, if I had received this assault in the position General Meade says he designed I should take, then indeed would my corps have been virtually destroyed and the enemy in possession of our left flank and rear before the troops I have enumerated could have been brought up.

In conclusion allow me to show that General Meade's letter, so far as it relates to the orders and instructions therein alleged to have been given to me, is flatly contradicted by his own official report of the battle and by his sworn testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War. In his official report General Meade says that "the Second and Third corps were directed to occupy the continuation of the Cemetery Ridge on the left of the Eleventh Corps." That is the only statement in General Meade's official report to indicate the position of the Third Corps. No mention is made of the occupation of Round Top, which is a mile and more from Cemetery Ridge and in advance of it. Now we will see how guardedly he speaks of it in his testimony: "About 3 or 3:30 o'clock in the afternoon I proceeded from my headquarters to the extreme left in order to see to the posting of the Fifth Corps, also to inspect the position of the Third Corps, about which I was in doubt. General Sickles had said to me earlier in the day that there was in the neighborhood of where his corps was some very good ground for artillery, and that he should like to have some staff-officer of mine go out there and see as to the posting of artillery. He also asked me whether he was not authorized to post his corps in such manner as in his judgment he should deem the most suitable. I answered General Sickles: 'Certainly, within the limits of the general instruction I have given you. Any ground within those limits you choose to occupy I leave to you,' and I directed Brigadier-General Hunt, my chief-of-artillery, to accompany Sickles and examine and inspect such positions as General Sickles thought good for artillery, and to give General Sickles the benefit of his judgment."

General Meade's "general instructions" to me were all verbal and extremely vague and indefinite. As I have said, he was wholly preoccupied with his right flank. None of his instructions contemplated the probability of an attack on his left. The only definite instruction that reached me from General Meade before the battle opened on July 2d was that I should relieve Geary's division, which he had ordered over to the right. I at once reported to him that I found no troops on the left, except Buford's cavalry; that Geary's division had not been in position at all; that it was massed to the right of Round Top during the night of the 1st of July, and had moved over to Culp's Hill before I had received his instructions to relieve it. In fact this was the only instruction, general or particular, the only order of any nature or kind, that I had received from General Meade on the 2d of July from daybreak in the morning until 6 o'clock in the evening, when I was wounded. I had no communication from General Geary whatever. He had left the field, and there was no staff-officer or representative of General Geary to indicate his position, and for obvious reasons, because he was not in position. He had bivouacked for the night

on the left, and when his corps, under Slocum, went into position on Culp's Hill on the right he followed it.

I am persuaded that Generals Slocum, Howard, Pleasonton, Doubleday, Robinson, Howe, and Williams, and other corps and division commanders of the Army of the Potomac would agree with me in the observation that General Meade was very imperfectly informed as to the movements and operations of his corps, divisions, and brigades of the army, during the first and second days of July, 1863. I am unwilling to attribute to General Meade an intention to do injustice to any of the troops under his command, yet much, very much, injustice was done. No adequate recognition was accorded to the First and Eleventh corps, by whose sacrifices and by the sagacity of whose leaders we seized from the enemy the impregnable position of Cemetery Ridge. The heroic stand made by John Buford on the Cashtown road on the morning of the 1st of July; the brilliant deployments of his cavalry, holding the enemy in check for hours until Reynolds came up with his leading division under Wadsworth, are barely mentioned. In truth the cavalry under Pleasonton and Buford and Gregg and Kilpatrick, to which General Meade owed so much of his success, and the artillery under General Hunt, equally brilliant in its service, received no adequate appreciation. I have already given examples in which whole corps and divisions of infantry are placed in positions by General Meade, in his report, other than those they occupied, so that it will be seen that it is by no means myself alone who complain of injustice at the hands of General Meade. In my belief the forced march I made of twelve miles over a difficult road in the heat of a July afternoon, with troops which had been without rest from the Rappahannock to the heart of Pennsylvania, a march made without orders, on my own responsibility, to help the overtasked troops of Howard — in my belief this was a soldierly act that deserved recognition at the hands of the commanding general. Yet it is not mentioned either in General Meade's official report or in his confidential letter. Why is it that General Meade is so unwilling to praise where praise might be bestowed, and is so lavish of censure where censure might be more gracefully suppressed, even if an error of judgment had been committed by an officer who paid dearly enough for the zeal which exposed himself and his command to the shock of the enemy's assaults? "I am of the opinion," says General Meade in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, "that General Sickles did what he thought was for the best, but I differed from him in judgment." Here is no question of orders disobeyed or of instructions disregarded, and here I leave the issue where General Meade puts it. Military critics more competent than I will decide whether General Meade's judgment or my judgment was correct.

THE CONFEDERATE RETREAT FROM GETTYSBURG.

BY JOHN D. IMBODEN, BRIGADIER-GENERAL, C. S. A.



DURING the Gettysburg campaign, my command—an independent brigade of cavalry—was engaged, by General Lee's confidential orders, in raids on the left flank of his advancing army, destroying railroad bridges and cutting the canal below Cumberland wherever I could—so that I did not reach the field till noon of the last day's battle. I reported direct to General Lee for orders, and was assigned a position to aid in repelling any cavalry demonstration on his rear. None of a serious character being made, my little force took no part in the battle, but were merely spectators of the scene, which transcended in grandeur any that I beheld in any other battle of the war.

When night closed the struggle, Lee's army was repulsed. We all knew that the day had gone against us, but the full extent of the disaster was only known in high quarters. The carnage of the day was generally understood to have been frightful, yet our army was not in retreat, and it was surmised in camp that with to-morrow's dawn would come a renewal of the struggle. All felt and appreciated the momentous consequences to the cause of Southern independence of final defeat or victory on that great field.

It was a warm summer's night; there were few camp-fires, and the weary soldiers were lying in groups on the luxuriant grass of the beautiful meadows, discussing the events of the day, speculating on the morrow, or watching that our horses did not straggle off while browsing. About 11 o'clock a horseman came to summon me to General Lee. I promptly mounted and, accompanied by Lieutenant George W. McPhail, an aide on my staff, and guided by the courier who brought the message, rode about two miles toward Gettysburg to where half a dozen small tents were pointed out, a little way from the roadside to our left, as General Lee's headquarters for the night. On inquiry I found that he was not there, but had gone to the headquarters of General A. P. Hill, about half a mile nearer to Gettysburg. When we reached the place indicated, a single flickering candle, visible from the road through the open front of a common wall-tent, exposed to view Generals Lee and Hill seated on camp-stools with a map spread upon their knees. Dismounting, I approached on foot. After exchanging the ordinary salutations General Lee directed me to go back to his headquarters and wait for him. I did so, but he did not make his appearance until about 1 o'clock, when he came riding alone, at a slow walk, and evidently wrapped in profound thought.

When he arrived there was not even a sentinel on duty at his tent, and no one of his staff was awake. The moon was high in the clear sky and the silent scene was unusually vivid. As he approached and saw us lying on the

grass under a tree, he spoke, reined in his jaded horse, and essayed to dismount. The effort to do so betrayed so much physical exhaustion that I hurriedly rose and stepped forward to assist him, but before I reached his side he had succeeded in alighting, and threw his arm across the saddle to rest, and fixing his eyes upon the ground leaned in silence and almost motionless upon his equally weary horse,—the two forming a striking and never-to-be-forgotten group. The moon shone full upon his massive features and revealed an expression of sadness that I had never before seen upon his face. Awed by his appearance I waited for him to speak until the silence became embarrassing, when, to break it and change the silent current of his thoughts, I ventured to remark, in a sympathetic tone, and in allusion to his great fatigue :

“General, this has been a hard day on you.”

He looked up, and replied mournfully :

“Yes, it has been a sad, sad day to us,” and immediately relapsed into his thoughtful mood and attitude. Being unwilling again to intrude upon his reflections, I said no more. After perhaps a minute or two, he suddenly straightened up to his full height, and turning to me with more animation and excitement of manner than I had ever seen in him before, for he was a man of wonderful equanimity, he said in a voice tremulous with emotion :

“I never saw troops behave more magnificently than Pickett’s division of Virginians did to-day in that grand charge upon the enemy. And if they had been supported as they were to have been,—but, for some reason not yet fully explained to me, were not,—we would have held the position and the day would have been ours.” After a moment’s pause he added in a loud voice, in a tone almost of agony, “Too bad! *Too bad!* OH! TOO BAD!”

I shall never forget his language, his manner, and his appearance of mental suffering. In a few moments all emotion was suppressed, and he spoke feelingly of several of his fallen and trusted officers; among others of Brigadier-Generals Armistead, Garnett, and Kemper of Pickett’s division. He invited me into his tent, and as soon as we were seated he remarked :

!Of interest in this connection is a letter written by General Lee to Mr. Davis from Camp Orange on the 8th of August, 1863, and first printed in “A Piece of Secret History,” by Colonel C. C. Jones, Jr., in “The Century” (old series) for February, 1876. In this letter General Lee speaks in the highest terms of his army, and says, in part :

“ . . . We must expect reverses, even defeats. They are sent to teach us wisdom and prudence, to call forth greater energies, and to prevent our falling into greater disasters. Our people have only to be true and united, to bear manfully the misfortunes incident to war, and all will come right in the end.

“I know how prone we are to censure, and how ready to blame others for the nonfulfillment of our expectations. This is unbecoming in a generous people, and I grieve to see its expression. The general remedy for the want of success in a military commander is his removal. This is natural, and in many instances proper. For, no matter what may be the ability of the officer, if he loses the confidence of his troops, disaster must sooner or later ensue.

“I have been prompted by these reflections more than once since my return from Penna. to propose to your Exc’y the propriety of selecting another commander for this army. I have seen and heard of expressions of discontent in the public journals at the result of the expedition. I do not know how far this feeling extends in the army. My brother officers have been too kind to report it, and so far the troops have been too generous to exhibit it. It is fair, however, to suppose that it does exist, and success is so necessary to us that nothing should be risked to secure it. I therefore, in all sincerity, request your Exc’y to take measures to supply my place. I do this with the more earnestness because no one is more aware than myself of my inability for the duties of my position. I cannot even accomplish what I myself desire. How can I fulfill the expectations of others? . . .

“I have no complaints to make of any one but myself. I have received nothing but kindness from those above me, and the most considerate attention from my comrades and companions in arms. To your Excellency I am specially indebted for uniform kindness and consideration. You have done everything in your power to aid me in the work committed to my charge, without omitting anything to promote the general welfare. . . .”

"We must now return to Virginia. As many of our poor wounded as possible must be taken home. I have sent for you, because your men and horses are fresh and in good condition, to guard and conduct our train back to Virginia. The duty will be arduous, responsible, and dangerous, for I am afraid you will be harassed by the enemy's cavalry. How many men have you?"

"About 2100 effective present, and all well mounted, including McClanahan's six-gun battery of horse artillery."

"I can spare you as much artillery as you require," he said, "but no other troops, as I shall need all I have to return safely by a different and shorter route than yours. The batteries are generally short of ammunition, but you will probably meet a supply I have ordered from Winchester to Williamsport. Nearly all the transportation and the care of all the wounded will be intrusted to you. You will recross the mountain by the Chambersburg road, and then proceed to Williamsport by any route you deem best, and without a halt till you reach the river. Rest there long enough to feed your animals; then ford the river, and do not halt again till you reach Winchester, where I will again communicate with you."

After a good deal of conversation about roads, and the best disposition of my forces to cover and protect the vast train, he directed that the chiefs of his staff departments should be waked up to receive, in my presence, his orders to collect as early next day as possible all the wagons and ambulances which I was to convoy, and have them in readiness for me to take command of them. His medical director [Dr. Lafayette Guild] was charged to see that all the wounded who could bear the rough journey should be placed in the empty wagons and ambulances. He then remarked to me that his general instructions would be sent to me in writing the following morning. As I was about leaving to return to my camp, as late, I think, as 2 A. M., he came out of his tent to where I was about to mount, and said in an undertone: "I will place in your hands by a staff-officer, to-morrow morning, a sealed package for President Davis, which you will retain in your possession till you are across the Potomac, when you will detail a reliable commissioned officer to take it to Richmond with all possible dispatch and deliver it into the President's own hands. And I impress it on you that, whatever happens, this package must not fall into the hands of the enemy. If unfortunately you should be captured, destroy it at the first opportunity."

On the morning of July 4th my written instructions, and a large official envelope addressed to President Davis, were handed to me by a staff-officer.

It was apparent by 9 o'clock that the wagons, ambulances, and wounded could not be collected and made ready to move till late in the afternoon. General Lee sent to me eight Napoleon guns of the famous Washington Artillery of New Orleans, under the immediate command of Major Eshleman, one of the best artillery officers in the army, a four-gun battery under Captain Tanner, and a Whitworth under Lieutenant Pegram. Hampton's cavalry brigade, then under command of Colonel P. M. B. Young, with Captain James F. Hart's four-gun battery of horse artillery, was ordered to cover the rear of all trains



GOOD-BYE!

moving under my convoy on the Chambersburg road. These 17 guns and McClanahan's 6 guns gave us 23 pieces in all for the defense of the trains.

Shortly after noon of the 4th the very windows of heaven seemed to have opened. The rain fell in blinding sheets; the meadows were soon overflowed, and fences gave way before the raging streams. During the storm, wagons, ambulances, and artillery carriages by hundreds—nay, by thousands—were assembling in the fields along the road from Gettysburg to Cashtown, in one confused and apparently inextricable mass. As the afternoon wore on there was no abatement in the storm. Canvas was no protection against its fury, and the wounded men lying upon the naked boards of the wagon-bodies were drenched. Horses and mules were blinded and maddened by the wind and water, and became almost unmanageable. The deafening roar of the mingled sounds of heaven and earth all around us made it almost impossible to communicate orders, and equally difficult to execute them.

About 4 P. M. the head of the column was put in motion near Cashtown, and began the ascent of the mountain in the direction of Chambersburg. I remained at Cashtown giving directions and putting in detachments of guns and troops at what I estimated to be intervals of a quarter or a third of a mile. It was found from the position of the head of the column west of the mountain at dawn of the 5th—the hour at which Young's cavalry and Hart's battery began the ascent of the mountain near Cashtown—that the entire column was seventeen miles long when drawn out on the road and put in motion. As an advance-guard I had placed the 18th Virginia Cavalry, Colonel George W. Imboden, in front with a section of McClanahan's battery.

Next to them, by request, was placed an ambulance carrying, stretched side by side, two of North Carolina's most distinguished soldiers, Generals Pender and Scales, both badly wounded, but resolved to bear the tortures of the journey rather than become prisoners. I shared a little bread and meat with them at noon, and they waited patiently for hours for the head of the column to move. The trip cost poor Pender his life. General Scales appeared to be worse hurt, but stopped at Winchester, recovered, and fought through the war.

After dark I set out from Cashtown to gain the head of the column during the night. My orders had been peremptory that there should be no halt for any cause whatever. If an accident should happen to any vehicle, it was immediately to be put out of the road and abandoned. The column moved rapidly, considering the rough roads and the darkness, and from almost every wagon for many miles issued heart-rending wails of agony. For four hours I hurried forward on my way to the front, and in all that time I was never out of hearing of the groans and cries of the wounded and dying. Scarcely one in a hundred had received adequate surgical aid, owing to the demands on the hard-working surgeons from still worse cases that had to be left behind. Many of the wounded in the wagons had been without food for thirty-six hours. Their torn and bloody clothing, matted and hardened, was rasping the tender, inflamed, and still oozing wounds. Very few of the wagons had even a layer of straw in them, and all were without springs. The road was rough and rocky from the heavy washings of the preceding day. The jolting was enough to have killed strong men, if long exposed to it. From nearly every wagon as the teams trotted on, urged by whip and shout, came such cries and shrieks as these :

“O God! why can't I die?”

“My God! will no one have mercy and kill me?”

“Stop! Oh! for God's sake, stop just for one minute; take me out and leave me to die on the roadside.”

“I am dying! I am dying! My poor wife, my dear children, what will become of you?”

Some were simply moaning; some were praying, and others uttering the most fearful oaths and execrations that despair and agony could wring from them; while a majority, with a stoicism sustained by sublime devotion to the cause they fought for, endured without complaint unspeakable tortures, and even spoke words of cheer and comfort to their unhappy comrades of less will or more acute nerves. Occasionally a wagon would be passed from which only low, deep moans could be heard. No help could be rendered to any of the sufferers. No heed could be given to any of their appeals. Mercy and duty to the many forbade the loss of a moment in the vain effort then and there to comply with the prayers of the few. On! On! we *must* move on. The storm continued, and the darkness was appalling. There was no time even to fill a canteen with water for a dying man; for, except the drivers and the guards, all were wounded and utterly helpless in that vast procession of misery. During this one night I realized more of the horrors of war than I had in all the two preceding years.

And yet in the darkness was our safety, for no enemy would dare attack where he could not distinguish friend from foe. We knew that when day broke upon us we should be harassed by bands of cavalry hanging on our flanks. Therefore our aim was to go as far as possible under cover of the night. Instead of going through Chambersburg, I decided to leave the main road near Fairfield after crossing the mountains, and take "a near cut" across the country to Greencastle, where daybreak on the morning of the 5th of July found the head of our column. We were now twelve or fifteen miles from the Potomac at Williamsport, our point of crossing into Virginia.

Here our apprehended troubles began. After the advance — the 18th Virginia Cavalry — had passed perhaps a mile beyond the town, the citizens to the number of thirty or forty attacked the train with axes, cutting the spokes out of ten or a dozen wheels and dropping the wagons in the streets. The moment I heard of it I sent back a detachment of cavalry to capture every citizen who had been engaged in this work, and treat them as prisoners of war. This stopped the trouble there, but the Union cavalry began to swarm down upon us from the fields and cross-roads, making their attacks in small bodies, and striking the column where there were few or no guards, and thus creating great confusion. I had a narrow escape from capture by one of these parties — of perhaps fifty men that I tried to drive off with canister from two of McClanahan's guns that were close at hand. They would perhaps have been too much for me, had not Colonel Imboden, hearing the firing turned back with his regiment at a gallop, and by the suddenness of his movement surrounded and caught the entire party.

To add to our perplexities still further, a report reached me a little after sunrise, that the Federals in large force held Williamsport. I did not fully credit this, and decided to push on. Fortunately the report was untrue. After a great deal of desultory fighting and harassments along the road during the day, nearly the whole of the immense train reached Williamsport on the afternoon of the 5th. A part of it, with Hart's battery, came in next day, General Young having halted and turned his attention to guarding the road from the west with his cavalry. We took possession of the town to convert it into a great hospital for the thousands of wounded we had brought from Gettysburg. I required all the families in the place to go to cooking for the sick and wounded, on pain of having their kitchens occupied for that purpose by my men. They readily complied. A large number of surgeons had accompanied the train, and these at once pulled off their coats and went to work, and soon a vast amount of suffering was mitigated. The bodies of a few who had died on the march were buried. All this became necessary because the tremendous rains had raised the river more than ten feet above the fording stage of water, and we could not possibly cross then. There were two small ferry-boats or "flats" there, which I immediately put into requisition to carry across those of the wounded, who, after being fed and having their wounds dressed, thought they could walk to Winchester. Quite a large number were able to do this, so that the "flats" were kept running all the time.



THE RETREAT FROM GETTYSBURG.

Our situation was frightful. We had probably ten thousand animals and nearly all the wagons of General Lee's army under our charge, and all the wounded, to the number of several thousand, that could be brought from Gettysburg. Our supply of provisions consisted of a few wagon-loads of flour in my own brigade train, a small lot of fine fat cattle which I had collected in Pennsylvania on my way to Gettysburg, and some sugar and coffee procured in the same way at Mercersburg.

The town of Williamsport is located in the lower angle formed by the Potomac with Conococheague Creek. These streams inclose the town on two sides, and back of it about one mile there is a low range of hills that is crossed by four roads converging at the town. The first is the Greencastle road leading down the creek valley; next the Hagerstown road; then the Boonsboro' road; and lastly the River road. [See map, p. 246.]

Early on the morning of the 6th I received intelligence of the approach from Frederick of a large body of cavalry with three full batteries of six rifled guns. These were the divisions of Generals Buford and Kilpatrick, and Huey's brigade of Gregg's division, consisting, as I afterward learned, of 23 regiments of cavalry, and 18 guns, a total force of about 7000 men.

I immediately posted my guns on the hills that concealed the town, and dismounted my own command to support them—and ordered as many of the wagoners to be formed as could be armed with the guns of the wounded that we had brought from Gettysburg. In this I was greatly aided by Colonel J. L. Black of South Carolina, Captain J. F. Hart commanding a battery from

the same State, Colonel William R. Aylett of Virginia, and other wounded officers. By noon about 700 wagoners were organized into companies of 100 each and officered by wounded line-officers and commissaries and quartermasters,—about 250 of these were given to Colonel Aylett on the right next the river,—about as many under Colonel Black on the left, and the residue were used as skirmishers. My own command proper was held well in hand in the center.

The enemy appeared in our front about half-past one o'clock on both the Hagerstown and Boonsboro' roads, and the fight began. Every man under my command understood that if we did not repulse the enemy we should all be captured and General Lee's army be ruined by the loss of its transportation, which at that period could not have been replaced in the Confederacy. The fight began with artillery on both sides. The firing from our side was very rapid, and seemed to make the enemy hesitate about advancing. In a half hour J. D. Moore's battery ran out of ammunition, but as an ordnance train had arrived from Winchester, two wagon-loads of ammunition were ferried across the river and run upon the field behind the guns, and the boxes tumbled out, to be broken open with axes. With this fresh supply our guns were all soon in full play again. As the enemy could not see the supports of our batteries from the hill-tops, I moved the whole line forward to his full view, in single ranks, to show a long front on the Hagerstown approach. My line passed our guns fifty or one hundred yards, where they were halted awhile, and then were withdrawn behind the hill-top again, slowly and steadily.

Leaving Black's wagoners and the Marylanders on the left to support Hart's and Moore's batteries, Captain Hart having been put in command by Colonel Black when he was obliged to be elsewhere, I moved the 18th Virginia Cavalry and 62d Virginia Mounted Infantry rapidly to the right, to meet and repel five advancing regiments (dismounted) of the enemy. My three regiments, with Captain John H. McNeill's Partisan Rangers and Aylett's wagoners, had to sustain a very severe contest. Hart, seeing how hard we were pressed on the right, charged the enemy's right with his little command, and at the same time Eshleman with his eight Napoleons advanced four hundred yards to the front, and got an enfilading position, from which, with the aid of McClanahan's battery, he poured a furious fire into the enemy's line. The 62d and Aylett, supported by the 18th Cavalry, and McNeill, charged the enemy who fell back sullenly to their horses.

Night was now rapidly approaching, when a messenger from Fitzhugh Lee arrived to urge me to "hold my own," as he would be up in a half hour with three thousand fresh men. The news was sent along our whole line, and was received with a wild and exultant yell. We knew then that the field was won, and slowly pressed forward. Almost at the same moment we heard distant guns on the enemy's rear and right on the Hagerstown road. They were Stuart's, who was approaching on that road, while Fitzhugh Lee was coming on the Greencastle road. That settled the contest. The enemy broke to the left and fled by the Boonsboro' road. It was too dark to follow. When General Fitzhugh Lee joined me with his staff on the field, one of

the enemy's shells came near striking him. General Lee thought it came from Eshleman's battery, till, a moment later, he saw a blaze from its gun streaming away from us.

We captured about 125 of the enemy who failed to reach their horses. I could never ascertain the loss on either side. I estimated ours at about 125. The wagoners fought so well that this came to be known as "the wagoners' fight." Quite a number of them were killed in storming a farm from which sharp-shooters were rapidly picking off Eshleman's men and horses.

My whole force engaged, wagoners included, did not exceed three thousand men. The ruse practiced by showing a formidable line on the left, then withdrawing it to fight on the right, together with our numerous artillery, 23 guns, led to the belief that our force was much greater.

By extraordinary good fortune we had thus saved all of General Lee's trains. A bold charge at any time before sunset would have broken our feeble lines, and then we should all have fallen an easy prey to the Federals. The next day our army arrived from Gettysburg, and the country is familiar with the way it escaped across the Potomac on the night of the 13th of July.

It may be interesting to repeat one or two facts to show the peril in which the army was till the river could be bridged. Over four thousand prisoners taken at Gettysburg were ferried across the river by the morning of the 9th, and I was ordered with a single regiment, the 62d Virginia, to guard them to Staunton and send them on to Richmond. When the general assigned me to this duty he expressed an apprehension that before I could reach Winchester the Federal cavalry would cross at Harper's Ferry, intercept and capture my guard and release the prisoners. Before we had left the river I had an interview with him at his headquarters near Hagerstown, in which he expressed great impatience at the tardiness in building rude pontoons at the river, and calling in Colonel James L. Corley, his chief quartermaster, told him to put Major John A. Harman in charge of the work; remarking that without Harman's extraordinary energy to conduct the work, the pontoons would not be done for several days. Harman took charge that day, and by tearing down warehouses on the canal got joists to build boats with, and in twenty-four hours had enough of them ready to float down to Falling Waters and construct a bridge. As we were talking General Longstreet came into the tent, wet and muddy, and was cordially greeted by General Lee in this wise: "Well, my old war-horse, what news do you bring us from the front?" That cordial greeting between chief and lieutenant is a sufficient answer, in my mind, to the statements of alleged ill feeling between the two men growing out of affairs at Gettysburg. It has been said that if "Stonewall" Jackson had been in command at Gettysburg, Longstreet would have been shot. This is a monstrous imputation upon General Lee, no less than upon Longstreet, and utterly without foundation, in my opinion. They were surely cordial on the 9th of July, 1863.

Before I had gone two miles on my anxious march toward Winchester a courier overtook me with a note from General Lee directing me to return immediately to his headquarters. I halted my column, hurried back, was ferried over the river, and galloped out on the Hagerstown road to where I had

parted from the general that morning. He had left with his staff to ride toward Hagerstown, where a heavy artillery fire indicated an attack by the enemy in considerable force. When I overtook him he said that he understood I was familiar with the fords of the Potomac from Williamsport to Cumberland, and with the roads to them. I replied that I was. He then called up one of his staff, either General Long or General Alexander, I think, and directed him to write down my answers to his questions, and required me to name and describe ford after ford all the way up to Cumberland, and to describe minutely their character, and the roads and surrounding country on both sides of the river, and directed me, after I had given him all the information I could, to send to him my brother and his regiment, the 18th Virginia Cavalry, to act as an advance and guide if he should require it. He did not say so, but I felt that his situation was precarious in the extreme. When about to dismiss me, referring to the freshet in the river he laughingly said: "You know this country well enough to tell me whether it ever quits raining about here? If so, I should like to see a clear day soon." I did not see him again till he left the Shenandoah Valley for the east side of the Blue Ridge.



BRIGADIER-GENERAL J. JOHNSTON PETTIGREW,
C. S. A., KILLED IN AN ACTION AT FALL-
ING WATERS, MD., JULY 14, 1863.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

A PRISONER'S MARCH FROM GETTYSBURG TO STAUNTON.

BY JOHN L. COLLINS, 8TH PENNSYLVANIA CAVALRY.



CONFEDERATE VIDEITE.

ON the 4th, when Lee's movement of withdrawal became known, the cavalry was ordered to throw itself between the Confederate army and the Potomac. To do this the different divisions were headed for the gaps and passes through which the trains sent under escort in advance were escaping over the mountains to Williamsport.

The regiment to which I belonged was in Gregg's division, but having become detached with the rest of the brigade during the three days of the battle, it united with two other brigades under General Kilpatrick

and made an attack upon a Confederate train near Monterey. The fight took place before midnight the first day of the march, the train was burned, the guard was made prisoners, and then our command pushed on after another train that was reported ahead of the one we destroyed. A few whose horses were killed or disabled were ordered back to the division for a remount, instead of being mounted upon the enemy's horses. I disobeyed the orders, and hoping to get one of the enemy's horses I led my own and followed on foot. I soon lost sight of the brigade, however, but toiled along the dark and rough road, until my horse, which at first could walk with only the weight of the saddle, refused to go any farther. As the day was breaking, I was examining and washing the poor creature's wounded shoulder, when I was surprised by about 150 Confederate cavalry, whose approach I had hailed as that of friends. At a motion from their colonel three men dismounted, the foremost of whom held out his hand to me and cheerfully said: "Good morning, sir! I am

sorry to say you are a prisoner." The other two went toward my arms, which were piled on the saddle on the roadside, and, holding them up, exclaimed, "What splendid arms he has!" Surprise and the novelty of the first man's greeting kept me from realizing my position until I saw them take my carbine, saber, and pistol. Then my heart sank.

Those "splendid arms" had been my companions for two years, and two months previously I had been publicly commended for bringing them with me through the enemy's ranks when my horse was shot inside their lines as we charged upon Jackson's men at Chancellorsville. But such is war, and I bade them a sorrowful adieu, as I looked from them to the faces of my captors, some of which showed sympathy, some indifference, while all seemed manly and soldierly. The commander alone took no notice of me or my arms; he gazed up the road through the gray light of the morning as if bent on some bold manœuvre, and then said to one of his men in a loud voice: "Tell General Lee (Fitzhugh) that there is a regiment of Yankee cavalry half a mile up the road, and ask him if I shall charge them."

The man galloped back, and without waiting for General Lee's orders, the colonel wheeled his men and galloped after him,—such a piece of cheap braggadocio as I had seen displayed by some of our own colonels. I was left in the care of two men to put the saddle on my horse and follow at a walk. My guards were frank, and in answer to my question told me that they belonged to General William E. Jones's brigade, that they had been captured in the fight just mentioned, and had escaped during the night from Kilpatrick who was more intent in overtaking larger bodies than in watching the few hundred he had taken. Between midnight and daybreak the colonel and about 150 men came together in the woods and fell in with General Fitzhugh Lee, who was then slipping out between two divisions of our cavalry.

About noon I was introduced to about thirty of those who had been sent back for horses to the division, and had shared my fate. We were with General Stuart's headquarters, as he was moving in the center of his brigades—they being pushed out in every direction, trying to keep a road clear for their infantry and artillery.

A young Virginian about my own age, but with much more suavity and self-complacency than I could claim, introduced himself to me and told me that he belonged to the "King and Queen" cavalry (1st Virginia, I think), and said that they knew my regiment well, and considered it a "rough one to deal with." He asked me if I remembered all the skirmishes we had as we advanced from New Kent Court House to the Chickahominy, which I did well, and then when we had become quite well acquainted, asked me if I would have any objections to exchanging saddles with him. I had not the least, as I never expected to sit on mine again, and when we stopped on the roadside to make the exchange I walked back into the ranks without my horse, as I saw no reason why I should bother leading him along for my captors to ride, if he should

ever get well. Fresh prisoners were added all the time, mostly cavalry, and we marched along through the mountains the entire day. Stuart and his staff rode in our midst—rather an imprudent thing, I thought, for many of the men observed him closely with reference to a future meeting. I know it was in my mind every time I looked at him, though I had no malice and nothing to complain of in regard to my treatment. Within a year he fell by the carbine of a cavalryman whose regiment was at this time well represented among the prisoners.

The day was a hard one for me, used to fatigue and fasting though I was. The roads were the roughest and narrowest that could be found, and I had eaten nothing since the previous day, having lost my haversack during the night. I was at last compelled to tell one of the guards that I was very hungry, and he apologized for having nothing to give me, but promised to see that I got something before we went much farther. He left the ranks soon and shortly afterward returned with some bread and butter, which he divided with me. Later in the afternoon foragers brought us in rations collected from the farm-houses.

Just before sunset, as we were going through a gap, a rapid exchange of shots was heard ahead of us, and both prisoners and captors became excited. A few moments later we were near enough to look out into the plain beyond; we saw the Confederates in front of us dismounting and deploying as skirmishers, and my heart bounded as I saw my own regiment drawn up for a charge about five hundred yards away! I began to cry like a child; I thought that I would be free again in about ten minutes, with my friends; that I would be armed and mounted as twenty-four hours before. The question, How did I know my regiment? naturally comes, and is as easily answered. I could distinguish the companies by the color of their horses, and knew the order of the squadrons in the line. The black horses of troop C and the light bays of H formed the first squadron, the sorrel horses of E and the dark bays of G formed the next, and so on. The troops changed squadron often to suit the seniority of the captains, and the squadrons changed positions in the regiment for the same reason, but the combination of companies before me now had been that of the regiment for a week at least.

A call was made for sharpshooters, and those who dismounted and presented themselves were supplied with cartridges and sent into the cornfield in front of us. But my regiment seemed disinclined to charge, and merely threw out skirmishers to meet them. Some of the Confederates enthusiastically cried, "My! won't the sharpshooters make it hot for that cavalry!"

Though the firing became brisk, it wearied me; I wanted the charge, because I was sure that a vigorous attack would send our guards fleeing without us in less than five minutes. One of them, a quiet, pleasant-faced man, as were many of the others, noticed my dejected look, came to me, and, swinging himself from his saddle to a fence-rail,

took a Testament from his pocket, and asked me if I objected to his reading a chapter aloud. I thankfully asked him to do so, as I had not had heart enough to read my own that day. He read a chapter in one of Paul's epistles, and when he had concluded remarked that he would feel fifty per cent. better if the country were at peace and he at home that night. I must add that while he was reading I held Quaker principles myself, for I was pained to think I was an enemy of that fair-minded Christian young man who, like myself, thought he was right in engaging in a career of destruction to life and property. But we were both reminded that it was war and not peace by the call of "More ammunition" for the sharp-shooters, and our guards had to supply it from their boxes, it being apparently scarce.

Now is the time for a charge, I thought. General Stuart had not more than three hundred men, encumbered by as many prisoners, and the regiment in front had five hundred in line. But while their commander hesitated, General Stuart, whose genius and courage had gotten him out of many a difficulty, proved himself equal to the present emergency. While his skirmishers were firing their last cartridges he made us fall in by fours, and marched us two or three times across the opening. We were mistaken in the twilight for Confederate infantry coming up, and then his whole column was moved along the edge of the corn-field, keeping the skirmishers between us and my regiment, which moved parallel with us, until darkness shut them out from my view.

The next morning Stuart's men were gone, and we were guarded toward the Potomac by Pickett's division. I regretted the change, the rank and file of the cavalry were so different from what I had expected to find the Southern soldiers. They were quiet, courteous, and considerate; they all seemed young, of light build with fair or sandy complexions predominant; and, better than all, they had more by far than the average share of intelligence. The infantry that took their place were nearer my conception of the Southern soldier. But I must not blame the poor fellows if they had not the kindness and elasticity of the cavalry. They were out of heart—a large part of their division had been left on the field on the 3d of July, and besides the commander of the division there was only one officer above the rank of captain left in it.

We were halted by the roadside often during the day to let Confederate troops hurry past us. In one of these halts General Longstreet was pointed out to me with evident pride by a staff-officer who had turned aside to make some courteous remarks to me. I told the officer as politely as I could that I thought they were badly beaten, and would hardly get across the Potomac. He laughed and said that they were not trying to get across,—that Baltimore was their objective point just then; from there, he explained, it was but a forced march to Washington, and once there they could conquer a peace in thirty days. His hopes amused me; I remembered that when retreating from the Chickahominy and from Chancellorsville I did not know anything of defeat, but thought I was marching to victory by another road.

The next time we were halted I was not so pleasantly entertained. I sat on a high bank watching the various regiments and batteries go by, when a haughty young officer rode up, looking at the prisoners' feet, as if he wanted a pair of boots. Several of the men concealed theirs by drawing them up, but I did not; the soles of mine were coming off, for two days' march over rough roads was something the contractor for cavalry boots had not contemplated. The officer pulled up in front of me, however, and said in an overbearing manner, "I want those spurs." I merely looked at them and nodded. "Hand them to me," he said sternly. "They were given to me for the United States service, not for rebel service," I said, stung by his manner. "Oh!" he scornfully remarked, "I suppose you know you are a prisoner?" "Yes, I have been nearly two days without food; that convinces me." "And when a soldier is taken, his horse, his arms, and equipments are his captor's?" "Yes, mine are all gone." "And his spurs, too?" "Yes, and his boots sometimes." "Hand me your spurs, then." "Take them, if you want them, I won't hand them to you." He took out his pistol and raised it, but controlling himself lowered it and moved away. Then he turned his horse and demanded them again. The same answer, and the same arguments were repeated; the pistol was pointed at me, but his soldierly qualities triumphed over his temper as before. There seemed no way out of the difficulty; he was determined to have the spurs, but too proud to dismount and unbuckle them, and I was too stubborn to yield. At last one of Pickett's men came up and took them off, and the officer rode away with them.

Before I left the spot I kicked off my boots, for they seemed made only to carry spurs, and went barefoot the rest of the way to Richmond. The prisoners who on the first day had numbered only about 300, mostly cavalry, were now increased to nearly as many thousands, as the men taken at Gettysburg were added to us. Besides these, fresh cavalry prisoners were brought in every day. From them we heard of the extent of the victory, and the fighting that was still in progress, and we were assured by them that neither we nor our guards could ever reach the Potomac. This helped to restore the self-respect that a soldier partly loses when his arms are taken from him, and which continued captivity almost entirely destroys.

We were marched past a handsome house which had attracted our attention on our way to Gettysburg by the number of United States flags and the gayly dressed ladies waving handkerchiefs to us. They were waving them as boldly to the Confederates now, and the stars and stripes had been transformed into the stars and bars.

Some of the newly captured were badly wounded, but had no attention given them, except such crude service as their fellow-prisoners could do for them. None of our surgeons were captured, and I suppose those of the enemy had plenty to do among their own. One poor fellow of the 5th New York Cavalry had seventeen wounds which he got from the 11th Virginia. He was cut and slashed at every angle,

and when we had gotten some bandages and patched him up he looked ludicrously odd.

Before we entered Williamsport a correspondent, whom the Confederates had decided to let go, took the names of those who chose to give them to him, that their friends might learn their fate from the papers. I gave him mine, and though it was printed in a leading Philadelphia paper, I was afterward mortified to learn that only one of all my friends in that city had seen it. A dozen others there with whom I had correspondence supposed I had been killed.

At Williamsport all was crowded and in confusion. The Confederates were throwing up weak defenses in expectation of an attack. Our cavalry had cut their way in and destroyed the only bridge that Lee had left in his rear. Some of the poor fellows that must always get left on such occasions cheered us by telling us how they did it. Three regiments charged in,—one fought to the right, another to the left, while the third, supplied with straw and turpentine, dashed at the bridge, set fire to it, then cut it loose from its moorings and let it float down the river, a burning wreck. "Score another for the cavalry," we cried.

My hopes rose with the river, which was a seething flood, boiling over its banks; it seemed impossible to get us across the Potomac now. Rigging up a rope ferry, and getting the prisoners across on flat-boats was the work of two or three days, and then they encamped us on a hill a few days more, waiting for their army to follow. I think they feared an advance by Harper's Ferry and Martinsburg. The cavalry and flying artillery came from that direction; Imboden's men told us so, and I never gave up hope until we had passed Winchester. A brigade composed of infantry, cavalry, and artillery under General Imboden guarded us from this point to Staunton, a distance of over 120 miles, I think. It seemed five hundred miles to me, for I was barefooted and the pike had been recently repaired.

The mode of marching us was now for the first time systematic. We numbered at least four thousand men, and were divided into divisions, marching by columns of fours. The cavalry and artillery marched *en masse* between the divisions, while the infantry marched in two files, one at each side of the column. Imboden's brigade did not seem to have seen much hard service, at least I thought so because their clothes were new, yet the general had a new suit of gray on, and certainly he had seen plenty of hard service. The men were as kind to us as could be expected; only one unpleasant affair came under my observation all the way. In the heat of a discussion a guard clubbed his musket and struck a wounded man on the head. I have no doubt that the latter had his tongue to blame for it; but he was a prisoner and a wounded man, and the guard was promptly placed under arrest.

I have said nothing so far of the commissary arrangements simply because there was nothing to be said. I do not now remember getting anything to eat until we crossed the Potomac, except from Stuart's cavalry the first day of my captivity.

But my memory must fail me, for I could not have lived unless I had gotten something occasionally. After we left Williamsport the arrangements were regular—in their meagerness, too regular. We got about a pint of flour every other day, and with it now and then a piece of rusty fitch. Some of the men tried to make bread of the flour as we camped, but the greater number stirred it up in water, and drank the paste, saying that "it stuck to their ribs longer" that way. We got an extra ration at Martinsburg, that, out of compliment to the ladies, I ought not to forget. As we marched through the town the whole populace turned out to greet us, not as enemies but as friends and sympathizers. They cried out to us, to cheer up—not to be downhearted—that we had won a great victory at Gettysburg, and though we were being marched to prison we were already avenged by the thousands of rebels that were left dead or prisoners in Pennsylvania. They appeared to be well posted by the Northern newspapers, and right in the teeth of the guards they upbraided the Confederates for theft and violence north of the Potomac. It must have been very galling to Imboden's command to be reviled that way by their countrywomen, but they bore it with cast-down heads, and made no reply. We could not have done it, I fear, had we been the guards, and in Pennsylvania. At last some of our men, in reply to questions on the subject, said they did not give us anything to eat. There was a sudden rush for the houses, and in a few seconds the street was lined with women with dishes of cake, bread, and everything they could lay hands on with so short a notice.

The sight of the food threw our column into disorder. Some men tried to break out of the ranks, and this being resisted, the women tried to break in. In the confusion that followed a few women were pushed back to the street-curb and fell down. The falls were, I think, accidental; but the prisoners became furious when they saw them fall, they struck at the guards right and left, and overpowered many of them, bearing them to the ground. It looked for the moment as if there would be a general fight, which must result in the death of many prisoners and the escape of others; but this was prevented by the prompt action of the cavalry and artillery, marching near the scene of the revolt. Then the general, or some one for him, promised the people and the prisoners that the latter would be halted outside the town to receive the contributions. In an open wood by the roadside we were halted, and the guards themselves soon brought us the coveted food. The sly rascals must have tossed the dairies up in the blankets as they brought them along so that every man of us at a single grab could get a sample of all they sent. I got one good handful only, but it was a mixture of ginger-bread, cookies, cake, corn-bread, and everything else that the people of Martinsburg ate. It was here that the Barbara Fritchie's lived. After the battle of Antietam these women had laid planks on a torn up bridge for us, so that we could cross and drive Stuart's cavalry out of the town.

But notwithstanding this extra food at Martinsburg the low diet and the sharp stoues soon told

on my strength. My feet were sore, and my stomach was faint beyond endurance, and the climax was reached one day when my sight left me, and I threw myself down on the roadside to die. The rallying cry of "A cavalry charge" had no more effect on me; I knew they could not approach us now, and I gave up in despair as soon as I found I was blind. The guards tried to make me get up, but I listened with indifference to their threats to shoot me. The rear-guard of each division passed me with the same result for their efforts to rouse me, until at last the rear-guard of all came up; the officer in command assured me that it was his duty to kill me rather than leave me behind, and though I believed him I could not move, and merely told him so. At last he told a man to "run me through" with his bayonet, but I suppose there was a saving sign that I did not see, for after a pause I heard him tell the man to stay with me until a wagon came along and I could be taken and given something to eat. I never saw that officer, but I hope God saw his act of forbearance and humanity and rewarded him for it. There have been miserable cowards in either army who bullied and mistreated unfortunate prisoners when they had the power to do so, but the true soldier never did, and I never saw anything but kindness shown to the prisoners that my regiment took, and I never experienced anything but kindness from the men who guarded me from Gettysburg to Staunton.

After a long rest I was placed in a wagon and taken to a house where I got a big slice of bread and butter, and in a short time sight and strength returned, and I was able to march with the column. I ought to add for my own credit that I did not fall out again, though faint and hungry often enough. The towns through which we passed on our way up the Shenandoah Valley were apprised of our coming, and manifested a different spirit, of course, from that exhibited at Martinsburg. Many insulted and upbraided us, but some of our men who excelled in nothing else were mighty in vituperation and abusive eloquence, and these

paid back with interest all the taunts we received, often, I am sorry to say, surpassing the bounds of self-respect and decency.

We usually encamped in large meadows, through which streams of good water ran, and were here allowed to wash, eat, and sleep while our guards were posted around the fences. At one of those halts, as we approached Staunton, a farmer with his wife drove up close to the fence, and after taking a critical survey of the crowd he said indignantly: "Forty thousand Yankee prisoners! Why, I would bet the best farm in the valley that there isn't a quarter of them here!"

The heralds everywhere had doubtless added a harmless cipher to our real number.

At length—about the 20th of July, I think—we arrived at Staunton, weary and sore. We had marched about fifteen miles a day since we left Williamsport. As we entered Staunton some showed their love to their enemies by supplying us with tracts, but I am not sure that their kindness was appreciated by the prisoners as generally as was the attention paid to our hungry stomachs by the people of Martinsburg. While waiting there for transportation to Richmond we were amused to note the esteem in which the people held the Confederate money. Those who brought wares into our camp for sale at first refused to sell at all except for Federal money. When the officers threatened to expel from the camp any who did that, they would ask to see the money before naming the price, and if it was Federal, the pie was a quarter, but if Confederate, it would cost a dollar. One young army sharper—not one of our guards and not a Virginian—must have made a small fortune by exchanging money with our men at the rate of about two for one. He told them that at Richmond the respective values were even, but when we were marched through that city we found it to be as ten to one.

Our marches ended here; we were placed in box, or gravel cars, and at a slightly increased rate of speed were taken to Richmond.



CONFEDERATES CAPTURED AT GETTYSBURG. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

THE OPPOSING FORCES AT GETTYSBURG, PA.

July 1st-3d, 1863.

The composition, losses, and strength of each army as here stated give the gist of all the data obtainable in the Official Records. K stands for killed; w for wounded; m w for mortally wounded; m for captured or missing; e for captured.

THE UNION ARMY.

ARMY OF THE POTOMAC—Major-General George G. Meade. Staff loss: w, 4.

Command of the Provost Marshal General, Brig.-Gen. Marsena R. Patrick; 93d N. Y., [†]Lieut.-Col. Benjamin C. Butler; 8th U. S., [‡]Capt. Edwin W. H. Read; 2d Pa. Cav., Col. R. Butler Price; E and I, 6th Pa. Cav., Capt. James Starr; Detachments 1st, 2d, 5th and 6th, U. S. Cav. *Guards and Orderlies*: Oneida (N. Y.) Cav., Capt. Daniel P. Mann. *Artillery*, [‡]Brig.-Gen. Henry J. Hunt. *U. S. Engineer Battalion*, [‡]Capt. George H. Mendell.

FIRST ARMY CORPS, [‡]Maj.-Gen. Abner Doubleday, Maj.-Gen. John Newton. Staff loss: k, 1; w, 1=2.

General Headquarters: L, 1st Me. Cav., Capt. Constantine Taylor. Loss: k, 1; w, 2=3.

FIRST DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. James S. Wadsworth.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Solomon Meredith, Col. William W. Robinson; 19th Ind., Col. Samuel J. Williams; 24th Mich., Col. Henry A. Morrow (w), Capt. Albert M. Edwards; 2d Wis., Col. Leinefs Fahrenhild (w), Maj. John Mansfield (w), Capt. George H. Otis; 6th Wis., Lieut.-Col. Rufus R. Dawes; 7th Wis., Col. William W. Robinson, Maj. Mark Finnium. Brigade loss: k, 162; w, 724; m, 267=1153. *Second Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Lysander Cutler; 7th Ind., Col. Ira G. Grover; 76th N. Y., Maj. Andrew J. Grover (k), Capt. John E. Cook; 84th N. Y. (14th Militia), Col. Edward B. Fowler; 95th N. Y., Col. George H. Biddle (w), Maj. Edward Pye; 147th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Francis C. Miller (w), Maj. George Harney; 56th Pa., Col. J. William Hofmann. Brigade loss: k, 111; w, 498; m, 366=975.

SECOND DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. John C. Robinson. Staff loss: w, 1.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Gabriel R. Paul (w), Col. Samuel H. Leonard (w), Col. Adrian R. Root (w and e), Col. Richard Coulter (w), Col. Peter Lyle, Col. Richard Coulter; 16th Me., Col. Charles W. Tilden (e), Maj. Arelbald D. Leavitt; 13th Mass., Col. Samuel H. Leonard, Lieut.-Col. N. Walter Bateholder; 94th N. Y., Col. Adrian R. Root, Maj. Samuel A. Moffett; 104th N. Y., Col. Gilbert G. Prey; 107th Pa., Lieut.-Col. James MacThomson (w), Capt. Emanuel D. Roath. Brigade loss: k, 51; w, 357; m, 633=1041. *Second Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Henry Baxter; 12th Mass., Col. James L. Bates (w), Lieut.-Col. David Allen, Jr.; 83d N. Y. (9th Militia), Lieut.-Col. Joseph A. Moesch; 97th N. Y., Col. Charles Wheelock (e), Maj. Charles Northrup; 11th Pa., [‡]Col. Richard Coulter, Capt. Benjamin F. Haines (w), Capt. John B. Overmyer; 88th Pa., Maj. Benezet F. Fonst (w), Capt. Henry Whiteside; 90th Pa., Col. Peter Lyle, Maj. Alfred J. Sellers, Col. Peter Lyle. Brigade loss: k, 39; w, 255; m, 350=644.

THIRD DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Thomas A. Rowley, Maj.-Gen. Abner Doubleday. Staff loss: w, 1.

First Brigade, Col. Chapman Biddle (w), Brig.-Gen. Thomas A. Rowley, Col. Chapman Biddle; 80th N. Y. (20th Militia), Col. Theodore R. Gates; 121st Pa., Maj. Alexander Biddle, Col. Chapman Biddle, Maj. Alexander Biddle; 142d Pa., Col. Robert P. Cummins (k), Lieut.-Col. Alfred B. McCalmont; 151st Pa., Lieut.-Col. George F. McFarland (w), Capt. Walter L. Owens, Col. Harrison Allen. Brigade loss: k, 91; w, 548; m, 257=896. *Second Brigade*, Col. Roy Stone (w), Col. Langhorne Wister (w),

Col. Edmund L. Dana; 143d Pa., Col. Edmund L. Dana, Lieut.-Col. John D. Musser; 149th Pa., Lieut.-Col. Walton Dwight (w), Capt. James Glenn; 150th Pa., Col. Langhorne Wister, Lieut.-Col. Henry S. Huidekoper (w), Capt. Cornelius C. Widdis. Brigade loss: k, 84; w, 462; m, 306=852. *Third Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. George J. Stannard (w), Col. Francis V. Randall; 12th Vt., [‡]Col. Asa P. Blunt; 13th Vt., Col. Francis V. Randall, Maj. Joseph J. Boynton, Lieut.-Col. William D. Munson; 14th Vt., Col. William T. Nichols; 15th Vt., [‡]Col. Redfield Proctor; 16th Vt., Col. Wheelock G. Veazey. Brigade loss: k, 45; w, 274; m, 32=351.

ARTILLERY BRIGADE, Col. Charles S. Wainwright; 2d Me., Capt. James A. Hall; 5th Me., Capt. Greenleaf T. Stevens (w), Lieut. Edward N. Whittier; L, 1st N. Y. (E, 1st N. Y. attached), Capt. Gilbert H. Reynolds (w), Lieut. George Breck; B, 1st Pa., Capt. James H. Cooper; B, 4th U. S., Lieut. James Stewart (w). Brigade loss: k, 9; w, 86; m, 11=106.

SECOND ARMY CORPS, [‡]Maj.-Gen. Winfield S. Hancock (w), Brig.-Gen. John Gibbon (w). Staff loss: w, 3.

General Headquarters: D and K, 6th N. Y. Cav., Capt. Riley Johnson. Loss: k, 1; w, 3=4.

FIRST DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. John C. Caldwell.

First Brigade, Col. Edward E. Cross (k), Col. H. Boyd McKeen; 5th N. H., Lieut.-Col. Charles E. Hapgood; 61st N. Y., Lieut.-Col. K. Oscar Broady; 81st Pa., Col. H. Boyd McKeen, Lieut.-Col. Amos Stroh; 148th Pa., Lieut.-Col. Robert McFarlane. Brigade loss: k, 57; w, 260; m, 13=330. *Second Brigade*, Col. Patrick Kelly; 28th Mass., Col. Richard Byrnes; 63d N. Y. (2 co's), Lieut.-Col. Richard C. Bentley (w), Capt. Thomas Touhy; 69th N. Y. (2 co's), Capt. Richard Moroney (w), Lieut. James J. Smith; 88th N. Y. (2 co's), Capt. Denis F. Burke; 116th Pa. (4 co's), Maj. St. Clair A. Mulholland. Brigade loss: k, 27; w, 109; m, 62=198. *Third Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Samuel K. Zook (k), Lieut.-Col. John Fraser; 52d N. Y., Lieut.-Col. C. G. Frendenberg (w), Capt. William Scherrer; 57th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Alford B. Chapman; 66th N. Y., Col. Orlando H. Morris (w), Lieut.-Col. John S. Hammell (w), Maj. Peter Nelson; 140th Pa., Col. Richard P. Roberts (k), Lieut.-Col. John Fraser. Brigade loss: k, 49; w, 227; m, 82=358. *Fourth Brigade*, Col. John R. Brooke (w); 27th Conn. (2 co's), Lieut.-Col. Henry C. Merwin (k), Maj. James H. Coburn; 2d Del., Col. William P. Bailly, Capt. Charles H. Christman; 64th N. Y., Col. Daniel G. Bingham (w), Maj. Leman W. Bradley; 53d Pa., Lieut.-Col. Richards McMichael; 145th Pa. (7 co's), Col. Hiram L. Brown (w), Capt. John W. Reynolds (w), Capt. Moses W. Oliver. Brigade loss: k, 53; w, 281; m, 49=383.

SECOND DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. John Gibbon, Brig.-Gen. William Harrow. Staff loss: w, 3.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. William Harrow, Col. Francis E. Heath; 19th Me., Col. Francis E. Heath, Lieut.-Col. Henry W. Cunningham; 15th Mass., Col. George H. Ward (k), Lieut.-Col. George C. Joslin; 1st Minn. (2d Co. Minn. S. S. attached), Col. William Colvill, Jr. (w), Capt. Nathan S. Messick (k), Capt. Henry C. Coates; 82d N. Y. (2d Militia), Lieut.-Col. James Huston (k), Capt. John

[†] At Taneytown and not engaged in the battle.

[‡] See artillery brigades attached to army corps and the reserve.

[‡] Maj.-Gen. John F. Reynolds of this corps was killed July 1st, while in command of the left wing of the army.

[‡] Transferred on afternoon of July 1st to the First Brigade.

[‡] Guarding trains and not engaged in the battle.

[‡] After the death of General Reynolds General Hancock was assigned to the command of all the troops on the field

of battle, relieving General Howard, who had succeeded General Reynolds. General Gibbon of the Second Division assumed command of the corps. These assignments terminated on the evening of July 1. Similar changes in commanders occurred during the battle of the 2d, when General Hancock was put in command of the Third Corps, in addition to his own. He and General Gibbon were wounded on the 3d, and Brig.-Gen. William Hays was assigned to the command of the corps.

Darrow. Brigade loss: k, 147; w, 569; m, 48=764. *Second Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Alexander S. Webb (w); 69th Pa., Col. Dennis O'Kane (m w), Capt. William Davis; 71st Pa., Col. Richard Penn Smith; 72d Pa., Col. DeWitt C. Baxter (w), Lieut.-Col. Theodore Hesser; 106th Pa., Lieut.-Col. William L. Curry. Brigade loss: k, 114; w, 337; m, 39=490. *Third Brigade*, Col. Norman J. Hall; 19th Mass., Col. Arthur F. Devereux; 20th Mass., Col. Paul J. Revere (m w), Lieut.-Col. George N. Macy (w), Capt. Henry L. Abbott; 7th Mich., Lieut.-Col. Amos E. Steele, Jr. (k), Maj. Sylvanus W. Curtis; 42d N. Y., Col. James E. Mallon; 59th N. Y. (4 co's), Lieut.-Col. Max A. Thoman (m w), Capt. William McFadden. Brigade loss: k, 81; w, 282; m, 14=377. *Unattached*: 1st Co. Mass. Sharpshooters, Capt. William Plummer, Lieut. Emerson L. Bicknell. Loss: k, 2; w, 6=8.

THIRD DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Alexander Hays.

First Brigade, Col. Samuel S. Carroll; 14th Ind., Col. John Coons; 4th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Leonard W. Carpenter; 8th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Franklin Sawyer; 7th W. Va., Lieut.-Col. Jonathan H. Lockwood. Brigade loss: k, 38; w, 166; m, 7=211. *Second Brigade*, Col. Thomas A. Smyth (w), Lieut.-Col. Francis E. Pierce; 14th Conn., Maj. Theodore G. Ellis; 1st Del., Lieut.-Col. Edward P. Harris, Capt. Thomas B. Hizar (w), Lieut. William Smith (k), Lieut. John T. Dent; 12th N. J., Maj. John T. Hill; 10th N. Y. (battalion), Maj. George F. Hopper; 108th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Francis E. Pierce. Brigade loss: k, 61; w, 279; m, 26=366. *Third Brigade*, Col. George L. Willard (k), Col. Eliakim Sherrill (k), Lieut.-Col. James M. Bull; 39th N. Y. (4 co's), Maj. Hugo Hildebrandt (w); 111th N. Y., Col. Clinton D. MacDougall (w), Lieut.-Col. Isaac M. Lusk, Capt. Aaron P. Seelye; 125th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Levin Crandell; 126th N. Y., Col. Eliakim Sherrill, Lieut.-Col. James M. Bull. Brigade loss: k, 139; w, 542; m, 33=714.

ARTILLERY BRIGADE, Capt. John G. Hazard; B, 1st N. Y. (14th N. Y. Battery attached), Lieut. Albert S. Sholdon (w), Capt. James McKay Rorty (k), Lieut. Robert E. Rogers; A, 1st R. I., Capt. William A. Arnold; B, 1st R. I., Lieut. T. Fred. Brown (w), Lieut. Walter S. Perrin; I, 1st U. S., Lieut. George A. Woodruff (m w), Lieut. Tully McCrea; A, 4th U. S., Lieut. Alonzo H. Cushing (k), Sergt. Frederiek Fuger. Brigade loss: k, 27; w, 119; m, 3=149.

THIRD ARMY CORPS, Maj.-Gen. Daniel E. Sickles (w), Maj.-Gen. David B. Birney. Staff loss: w, 2.

FIRST DIVISION, Maj.-Gen. David B. Birney, Brig.-Gen. J. H. Hobart Ward.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Charles K. Graham (w and c), Col. Andrew H. Tiffin; 57th Pa. (8 co's), Col. Peter Sides (w), Capt. Alanson H. Nelson; 63d Pa., Maj. John A. Danks; 68th Pa., Col. Andrew H. Tiffin, Capt. Milton S. Davis; 105th Pa., Col. Calvin A. Craig; 114th Pa., Lieut.-Col. Frederick F. Cavada (c), Capt. Edward R. Bowen; 141st Pa., Col. Henry J. Madill. Brigade loss: k, 61; w, 508; m, 171=740. *Second Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. J. H. Hobart Ward, Col. Hiram Berdan; 20th Ind., Col. John Wheeler (k), Lieut.-Col. William C. L. Taylor; 3d Me., Col. Moses B. Lakeman; 4th Me., Col. Elijah Walker (w), Capt. Edwin Libby; 86th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Benjamin L. Higgins (w); 124th N. Y., Col. A. Van Horne Ellis (k), Lieut.-Col. Francis M. Cummins (w); 99th Pa., Maj. John W. Moore; 1st U. S. Sharpshooters, Col. Hiram Berdan, Lieut.-Col. Casper Trepp; 2d U. S. Sharpshooters (8 co's), Maj. Homer R. Stoughton. Brigade loss: k, 129; w, 482; m, 170=781. *Third Brigade*, Col. P. Regis De Trobriand; 17th Me., Lieut.-Col. Charles B. Merrill; 3d Mich., Col. Byron R. Pierce (w), Lieut.-Col. Edwin S. Pierce; 5th Mich., Lieut.-Col. John Pulford (w); 40th N. Y., Col. Thomas W. Egan; 110th Pa. (6 co's), Lieut.-Col. David M. Jones (w), Maj. Isaac Rogers. Brigade loss: k, 75; w, 394; m, 21=490.

SECOND DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Andrew A. Humphreys. Staff loss: k, 2; w, 9=11.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Joseph B. Carr; 1st Mass., Lieut.-Col. Clark B. Baldwin; 11th Mass., Lieut.-Col.

Porter D. Tripp; 16th Mass., Lieut.-Col. Waldo Merriam (w), Capt. Matthew Donovan; 12th N. H., Capt. John F. Langley; 11th N. J., Col. Robert McAllister (w), Capt. Luther Martin (w), Lieut. John Schoonover (w), Capt. William H. Lloyd (w), Capt. Samuel T. Sleeper, Lieut. John Schoonover; 26th Pa., Maj. Robert L. Bodine; 84th Pa., Lieut.-Col. Milton Opp. Brigade loss: k, 121; w, 604; m, 65=790. *Second Brigade*, Col. William R. Brewster; 70th N. Y., Col. J. Egbert Farnum; 71st N. Y., Col. Henry L. Potter; 72d N. Y., Col. John S. Austin (w), Lieut.-Col. John Leonard; 73d N. Y., Maj. Michael W. Burus; 74th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Thomas Holt; 120th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Cornelius D. Westbrook (w), Maj. John R. Tappen. Brigade loss: k, 130; w, 573; m, 75=778. *Third Brigade*, Col. George C. Burling; 2d N. H., Col. Edward L. Bailey (w); 5th N. J., Col. William J. Sewell (w), Capt. Thomas C. Godfrey, Capt. Henry H. Woolsey; 6th N. J., Lieut.-Col. Stephen R. Gilkyson; 7th N. J., Col. Louis R. Francine (m w), Maj. Frederiek Cooper; 8th N. J., Col. John Ramsey (w), Capt. John G. Langston; 115th Pa., Maj. John P. Dunne. Brigade loss: k, 59; w, 376; m, 78=513.

ARTILLERY BRIGADE, Capt. George E. Randolph (w), Capt. A. Judson Clark; 2d N. J., Capt. A. Judson Clark, Lieut. Robert Sims; D, 1st N. Y., Capt. George B. Winslow; 4th N. Y., Capt. James E. Smith; E, 1st R. I., Lieut. John K. Bueklyu (w), Lieut. Benjamin Freeborn; K, 4th U. S., Lieut. Francis W. Seelye (w), Lieut. Robert James. Brigade loss: k, 8; w, 81; m, 17=106.

FIFTH ARMY CORPS, Maj.-Gen. George Sykes.

General Headquarters: D and E, 12th N. Y. Inf., Capt. Henry W. Rider; D and H, 17th Pa. Cav., Capt. William Thompson.

FIRST DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. James Barnes.

First Brigade, Col. William S. Tilton; 18th Mass., Col. Joseph Hayes; 22d Mass., Lieut.-Col. Thomas Sherwin, Jr.; 1st Mich., Col. Ira C. Abbott (w), Lieut.-Col. William A. Throop; 118th Pa., Lieut.-Col. James Gwyn. Brigade loss: k, 12; w, 102; m, 11=125. *Second Brigade*, Col. Jacob B. Sweitzer; 9th Mass., Col. Patrick R. Guiney; 32d Mass., Col. G. L. Prescott; 4th Mich., Col. Harrison H. Jeffords (k), Lieut.-Col. George W. Lombard; 62d Pa., Lieut.-Col. James C. Hull. Brigade loss: k, 67; w, 239; m, 121=427. *Third Brigade*, Col. Strong Vincent (m w), Col. James C. Rice; 20th Me., Col. Joshua L. Chamberlain; 16th Mich., Lieut.-Col. Norval E. Welch; 44th N. Y., Col. James C. Rice, Lieut.-Col. Freeman Conner; 83d Pa., Capt. Orpheus S. Woodward. Brigade loss: k, 88; w, 253; m, 11=352.

SECOND DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Romeyn B. Ayres.

First Brigade, Col. Hannibal Day; 3d U. S. (6 co's), Capt. Henry W. Freedley (w), Capt. Richard G. Lay; 4th U. S. (4 co's), Capt. Julius W. Adams; 6th U. S. (5 co's), Capt. Levi C. Bootes; 12th U. S. (8 co's), Capt. Thomas S. Dunn; 14th U. S. (8 co's), Maj. Grotius R. Giddings. Brigade loss: k, 46; w, 318; m, 18=382. *Second Brigade*, Col. Sidney Burbank; 2d U. S. (6 co's), Maj. Arthur T. Lee (w), Capt. Samuel A. McKee; 7th U. S. (4 co's), Capt. David P. Hancock; 10th U. S. (3 co's), Capt. William Clinton; 11th U. S. (6 co's), Maj. DeLaucey Floyd-Jones; 17th U. S. (7 co's), Lieut.-Col. J. Durell Greene. Brigade loss: k, 78; w, 342; m, 27=447. *Third Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Stephen H. Weed (k), Col. Kenner Garrard; 140th N. Y., Col. Patrick H. O'Rourke (k), Lieut.-Col. Louis Ernst; 146th N. Y., Col. Kenner Garrard, Lieut.-Col. David T. Jenkins; 91st Pa., Lieut.-Col. Joseph H. Sinex; 155th Pa., Lieut.-Col. John H. Cain. Brigade loss: k, 40; w, 142; m, 18=200.

THIRD DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Samuel W. Crawford.

First Brigade, Col. William McCandless; 1st Pa. Reserves, Col. William C. Talley; 2d Pa. Reserves, Lieut.-Col. George A. Woodward; 6th Pa. Reserves, Lieut.-Col. Wellington H. Ent; 13th Pa. Reserves, Col. Charles F. Taylor (k), Maj. William R. Harthorne. Brigade loss: k, 20; w, 132; m, 3=155. *Third Brigade*, Col. Joseph W. Fisher; 5th Pa. Reserves, Lieut.-Col. George Dare; 9th Pa. Reserves, Lieut.-Col. James McK. Snodgrass; 10th Pa. Reserves, Col. Adoniram J. Warner; 11th Pa. Re-

Guarding trains and not engaged in the battle.

serves, Col. Samuel M. Jackson; 12th Pa. Reserves, Col. Martin D. Hardin. Brigade loss: k, 6; w, 49 = 55.

ARTILLERY BRIGADE, Capt. Augustus P. Martin: 3d Mass., Lieut. Aaron F. Walcott; C, 1st N. Y., Col. Almont Barnes; L, 1st Ohio, Capt. Frank C. Gibbs; D, 5th U. S., Lieut. Charles E. Hazlett (k), Lieut. Benjamin F. Rittenhouse; I, 5th U. S., Lieut. Malbone F. Watson (w), Lieut. Charles C. MacConnell. Brigade loss: k, 8; w, 33; m, 2 = 43.

SIXTH ARMY CORPS, Maj.-Gen. John Sedgwick.

General Headquarters: L, 1st N. J., and H, 1st Pa. Cav., Capt. William S. Craft.

FIRST DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Horatio G. Wright.

Provost Guard: 4th N. J. (3 co's), Capt. William R. Maxwell. *First Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. A. T. A. Torbert: 1st N. J., Lieut.-Col. William Henry, Jr.; 2d N. J., Lieut.-Col. Charles Wiebecke; 3d N. J., Lieut.-Col. Edward L. Campbell; 15th N. J., Col. William H. Penrose. Brigade loss: w, 11. *Second Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Joseph J. Bartlett: ☆ 5th Me., Col. Clark S. Edwards; 121st N. Y., Col. Emory Upton; 95th Pa., Lieut.-Col. Edward Carroll; 96th Pa., Maj. William H. Lessig. Brigade loss: k, 1; w, 4 = 5. *Third Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. David A. Russell: 6th Me., Col. Hiram Burnham; 49th Pa. (4 co's), Lieut.-Col. Thomas M. Hulings; 119th Pa., Col. Peter C. Ellmaker; 5th Wis., Col. Thomas S. Allen. Brigade loss: w, 2.

SECOND DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Albion P. Howe.

Second Brigade, Col. Lewis A. Grant: 2d Vt., Col. James H. Walbridge; 3d Vt., Col. Thomas O. Seaver; 4th Vt., Col. Charles B. Stoughton; 5th Vt., Lieut.-Col. John R. Lewis; 6th Vt., Col. Elisha L. Barney. Brigade loss: w, 1. *Third Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Thomas H. Neill: 7th Me. (6 co's), Lieut.-Col. Selden Connor; 33d N. Y. (detachment), Capt. Henry J. Gifford; 43d N. Y., Lieut.-Col. John Wilson; 49th N. Y., Col. Daniel D. Bidwell; 77th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Winsor B. French; 61st Pa., Lieut.-Col. George F. Smith. Brigade loss: k, 2; w, 11; m, 2 = 15.

THIRD DIVISION, Maj.-Gen. John Newton, Brig.-Gen. Frank Wheaton.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Alexander Shaler: 65th N. Y., Col. Joseph E. Hamblin; 67th N. Y., Col. Nelson Cross; 122d N. Y., Col. Silas Titus; 23d Pa., Lieut.-Col. John F. Glenn; 82d Pa., Col. Isaac C. Bassett. Brigade loss: k, 15; w, 56; m, 3 = 74. *Second Brigade*, Col. Henry L. Eustis: 7th Mass., Lieut.-Col. Franklin P. Harlow; 10th Mass., Lieut.-Col. Joseph B. Parsons; 37th Mass., Col. Oliver Edwards; 2d R. I., Col. Horatio Rogers, Jr. Brigade loss: k, 3; w, 41; m, 25 = 69. *Third Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Frank Wheaton, Col. David J. Nevin: 62d N. Y., Col. David J. Nevin, Lieut.-Col. Theodore B. Hamilton; 93d Pa., Maj. John I. Nevin; 98th Pa., Maj. John B. Kohler; 102d Pa., † Col. John W. Patterson; 139th Pa., Col. Frederick H. Collier, Lieut.-Col. William H. Moody. Brigade loss: k, 2; w, 51 = 53.

ARTILLERY BRIGADE, Col. Charles H. Tompkins: 1st Mass., Capt. William H. McCartney; 1st N. Y., Capt. Andrew Cowan; 3d N. Y., Capt. William A. Harn; C, 1st R. I., Capt. Richard Waterman; G, 1st R. I., Capt. George W. Adams; D, 2d U. S., Lieut. Edward B. Williston; G, 2d U. S., Lieut. John H. Butler; F, 5th U. S., Lieut. Leonard Martin. Brigade loss: k, 4; w, 8 = 12.

ELEVENTH ARMY CORPS, † Maj.-Gen. Oliver O. Howard. Staff loss: w, 1.

General Headquarters: I and K, 1st Ind. Cav., Capt. Abram Sharra; 8th N. Y. (1 co.), Lieut. Hermann Foerster. Loss: m, 3.

FIRST DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Francis C. Barlow (w), Brig.-Gen. Adelbert Ames. Staff loss: w, 1.

First Brigade, Col. Leopold von Gilsa: 41st N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Detleo von Einsiedel; 54th N. Y., Maj. Stephen Kovacs (e), Lieut. Ernest Both; 68th N. Y., Col. Gotthilf Bonny; 153d Pa., Maj. John Frueauff. Brigade loss: k, 54; w, 310; m, 163 = 527. *Second Brigade*, Brig.-

Gen. Adelbert Ames, Col. Andrew L. Harris: 17th Conn., Lieut.-Col. Douglas Fowler (k), Maj. Allen G. Brady; 25th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Jeremiah Williams (e), Capt. Nathaniel J. Manning, Lieut. William Maloney (w), Lieut. Israel White; 75th Ohio, Col. Andrew L. Harris, Capt. George B. Fox; 107th Ohio, Col. Seraphim Meyer, Capt. John M. Lutz. Brigade loss: k, 68; w, 366; m, 344 = 778.

SECOND DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Adolph von Steinwehr. Staff loss: w, 1.

First Brigade, Col. Charles R. Coster: 134th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Allan H. Jackson; 154th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. D. B. Allen; 27th Pa., Lieut.-Col. Lorenz Cantador; 73d Pa., Capt. D. F. Kelley. Brigade loss: k, 55; w, 228; m, 314 = 597. *Second Brigade*, Col. Orland Smith: 33d Mass., Col. Adin B. Underwood; 136th N. Y., Col. James Wood, Jr.; 55th Ohio, Col. Charles B. Gambee; 73d Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Richard Long. Brigade loss: k, 51; w, 278; m, 19 = 348.

THIRD DIVISION, Maj.-Gen. Carl Schurz.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Alex. Schimmelfennig, Col. George von Amsberg: 82d Ill., Lieut.-Col. Edward S. Salomon; 45th N. Y., Col. George von Amsberg, Lieut.-Col. Adolphus Dobke; 157th N. Y., Col. Philip P. Brown, Jr.; 61st Ohio, Col. Stephen J. McGroarty; 74th Pa., Col. Adolph von Hartung (w), Lieut.-Col. Alexander von Mitzel (e), Capt. Gustav Schleiter, Capt. Henry Krauseneck. Brigade loss: k, 58; w, 296; m, 453 = 807. *Second Brigade*, Col. W. Krzyzanowski: 58th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. August Otto, Capt. Emil Koenig; 119th N. Y., Col. John T. Lockman (w), Lieut.-Col. Edward F. Lloyd; 82d Ohio, Col. James S. Robinson (w), Lieut.-Col. David Thomson; 75th Pa., Col. Francis Mahler (w), Maj. August Ledig; 26th Wis., Lieut.-Col. Hans Boebel (w), Capt. John W. Fuchs. Brigade loss: k, 75; w, 388; m, 206 = 669.

ARTILLERY BRIGADE, Maj. Thomas W. Osborn: I, 1st N. Y., Capt. Michael Wedrich; 13th N. Y., Lieut. William Wheeler; I, 1st Ohio, Capt. Hubert Dilger; K, 1st Ohio, Capt. Lewis Heckman; G, 4th U. S., Lieut. Bayard Wilkeson (k), Lieut. Eugene A. Bancroft. Brigade loss: k, 7; w, 53; m, 9 = 69.

TWELFTH ARMY CORPS, Maj.-Gen. Henry W. Slocum, † Brig.-Gen. Alphens S. Williams.

Provost Guard: 10th Me. (4 co's), Capt. John D. Beardsley.

FIRST DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Alphens S. Williams, Brig.-Gen. Thomas H. Ruger.

First Brigade, Col. Archibald L. McDougall: 5th Conn., Col. Warren W. Packer; 20th Conn., Lieut.-Col. William B. Wooster; 3d Md., Col. Joseph M. Sndsborg; 123d N. Y., Lieut.-Col. James C. Rogers, Capt. Adolphus H. Tanner; 145th N. Y., Col. E. Livingston Price; 46th Pa., Col. James L. Selfridge. Brigade loss: k, 12; w, 60; m, 8 = 80. *Second Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Henry H. Lockwood: 1st Md. Potomac Home Brigade, Col. William P. Maulsby; 1st Md. Eastern Shore, Col. James Wallace; 150th N. Y., Col. John H. Ketcham. Brigade loss: k, 35; w, 121; m, 18 = 174. *Third Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Thomas H. Ruger, Col. Silas Colgrove: 27th Ind., Col. Silas Colgrove, Lieut.-Col. John R. Fesler; 2d Mass., Lieut.-Col. Charles R. Mudge (k), Maj. Charles F. Morse; 13th N. J., Col. Ezra A. Carman; 107th N. Y., Col. Nirom M. Crane; 3d Wis., Col. William Hawley. Brigade loss: k, 49; w, 225; m, 5 = 279.

SECOND DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. John W. Geary.

First Brigade, Col. Charles Cady: 5th Ohio, Col. John H. Patrick; 7th Ohio, Col. William R. Creighton; 29th Ohio, Capt. Wilbur F. Stevens (w), Capt. Edward Hayes; 66th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Eugene Powell; 28th Pa., Capt. John Flynn; 147th Pa. (8 co's), Lieut.-Col. Ario Pardee, Jr. Brigade loss: k, 18; w, 117; m, 3 = 138. *Second Brigade*, Col. George A. Cobham, Jr., Brig.-Gen. Thomas L. Kane, Col. George A. Cobham, Jr.: 29th Pa., Col. William Rick-

☆ Also commanded Third Brigade, Third Division, July 3d.
† Guarding trains and not engaged in the battle.

‡ During the interval between the death of General Reynolds and the arrival of General Hancock on the afternoon of July 1st, all the troops on the field of battle were

commanded by General Howard, General Schurz taking command of the Eleventh Corps, and General Schimmelfennig of the Third Division.

§ General Slocum exercised command of the right wing during a part of the battle.

ards, Jr.; 109th Pa., Capt. F. L. Gimber; 111th Pa., Lieut.-Col. Thomas M. Walker, Col. George A. Cobham, Jr., Lieut.-Col. Thomas M. Walker. Brigade loss: k, 23; w, 66; m, 9=98. *Third Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. George S. Greene: 60th N. Y., Col. Abel Godard; 78th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Herbert von Hammerstein; 102d N. Y., Col. James C. Lane (w), Capt. Lewis R. Stegman; 137th N. Y., Col. David Ireland; 149th N. Y., Col. Henry A. Barnum, Lieut.-Col. Charles B. Randall (w). Brigade loss: k, 67; w, 212; m, 24=303.

ARTILLERY BRIGADE, Lieut. Edward D. Muhlenberg: M, 1st N. Y., Lieut. Charles E. Winegar; E, Pa., Lieut. Charles A. Atwell; F, 4th U. S., Lieut. Sylvanus T. Rugg; K, 5th U. S., Lieut. David H. Kinzie. Brigade loss: w, 9.

CAVALRY CORPS, Maj.-Gen. Alfred Pleasonton. **FIRST DIVISION**, Brig.-Gen. John Buford.

First Brigade, Col. William Gamble: 8th Ill., Maj. John L. Beveridge; 12th Ill. (4 co's) and 3d Ind. (6 co's), Col. George H. Chapman; 8th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. William L. Markell. Brigade loss: k, 13; w, 58; m, 28=99. *Second Brigade*, Col. Thomas C. Devin: 6th N. Y., Maj. Wm. E. Beardsley; 9th N. Y., Col. William Sackett; 17th Pa., Col. J. H. Kellogg; 3d W. Va. (2 co's), Capt. Seymour B. Conger. Brigade loss: k, 2; w, 3; m, 23=28. *Reserve Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Wesley Merritt: 6th Pa., Maj. James H. Haseltine; 1st U. S., Capt. Robert S. C. Lord; 2d U. S., Capt. T. F. Rodenbough; 5th U. S., Capt. Julius W. Mason; 6th U. S., Maj. Samuel H. Starr (w and e), Lieut. Louis H. Carpenter, Lieutenant Nicholas Nolan, Captain Ira W. Claffin. Brigade loss: k, 13; w, 55; m, 223=291.

SECOND DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. David McM. Gregg. *Headquarters Guard*: A, 1st Ohio, Capt. Noah Jones.

First Brigade, Col. John B. McIntosh: 1st Md., Lieut.-Col. James M. Deems; A, Purnell (Md.) Legion, Capt. Robert E. Duvall; 1st Mass., Lieut.-Col. Greely S. Curtis; 1st N. J., Maj. M. H. Beaumont; 1st Pa., Col. John P. Taylor; 3d Pa., Lieut.-Col. E. S. Jones; Section Battery H, 3d Pa. Art'y, Captain William D. Rank. Brigade loss: w, 26; m, 9=35. *Second Brigade*, Col. Pennoek Huey: 2d N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Otto Harhaus; 4th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Augustus Pruyn; 6th Ohio, Maj. William Stedman; 8th Pa., Capt. William A. Corrie. *Third Brigade*, Col. J. Irvin Gregg: 1st Me., Lieut.-Col. Charles H. Smith; 10th N. Y., Major M. Henry Avery; 4th Pa., Lieut.-Colonel William E. Doster; 16th Pa., Lieut.-Colonel John K. Robison. Brigade loss: k, 6; w, 12; m, 3=21.

THIRD DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Judson Kilpatrick. *Headquarters Guard*: C, 1st Ohio, Capt. Samuel N. Stanford.

† At Westminster, etc., and not engaged in the battle.

‡ With Huey's cavalry brigade, and not in the battle.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Elon J. Farnsworth (k), Col. Nathaniel P. Richmond; 5th N. Y., Maj. John Hammond; 18th Pa., Lieut.-Col. William P. Brinton; 1st Vt., Lieut.-Col. Addison W. Preston; 1st W. Va., Col. Nathaniel P. Richmond, Maj. Charles E. Capehart. Brigade loss: k, 21; w, 34; m, 43=98. *Second Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. George A. Custer: 1st Mich., Col. Charles H. Town; 5th Mich., Col. Russell A. Alger; 6th Mich., Col. George Gray; 7th Mich., Col. William D. Mann. Brigade loss: k, 32; w, 147; m, 78=257.

HORSE ARTILLERY. *First Brigade*, Capt. James M. Robertson: 9th Mich., Capt. Jabez J. Daniels; 6th N. Y., Capt. Joseph W. Martin; B and L, 2d U. S., Lieut. Edward Heaton; M, 2d U. S., Lieut. A. C. M. Pennington; E, 4th U. S., Lieut. Samuel S. Elder. Brigade loss: k, 2; w, 6=8. *Second Brigade*, Capt. John C. Tidball: E and G, 1st U. S., Capt. Alanson M. Randol; K, 1st U. S., Capt. William M. Graham; A, 2d U. S., Lieut. John H. Calef; C, 3d U. S., † Lieut. William D. Fuller. Brigade loss: k, 2; w, 13=15.

ARTILLERY RESERVE, Brig.-Gen. Robert O. Tyler, Capt. James M. Robertson.

Headquarters Guard: C, 32d Mass., Capt. Josiah C. Fuller.

First Regular Brigade, Capt. Dunbar R. Ransom (w): H, 1st U. S., Lieut. Chandler P. Eakin (w), Lieut. Philip D. Mason; F and K, 3d U. S., Lieut. John G. Turnbull; C, 4th U. S., Lieut. Evan Thomas; C, 5th U. S., Lieut. Gulian V. Weir. Brigade loss: k, 13; w, 53; m, 2=68. *First Volunteer Brigade*, Lieut.-Col. Freeman McGilvery: 5th Mass. (10th N. Y. attached), Capt. Charles A. Phillips; 9th Mass., Capt. John Bigelow (w), Lieut. Richard S. Milton; 15th N. Y., Capt. Patrick Hart (w); C and F, Pa., Capt. James Thompson (w). Brigade loss: k, 16; w, 71; m, 6=93. *Second Volunteer Brigade*, Capt. Elijah D. Taft: B, 1st Conn., † Capt. Albert F. Brooker; M, 1st Conn., † Capt. Franklin A. Pratt; 2d Conn., Capt. John W. Sterling; 5th N. Y., Capt. Elijah D. Taft. Brigade loss: k, 1; w, 5; m, 2=8. *Third Volunteer Brigade*, Capt. James F. Huntington: 1st N. H., Capt. Frederick M. Edgell; H, 1st Ohio, Lieut. George W. Norton; F and G, 1st Pa., Capt. R. Bruce Ricketts; C, W. Va., Capt. Wallace Hill. Brigade loss: k, 10; w, 24; m, 3=37. *Fourth Volunteer Brigade*, Capt. Robert H. Fitzhugh: 6th Me., Lieut. Edwin B. Dow; A, Md., Capt. James H. Rigby; 1st N. J., Lieut. Augustin N. Parsons; G, 1st N. Y., Capt. Nelson Ames; K, 1st N. Y. (11th N. Y. attached), Capt. Robert H. Fitzhugh. Brigade loss: k, 2; w, 34=36.

Train Guard: 4th N. J. (7 co's), Maj. Charles Ewing. The total loss of the Union army was 3072 killed, 14,497 wounded, and 5434 captured or missing=23,003.

↓ At Taneytown and Westminster, and not engaged in the battle.

THE CONFEDERATE ARMY.

ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA—General Robert E. Lee.

FIRST ARMY CORPS, Lieut.-Gen. James Longstreet. **McLAW'S DIVISION**, Maj.-Gen. Lafayette McLaws.

Kershaw's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Joseph B. Kershaw: 2d S. C., Col. J. D. Keumedy (w), Lieut.-Col. F. Gaillard; 3d S. C., Maj. R. C. Maffett, Col. J. D. Nance; 7th S. C., Col. D. Wyatt Aiken; 8th S. C., Col. J. W. Henagan; 15th S. C., Col. W. D. De Saussure (k), Maj. William M. Gist; 3d S. C. Battalion, Lieut.-Col. W. G. Rice. Brigade loss: k, 115; w, 483; m, 32=630. *Semmes's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Paul J. Semmes (m w), Col. Goode Bryan; 10th Ga., Col. John B. Weems; 50th Ga., Col. W. R. Manning; 51st Ga., Col. E. Ball; 53d Ga., Col. James P. Simms. Brigade loss: k, 55; w, 284; m, 91=430. *Barksdale's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. William Barksdale (m w), Col. Benjamin G. Humphreys; 13th Miss., Col. J. W. Carter; 17th Miss., Col. W. D. Holder, Lieut.-Col. John C. Fiser; 18th Miss., Col. T. M. Griffin, Lieut.-Col. W. H. Luse; 21st Miss., Col. B. G. Humphreys. Brigade loss: k, 105; w, 550; m, 92=747. *Wofford's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. William T. Wofford: 16th Ga., Col. Goode Bryan; 18th Ga., Lieut.-

Col. S. Z. Ruff; 24th Ga., Col. Robert McMillan; Cobb's (Ga.) Legion, Lieut.-Col. Luther J. Glenn; Phillips's (Ga.) Legion, Lieut.-Col. E. S. Barclay. Brigade loss: k, 30; w, 192; m, 112=334. *Artillery Battalion*, Col. Henry C. Cabell: A, 1st N. C., Capt. B. C. Manly; G, Battery (Pulaski Art'y), Capt. J. C. Fraser (m w), Lieut. W. J. Furlong; Va. Battery (1st Richmond Howitzers), Capt. E. S. McCarthy; Ga. Battery (Troup Art'y), Capt. H. H. Carlton (w), Lieut. C. W. Motes. Battalion loss: k, 8; w, 29=37.

PICKETT'S DIVISION, Maj.-Gen. George E. Pickett.

Garnett's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Richard B. Garnett (k), Maj. Charles S. Peyton; 8th Va., Col. Eppa Hunton (w); 18th Va., Lieut.-Col. H. A. Carrington (w); 19th Va., Col. Henry Gantt (w), Lieut.-Col. John T. Ellis (k); 28th Va., Col. R. C. Allen (k), Lieut.-Col. William Watts; 56th Va., Col. W. D. Stuart (m w), Lieut.-Col. P. P. Slaughter. Brigade loss: k, 78; w, 324; m, 539=941. *Armistead's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Lewis A. Armistead (k), Col. W. R. Aylett; 9th Va., Maj. John C. Owens (k); 14th Va., Col.

James G. Hodges (k), Lieut.-Col. William White; 38th Va., Col. E. C. Edmonds (k), Lieut.-Col. P. B. Whittle; 53d Va., Col. W. R. Aylett (w); 57th Va., Col. John Bowie Magruder (k). Brigade loss: k, 88; w, 460; m, 643 = 1191. *Kemper's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. James L. Kemper (w and c), Col. Joseph Mayo, Jr. (w); 1st Va., Col. Lewis B. Williams (w), Lieut.-Col. F. G. Skinner; 3d Va., Col. Joseph Mayo, Jr., Lieut.-Col. A. D. Calleeote (k); 7th Va., Col. W. T. Patton (k), Lieut.-Col. C. C. Flowerree; 11th Va., Maj. Kirkwood Otey (w); 24th Va., Col. William R. Terry (w). Brigade loss: k, 58; w, 356; m, 317 = 731. *Artillery Battalion*, Maj. James Dearing; Va. Battery (Fauquier Art'y), Capt. R. M. Stribbling; Va. Battery (Hampden Art'y), Capt. W. H. Caskie; Va. Battery (Richmond Fayette Art'y), Capt. M. C. Macon; Va. Battery, Capt. Joseph G. Blount. Battalion loss: k, 8; w, 17 = 25.

HOOD'S DIVISION, Maj.-Gen. John B. Hood (w), Brig.-Gen. E. McIver Law.

Law's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. E. McIver Law, Col. James L. Sheffield; 4th Ala., Lieut.-Col. L. H. Scruggs; 15th Ala., Col. William C. Oates, Capt. B. A. Hill; 44th Ala., Col. William F. Perry; 47th Ala., Col. James W. Jackson, Lieut.-Col. M. J. Bulger, (w and c), Maj. J. M. Campbell; 48th Ala., Col. James L. Sheffield, Capt. T. J. Eubanks. Brigade loss: k, 74; w, 276; m, 146 = 496. *Anderson's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. George T. Anderson (w), Lieut.-Col. William Luffman; 7th Ga., Col. W. W. White; 8th Ga., Col. John R. Towers; 9th Ga., Lieut.-Col. John C. Mounser (k), Maj. W. M. Jones (w), Capt. George Hillier; 11th Ga., Col. F. H. Little (w), Lieut.-Col. William Luffman, Maj. Henry D. McDaniel, Capt. William H. Mitchell; 59th Ga., Col. Jack Brown (w), Capt. M. G. Bass. Brigade loss: k, 105; w, 512; m, 54 = 671. *Robertson's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Jerome B. Robertson (w); 3d Ark., Col. Van H. Manning (w), Lieut.-Col. R. S. Taylor; 1st Tex., Lieut.-Col. P. A. Work; 4th Tex., Col. J. C. G. Key (w), Maj. J. P. Bane; 5th Tex., Col. R. M. Powell (m w), Lieut.-Col. K. Bryan (w), Maj. J. C. Rogers. Brigade loss: k, 84; w, 393; m, 120 = 597. *Benning's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Henry L. Benning; 2d Ga., Lieut.-Col. William T. Harris (k), Maj. W. S. Shepherd; 15th Ga., Col. D. M. Du Bose; 17th Ga., Col. W. C. Hodges; 20th Ga., Col. John A. Jones (k), Lieut.-Col. J. D. Waddell. Brigade loss: k, 76; w, 299; m, 122 = 497. *Artillery Battalion*, Maj. M. W. Henry; N. C. Battery (Branch Art'y), Capt. A. C. Latham; S. C. Battery (German Art'y), Capt. William K. Bachman; S. C. Battery (Palmetto Light Art'y), Capt. Hugh R. Garden; N. C. Battery (Rowan Art'y), Capt. James Reilly. Battalion loss: k, 4; w, 23 = 27.

RESERVE ARTILLERY, Col. J. B. Walton.

Alexander's Battalion, Col. E. Porter Alexander; La. Battery (Madison Light Art'y), Capt. George V. Moody; S. C. Battery (Brooks Art'y), Lieut. S. C. Gilbert; Va. Battery (Ashland Art'y), Capt. P. Woolfolk, Jr. (w), Lieut. James Woolfolk; Va. Battery (Bedford Art'y), Capt. T. C. Jordan; Va. Battery, Capt. William W. Parker; Va. Battery, Capt. O. B. Taylor. Battalion loss: k, 19; w, 114; m, 6 = 139. *Washington (La.) Artillery*, Maj. B. F. Eshleman; 1st Co., Capt. C. W. Squires; 2d Co., Capt. J. B. Richardson; 3d Co., Capt. M. B. Miller; 4th Co., Capt. Joe Norcom (w), Lieut. H. A. Battles. Battalion loss: k, 3; w, 26; m, 16 = 45.

SECOND ARMY CORPS, Lieut.-Gen. Richard S. Ewell. Staff loss: w, 1.

EARLY'S DIVISION, Maj.-Gen. Jubal A. Early.

Hays's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Harry T. Hays; 5th La., Maj. Alexander Hart (w), Capt. T. H. Biscoe; 6th La., Lieut.-Col. Joseph Hanlon; 7th La., Col. D. B. Penn; 8th La., Col. T. D. Lewis (k), Lieut.-Col. A. de Blanc (w), Maj. G. A. Lester; 9th La., Col. Leroy A. Stafford. Brigade loss: k, 36; w, 201; m, 76 = 313. *Hoke's Brigade*, Col. Isaac E. Avery (m w), Col. A. C. Godwin; 6th N. C., Maj. S. McD. Tate; 21st N. C., Col. W. W. Kirkland; 57th N. C., Col. A. C. Godwin. Brigade loss: k, 35; w, 216; m, 94 = 345. *Smith's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. William Smith; 31st Va., Col. John S. Hoffman; 49th Va., Lieut.-Col. J. Catlett Gibson; 52d Va., Lieut.-Col. James H. Skinner. Brigade loss: k, 12; w, 113; m, 17 = 142. *Gordon's Bri-*

gade, Brig.-Gen. John B. Gordon; 13th Ga., Col. James M. Smith; 26th Ga., Col. E. N. Atkinson; 31st Ga., Col. Clement A. Evans; 38th Ga., Capt. William L. McLeod; 60th Ga., Capt. W. B. Jones; 61st Ga., Col. John H. Lamar. Brigade loss: k, 71; w, 270; m, 39 = 380. *Artillery Battalion*, Lieut.-Col. H. P. Jones; Va. Battery (Charlottesville Art'y), Capt. James McD. Carrington; Va. Battery (Courtney Art'y), Capt. W. A. Tanner; La. Battery (Guard Art'y), Capt. C. A. Green; Va. Battery (Staunton Art'y), Capt. A. W. Garber. Battalion loss: k, 2; w, 6 = 8.

JOHNSON'S DIVISION, Maj.-Gen. Edward Johnson. Staff loss: w, 1; m, 1 = 2.

Stewart's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. George H. Stewart; 1st Md. Battalion, Lieut.-Col. James R. Herbert (w), Maj. W. W. Goldsborough (w), Capt. J. P. Crane; 1st N. C., Lieut.-Col. H. A. Brown; 3d N. C., Maj. W. M. Parsley; 10th Va., Col. E. T. H. Warren; 23d Va., Lieut.-Col. S. T. Walton; 37th Va., Maj. H. C. Wood. Brigade loss: k, 83; w, 409; m, 190 = 682. *Nicholls's Brigade*, Col. J. M. Williams; 1st La., Capt. E. D. Willett; 2d La., Lieut.-Col. R. E. Burke; 10th La., Maj. T. N. Powell; 14th La., Lieut.-Col. David Zable; 15th La., Maj. Andrew Brady. Brigade loss: k, 43; w, 309; m, 36 = 388. *Stonewall Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. James A. Walker; 2d Va., Col. J. Q. A. Nadenbousch; 4th Va., Maj. William Terry; 5th Va., Col. J. H. S. Funk; 27th Va., Lieut.-Col. D. M. Shriver; 33d Va., Capt. J. B. Golladay. Brigade loss: k, 35; w, 208; m, 87 = 330. *Jones's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. John M. Jones (w), Lieut.-Col. R. H. Dungan; 21st Va., Capt. W. P. Moseley; 25th Va., Col. J. C. Higginbotham (w), Lieut.-Col. J. A. Robinson; 42d Va., Lieut.-Col. R. W. Withers (w), Capt. S. H. Saunders; 44th Va., Maj. N. Cobb (w), Capt. T. R. Buckner; 48th Va., Lieut.-Col. R. H. Dungan; Maj. Oscar White; 50th Va., Lieut.-Col. H. N. Salyer. Brigade loss: k, 58; w, 302; m, 61 = 421. *Artillery Battalion*, Maj. J. W. Latimer (m w), Capt. Charles I. Raine; 1st Md. Battery, Capt. William F. Dement; Va. Battery (Alleghany Art'y), Capt. J. C. Carpenter; Md. Battery (Chesapeake Art'y), Capt. William D. Brown (w); Va. (Lee) Battery, Capt. Charles I. Raine, Lieut. William W. Hardwicke. Battalion loss: k, 10; w, 40 = 50.

RODES'S DIVISION, Maj.-Gen. Robert E. Rodes.

Daniel's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Junius Daniel; 32d N. C., Col. E. C. Brabble; 43d N. C., Col. T. S. Kenan (w and c), Lieut.-Col. W. G. Lewis; 45th N. C., Lieut.-Col. S. H. Boyd (w and c), Maj. John R. Winston (w and c), Capt. A. H. Galloway (w), Capt. J. A. Hopkins; 53d N. C., Col. W. A. Owens; 2d N. C. Battalion, Lieut.-Col. H. L. Andrews (k), Capt. Van Brown. Brigade loss: k, 165; w, 635; m, 116 = 916. *Iverson's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Alfred Iverson; 5th N. C., Capt. Speight B. West (w), Capt. Benjamin Robinson (w); 12th N. C., Lieut.-Col. W. S. Davis; 20th N. C., Lieut.-Col. Nelson Slough (w), Capt. Lewis T. Hicks; 23d N. C., Col. D. H. Christie (m w), Capt. William H. Johnston. Brigade loss: k, 130; w, 328; m, 308 = 820. *Doles's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. George Doles; 4th Ga., Lieut.-Col. D. R. E. Winn (k), Maj. W. H. Willis; 12th Ga., Col. Edward Willis; 21st Ga., Col. John T. Mercer; 44th Ga., Col. S. P. Lumpkin (w), Maj. W. H. Peebles. Brigade loss: k, 24; w, 124; m, 31 = 179. *Ramseur's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Stephen D. Ramseur; 2d N. C., Maj. D. W. Hurtt (w), Capt. James T. Seales; 4th N. C., Col. Bryan Grimes; 14th N. C., Col. R. Tyler Bennett (w), Maj. Joseph H. Lambeth; 30th N. C., Col. Francis M. Parker (w), Maj. W. W. Sellers. Brigade loss: k, 23; w, 722; m, 32 = 177. *O'Neal's Brigade*, Col. Edward A. O'Neal; 3d Ala., Col. C. A. Battle; 5th Ala., Col. J. M. Hall; 6th Ala., Col. J. N. Lightfoot (w), Capt. M. L. Bowie; 12th Ala., Col. S. B. Pickens; 26th Ala., Lieut.-Col. John C. Goodgame. Brigade loss: k, 73; w, 430; m, 193 = 696. *Artillery Battalion*, Lieut.-Col. Thomas H. Carter; Ala. Battery (Jeff Davis Art'y), Capt. W. J. Reese; Va. Battery (King William Art'y), Capt. W. P. Carter; Va. Battery (Morris Art'y), Capt. R. C. M. Page (w); Va. Battery (Orange Art'y), Capt. C. W. Fry. Battalion loss: k, 6; w, 35; m, 24 = 65.

RESERVE ARTILLERY, Col. J. Thompson Brown.

Brown's Battalion, Capt. Willis J. Dance; Va. Battery

(2d Richmond Howitzers), Capt. David Watson; Va. Battery (3d Richmond Howitzers), Capt. B. H. Smith, Jr.; Va. Battery (Powhatan Art'y), Lieut. John M. Cunningham; Va. Battery (Rockbridge Art'y), Capt. A. Graham; Va. Battery (Salem Art'y), Lieut. C. B. Griffin. Battalion loss: k, 3; w, 19=22. *Nelson's Battalion*, Lieut.-Col. William Nelson; Va. Battery (Amherst Art'y), Capt. T. J. Kirkpatrick; Va. Battery (Fluvanna Art'y), Capt. J. L. Massie; Ga. Battery, Capt. John Milledge, Jr. Battalion loss (not reported).

THIRD ARMY CORPS, Lieut.-Gen. Ambrose P. Hill.

ANDERSON'S DIVISION, Maj.-Gen. Richard H. Anderson.

Wilcox's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Cadmus M. Wilcox: 8th Ala., Lieut.-Col. Hilary A. Herbert; 9th Ala., Capt. J. H. King (w); 10th Ala., Col. William H. Forney (w and c), Lieut.-Col. James E. Shelley; 11th Ala., Col. J. C. C. Sanders (w), Lieut.-Col. George E. Tayloe; 14th Ala., Col. L. Pinckard (w), Lieut.-Col. James A. Broome. Brigade loss: k, 51; w, 469; m, 257=777. *Mahone's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. William Mahone: 6th Va., Col. George T. Rogers; 12th Va., Col. D. A. Weisiger; 16th Va., Col. Joseph H. Ham; 41st Va., Col. William A. Parham; 61st Va., Col. V. D. Groner. Brigade loss: k, 8; w, 55; m, 39=102. *Wright's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Ambrose R. Wright, Col. William Gibson, Brig.-Gen. Ambrose R. Wright: 3d Ga., Col. E. J. Walker; 22d Ga., Col. Joseph Wasden (c), Capt. B. C. McCurry; 48th Ga., Col. William Gibson, Capt. M. R. Hall, Col. William Gibson (w and c); 2d Ga. Battalion, Maj. George W. Ross (m w), Capt. Charles J. Moffett. Brigade loss: k, 40; w, 295; m, 333=668. *Perry's Brigade*, Col. David Lang: 2d Fla., Maj. W. R. Moore (w and c); 5th Fla., Capt. R. N. Gardner (w); 8th Fla., Col. David Lang. Brigade loss: k, 33; w, 217; m, 205=455. *Posey's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Carnot Posey: 12th Miss., Col. W. H. Taylor; 16th Miss., Col. Samuel E. Baker; 19th Miss., Col. N. F. Harris; 48th Miss., Col. Joseph M. Jayne. Brigade loss: k, 12; w, 71=83. *Sampter (Ga.) Artillery Battalion*, Maj. John Lane: Co. A, Capt. Hugh M. Ross; Co. B, Capt. George M. Patterson; Co. C, Capt. John T. Wingfield (w). Battalion loss: k, 3; w, 21; m, 6=30.

HETH'S DIVISION, Maj.-Gen. Henry Heth (w), Brig.-Gen. J. Johnston Pettigrew (w). Staff loss: w, 2.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. J. Johnston Pettigrew, Col. James K. Marshall (w and c); 11th N. C., Col. Collett Leventhorpe (w); 26th N. C., Col. Henry K. Burgwyn, Jr. (k), Capt. H. C. Albright; 47th N. C., Col. G. H. Fari-bault (w); 52d N. C., Col. James K. Marshall, Lieut.-Col. Marcus A. Parks (w). Brigade loss: k, 190; w, 915=1105. *Second Brigade*, Col. J. M. Brockenbrough: 40th Va., Capt. T. E. Betts, Capt. R. B. Davis; 47th Va., Col. Robert M. Mayo; 55th Va., Col. W. S. Christian; 22d Va. Battalion, Maj. John S. Bowles. Brigade loss: k, 25; w, 123=148. *Third Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. James J. Archer (c), Col. B. D. Fry (w and c), Lieut.-Col. S. G. Shepard: 13th Ala., Col. B. D. Fry; 5th Ala. Battalion, Maj. A. S. Van de Graaff; 1st Tenn. (Prov. Army), Maj. Felix G. Buchanan; 7th Tenn., Lieut.-Col. S. G. Shepard; 14th Tenn., Capt. B. L. Phillips. Brigade loss: k, 16; w, 144; m, 517=677. *Fourth Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Joseph R. Davis: 2d Miss., Col. J. M. Stone (w); 11th Miss., Col. F. M. Greene; 42d Miss., Col. H. R. Miller; 55th N. C., Col. J. K. Connally (w). Brigade loss: k, 180; w, 717=897. *Artillery Battalion*, Lieut.-Col. John J. Garnett: La. Battery (Donaldsonville Art'y), Capt. Victor Maurin; Va. Battery (Huger Art'y), Capt. Joseph D. Moore; Va. Battery, Capt. John W. Lewis; Va. Battery (Norfolk Light Art'y Blues), Capt. C. R. Grandy. Battalion loss: w, 5; m, 17=22.

PENDER'S DIVISION, Maj.-Gen. William D. Pender (m w), Brig.-Gen. James H. Lane, Maj.-Gen. Isaac R. Trimble (w and c), Brig.-Gen. James H. Lane. Staff loss: k, 1; w, 4=5.

First Brigade, Col. Abner Perrin: 1st S. C. (Prov. Army), Maj. C. W. McCreary; 1st S. C. (Rifles), Capt. William M. Hadden; 12th S. C., Col. John L. Miller; 13th S. C., Lieut.-Col. B. T. Brockman; 14th S. C., Lieut.-Col. Joseph N. Brown (w). Brigade loss: k, 100; w, 477=577. *Second Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. James H. Lane,

Col. C. M. Avery, Brig.-Gen. James H. Lane (w), Col. C. M. Avery; 7th N. C., Capt. J. McLeod Turner (w and c), Capt. James G. Harris; 18th N. C., Col. John D. Barry; 28th N. C., Col. S. D. Lowe (w), Lieut.-Col. W. H. A. Speer; 33d N. C., Col. C. M. Avery; 37th N. C., Col. W. M. Barbour. Brigade loss: k, 41; w, 348; m, 241=660. *Third Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Edward L. Thomas: 14th Ga., —; 35th Ga., —; 45th Ga., —; 49th Ga., Col. S. T. Player. Brigade loss: k, 16; w, 136=152. *Fourth Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Alfred M. Scales (w), Lieut.-Col. G. T. Gordon, Col. William Lee J. Lowrance: 13th N. C., Col. J. H. Hyman (w); 16th N. C., Capt. L. W. Stowe; 22d N. C., Col. James Conner; 34th N. C., Col. William Lee J. Lowrance (w), Lieut.-Col. G. T. Gordon; 38th N. C., Col. W. J. Hoke (w). Brigade loss: k, 102; w, 323; m, 110=535. *Artillery Battalion*, Maj. William T. Poague: Va. Battery (Albemarle Art'y), Capt. James W. Wyatt; N. C. Battery (Charlotte Art'y), Capt. Joseph Graham; Miss. Battery (Madison Light Art'y), Capt. George Ward; Va. Battery, Capt. J. V. Brooke. Battalion loss: k, 2; w, 24; m, 6=32.

RESERVE ARTILLERY, Col. R. Lindsay Walker.

McIntosh's Battalion, Maj. D. G. McIntosh: Ala. Battery (Hardaway Art'y), Capt. W. B. Hurt; Va. Battery (Danville Art'y), Capt. R. S. Rice; Va. Battery (2d Rockbridge Art'y), Lieut. Samuel Wallace; Va. Battery, Capt. M. Johnson. Battalion loss: k, 7; w, 25=32. *Pegram's Battalion*, Maj. W. J. Pegram, Capt. E. B. Brinson: S. C. Battery (Pee Dee Art'y), Lieut. William E. Zimmerman; Va. Battery (Crenshaw), —; Va. Battery (Fredericksburg Art'y), Capt. E. A. Marye; Va. Battery (Letcher Art'y), Capt. T. A. Brander; Va. Battery (Purcell Art'y), Capt. Joseph McGraw. Battalion loss: k, 10; w, 37; m, 1=48.

CAVALRY, Maj.-Gen. James E. B. Stuart.

Fitz Lee's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Fitzhugh Lee: 1st Md. Battalion (serving with Ewell's corps), Maj. Harry Gil-mor, Maj. Ridgely Brown; 1st Va., Col. James H. Drake; 2d Va., Col. T. T. Mumford; 3d Va., Col. Thomas H. Owen; 4th Va., Col. Williams C. Wickham; 5th Va., Col. T. L. Rosser. Brigade loss: k, 5; w, 16; m, 29=50. *Hampton's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Wade Hampton (w), Col. Lawrence S. Baker: 1st N. C., Col. Lawrence S. Baker; 1st S. C., —; 2d S. C., —; Cobb's (Ga.) Legion, —; Jeff Davis Legion, —; Phillips's (Ga.) Legion, —. Brigade loss: k, 17; w, 58; m, 16=91. *W. H. F. Lee's Brigade*, Col. John R. Chambliss, Jr.: 2d N. C., —; 9th Va., Col. R. L. T. Beale; 10th Va., Col. J. Lucius Davis; 13th Va., —. Brigade loss: k, 2; w, 26; m, 13=41. *Jenkins's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Albert G. Jen-kins (w), Col. M. J. Ferguson: 14th Va., —; 16th Va., —; 17th Va., Col. W. H. French; 34th Va. Bat-talion, Lieut.-Col. V. A. Wither; 36th Va. Battalion, —; Va. Battery, Capt. Thomas E. Jackson. *Robert-son's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Beverly H. Robertson (com-manded his own and W. E. Jones's brigades): 4th N. C., Col. D. D. Ferebee; 5th N. C., —. *Jones's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. William E. Jones: 6th Va., Maj. C. E. Flour-noy; 7th Va., Lieut.-Col. Thomas Marshall; 11th Va., Col. L. L. Lomax; 35th Va. Battalion, Lieut.-Col. E. V. White. Brigade loss: k, 12; w, 40; m, 6=58. *Stuart's Horse Artillery*, Maj. R. F. Beckham: Va. Battery, Capt. James Breathed; Va. Battery, Capt. R. P. Chew; Mary-land Battery, Capt. W. H. Griffin; S. C. Battery, Capt. J. F. Hart; Va. Battery, Capt. W. M. McGregor; Va. Battery, Capt. M. N. Moorman. *Imboden's Command*, Brig.-Gen. John D. Imboden: 18th Va. Cav., Col. George W. Imboden; 62d Va. (mounted infantry), Col. George H. Smith; Va. Partisan Rangers, Capt. John H. McNeill; Va. Battery, Capt. J. H. McClanahan.

According to the reports of brigade and other sub-ordinate commanders the total loss of the Confederate Army was 2592 killed, 12,709 wounded, and 5150 captured or missing=20,451. Several of the reports indicate that many of the "missing" were killed or wounded. Rolls on file in the office of the Adjutant-General, U. S. Army, bear the names of 12,227 wounded and un wounded Con-federates captured at and about Gettysburg from July 1st to 5th, inclusive. The number of wounded prisoners is re-ported by the medical director of Meade's army as 6802.

RELATIVE STRENGTH OF THE ARMIES.

The consolidated morning reports of the Union Army for June 30th, 1863, give the numbers "actually available for line of battle," or the effective force, including officers and men, as follows:

COMMAND.	Cavalry.	Artillery.	Infantry.	Total.
First Army Corps.....	67	619	9,403	10,089
Second Army Corps.....	82	551	12,363	12,996
Third Army Corps.....		677	11,247	11,924
Fifth Army Corps.....		555	11,954	12,509
Sixth Army Corps.....	124	1,039	14,516	15,679
Eleventh Army Corps..	52	644	9,197	9,893
Twelfth Army Corps.....		396	8,193	8,589
Cavalry Corps.....	12,653	491		13,144
Artillery Reserve.....		2,211	335	2,546
Aggregate	12,978	7,183	77,208	97,369

Between June 30th and July 3d, the reinforcements that joined the army may be estimated as follows:

Stannard's brigade to First Corps.....	2,500
Lockwood's brigade to Twelfth Corps....	1,700
Duvall's company Maryland cavalry to Gregg's cavalry division	60
Rank's Pennsylvania artillery to Gregg's cavalry division.....	50
Total reinforcements	4,310

This number, added to the strength as per returns of June 30th, makes a maximum of 101,679 effectives of all arms.

The severe marches following the roll-call of June 30th considerably reduced by sickness and straggling the strength of the commands, but a satisfactory computation of the shrinkage from these causes does not seem possible. It may have ranged from five to ten per cent.

The field returns of the infantry and artillery of the army corps, for July 4th, give the following effective figures:

First Corps (except one regiment detailed as wagon guard).....	5,430
Second Corps	6,923
Third Corps.....	6,130
Fifth Corps	9,553
Sixth Corps	12,832
Eleventh Corps	5,513
Twelfth Corps (except one battery on reconnaissance).....	9,757

Total

Adding to this the loss of 21,905 sustained by the commands mentioned, gives an approximate calculation of the strength of the seven army corps, viz., 78,043.

There are no field returns of the Cavalry Corps or the Artillery Reserve for July 4th. But by assuming, in round numbers, 78,000 as the maximum fighting strength of the seven army corps, and adding 13,000 for the Cavalry Corps, and 2500 for the Artillery Reserve (as shown by the return for June 30th), an aggregate of 93,500 is obtained.

The effective strength as reported by the seven army corps commanders at the council held on the evening of July 2d, was as follows: "About 9000, 12,500, 9000, 6000, 8500, 6000, 7000,—total 58,000.

Unfortunately the particular corps represented by these figures are not stated in the minutes of the council.

According to the returns of the Confederate Army for May 31st, 1863 (the latest immediately preceding the battle), the "effective total" of enlisted men was:

Infantry.....	54,356
Stuart's Cavalry.....	9,536
Artillery.....	4,460

Alexander's and Garnett's artillery battalions, consisting of ten batteries, are not included in the above figures. Their effective strength may, however, be put at 800 officers and men. There were also 6116 officers borne on the return as "present for duty," which, added to the foregoing, give an aggregate of 75,268 officers and men.


The accessions by organizations to the army between May 31st and July 3d, were as follows:

	<i>Estimated at not less than</i>
1st. Pettigrew's infantry brigade.....	2,000
2d. Jenkins's cavalry brigade.....	1,600
3d. Imboden's cavalry brigade.....	2,000
Total gain.....	5,600

The loss by organizations during the same period was:

1st. Corse's brigade and one regiment of Pettigrew's brigade left at Hanover Court House, Va.....	2,000
2d. Three regiments of Early's division left at Winchester, Va.....	1,000
3d. One regiment of Stuart's cavalry left in Virginia.....	350
Total loss (estimated).....	3,350

or a net gain of 2250, which, added to the strength on May 31st, of 75,268, makes a maximum in the campaign of 77,518. After making a liberal allowance for losses by sickness, straggling, guards to prisoners and casualties in the various encounters between June 1st and June 30th inclusive, it seems reasonable to conclude that *General Lee had at his command on the field of battle, from first to last, an army numbering at least 70,000 men of all arms.*



CONSECRATION OF THE GETTYSBURG CEMETERY, NOVEMBER 19, 1863—THE GATHERING THAT PRESIDENT LINCOLN ADDRESSED. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.



UNION CAVALRYMAN—THE WATER-CALL.

THE CONQUEST OF ARKANSAS.†

BY COLONEL THOMAS L. SNEAD.


I HAVE already sketched in this work the chief events of the war west of the Mississippi, down to the defeat of Van Dorn and Price by Curtis, in the battle of Elkhorn [see Vol. I., p. 263], and the withdrawal of the Confederate forces to Des Arc, whither boats were to be sent by Beauregard to transport them to Memphis.

Van Dorn, after issuing orders for the transfer of the army from Des Arc to Memphis, to reënforce the army of Albert Sidney Johnston, in west Tennessee, went, on March 29th, 1862, to Corinth, accompanied by Colonel Dabney H. Maury, in order to confer personally with Johnston and Beauregard as to the movement of his command. He was directed to return forthwith to Arkansas and bring every man that he could to Corinth, in all haste, so as to take part in the projected attack upon Grant, who was then at Pittsburg Landing.

Until Van Dorn returned to Des Arc, on April 5th, it was not generally known that the Trans-Mississippi army was to be sent across the river, and that Missouri and Arkansas were to be abandoned to the enemy. The governors of both of these States protested earnestly against the movement, and the troops themselves manifested the greatest unwillingness to leave their homes in possession of the enemy, while they should go far away to fight for others. But Van Dorn assured them that they were to be brought back to Arkansas as soon as the impending battle on the Tennessee had been

†Including the battles of Prairie Grove and the capture of Arkansas Post, Helena, and Little Rock.

See also "Naval Operations in the Vicksburg Campaign," to follow.—EDITORS.



CAMPAIGNS OF THE MISSISSIPPI VALLEY.

fought, and Price, though he utterly disapproved of the movement, used his influence with the men to induce them to go willingly. They all consented to go, and the mounted men were even persuaded to leave their horses behind them. On the 8th of April, 1862, Little's Missouri brigade embarked for Memphis, quickly followed by the remainder of the Army of the West, twenty thousand men. Few of these ever got back to their Western homes, and Arkansas and Missouri were abandoned to their fate; moreover, Van Dorn was too late for the battle of Shiloh.

The transfer of Van Dorn's forces to Corinth resulted before the middle of May not only in the abandonment of Missouri and northern Arkansas to the enemy, but in the transfer by Halleck of more than thrice as many Union troops from the Trans-Mississippi to the Tennessee to meet them there. This policy of depleting the forces west of the Mississippi, persisted in by the Confederate authorities, thenceforth down to the fall of Vicksburg, was one of the gravest of those blunders whereby the downfall of the Confederacy was precipitated.

Curtis meanwhile moved without opposition from Elkhorn into north-eastern Arkansas, and on the 3d of May occupied Batesville, a small town on White River within ninety miles of Little Rock. His effective force, after sending two divisions, under Generals Asboth and Jeff. C. Davis, to the Tennessee, still amounted to 12,422 men.† Nothing now prevented him from moving against the capital and the valley of the Arkansas, but the difficulty of subsisting his army so far from its base of supply, which was St. Louis.


In spite of this difficulty he had begun to advance to Little Rock, and his outposts were within thirty-five miles of that city (where he was to assume the position of military governor), when the evacuation of Corinth and the consequent opening of the Mississippi to Vicksburg also opened the White River to the Federal fleet and furnished him, as he hoped, a safe and convenient water communication with his base. While waiting for the opening of this new line of communication, for which gun-boats and transports were being made ready, he lay inactive at Batesville.

Van Dorn, on leaving Arkansas, had assigned Brigadier-General Roane to the command of that State. There were no troops there except a few companies of State militia, and these were badly organized and poorly armed; and Roane, though he had been governor of the State and was a brave and estimable gentleman, amiable and popular, was wholly unfit for a military command. Besides these militia companies there were some 5000 or 6000 Indian and mixed (Indian and white) troops in the Indian Territory under Brigadier-General Albert Pike, but they could hardly be accounted a force, as they were of no value except on furlough, and had even then to be fed and clothed, and supplied with all sorts of things, and treated with great consideration and gentleness.

Arkansas was thus utterly undefended, and her people, feeling that they

† The Army of the South-west consisted, May 13th, 1862, of three divisions under Generals Frederick Steele, E. A. Carr, and P. J. Osterhaus. General Sigel was assigned to duty in the East by orders dated June 1st, 1862.—EDITORS.

had been abandoned by the Confederate Government, were fast becoming despondent or apathetic. Those living to the north of the Arkansas among the mountains which rise west of the White and Black rivers were fast submitting to the authority of the Union, and many of them were enlisting in the Union army. The slave-holders that lived in the valley of the Arkansas and on the rich alluvial lands south of that river and along the Mississippi were in despair. The governor and State officers were making ready to abandon the capital, and that part of the population which still remained loyal



LIEUTENANT-GENERAL T. H. HOLMES, C. S. A.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

to the Confederacy was panic-stricken. In these straits a delegation was sent to Beauregard, to whose Department the Trans-Mississippi still belonged, to beg him to appoint Major-General Hindman to the command, from which Van Dorn had been taken, and to authorize him to raise an army for the defense of the State.

Hindman was consequently assigned, on the 26th of May, to the command of the Trans-Mississippi District, comprising the States of Missouri and Arkansas and that part of Louisiana north of the Red River and the Indian Territory. He had commanded a brigade at Shiloh, was wounded there, and had been promoted for good conduct.

Leaving Corinth at once Hindman went to Memphis, which the Confederates were preparing to evacuate as soon as Corinth should be abandoned. There he collected a few supplies for his army, and "impressed" a million dollars that was in the banks. Thus equipped, he hastened to Little Rock, where he assumed command of his district and established headquarters on the 31st of May, 1862. With great energy and with administrative ability of the highest order, he went to work to create an army and provide supplies for it. He declared martial law, and scattered his provost-marshals all over the State; enforced the Conscrip Law[↓] remorselessly; collected thousands of stragglers that were skulking in all directions; arrested deserters and shot scores of them; sent recruiting officers into north Arkansas and Missouri; stopped five Texas regiments that were on their way to Beauregard; established workshops for making powder, shot, arms, clothing, and other supplies

[↓] The first Confederate Conscrip Law, entitled "An act to provide for the public defense," was approved April 16th, 1862. This act annulled all previous contracts made by volunteers, and virtually constituted all men over eighteen years of age and under thirty-five, soldiers during the continuance of the war. The provisions withdrew from State control all male citizens within the ages prescribed and made them subject to the


control of the President of the Confederacy during the war. The act further provided that all persons under the age of eighteen years or over the age of thirty-five years, who were in military service at the time of the passage of the act, should be held to duty in the organizations where they were then serving, for a period of ninety days, unless their places in the ranks should be filled by other recruits.—EDITORS.

for his forces ; and worked in every way so intelligently and earnestly that early in July he had an army of about 20,000 armed men and 46 pieces of artillery.

Not only had Little Rock and the valley of the Arkansas been saved to the Confederacy, but Curtis's position at Batesville was fast becoming untenable. In front he was threatened by Hindman, who was growing stronger and bolder every day, while behind him the Missourians were organizing in all directions to break his long line of communication with St. Louis. The failure of a gun-boat expedition [‡] to relieve him from this precarious situation determined him to retreat across the swamps to Helena. Hindman resolved to attack him. Sending a considerable force under Brigadier-General Albert Rust to get between the retreating army and Helena, and to hold the crossing of the almost impassable Cache, he himself set off in pursuit. But Rust, though a very successful politician, was one of the most incompetent of all "political generals," and was easily brushed out of the way by Curtis, who, conquering the greater obstacles which Nature opposed to his march, got safely to Helena on the 13th of July.

Meanwhile the Confederate Government, yielding to the importunities of General Price and of the representatives of the States west of the Mississippi, and alarmed by the progress of the Union armies in that direction, determined to prosecute more vigorously the war in the West, and to make some effort to recover Missouri and that part of Louisiana which the Union armies had conquered.

Accordingly, just after McClellan's "change of base" to the James, General J. B. Magruder, who had won distinction in the Virginia campaign and was believed to be an officer of great ability and force, was assigned to the command of the Trans-Mississippi, which was now, for the first time, made a separate department. He was told that Hindman, Dick Taylor, and Price would be ordered to report to him — Taylor to command the forces in Louisiana, Hindman the District of Arkansas, and Price the army which was to be sent into Missouri. But hardly had this wise plan been agreed upon before it was set aside. Magruder, who was already on his way to the West, was recalled to Richmond, and subsequently ordered to Texas; Price was directed to remain in Mississippi; [§] and Major-General Theophilus H. Holmes was assigned to the command of the Trans-Mississippi.



MAJOR-GENERAL T. C. HINDMAN, C. S. A.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

[‡] See "Naval Operations," to follow.—EDITORS.

[§] See "With Price East of the Mississippi," Vol. II., p. 717. After the battle of Corinth and the

retreat to Ripley, General Price and his forces continued to be attached to the Department of Mississippi and East Louisiana.—EDITORS.

General Holmes reached Vicksburg on the 30th of July, and on the 12th of August established the headquarters of his department at Little Rock. The force which Hindman turned over to him consisted of about 18,000 infantry "effectives," some 6000 mounted men, 54 pieces of artillery, and 7000 or 8000 unarmed men in camps of instruction.

Hindman was now ordered by Holmes to concentrate the greater part of this force near Fort Smith on the western border of the State, and to organize there an expedition into Missouri, which State was at that time in the utmost commotion.

When Halleck went to the Tennessee in April, 1862, to assume command of the armies which he was to lead against Corinth, he left Schofield in command

of the Union troops in Missouri. This force consisted chiefly of the State militia which Schofield had himself organized. Before the end of the summer this militia had an effective strength of about fifty thousand men. Great as this force was, Schofield did not find it sufficient to hold the Missourians in subjection and to disperse the roving bands which kept up the fight for their State upon its own soil, and he had to call to his assistance several considerable bodies of Union troops. With the aid of these he was gradually driving the Confederate bands out of the State when he learned, toward the last of August, that Hindman was gathering an army for the invasion of Missouri. Rumor so magnified the great-



MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN S. MARMADUKE, C. S. A.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

ness of this invasion that Schofield fancied that Hindman was at the head of from 40,000 to 70,000 men. He accordingly called eagerly for help. The Department of the Missouri was thereupon enlarged by the addition of Kansas; and on the 24th of September Curtis was assigned to the command of it. Curtis ordered Schofield, who was then at Springfield, to take command of all the troops in the south-west. At the same time he ordered General J. G. Blunt, who was commanding in Kansas, to reënforce Schofield with all his available men. This order was promptly obeyed, and Schofield found himself by the 1st of October at the head of about 11,000 effectives with 16 pieces of artillery. This force he called the "Army of the Frontier."

Hindman assumed personal command of the Confederate troops in north-western Arkansas on the 24th of August. These consisted of between 9000 and 10,000 men, of whom about 3000 were Indians, under command of Colonel Douglas H. Cooper. With this force he moved to the borders of Missouri, and took position along the line between that State and Arkansas. His advance consisted of a brigade of Missouri Cavalry (two thousand strong, perhaps), lying in and around Newtonia under Colonel Joseph O. Shelby, one

of the very best officers I have ever known. The men had all just been recruited in Missouri, and were as fine a body of young fellows as ever fought under any flag.

Hindman had hardly entered Missouri when, on the 10th of September, he was recalled to Little Rock by General Holmes, in order to help organize the troops in that neighborhood for his expedition. He left Rains in command, with orders not to provoke an engagement. Matters remained quiet till the 30th of September, when General Frederick Salomon with a part of Blunt's reinforcements approached Newtonia. Cooper with 4000 or 5000 Indians and mixed troops had previously joined Shelby. Together they attacked Salomon and drove him back in confusion. Schofield marched at once to the assistance of Salomon, and on the 4th of October reached Newtonia. Cooper and Shelby fell back toward Rains. Thereupon Schofield continued to advance, driving the Confederates before him out of Missouri and into the mountains of Arkansas. Thence Cooper continued to retreat toward the Indian Territory, while Rains made his way to Huntsville. Schofield sent Blunt in pursuit of Cooper, who was overtaken at Old Fort Wayne near Maysville on the 22d of October and completely routed and driven into the Indian Territory.


Hindman had meanwhile returned to Fort Smith on the 15th of October. Learning there of the disasters that had befallen his army, he hastened to the front, relieved Rains, assumed command himself, and was about to take a strong position near Fayetteville, whither reinforcements were hastening to him, when Schofield on the 27th of October again advanced. Hindman thereupon retreated somewhat precipitately to the banks of the Arkansas, whence he wrote to Holmes that with another division he could "move into Missouri, take Springfield, and winter on the Osage at least."

Schofield, whose effective strength had been increased by reinforcements to over sixteen thousand men, having accomplished the object of his expedition, now returned toward Springfield with two divisions of the Army of the Frontier, leaving Blunt with another division in the vicinity of Fayetteville to guard the mountain passes. Believing that hostilities were ended for the winter, and being ill, he turned over the command of the Army of the Frontier to Blunt on the 20th of November, and went to St. Louis.

Blunt was a typical Kansas man of that period. Born in Maine, he had practiced medicine in Ohio, and gone thence to Kansas when that territory was the battle-field between slavery and freedom. Deeply inspired by the fierce passions which that savage conflict generated, he was one of the first to enlist



MAJOR-GENERAL JAMES G. BLUNT.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.



FAYETTEVILLE, ARKANSAS. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

for the defense of the Union and the abolition of slavery. He was rapidly promoted, and on the 8th of April, 1862, was made brigadier-general and assigned to the command of the Department of Kansas. He was then 36 years old.

While Hindman was actively reorganizing his army on the Arkansas, about fifty miles south of Fayetteville (where Blunt was), and getting ready to move again into Missouri, Holmes, who was doing all that he could to reinforce him, was ordered by reason of the exigencies of the war on the eastern side of the Mississippi to abandon the Missouri expedition.


The disastrous defeat of Van Dorn at Corinth in October, 1862, opened the way to Grant to move overland against Vicksburg, which stronghold and Port Hudson were the only places that the Confederates then held on the Mississippi. Leaving Grand Junction on the 4th of November Grant advanced toward Holly Springs, Van Dorn falling back before him. McClelland was at the same time concentrating at Memphis a large force which was to move by the river and cooperate in the attack upon Vicksburg. Alarmed by these great preparations the Confederate Government, which had sent Pemberton, who had been in command of the Department of South Carolina and Georgia, to supersede Van Dorn, instructed Holmes, under date of November 11th, to send ten thousand men to Vicksburg if possible. Holmes, on receiving this order, straightway ordered Hindman to abandon the invasion of Missouri and return to Little Rock with his army. Hindman protested; and to entreaties from Van Dorn, Pemberton, and Joseph E. Johnston (who on the 24th of November had been assigned to the command), and to the reiterated orders of the President and Secretary of War requiring him to reinforce Vicksburg, Holmes only replied that he could do nothing as "two-thirds of his force was in north-western Arkansas to meet a heavy advance from Springfield." He nevertheless again ordered Hindman to bring his army to Little Rock without further delay.

Hindman, however, had made up his mind to attack Blunt before obeying Holmes's order. He had already sent Marmaduke toward Cane Hill with a division of cavalry; and skirmishing was taking place almost daily between him and Blunt, who had some 7000 or 8000 men. At last Blunt attacked in force on the 28th of November, and drove Marmaduke back to the vicinity of Van Buren. Blunt then took position at Cane Hill.


Hindman resolved to attack him there with his whole available force. Leaving Van Buren on the 3d of December with 9000 infantry, 2000 cavalry, and 22 pieces of artillery, about 11,500 men in all, he drove in Blunt's pickets on the evening of the 6th, and was getting ready to attack him the next evening, when he learned that General F. J. Herron was coming to reinforce Blunt with about 4000 infantry, 2000 cavalry, and 30 guns, and was already entering Fayetteville.

Blunt had learned on the 24th of December that Hindman was moving his infantry from the south side of the Arkansas to the north side of that river. He immediately ordered Herron, who was encamped with two divisions of the Army of the Frontier near Springfield, to come instantly to Cane Hill. That excellent officer broke camp on the morning of the 3d, and, marching 110 miles in 3 days, reached Elkhorn on the evening of the 6th of December.

There seemed nothing to prevent Hindman from first destroying Herron and then turning upon Blunt and defeating him; for Herron and Blunt were twelve miles apart and the Confederates lay between them. Indeed that was what Hindman determined to do. Masking his movement from Blunt by so



disposing a brigade of cavalry as to deceive him into believing that it was he whom he was about to attack, Hindman moved at 3 o'clock on the morning of December 7th against Herron. His cavalry under Marmaduke soon encountered Herron's on the march to Blunt, and drove them back upon the main body. Herron brought up his entire force, and Marmaduke gave way in turn. Hindman thereupon brought up his infantry, but, instead of attacking, as he ought to have done, took a strong position and awaited Herron's attack. This fatal mistake gave the victory to Blunt. Herron did attack



BRIGADIER-GENERAL T. J. CHURCHILL, C. S. A.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

at noon. The moment that Blunt heard Herron's guns he rushed to his assistance, and Hindman had then to confront the united army, which was not only stronger than his own in numbers, but very much stronger in organization, arms, artillery, and leadership. Darkness ended the battle. During the night Hindman withdrew his army and retreated toward Van Buren. Blunt did not pursue. Hindman's loss in killed, wounded, and missing was 1317; Blunt's was 1251, of which 918 belonged to Herron's two divisions, which bore the brunt of the battle, known as "the battle of Prairie Grove."

Hindman sheltered his demoralized army behind the Arkansas, opposite Van Buren, and tried to reorganize it.

It was still lying there when, on December 28th, Blunt dashed into Van Buren at the head of a small mounted force, and hastened the long-projected Confederate retreat to Little Rock, which place was reached toward the middle of January. During the long and dreary march thither the troops, who were not clad to withstand the snows and rains of winter, suffered severely. Sickness increased alarmingly; the men straggled at will; hundreds deserted; and Hindman's army faded away. Hindman "was a man of genius and could have commanded a department, or have been a minister of war; but he could not command an army in the field, or plan and execute a battle."

A disaster almost as great as that which had befallen Holmes in western Arkansas befell him in the eastern part of the State while Hindman was retreating to Little Rock. The Confederates had strongly fortified the Post of Arkansas, on the north bank of the Arkansas, 50 miles above the mouth of the river, and 117 miles below Little Rock. The fort was primarily intended for the protection of that city and of the valley of the Arkansas, but it was also useful to the Confederates in obstructing the navigation of the Mississippi. Several unsuccessful attempts to capture it had been made, but now it was about to fall.

When Grant was ready to move overland against Vicksburg he ordered Sherman, in the absence of McClelland, ¶ to take all the troops at Memphis and Steele's division at Helena, and to move with Porter's fleet by the river and coöperate in the attack. Grant had advanced a part of his own immediate army as far as Holly Springs, where he established a great depot of supplies, and was about to move forward when Van Dorn, by a splendid dash upon Holly Springs, ‡ on the 20th of December, and Forrest, by a brilliant raid into west Tennessee, so broke Grant's communications and destroyed his supplies that he was forced to abandon his

¶ On the 21st of October, 1862, Secretary Stanton by a confidential order authorized Major-General John A. McClelland, then in Washington, to proceed to the States of Indiana, Illinois, and Iowa for the purpose of raising and organizing troops for an expedition, to be commanded by him, having for its object the capture of Vicksburg, the freeing of the Mississippi, and the opening of navigation to New Orleans. On the 9th of November General Banks was ordered to relieve General Butler, at New Orleans, and proceed to open the Mississippi from below. General McClelland was authorized to show his confidential orders to the governors of the States named, but they were not communicated to General Grant, who, on October 16th, was formally assigned to the command of the Department of the Tennessee, a command he had been exercising ever since Halleck went to Washington in July. ☆ Being advised, however, of the President's strong desire for a movement against Vicksburg, General Grant made his preparations for a combined attack on that stronghold by a force descending the river on transports from Memphis and a heavier force under his own command moving by land along the general line of the Jackson railroad. Some correspondence took place by telegraph between General Grant and General Halleck, as General-in-Chief, regarding a commander for the river column, to which McClelland's levies were assigned as they reported at Cairo, and General Grant was authorized to designate the commander, unless otherwise ordered. General Grant had already indicated to Halleck his purpose of assigning Sherman; General Halleck replied, December 9th, that Sherman would be his choice, but that the President might insist on naming the commander. Finally, just as the expedition was ready to start from Memphis, General Grant, at Oxford, Mississippi, received General Halleck's telegram of December 18th, directing him to give the command to McClelland. General McClelland, who had also been in correspondence with the Government on this subject and had now received corresponding orders direct, was at that moment on

his way to report for duty. General Grant's telegram to him at Cairo did not find him promptly, and General Grant's telegram to Sherman, intended to cause him to wait for McClelland, did not reach Memphis until after Sherman with the advance of his troops had started. The capture of Holly Springs on the 20th of December broke up General Grant's coöperating movement by land. Sherman, knowing nothing of the enforced change of Grant's plans, attacked alone the reënforced garrison of Vicksburg, at Chickasaw's Bluffs, and was repulsed with heavy loss. [See p. 462.] The following day, January 4th, General McClelland arrived and took command of the expedition, to which he gave the name of the "Army of the Mississippi," dividing it into two corps, commanded by Major-General Sherman and Brigadier-General George W. Morgan. Without waiting for further instructions, McClelland at once moved up the Arkansas River and captured the works known as Arkansas Post, with about five thousand prisoners. Grant at first disapproved of the movement as having been made without orders. McClelland, however, considered himself an independent commander. All question as to McClelland's position disappeared in the reorganization of the forces under General Grant, December 18th, 1862, into four army corps: the Thirteenth to be commanded by McClelland, the Fifteenth by Sherman, the Sixteenth by Hurlbut, the Seventeenth by McPherson.

EDITORS.

‡ The post at Holly Springs was commanded by Colonel R. C. Murphy, 8th Wisconsin Volunteers, and the force there consisted of the 8th Wisconsin and a portion of the 62d Illinois Infantry, and six companies of the 2d Illinois Cavalry. The surprise was made at daylight, and was complete, but many of the soldiers resisted capture. The cavalrymen distinguished themselves by bold attacks on isolated parties of the enemy, and lost nine killed and thirty-nine wounded in these affrays. The value of the stores destroyed was estimated by Grant at \$400,000, and by Van Dorn at \$1,500,000. Fifteen hundred prisoners were taken by Van Dorn.—EDITORS.

☆ The origin of the expedition down the Mississippi, December 12th to January 4th, under Sherman's command, is given in General Grant's "Personal Memoirs" (C. L. Webster & Co.), as follows:

"During the delay at Oxford in repairing railroads, I learned that an expedition down the Mississippi now was inevitable, and, desiring to have a competent commander in charge, I

ordered Sherman, on the 8th of December, back to Memphis to take charge. . . . As stated, my action in sending Sherman back was expedited by a desire to get him in command of the forces separated from my direct supervision. I feared that delay might bring McClelland, who was his senior and who had authority from the President and Secretary of War, to exercise that particular command,—and independently."

EDITORS.

both army and navy, and after a terrific bombardment of nearly four hours Churchill surrendered. The Confederate loss was 60 killed, 75 or 80 wounded, and 4791 prisoners; the Union loss was 1061 killed and wounded. The next day McClelland received peremptory orders from Grant to return forthwith to Milliken's Bend with his entire command.


By the disasters in the north-western part of the State and the capture of the Post of Arkansas, and through the demoralization consequent upon those events, the fine army which Hindman had turned over to Holmes on the 12th of August, 1862, had been reduced within less than five months to about 10,000 effectives, most of which were in camp near Little Rock.

The ill consequences of Holmes's incompetence to command a department and of Hindman's unfitness to command an army, now began to be seriously felt by the Confederacy. For not only was Holmes wholly unable to do anything for the relief of Vicksburg, but his weakness relieved the Federal general-in-chief of all apprehension of another invasion of Missouri, and of all fear for the safety of Helena. Halleck consequently ordered 19,000 of the force at Helena, including those with which Steele had joined Sherman in December, to be sent


to Grant, leaving a garrison of only about 5000 men for the defense of the place. All this was done before the 19th of January, 1863. Curtis was also ordered to send all the men that could be spared from Missouri to the Mississippi to coöperate in the capture of Vicksburg.

Schofield, who had resumed command of the Army of the Frontier, immediately after the battle of Prairie Grove, began in

consequence of this order to withdraw the greater part of his army, which was then 18,000 strong, from north-western Arkansas and put it on the march through Missouri to north-eastern Arkansas, where it was to be joined by Davidson with six thousand cavalry from St. Louis.




PLAN OF FORT HINDMAN, ARKANSAS POST.



SECTION OF A CASEMATE OF FORT HINDMAN.

Schofield proposed that ten thousand of these men should be sent to Grant instead. This led to the culmination of long-existing differences between Curtis and Schofield, the former of whom represented the Radical or Abolition faction of the Union men of Missouri, while the latter represented the Conservative faction, at whose head was Governor Gamble. Curtis desired to retain the 45,000 "effectives" that were in the State in order to dragoon the Southern sympathizers into submission. Schofield thought that a part of

these men could be better employed elsewhere. Curtis was sustained by the Government, and on the 1st of April Schofield was, at his own request, relieved from duty in Missouri. Curtis's conduct, however, soon raised such a storm in Missouri that the President on the 10th of March ordered General E. V. Sumner, from



CASEMATE ON THE EASTERN CURTAIN OF FORT HINDMAN, SHOWING THE EFFECT OF SHOT FROM THE UNION GUNS.

the Army of the Potomac, to relieve him. Sumner died on the way to St. Louis, and thereupon the President, on the 13th of May, ordered Schofield to relieve Curtis.

Schofield at once postponed further operations against Arkansas until after the all-important struggle for Vicksburg had been decided, and sent nearly twelve thousand of his men thither and to Tennessee, making more than thirty thousand men that were sent out of Missouri to reinforce Grant at Vicksburg, a force which gave him the victory there and opened all the Western waters to the Union fleets and armies.

Even President Davis at last saw that General Holmes was unfit for his great command, and on the 7th of February, 1863, ordered Lieutenant-General Edmund Kirby Smith to relieve him, and sent General Price to report to Smith. The latter assumed command of the Department of the Trans-Mississippi at Alexandria, in Louisiana, on the 7th of March, 1863. Taylor was left in command of Louisiana, and Magruder of Texas. Holmes was put in command of the District of Arkansas. The change resulted in very little, if any, advantage to the Confederacy, for Smith was even feebler than Holmes, and though attempting to do a great deal more did almost nothing.

General Price reached Little Rock on the 25th of March and was assigned to the command of Hindman's division. The state of affairs in Arkansas at that time is quite accurately depicted in a letter which the Confederate Secretary of War addressed to General Smith on the 18th of March. He says:


"From a variety of sources, many of which I cannot doubt, the most deplorable accounts reach this department of the disorder, confusion, and demoralization everywhere prevalent both with the armies and people of that State. The commanding general [Holmes] seems, while esteemed for his virtues, to have lost the confidence and attachment of all; and the next in command, General Hindman, who is admitted to have shown energy and ability, has rendered him-



HELENA, ARKANSAS. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH MADE IN 1888.

self by alleged acts of violence and tyranny perfectly odious. The consequences as depicted are fearful. The army is stated to have dwindled by desertion, sickness, and death from 40,000 or 50,000 men to some 15,000 or 18,000, who are disaffected and helpless, and are threatened with positive starvation from deficiency of mere necessities. The people are represented as in a state of consternation, multitudes suffering for means of subsistence, and yet exposed from gangs of lawless marauders and deserters to being plundered of the little they have."

Such was the outlook in Arkansas when Price assumed command of a division at Little Rock on the 1st of April. Holmes's entire force in Arkansas and the Indian Territory at that time (exclusive of Walker's division which was soon sent to Taylor in Louisiana) aggregated less than 12,500 officers and men. Seven thousand of these constituted Price's division, which was stationed near Little Rock. With them Price



MAP OF THE BATTLE OF HELENA, ARKANSAS.

would have done something had he not been repressed by both Smith and Holmes.


At last toward the middle of June Kirby Smith determined to do something for the relief of Vicksburg, and as the President had frequently suggested an attack upon Helena he ordered Holmes to move from Little Rock for that place. He could hardly have done anything more unwise, for Helena was garrisoned by 5000 men, and was strongly fortified. It was also protected by gun-boats, and could not have been held 24 hours even if it had been taken.

The Confederates bivouacked within five miles of Helena on the evening of the 3d of July, and Holmes then learned for the first time the difficulties which he was to encounter. Between him and the city rose a succession of precipitous hills over which it was impossible to move artillery, and difficult to manœuvre infantry. The hills nearest the city were occupied by strong redoubts,—Graveyard Hill in the center, Fort Righter on the north, and Fort Hindman on the south,—and these redoubts were all connected by a line of bastions. In the low ground between these hills and Helena was a strong work,—Fort Curtis,—and in the river lay the gun-boat *Tyler*, Lieutenant Commanding James M. Prichett, whose great guns were to do no little execution. The Union forces were under the command of General B. M. Prentiss. [See organization, p. 460.]

Holmes, nothing daunted, for he was both brave and fearless, ordered the attack to be made at daybreak of the 4th of July. Price with 3095 men was to take Graveyard Hill; Fagan with 1770 men to attack Fort Hindman; and Marmaduke and L. M. Walker were sent with 2781 men against Fort Righter. The attack was made as ordered; Price carried Graveyard Hill in gallant style and held it, but Fagan and Marmaduke were both repulsed, and the fire of the forts, rifle-pits, and gun-boat was then all concentrated against Price. By half-past 10 o'clock in the morning Holmes saw that his attack had failed and withdrew Price's men from the field. Holmes's force aggregated 7646 officers and men. His losses were 173 killed, 687 wounded, and 776 missing, 1636 in all. Prentiss's force aggregated about 5000, but he says that he had only 4129 men in the fight, and that he lost 57 killed, 146 wounded, and 36 missing, 239 in all. All this happened on the day that Grant's victorious army entered Vicksburg, and that Lee began his retreat from Gettysburg.

Holmes withdrew his army to the White River, and, being ill, turned over the command of the District of Arkansas to General Price on the 23d of July. Price at once urged General Smith to concentrate his scattered forces on the Arkansas and to do something, but Smith was then too busy organizing a sort of independent Trans-Mississippi Confederacy to have time for anything else. All that Price could do was to concentrate his own force for the defense of Little Rock, the approaches to which on the north side of the river he now began to fortify.

The capture of Vicksburg and Port Hudson (the former on the 4th and the latter on the 8th of July) opened the way to the Union armies for active operations in Arkansas. Major-General Frederick Steele was accordingly



MAP OF THE CAPTURE OF LITTLE ROCK.

sent with a force to Helena, and instructed to form a junction with Brigadier-General Davidson, who was moving south from Missouri, by Crowley's Ridge, and to "break up Price and occupy Little Rock."

Steele organized his expedition at Helena on the 5th of August, and moved thence with two divisions of infantry, a brigade of cavalry, and 39 guns to the White River, where he effected a junction with Davidson, who had 6000 cavalry, taught as dragoons, and three batteries. On the 18th of August Steele moved from Devall's Bluff upon Little Rock with 13,000 officers and men and 57 pieces of artillery. He was reënforced a few days later by True's brigade, which raised his aggregate to nearly 14,500 "present." Of this number 10,500 were "present for duty." On the morning of the 10th of September he had come within eight miles of Little Rock.

Price had "present for duty" 7749 men of all arms. About 6500 of these occupied the trenches on the north side of the Arkansas, and about 1250 were disposed on the south side with orders to prevent the enemy from crossing the river. This was not easy to do, as the river was fordable at many points, and Davidson did in fact effect a crossing below Little Rock, about 10 o'clock, without much difficulty.

As soon as Price learned that his fortified position on the north side of the river had been turned by Davidson he withdrew his troops across the Arkansas, and evacuated Little Rock about 5 o'clock in the afternoon. Two brigades of Steele's cavalry, under Colonel Lewis Merrill, started in pursuit, followed Marmaduke for a day, and returned to Little Rock on the 12th. General Price's total casualties in the series of operations around Little Rock amounted to 64 killed, wounded, and missing; General Steele's to 137.

Price continued his retreat undisturbed to Arkadelphia. There Holmes resumed command on the 25th of September. On the 7th of October Smith ordered him to fall back to Camden, whence he could either safely retreat

to Shreveport or coöperate with Taylor, who was concentrating his forces on the Red River. General Holmes's "present for duty" then aggregated 8532 officers and men; General Taylor's 13,649; and General Kirby Smith's entire force in the Trans-Mississippi amounted to 41,887, of whom 32,971 were "present for duty."

Schofield's force in Missouri and Arkansas at this time aggregated 47,000 officers and men. Nearly eighteen thousand of these were in Arkansas under

Steele. Halleck, who was still general-in-chief, ordered Steele to hold the line of the Arkansas, and to wait till Banks was ready to coöperate with him from Port Hudson in an attack upon Shreveport, and in taking possession of the Red River and its valley.

Holmes, not being pressed by Steele, settled his infantry quietly at Camden, while his cavalry indulged in a sort of spasmodic activity, the main object of which was to procure forage for their horses.

A division of infantry—consisting of Churchill's Arkansas brigade and Parsons's Missouri brigade, the two having some five thousand effectives—was near Spring Hill. On their left flank was Cabell's brigade of Arkansas cavalry; and on their right, toward Camden, was Marmaduke

with a division of Missouri cavalry—Shelby's and Greene's brigades. Cabell had about 1200 men for duty; Marmaduke about 2000. East of the Washita were Dockery's brigade of cavalry and some other mounted men.

Lieutenant-General E. Kirby Smith was kept very busy at Shreveport organizing bureaus and sub-bureaus; fortifying his capital; issuing orders and countermanding them; and planning campaigns that were never to be fought.

Throughout all his great department hostilities were virtually suspended during the autumn, throughout the winter, and far into the spring. His soldiers lay idle in their camps, and the people gave themselves up to cotton-trading and money-getting. Neither soldiers nor civilians did anything to sustain, or even to encourage, the armies which were fighting in Virginia and Tennessee against overwhelming odds.

It was to no purpose that Dick Taylor and General Price begged Kirby Smith to concentrate the troops that were scattered through Louisiana, Arkansas and Texas, and to move them northward and into Missouri, where



MAJOR-GENERAL FREDERICK STEELE.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

they would at least create a diversion in favor of Lee and of Johnston, even if they did not regain Arkansas and Missouri. Smith listened, but did nothing. Yes!—he asked the President to relieve General Holmes from service in the Trans-Mississippi, and toward the middle of March this was done.

General Price was then put in temporary command of what was left of the District of Arkansas—that small portion of the State which lies south of a line drawn east and west through Camden.

General Price's lines extended from Monticello in the east to the Indian Territory in the west, where General Samuel B. Maxey (who, from March, 1875, till March, 1887, represented Texas in the United States Senate) had a mixed command of Texans and Indians, some two thousand strong.

THE OPPOSING FORCES IN ARKANSAS.

December 7th, 1862–September 14th, 1863.

The composition, losses, and strength of each army as here stated give the gist of all the data obtainable in the Official Records. K stands for killed; w for wounded; m w for mortally wounded; m for captured or missing; c for captured.

PRAIRIE GROVE, DECEMBER 7TH, 1862.

UNION: ARMY OF THE FRONTIER.—Brig.-Gen. James G. Blunt.

FIRST DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. James G. Blunt.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Frederick Salomon: 6th Kan. Cav., Col. William R. Judson; 9th Kan. Cav., Col. Edward Lynde; 3d Wis. Cav. (6 co's), Maj. Elias A. Calkins; 9th Wis. Inf. (train guard), Col. Charles E. Salomon. Brigade loss: k, 1; m, 1. *Second Brigade*, Col. William Weer: 3d Indian Home Guard, Col. William A. Phillips; 10th Kan., Maj. Henry H. Williams; 13th Kan., Col. Thomas M. Bowen; 1st Kan. Battery, Lieut. Marcus D. Tenney. Brigade loss: k, 16; w, 117; m, 5=138. *Third Brigade*, Col. William F. Cloud: 1st Indian Home Guard, Lieut.-Col. Stephen H. Wattles; 2d Kan. Cav., Lieut.-Col. Owen A. Bassett; 11th Kan., Col. Thomas Ewing, Jr.; 2d Ind. Battery, Capt. John W. Rabb; 2d Kan. Battery, Capt. Henry Hopkins. Brigade loss: k, 8; w, 63=71.

SECOND DIVISION, Col. Daniel Hinton, Jr.

Escort: 1st Mo. Cav. (2 co's), Maj. Charles Banzhaf.

First Brigade, Col. John G. Clark: 26th Ind., Col. John G. Clark; 7th Mo. Cav., Maj. Eliphalet Bredett (k), Capt. Wesley R. Love; A, 2d Ill. Art'y, Lieut. Herman Borris. Brigade loss: k, 30; w, 181; m, 132=343. *Second Brigade*, Col. William McE. Dye: 37th Ill., Lieut.-Col. John C. Black (w), Maj. Henry M. Frisbie; 20th Iowa, Lieut.-Col. Joseph B. Leake; 2d Battalion, 6th Mo. Cav.,

Maj. Samuel Montgomery; F, 1st Mo. Art'y, Capt. David Murphy. Brigade loss: k, 17; w, 99; m, 38=154.

THIRD DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Francis J. Herron (in command of Second and Third Divisions combined).

Escort, etc.: 1st Mo. Cav. (battalion), Maj. James M. Hubbard (c), Capt. Amos L. Burrows. Loss: w, 5; m, 13=18.

First Brigade, Lieut.-Col. Henry Bertram: 10th Ill. Cav., } Lieut.-Col. James Stuart; 1st Iowa Cav., } Col. James O. Gower; 1st Battalion, 2d Wis. Cav., } Maj. William H. Miller; 20th Wis., Maj. Henry A. Starr; L, 1st Mo. Art'y, Capt. Frank Backof. Brigade loss: k, 51; w, 159; m, 13=223. *Second Brigade*, Col. William W. Orme: 94th Ill., Lieut.-Col. John McNulta; 19th Iowa, Lieut.-Col. Samuel McFarland (k), Maj. Daniel Kent; 8th Mo. Cav., } Col. Washington F. Geiger; E, 1st Mo. Art'y, Lieut. Joseph Foust. Brigade loss: k, 49; w, 185; m, 14=248. *Unattached*: 1st Ark. Cav., Col. M. La Rue Harrison; 14th Mo. S. M. Cav., Col. John M. Richardson. *Unattached loss*: k, 4; w, 4; m, 47=55.

Total Union loss: Killed, 174; wounded, 813; captured or missing, 263=1251. General Blunt says ("Official Records," Vol. XXII, Pt. I, p. 76): "The entire force . . . engaged did not exceed 7000, about 3000 cavalry not having been brought into action."

CONFEDERATE: FIRST CORPS, TRANS-MISSISSIPPI ARMY.—Maj.-Gen. Thomas C. Hindman.

FOURTH (CAVALRY) DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. John S. Marmaduke.

Carroll's Brigade, Col. J. C. Monroe: Ark. Reg't, Maj. John B. Thompson; Ark. Reg't, Maj. — Johnston. Brigade loss: k, 3; w, 12=15. *Shelby's Brigade*, Col. Joseph O. Shelby: 1st Mo., Lieut.-Col. B. F. Gordon; 2d Mo., Col. Beal G. Jeans; 3d Mo., Col. G. W. Thompson; Scouts, Maj. B. Elliott; Quantrill's Co., Lieut. — Gregg; Mo. Battery, Capt. H. M. Bledsoe; Mo. Battery, Capt. Westley Roberts. *MacDonald's Brigade*, Col. Emmett MacDonald: Lane's Tex. Reg't, Lieut.-Col. R. P. Crump; Mo. Reg't, Lieut.-Col. M. L.

Yonng; Ark. Battery, Capt. Henry C. West. Brigade loss: k, 5; w, 22; m, 8=35.

There are no official reports of the other divisions engaged, and their composition is not given. Generals Frost and Shomp were the division commanders, and the commanders of brigades were Roane, Fagan, Parsons, McRae, and Shaver. Major-General Thomas C. Hindman says ("Official Records," Vol. XXII, Pt. I, p. 140) that he had "for the fight less than 10,000 men of all arms." He also (*ibid.*, p. 142) reports his loss as 164 killed, 817 wounded, and 336 missing=1317.

† Temporarily organized as a cavalry brigade under Col. Dudley Wickersham.

ARKANSAS POST (FORT HINDMAN), JANUARY 11TH, 1863.

UNION: ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI, —Major-General John A. McClernand.

THIRTEENTH ARMY CORPS, Brig.-Gen. George W. Morgan.

Escort: A, 3d Ill. Cav., Capt. Richard H. Ballinger.

FIRST DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Andrew J. Smith.

Escort: C, 4th Ind. Cav., Capt. Joseph P. Lesslie.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Stephen G. Burbridge: 16th Ind., Lieut.-Col. John M. Orr (w), Maj. James H. Redfield, Col. Thomas J. Lueas; 60th Ind., Col. Richard Owen; 67th Ind., Col. Frank Emerson (w); 83d Ohio, Lieut.-Col. William H. Baldwin; 96th Ohio, Col. Joseph W. Vance; 23d Wis., Col. Joshua J. Guppy. *Brigade loss:* k, 37; w, 305; m, 7=349. *Second Brigade*, Col. William J. Landrum: 77th Ill., Col. David P. Grier; 97th Ill., Col. Friend S. Rutherford; 108th Ill., Col. John Warner; 131st Ill. (not in action), Lieut.-Col. R. A. Peter; 19th Ky., Lieut.-Col. John Cowan; 48th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Job R. Parker (w), Capt. S. G. W. Peterson (temporarily). *Brigade loss:* k, 8; w, 77=85. *Artillery*, Mercantile (Ill.) Battery, Capt. Charles G. Cooley; 17th Ohio Battery, Capt. Ambrose A. Blount. *Artillery loss:* w, 1. *Cavalry:* Squadron 6th Mo., Col. Clark Wright.

SECOND DIVISION, Brigadier-General Peter J. Osterhaus.

First Brigade, Col. Lionel A. Sheldon: 118th Ill., Col. John G. Fonda; 69th Ind., Col. Thomas W. Bennett; 120th Ohio, Col. Daniel French. *Brigade loss:* k, 3; w, 14; m, 11=28. *Second Brigade*, Col. Daniel W. Lindsey: 49th Ind., Col. James Keigwin; 3d Ky., Capt. Andrew H. Clark; 114th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Horatio B. Maynard. *Third Brigade*, Col. John F. DeCourcy: 54th Ind., Col. Fielding Mansfield; 22d Ky., Maj. William J. Worthington; 16th Ohio, Capt. Eli W. Botsford; 42d Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Don A. Pardee. *Artillery:* 7th Mich., Capt. Charles H. Lanphere; 1st Wis., Capt. Jacob T. Foster. *Ky. Engineers*, Capt. W. F. Patterson.

FIFTEENTH ARMY CORPS, Maj.-Gen. William T. Sherman.

FIRST DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Frederick Steele.

Escort: Kane County (Ill.) Cav., Capt. William C. Wilder.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Frank P. Blair, Jr.: 13th Ill., Lieut.-Col. A. B. Gorgas; 29th Mo., Col. John S. Caven-der; 30th Mo., Lieut.-Col. Otto Schadt; 31st Mo., Lieut.-Col. Samuel P. Simpson; 32d Mo., Col. Francis H. Man-ter; 58th Ohio, Capt. Bastian Benkler; 4th Ohio Battery, Capt. Louis Hoffmann. *Brigade loss:* w, 9. *Second Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Charles E. Hovey (w): 25th Iowa, Col. George A. Stone; 31st Iowa, Col. William Smyth; 3d Mo., Col. Isaac F. Shepard; 12th Mo. (not in action), Col. Hugo Wangelin; 17th Mo., Col. F. Hassendenbel; 76th Ohio, Col. Charles R. Woods; 1st Mo. Horse Bat-tery (not in action), Capt. C. Landgraaber. *Brigade loss:* k, 38; w, 182; m, 2=222. *Third Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. John M. Thayer: 4th Iowa, Col. J. A. Williamson; 9th Iowa, Lieut.-Col. W. H. Coyle; 26th Iowa, Col. Milo Smith; 30th Iowa, Lieut.-Col. W. M. G. Torrence; 34th Iowa, Col. George W. Clark; 1st Iowa Battery, Capt. Henry H. Griffiths. *Brigade loss:* k, 24; w, 156=180. *Cavalry:* 3d Ill., Col. Lafayette McCrillis.

SECOND DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. David Stuart.

First Brigade, Col. Giles A. Smith: 113th Ill., Col. George B. Hoge; 116th Ill., Lieut.-Col. James P. Boyd; 6th Mo., Lieut.-Col. James H. Blood; 8th Mo., Lieut.-Col. David C. Coleman (w); Maj. Dennis T. Kirby; 13th U. S. (1st Battalion), Maj. Daniel Chase. *Brigade loss:* k, 18; w, 84=102. *Second Brigade*, Col. T. Kilby Smith: 55th Ill., Lieut.-Col. Osear Malmborg; 127th Ill., Col. J. Van Arman; 83d Ind., Col. Benjamin J. Spooner; 54th Ohio, Capt. S. B. Yoeman (w); 57th Ohio, Col. William Mungen. *Brigade loss:* k, 6; w, 70; m, 9=85. *Artillery:* A, 1st Ill., Capt. Peter P. Wood; B, 1st Ill., Capt. Samuel E. Barrett; H, 1st Ill., Lieut. Levi W. Hart; 8th Ohio, Lieut. J. F. Putnam. *Cavalry:* A and B, Thiele-mann's (Ill.) Battalion, Capt. Berthold Marschner; C, 10th Mo., Lieut. Daniel W. Ballou.

The total loss of the Union Army was 134 killed, 898 wounded, and 29 missing=1061. The strength of McClernand's expeditionary force was about "32,000 infantry, 1000 cavalry, and 40 or more pieces of artill-ery." (See "Official Records," Vol. XVII., Pt. II., p. 553.)

THE CONFEDERATE FORCES.—Brigadier-General Thomas J. Churchill.

First Brigade, Col. Robert R. Garland: 6th Tex., Lieut.-Col. T. S. Anderson; 24th Tex. Cav. (dismounted), Col. F. C. Wilkes; 25th Tex. Cav. (dismounted), Col. C. C. Gillespie; Ark. Battery, Capt. William Hart; La. Cav., Capt. W. B. Denson. *Brigade loss:* k, 25; w, 64; m, 68=157. *Second Brigade*, Col. James Deshler: 10th Tex., Col. Roger Q. Mills; 15th Tex. Cav. (dismounted), Maj. V. P. Sanders; 17th Tex. Cav. (dismounted), Col. James R. Taylor; 18th Tex. Cav. (dismounted), Lieut.-Col. John T. Coit. *Brigade loss* not separately reported. *Third Brigade* (composition probably incomplete), Col. John W. Dunnington: 19th Ark., Lieut.-Col. A. S. Hut-

chinson. *Miscellaneous:* 24th Ark. (detachment), Col. E. E. Portlock, Jr.; Tex. Cav., Capt. Alfred Johnson; La. Cav., Capt. L. M. Nutt; Tex. Cav., Capt. Samuel J. Richardson.

General Churchill says ("Official Records," Vol. XVII., Pt. I., p. 782): "My loss will not exceed 60 killed and 75 or 80 wounded." He also states (*ibid*, p. 780) that the whole force under his command numbered about 3000 effective men. General McClernand (*ibid*, p. 708) re-ports 5000 prisoners captured, and General Sherman (*ibid*, p. 757) says that 4791 prisoners of war were em-barked on transports.

HELENA, JULY 4TH, 1863.

UNION: DISTRICT OF EASTERN ARKANSAS.—Maj.-Gen. B. M. Prentiss.

THIRTEENTH DIVISION (THIRTEENTH ARMY CORPS), Brig.-Gen. Frederick Salomon.

First Brigade, Col. William E. McLean: 43d Ind., Lieut.-Col. John C. Major; 35th Mo., Lieut.-Col. Horace Fitch; 28th Wis., Lieut.-Col. Edmund B. Gray. *Brigade loss:* k, 9; w, 28; m, 5=42. *Second Brigade*, Col. Samuel A. Rice: 29th Iowa, Col. Thomas H. Benton, Jr.; 33d Iowa, Lieut.-Col. Cyrus H. Maekey; 36th Iowa, Col. Charles W. Kittredge; 33d Mo., Lieut.-Col. William H.

Heath. *Brigade loss:* k, 43; w, 99; m, 30=172. *Cavalry Brigade*, Col. Powell Clayton: 1st Ind., Lieut.-Col. Thomas N. Pace; 5th Kan., Lieut.-Col. Wilton A. Jen-kins. *Brigade loss:* k, 5; w, 18; m, 1=24. *Artillery*, 3d Iowa, Lieut. Melvil C. Wright; K, 1st Mo., Lieut. John O'Connell. *Artillery loss*, w, 1. *Unattached:* 2d Ark. (colored) —.

Total Union loss: killed, 57; wounded, 146; captured or missing, 36=239. Effective strength: 4129.

 So styled, provisionally, by General McClernand, the Thirteenth Army Corps being designated as the First, and the Fifteenth Army Corps as the Second Corps of said army.

CONFEDERATE: DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS.—Lieut.-Gen. Theophilus H. Holmes.

PRICE'S DIVISION, Maj.-Gen. Sterling Price.

McRae's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Dandridge McRae: 32d Ark., Col. L. C. Gause; 36th Ark., Col. J. E. Glenn; 39th Ark., Col. R. A. Hart (w); Ark. Battery, Capt. John G. Marshall. Brigade loss: k, 46; w, 168; m, 133=347. *Parsons's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. M. Monroe Parsons: 7th Mo., Col. L. M. Lewis; 8th Mo., Col. S. P. Burns; 9th Mo., Col. J. D. White; 10th Mo., Col. A. C. Pickett; 1st Battalion Sharpshooters, Maj. L. A. Pindall; Mo. Battery, Capt. C. B. Tilden. Brigade loss: k, 62; w, 304; m, 365=731. *Fagan's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. J. F. Fagan: 6th Ark., Col. A. T. Hawthorn; 34th Ark., Col. W. H. Brooks; 35th Ark., Col. J. P. King; 37th Ark., Col. S. S. Bell (c), Maj. T. H. Blackall; Denson's Cav. (3 co's), Capt. W. B. Denson; Ark. Battery (section), Lieut. John

C. Arnett; Ark. Battery, Capt. W. D. Bloeker. Brigade loss: k, 47; w, 115; m, 273=435.

WALKER'S DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. L. M. Walker.

5th Ark. Cav., Col. Robert C. Newton; Ark. Cav., Col. Archibald S. Dobbin. Loss: k, 4; w, 8=12.

MARMADUKE'S DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. J. S. Marmaduke. Staff loss: k, 1.

Greene's Brigade, Col. Colton Greene: 3d Mo. Cav., —; 8th Mo. Cav., —; Young's Battalion, —. Brigade loss: k, 5; w, 7=12. *Shelby's Brigade*, Col. Joseph O. Shelby (w); 5th Mo. Cav., —; 6th Mo. Cav., —; Jeans's Regiment, —; Mo. Battery (Bledsoe's), —. Brigade loss: k, 8; w, 45; m, 1=54.

Total Confederate loss: killed, 173; wounded, 687; captured or missing, 776=1636. Effective strength, 7646.

LITTLE ROCK EXPEDITION, AUGUST 1ST-SEPTEMBER 14TH, 1863.

THE UNION ARMY.—Maj.-Gen. Frederick Steele.

Escort: D, 3d Ill. Cav., Lieutenant James K. McLean; Kane County (Ill) Cav., Lieutenant Eben C. Litherland.

FIRST (CAVALRY) DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. John W. Davidson.

First Brigade, Col. Washington F. Geiger, Col. Lewis Merrill: 2d Mo., Maj. Garrison Harker; 7th Mo., Lieut.-Col. John L. Chandler; 8th Mo., Lieut.-Col. J. W. Lisenby, Col. Washington F. Geiger. *Second Brigade*, Col. John M. Glover: 10th Ill., Col. Dudley Wickersham, Lieut.-Col. James Stuart; 1st Iowa, Lieut.-Col. Daniel Anderson, Maj. Joseph W. Caldwell; 3d Mo., Lieut.-Col. T. G. Black. *Reserve Brigade*, Col. John F. Ritter: 13th Ill., Maj. Lothar Lippert; 3d Iowa, Maj. George Duffield; 32d Iowa, Lieut.-Col. Edward H. Mix, Maj. Gustavus A. Eberhart; 1st Mo., Capt. J. W. Fuller. *Artillery*, Capt. Julius L. Hadley: K, 2d Mo., Lieut. T. S. Clarkson; M, 2d Mo., Capt. Gustav Stange; 25th Ohio, Capt. Julius L. Hadley.

SECOND DIVISION, Col. William E. McLean, Col. Adolph Engelmann.

First Brigade, Col. William H. Graves: 18th Ill., Col. Daniel H. Brush; 43d Ill., Maj. Charles Stephani; 54th Ill., Col. Greenville M. Mitchell; 61st Ill., Lieut.-Col. Simon P. Ohr; 106th Ill., Lieut.-Col. Henry Yates; 12th Mich., Lieut.-Col. Dwight May. *Second Brigade*, Col. Oliver Wood: 126th Ill., Lieut.-Col. Ezra M. Beardsley; 40th Iowa, Lieut.-Col. Samuel F. Cooper; 3d Minn., Col.

Christopher C. Andrews; 22d Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Homer Thrall; 27th Wis., Col. Conrad Krez.

THIRD DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Samuel A. Rice.

First Brigade, Col. Charles W. Kittredge: 43d Ind., Lieut.-Col. John C. Major; 36th Iowa, Lieut.-Col. Francis M. Drake; 77th Ohio, Col. William B. Mason. *Second Brigade*, Col. Thomas H. Benton, Jr.: 29th Iowa, Lieut.-Col. Robert F. Patterson; 33d Iowa, Lieut.-Col. Cyrus H. Mackey; 28th Wis., Maj. Calvert C. White. CAVALRY BRIGADE, Col. Powell Clayton: 1st Ind., Lieut.-Col. Thomas N. Paee; 5th Kans., Lieut.-Col. Wilton A. Jenkins. ARTILLERY, Capt. Mortimer M. Haden: 3d Iowa, Lieut. Melvil C. Wright; K, 1st Mo., Capt. Stillman O. Fish; 5th Ohio, Lieut. John D. Burner; 11th Ohio, Capt. Frank C. Sands. UNATTACHED BRIGADE, Col. James M. True; 49th Ill., Col. Phineas Pease; 62d Ill., Lieut.-Col. Stephen M. Meeker; 50th Ind., Lieut.-Col. Samuel T. Wells; 27th Iowa, Col. James I. Gilbert; Ill. Battery, Capt. Thomas F. Vaughn.

At the beginning of the campaign the Union forces aggregated about 12,000 for duty. (See "Official Records," Vol. XXII., Pt. I., p. 475.) From Devall's Bluff, Sept. 1, General Steele reported that his force, for duty, was considerably short of 12,000 (*ibid*, p. 474). According to the return for Sept. 10th (*ibid*, Part II., p. 523), the "present for duty" amounted to 10,477.

The total loss was 18 killed, 118 wounded, and 1 missing=137.

CONFEDERATE: DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS.—Maj.-Gen. Sterling Price.

WALKER'S DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Lucius Marsh Walker, Col. Archibald S. Dobbin, Col. Robert C. Newton.

Arkansas Cavalry Brigade, Col. Archibald S. Dobbin, Col. Robert C. Newton: Dobbin's regiment, Maj. Samuel Corley (k); Newton's regiment, Col. Robert C. Newton, Maj. John P. Bull. *Texas Cavalry Brigade* (composition not stated), Col. George W. Carter. *Artillery*: Ark. Battery, Capt. C. B. Etter; Tex. Battery, Capt. J. H. Pratt. *Miscellaneous Commands*: Spy Company, Capt. Alf. Johnson; La. Cav. Company, Capt. W. B. Denson; Tex. Squadron, Maj. C. L. Morgan.

MARMADUKE'S DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. John S. Marmaduke.

Marmaduke's Brigade, Col. William L. Jeffers: Jeffers's regiment, Lieut.-Col. S. J. Ward; Kitchen's regiment, Col. S. G. Kitchen; Burbridge's regiment, Lieut.-Col. W. J. Preston; Greene's regiment, Maj. L. A. Campbell; Young's Battalion, Lieut.-Col. M. L. Young; Bell's Battery, Lieut. C. O. Bell (m w). *Shelby's Brigade*, Lieut.-

Col. B. Frank Gordon, Col. G. W. Thompson: Elliott's Battalion, Maj. Benjamin Elliott; Gordon's regiment, Capt. George Gordon; Thompson's regiment, Lieut.-Col. J. C. Hooper; Gilkey's regiment, Col. C. A. Gilkey (m w); Jeans's regiment, Capt. R. H. Adams; Bledsoe's Battery, Capt. Joseph Bledsoe. *Unattached Artillery*: Mo. Battery, Capt. S. T. Rufner; Mo. Battery, Capt. R. A. Collius.

PRICE'S DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. D. M. Frost.

[Consisted of Fagan's, Parsons's, McRae's, and Clark's brigades; Tappan's brigade unattached. The composition of these brigades is not given in detail.]

Strength of Confederate forces: General Price says ("Official Records," Vol. XXII., Part I., p. 521) that he "had barely 8000 men of all arms."

Losses: An incomplete statement of casualties ("Official Records," as above, p. 523) shows 12 killed, 34 wounded, and 18 captured or missing=64.



CHICKASAW BAYOU AND THE VICKSBURG BLUFFS. (THE CANNON INDICATE THE POSITION OF GENERAL MORGAN L. SMITH'S UNION DIVISION.)
FROM A WAR-TIME SKETCH.

THE ASSAULT ON CHICKASAW BLUFFS.

BY GEORGE W. MORGAN, BRIGADIER-GENERAL, U. S. V.

PRESIDENT LINCOLN early determined to obtain control of the Mississippi, in its entire length. In pursuance of his plan, Island Number Ten in the north and Forts Jackson and St. Philip in the south had been captured, and New Orleans occupied by our troops in the spring of 1862; and in the fall of that year General McClelland was assigned to the command of a river expedition against Vicksburg.

The day following the receipt of this order by Grant at Oxford, Mississippi, Sherman, who was then at Memphis, in telegraphic communication with Grant, commenced the embarkation of a column upon three grand flotillas, each bearing a division, to be joined by a fourth (Steele's) at Helena.

In his "Memoirs,"¹ General Sherman says:

"The preparations at Memphis were necessarily hasty in the extreme, but it was the essence of the whole plan, viz., to reach Vicksburg, as it were, by surprise, while General Grant held in check Pemberton's army about Grenada, leaving me to contend only with the smaller garrison of Vicksburg and its well-known strong batteries and defenses."

In his written directions to his division commanders, December 23^d, 1862, General Sherman said: "Already the gun-boats have secured the Yazoo, for twenty miles, to a fort on the Yazoo, on Haynes's Bluff."

This movement of the gun-boats not only rendered a surprise impossible, but gave notice to the enemy of the coming attack. On the 24th, General

¹ "Memoirs of General William T. Sherman. By himself." Vol. I., p. 285.
(New York: D. Appleton & Co.)

John C. Pemberton, who was in command of the Confederate army at Grenada, received "definite and reliable information" of the operations of the gun-boats, and at noon on the 26th he reached Vicksburg in person, before Sherman had arrived at the mouth of the Yazoo. The strong brigades of Barton, Gregg, and Vaughn were promptly transferred from Grenada to Vicksburg, and formed the enemy's sole defense between Vicksburg and McNutt Lake, a distance of six miles.

General Pemberton describes the battle-ground as follows in his official report :

"Swamps, lakes, and bayous, running parallel with the river, intervene between the bank and the hills, and leave but four practicable approaches to the high ground from Snyder's Mills to the Mississippi River, but all outside of the fortifications of Vicksburg."

In its entire length Chickasaw Bayou is tortuous and in its course is known by different names. As we advanced along the road leading from the Yazoo to the bluffs, the bayou was on our left for some distance; on our right was a forest intersected by sloughs, more or less filled with water, and perpendicular to the bayou and parallel to the bluffs. Opposite the point where the bayou turns abruptly to the left, and on the right side of the road, the forest was felled and formed a tangled abatis to the point where the bayou divides into two branches, over one of which was a narrow corduroy bridge.

The ground on which the battle was fought was a triangle, the apex of which was at the point of divergence of the two branches of the bayou, the high and rugged bluff in front being the base. Standing at the apex and facing the base of the triangle, its left side was formed by the left branch of the bayou, which flowed obliquely to (and I believe through) a break in the bluffs; while the right was formed by a broken line of rifle-pits that ran obliquely from the base toward the apex, and by the other branch of the bayou, which first runs obliquely to the right, then parallel to the bluffs, and forms McNutt Lake.

Our troops had not only to advance from the narrow apex of a triangle, whose short base of about four hundred yards and sharp sides bristled with the enemy's artillery and small-arms, but had to wade the bayou and tug through the mucky and tangled swamp, under a withering fire of grape, canister, shells, and minie-balls, before reaching dry ground. Such was the point chosen for the assault by General Sherman. What more could be desired by an enemy about to be assailed in his trenches!

In a letter to the author of this article, in regard to the assault at Chickasaw, General Stephen D. Lee, who commanded the enemy's defenses at that point, says:

"Had Sherman moved a little faster after landing, or made his attack at the mound [Sherman's bluff, or sand-bar], or at any point between the bayou and Vicksburg, he could have gone into the city. As it was, he virtually attacked at the apex of a triangle while I held the base and parts of the two sides."

Sherman did make an attack at the mound, or sand-bar, but only sent one regiment, the 6th Missouri, to the assault; and in making it that gallant regiment lost fifty-seven men.

Sherman's army was composed of four splendid divisions, commanded by Brigadier-Generals A. J. Smith, Morgan L. Smith, George W. Morgan, and Frederick Steele. The entire force was about 30,000 strong. [See map, next page.]

On the night of the 28th of December Sherman ordered Steele to abandon his position, leave a small force to observe the road leading to Snyder's Mills, form in rear of Morgan, and give him such support as he might ask for. Blair's brigade had been ordered by General Sherman to report to Morgan, and was sent by him across the bayou and over the road which De Courcy and Thayer afterward advanced to the assault, to occupy the ground between the bayou and Thompson's Lake. This was promptly done.

The city of Vicksburg formed the extreme left of the enemy's position, and its immediate rear was the weakest point in the entire line of defense.

On the 28th and 29th the city was occupied and defended solely by the 27th Louisiana regiment, under Colonel Marks, and by the batteries commanding the Mississippi; and on the 29th there was but a single regiment, under General Vaughn, between the city and "the mound," "sand-bar," or "bluff," as it was differently called, four miles in rear of Vicksburg.

In the immediate rear of the city there were redans and redoubts connected by rifle-pits; but on the 28th and 29th these were empty, every soldier and every gun having been withdrawn and sent to the defense of "the swamp," or "county road."

In the original formation, Vaughn's brigade rested on a heavy abatis at the race-course. On his right was the brigade of Barton, and in their rear the brigade of Gregg was held as a reserve. On the right of Barton was S. D. Lee, who had had the command of the entire line from Vicksburg to Snyder's Mills prior to the arrival of the brigades of Vaughn, Barton, and Gregg from Grenada. Early on the 28th one of Vaughn's regiments was sent to reinforce Lee, and another to reinforce Barton; and thus Vaughn was left with only one regiment to protect the immediate rear of the city, with the whole of A. J. Smith's division opposed to him. This division was ordered to make a feint, and, in doing so, lost two men. Had a real attack been ordered by General Sherman, Vicksburg would have fallen, for Morgan L. Smith's division would have occupied Barton and Gregg at the "mound," "sand-bar," or "dry lake," while the divisions of Morgan and Steele would have held Lee at Chickasaw.


In his "Memoirs" (I., 290), General Sherman says:

"On reconnoitering the front in person, I became satisfied that General A. J. Smith could not cross the intervening obstacles under the heavy fire of the forts immediately in his front."

That front was the immediate rear of the city. There was skirmishing on the 27th and 28th, and the enemy was driven back to his trenches.

My division consisted of the brigades of Sheldon, Lindsey, and De Courcy.

General Blair's brigade, as already stated, had been detached from Steele's division, and ordered to report to me. December 28th, I directed Blair, then on the north side of the bayou, to reconnoiter his front, and with De Courcy, who was on the opposite side of the bayou from Blair, I reconnoi-



tered the front of his brigade; and then passed to McNutt Lake,—an enlargement of Chickasaw Bayou,—and with Colonel D. W. Lindsey (whose brigade, with that of Colonel L. A. Sheldon, was in the woods bordering on the lake) reconnoitered his front. The enemy had

relied on the depth and width of the lake as a sufficient defense, and at that place had neither troops nor works of any kind between the lake and the bluffs. I determined to bridge the lake during the night, and at dawn on the 29th to send Lindsey and Sheldon with their brigades to seize and hold the swamp road and bluff in their front, while the brigades of Blair and De Courcy should advance to the assault in parallel columns from my left. Could this plan have been executed, the day might have been ours. Fate willed it otherwise.

Captain W. F. Patterson, an intelligent and efficient officer, had a small body of engineer-mechanics, and I directed him, with the aid of a detail, to bring the pontoons, eight in number, from the steamers, and bridge the lake before daylight at a point indicated. The night was intensely dark, and Patterson by mistake bridged, instead of the lake, a wide and deep slough, parallel to the bluff and filled with water. It was nearly dawn when I learned of the mistake, whereupon I ordered Patterson to take up the bridge and throw it across the lake at the point selected.

I again reconnoitered the ground beyond the lake. There was no apparent change in the situation, and I still felt strong hopes of success. But in the extreme haste to get away from Memphis, General Sherman had not provided trestles on which to lay the plank between the pontoons, hence the bridge had to be built by laying the pontoons side by side. The bayou was 80 feet wide, and the eight pontoons thus placed would only form a bridge of 48 feet in length; for the rest it was necessary to make trestles or construct a raft.

The withdrawal of Steele from Sherman's left enabled the enemy to concentrate his right on the threatened point at Chickasaw. As soon as he discovered that a bridge was being thrown over McNutt Lake, Barton occupied the woods bordering the lake on the bluff side. Patterson had succeeded in placing and flooring six pontoons when the enemy opened a fire of artillery and small-arms on the pontoniers and drove them from their work. Two of the boats were damaged and a number of the men killed or wounded.

A short time previous to this, while standing near Foster's 1st Wisconsin battery, I saw approaching from the enemy's right, about a mile away, a caisson, with gunners on the ammunition boxes, and a few horsemen in front. I asked Foster if he could blow up that caisson. He replied, "I can try, sir." He waited until the caisson came within fair range, and fired. The report of the gun and the explosion of the caisson seemed to be instantaneous; caisson and gunners were blown into the air; every man and horse was killed, and a shout went up from around Foster and his battery. On the next day, when our flag of truce to the enemy had returned, I learned that one of the victims of the explosion was Captain Paul Hamilton, assistant adjutant-general on the staff of General S. D. Lee. He was but twenty-one years of age, was distinguished for his gallantry, and had gone through several battles without a scar. As he deserved, his death is mourned over to this day.

The fire of Barton was promptly returned by Lindsey, but it was certain the bridge could not be completed while the enemy covered it with his guns.

I now regarded an attack from my left, by way of the narrow road or causeway leading across the bayou, as impracticable, and reported the fact to General Sherman by my acting assistant adjutant-general, Lieutenant E. D. Saunders, with the request that he would come to my front. Upon his arrival I reported to him the condition of things on my right, and requested him to accompany me down the causeway leading to the corduroy bridge over the bayou. He did so. I called his attention to our very narrow and difficult front; to the bayou in its tortuous course on our left; to the mucky marsh beyond the bayou and bridge, all within easy range of the enemy's guns.

For a time General Sherman made no reply. At length, pointing toward the bluffs, he said: "That is the route to take!" And without another word having been exchanged he rode away to his headquarters behind the forest. ‡

‡ As to this interview, General Sherman and myself are at variance. He states that he gave me an order to lead the assault in person, and that I replied I would be on the top of those hills in ten minutes after the signal for the assault was given. I am positive that no such order was

given; nor was there such an understanding. A well-mounted horseman, unobstructed by an enemy, could not have reached the top of those hills in double that length of time. The circumstances of the occasion must decide between us.

G. W. M.

I was in the actual command of two divisions, that of Steele and my own. In his report Steele says:

"I received orders from the general commanding to halt the brigade [Thayer's] and subsequently to render General Morgan any assistance he might ask for. General Morgan finally told me that he was going to storm the heights without waiting for the completion of the bridge. He requested me to support the storming party with what force I had. . . . I gave no orders on the field that day, except at the suggestion of General Morgan, save that I followed the movement, encouraging the men while they were advancing, and endeavoring to check them when they fell back." ↓

In addition to the assaulting force of nine regiments, I held two of Blair's regiments in support of my artillery, to be used as circumstances might require; and the brigades of Lindsey and Sheldon, and four regiments of Thayer's brigade of Steele's division were on my right. I was the senior officer in the immediate presence of the enemy, and occupied a position on the causeway, near Foster's battery, ready to take such action as the chances of battle might call for.

Not long after the brief reconnoissance with General Sherman, Major John H. Hammond, his assistant adjutant-general, came to the front, and said that he had just come from General Sherman, and would give me his exact words: "Tell Morgan to give the signal for the assault; that we will lose 5000 men before we take Vicksburg, and may as well lose them here as anywhere else." I told him to say to General Sherman that I would order the assault; that we might lose 5000 men, but that his entire army could not carry the enemy's position in my front; that the larger the force sent to the assault, the greater would be the number slaughtered.

I sent orders to Blair and De Courey to form their brigades, and a request to Steele to send me another brigade for the assault. Just then Colonel De Courey, who was an officer of skill and experience, approached and said: "General, do I understand that you are about to order an assault?" To which I replied, "Yes; form your brigade!" With an air of respectful protest he said: "My poor brigade! Your order will be obeyed, General."

Blair was between the bayou and Thompson's Lake. The bayou was on his right; but at a short distance in advance it abruptly turned to the left, in his front. The brigade of De Courey was massed from the abatis, across the road or causeway, and fronting the corduroy bridge; and I directed Thayer to support De Courey, and indicated the point to assault. Thayer's brigade



LIEUTENANT-GENERAL S. D. LEE, C. S. A.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

↓ "Official Records," Vol. XVII., Part I., p. 652.

was now composed of five regiments—one being absent on detached duty—and a battery of artillery which did good service, though it did not cross the bayou. It was my intention to make the assault with the brigades of Blair, Thayer, and De Courcy, while Lindsey and Sheldon, by threatening to bridge McNutt Lake, would prevent the enemy (under Barton) from reënforcing Lee. By some misunderstanding—a fortunate one, I think, as it turned out—four of Thayer's regiments diverged to the right, leaving only one regiment, the 4th Iowa, with him in the assault.

The signal volley was fired, and with a wild shout the troops of De Courcy, Thayer, and Blair advanced to the assault. As soon as the corduroy bridge was reached by De Courcy and Thayer, and the bayou to the left by Blair, the assaulting forces came under a withering and destructive fire. A passage was forced over the abatis and through the mucky bayou and tangled marsh to dry ground. All formations were broken; the assaulting forces were jammed together, and, with a yell of desperate determination, they rushed to the assault and were mowed down by a storm of shells, grape and canister, and minie-balls which swept our front like a hurricane of fire. Never did troops bear themselves with greater intrepidity. They were terribly repulsed, but not beaten. There was neither rout nor panic, but our troops fell back slowly and angrily to our own line, halted, re-formed, and, if ordered, would again have rushed to the assault.

As in all cases of repulse or defeat, contention and crimination have arisen as to the cause of the disaster. Sherman, in his report,[†] and Grant, in his "Memoirs,"[‡] give a satisfactory cause—the true one in my opinion—the impregnable position of the enemy.

Sherman says, in his "Memoirs," Vol. I., p. 292:

"Had he [General Morgan] used with skill and boldness one of his brigades, in addition to that of Blair, he could have made a lodgment on the bluff, which would have opened a door for our whole force to follow."

The fact is that, beside the four regiments of Blair's brigade, the attacking forces included four regiments led by De Courcy and one by Thayer.

General Sherman also says, in his "Memoirs," that

"one brigade (De Courcy's), of Morgan's troops, crossed the bayou, but took to cover behind the bank, and could not be moved forward."

In fact, all the troops behaved gallantly, and the assault was as valiant as it was hopeless. Each of De Courcy's regiments brought back its colors, or what remained of them. The flag of the 16th Ohio was torn into shreds by the explosion of a shell in its very center, but the shreds were brought back adhering to the staff.

The losses speak for themselves. De Courcy had 48 killed, 321 wounded, and 355 missing; Blair, 99 killed, 331 wounded, 173 missing; Thayer (in the 4th Iowa), 7 killed, 105 wounded: total, for the 9 regiments engaged, 154 killed, 757 wounded, 528 missing,—in all, 1439. In Sherman's whole command the loss was 208 killed, 1005 wounded, 563 missing,—aggregate, 1776.

[†] "Official Records," Vol. XVII., Part I., p. 610.


[‡] "Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant" (C. L. Webster & Co.), Vol. I., p. 437.

The Confederates report 63 killed, 134 wounded, 10 missing,—aggregate, 207.

Shortly after De Courey had returned to his command, General Blair came. He said that De Courey's brigade had behaved badly. At the time I did not know the relative loss of the two brigades, but I did know that each of them, as well as Thayer's, had made a superb assault, and that the enemy's position was impregnable.

Blair did not refer to the matter in his report; but Thayer says in his:

"I found myself within the enemy's works, with one regiment. I then went back to the intrenchments, where I had seen, as we went over, a regiment of our troops lying in the ditch, entirely protected from the rebel fire. I ordered and begged them, but without effect, to come forward and support my regiment, which was now warmly engaged. *I do not know what regiment it was.*" (The italics are mine.—G. W. M.)



MAJOR-GENERAL DABNEY H. MAURY, C. S. A.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

But on August 30th, 1887, twenty-four years and eight months after the date of his report, in a letter to me, Thayer says:

"De Courey and his brigade on that day made no assault whatever, unless against the outside rifle-pits, and were not repulsed. They got into the enemy's rifle-pits, and there remained."

That Thayer and the 4th Iowa behaved gallantly is certain; that had his other regiments been with him they would have borne themselves with equal intrepidity is not less so; but that the statements of himself and Blair do injustice to De Courey is shown by the fact that the loss of De Courey's brigade was greater than that sustained by the brigades of Blair and Thayer together.

After it was determined that the assault was not to be renewed, I repaired to General Sherman's headquarters and found him alone, pacing backward and forward with restless strides. In brief terms I described the assault and the repulse, and suggested that a flag be sent to the enemy asking for an armistice of sufficient length to bring in our wounded and bury our dead. This was on the afternoon of the 29th of December.

In reply to my suggestion General Sherman said he did not like to ask for a truce, as it would be regarded as an admission of defeat. To this I replied that we had been terribly cut up, but were not dishonored; that the bearing of our troops was superb, and we held every foot of our own ground; but that our dead and wounded covered the field and could only be reached by a flag. He determined not to ask for a truce. However, at about dusk I was told that General Sherman had said that he had authorized me to send a flag to the enemy, and I immediately addressed a note "to the general

commanding the Confederate forces on Chickasaw Bluff," asking for a truce. In the meantime it had become so dark that the flag could not be seen, and the escort was fired upon and driven back. The next morning, December 30th, I sent another flag, with a note explaining the misadventure of the previous evening, when a truce was promptly granted and all of our wounded that had not been carried into the Confederate lines as prisoners, and our dead, were at once brought within our lines.

It has been charged that the enemy on the field of Chickasaw stripped our dead of their clothing. The charge is unjust and should not go into history. I saw our dead as they were brought in; all were in their uniforms; nor did I ever hear of such a charge till long years after the war.

In his report of the battle General Sherman says: ☆

"General Morgan's first report to me was that the troops were not discouraged at all, though the losses in the brigades of Blair and De Courey were heavy, and he would renew the assault in half an hour; but the assault was not again attempted."

But in his "Memoirs" General Sherman says: †

"At first I intended to renew the assault, but soon became satisfied that the enemy's attention having been drawn to the only two practicable points, it would prove too costly, and accordingly resolved to look elsewhere, below Haynes's Bluff or Blake's Plantation."

While the blood was yet fresh upon the field, McClelland arrived, assumed command, and divided the army into two army corps, one commanded by Major-General W. T. Sherman, and the other by Brigadier-General George W. Morgan.

General Pemberton's report of the defense, on the 29th, is as follows:

"On the 29th, about 9 o'clock, the enemy was discovered in his attempt to throw a pontoon-bridge across the lake. In this he was foiled by a few well-directed shots from a section each of Wofford's and Ward's batteries, that of the latter commanded by Lieutenant Tarleton.

"About 10 o'clock a furious cannonade was opened on General Lee's lines. This ceased about 11 o'clock, when a whole brigade—about six thousand strong, understood to have been Brigadier-General [F. P.] Blair's, though not led by him in person—emerged from the woods in good order and moved gallantly forward under a heavy fire of our artillery. They advanced to within 150 yards of the pits when they broke and retreated, but soon rallied, and dividing their forces sent a portion to their right, which was gallantly driven back by the 28th Louisiana and 42d Georgia regiments with heavy loss. Their attack in front was repulsed with still greater disasters. By a handsome movement on the enemy's flank the 26th and part of the 17th Louisiana threw the enemy into inextricable confusion, and were so fortunate as to capture 4 stand of regimental colors, 21 commissioned officers, 311 non-commissioned officers and privates, and 500 stand of arms. The 3d, 30th, and 80th Tennessee regiments occupied the rifle-pits in front and behaved with distinguished coolness and courage.

"During this assault upon the right the enemy in force was endeavoring to carry our center, commanded by General Barton, by storm. Five resolute efforts were made to carry our breast-works and were as often repulsed with heavy loss. Three times he succeeded in mounting the parapet, and once made a lodgment and attempted to mine. The 52d Georgia, Colonel [C. D.] Phillips, reinforced Colonel Morrison's and Colonel Abda Johnson's regiments early in the day. These troops and the line of skirmishers, formed of companies from the 40th and 42d Georgia, behaved with distinguished courage and steadiness throughout. At this point the enemy did not give up his attack until nightfall."

☆ "Official Records," Vol. XVII., Part I., p. 608.

† "Memoirs of W. T. Sherman" (D. Appleton & Co.), Vol. I., p. 292.

THE OPPOSING FORCES AT CHICKASAW BLUFFS (OR FIRST VICKSBURG), MISS.

December 27th, 1862—January 3d, 1863.

The composition, losses, and strength of each army as here stated give the gist of all the data obtainable in the Official Records. K stands for killed; w for wounded; m w for mortally wounded; m for captured or missing; c for captured.

THE UNION ARMY.

RIGHT WING, THIRTEENTH ARMY CORPS. Major-General William T. Sherman.

FIRST DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Andrew J. Smith (also in command of the Second Division December 29th).

Escort: C. 4th Ind. Cav., Capt. Joseph P. Lesslie.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Stephen G. Burbridge: 16th Ind., Col. Thomas J. Lucas; 60th Ind., Col. Richard Owen; 67th Ind., Col. Frank Emerson; 83d Ohio, Lieut.-Col. William H. Baldwin; 96th Ohio, Col. Joseph W. Vause; 23d Wis., Col. Joshua J. Guppy. *Brigade loss*: k, 1; w, 1=2. *Second Brigade*, Col. William J. Landram: 77th Ill., Col. David P. Grier; 97th Ill., Col. Friend S. Rutherford; 108th Ill., Col. John Warner; 131st Ill., Col. George W. Neeley; 89th Ind., Col. Charles D. Murray; 19th Ky., Lieut.-Col. John Cowan; 48th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Job R. Parker.

SECOND DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Morgan L. Smith (w), Brig.-Gen. David Stuart. *Staff loss*: w, 1.

First Brigade, Col. Giles A. Smith: 113th Ill., Col. George B. Hoge; 116th Ill., Col. Nathan W. Tupper; 6th Mo., Lieut.-Col. James H. Blood; 8th Mo., Lieut.-Col. David C. Coleman; 13th U. S. (1st Battalion), Maj. Daniel Chase. *Brigade loss*: k, 15; w, 63=78. *Fourth Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. David Stuart, Col. T. Kilby Smith: 55th Ill., Lieut.-Col. Oscar Mahnborg; 127th Ill., Col. John Van Arman; 83d Ind., Col. Benjamin J. Spooner; 54th Ohio, Col. T. Kilby Smith; 57th Ohio, Col. William Mungen. *Brigade loss*: k, 12; w, 39; m, 6=57.

THIRD DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. George W. Morgan.

First Brigade, Col. Lionel A. Sheldon: 118th Ill., Col. John G. Fonda; 69th Ind., Col. Thomas W. Bennett; 120th Ohio, Col. Daniel French. *Brigade loss*: w, 27; m, 2=29. *Second Brigade*, Col. Daniel W. Lindsey: 49th Ind., Col. James Kelgwiu; 3d Ky., Lieut.-Col. Joel W. Ridgell; 114th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Horatio B. Maynard. *Brigade loss*: k, 17; w, 68; m, 21=106. *Third Brigade*, Col. John F. De Courcy: 54th Ind., Col. Fielding Mansfield; 22d Ky., Lieut.-Col. George W. Monroe (w), Maj. William J. Worthington; 16th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Philip Kershner (w and c); 42d Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Don A. Pardee. *Brigade loss*: k, 48; w, 321; m, 355=724. *Artillery*:

7th Mich., Capt. Charles H. Lanphere; 1st Wis., Capt. Jacob T. Foster. *Artillery loss*: k, 1; w, 13=14. *Ky. Engineers*, Capt. William F. Patterson.

FOURTH DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Frederick Steele.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Frank P. Blair, Jr.: 13th Ill., Col. John B. Wyman (k), Lieut.-Col. Adam B. Gorgas; 29th Mo., Col. John S. Caveader; 30th Mo., Lieut.-Col. Otto Schadt; 31st Mo., Col. Thomas C. Fletcher (w and c), Lieut.-Col. Samuel P. Simpson (w); 32d Mo., Col. Francis H. Manter; 58th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Peter Dister (k); 4th Ohio Battery, Capt. Louis Hoffmann; C, 10th Mo. Cav., Lieut. Daniel W. Ballou. *Brigade loss*: k, 99; w, 331; m, 173=603. *Second Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Charles E. Hovey: 25th Iowa, Col. George A. Stone; 31st Iowa, Col. William Smyth; 3d Mo., Col. Isaac F. Shepard; 12th Mo., Col. Hugo Wangelin; 17th Mo., Col. Francis Hassendeubel; 76th Ohio, Col. Charles R. Woods; 1st Mo. Horse Art'y, Capt. Clemens Landgraber. *Brigade loss*: k, 6; w, 21; m, 2=29. *Third Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. John M. Thayer: 4th Iowa, Col. James A. Williamson; 9th Iowa, Lieut.-Col. William H. Coy1; 26th Iowa, Col. Milo Smith; 28th Iowa, Col. William E. Miller; 30th Iowa, Col. Charles H. Abbott; 34th Iowa, Col. George W. Clark; 1st Iowa Battery, Capt. Henry H. Griffiths. *Brigade loss*: k, 7; w, 115; m, 2=124. *Artillery*: A, 1st Ill., Capt. Peter P. Wood; B, 1st Ill., Capt. Samuel E. Barrett; H, 1st Ill., Lieut. Levi W. Hart; Chicago (Ill.) Mercantile, Capt. Charles G. Cooley; 8th Ohio, Lieut. James F. Putnam; 17th Ohio, Capt. Ambrose A. Blount. *Cavalry*: 6th Mo., Col. Clark Wright; 3d Ill., Col. Lafayette McCrillis; Thielemann's (Ill.) Battalion. The total loss of the Union army was 208 killed, 1005 wounded, and 563 captured or missing=1776. The effective strength of the expeditionary force is estimated at about 33,000 men. General Sherman says ("Official Records," Vol. XVII, Part I, p. 610) that "the only real fighting was during the assault by Morgan's and Steele's divisions, and at the time of crossing the 6th Missouri, during the afternoon of December 29th, by the Second Division."

THE CONFEDERATE FORCES.

Lieutenant-General John C. Pemberton.

DEFENSES OF VICKSBURG, Major-General Martin L. Smith, Major-General Carter L. Stevenson.

Barton's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Seth M. Barton: 40th Ga., Col. Abda Johnson (w); 42d Ga., Col. R. J. Henderson; 43d Ga., Lieut.-Col. Hiram P. Bell (w); 52d Ga., Col. C. D. Phillips. *Brigade loss*: k, 15; w, 39=54. *Vaughn's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. John C. Vaughn: 79th Tenn., Col. John H. Crawford; 80th Tenn., Col. John A. Rowan; 81st Tenn., —. *Brigade loss*: k, 8; w, 10=18. *Gregg's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. John Gregg: 1st Tenn., —; 3d Tenn., Col. C. J. Clack; 10th Tenn., —; 30th Tenn., Col. James J. Turner; 41st Tenn., —; 50th Tenn., —; 51st Tenn., —. *Brigade loss*: k, 1; w, 3=4. *Tracy's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. E. D. Tracy: 20th Ala., —; 23d Ala., Col. F. K. Beck; 30th Ala., —; 31st Ala., —.

PROVISIONAL DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Stephen D. Lee, Major-General Dabney H. Manry.

Brigade Commanders (Provisional): Colonels William T. Withers and Allen Thomas. *Troops*: 37th Ala., —;

40th Ala., Col. A. A. Coleman; 1st La., Col. S. R. Harrison; 17th La., Col. Robert Richardson; 22d La., Col. Edward Higgins; 26th La., Col. Winchester Hall; 28th La., Lieut.-Col. J. O. Landry; 31st La., Col. C. H. Morrison; 3d Miss., —; 3d Battalion Miss. State Troops, —; 4th Miss., Col. Pierre S. Layton; 30th Miss., —; 35th Miss., —; 46th Miss., Lieut.-Col. W. K. Easterling; Miss. Battery, Capt. Robert Bowman; Miss. Battery, Capt. J. L. Wofford; Miss. Battery (section), Lieut. Frank Johnston; Miss. Battery, Capt. N. J. Drew, Lieut. W. J. Duncan; 2d Tex., Lieut.-Col. W. C. Timmins (w); Hill's Co. Cav.; Johnson's (Miss.) Co. Cav.; Miss. Light Artillery, Maj. S. M. Ward.

The total Confederate loss is reported by General Pemberton as 63 killed, 134 wounded, and 10 missing=207.

The effective strength, including the reinforcements prior to the withdrawal of the Union forces, was about 25,000. (See "Official Records," Vol. XVII, Pt. II, pp. 824, 825.)

JEFFERSON DAVIS AND THE MISSISSIPPI CAMPAIGN.†

BY JOSEPH E. JOHNSTON, GENERAL, C. S. A.

IN Mr. Davis's account of the military operations in Mississippi in 1863,‡ their disastrous result is attributed to my misconduct. My object in the following statement is to exhibit the true causes of those disasters.

The combination of Federal military and naval forces which produced that result was made practicable by the military errors of the Confederate Government in 1862, and was made successful by its repetition of the gravest of those errors in 1863.↓

In the first half of July, 1862, General Halleck was ordered to Washington as general-in-chief. Before leaving Corinth he transferred General Buell, with his troops, to middle Tennessee, and left General Grant in command of those holding in subjection north-eastern Mississippi and southern West Tennessee. For this object they were distributed in Corinth, Memphis, Jackson, and intermediate places. They numbered about forty-two thousand present for duty by Mr. Davis's estimate. Their wide dispersion put them at the mercy of any superior or equal force, such as the Confederacy could have brought against them readily; but this opportunity, such a one as has rarely occurred in war, was put aside by the Confederate Government, and the army which, properly used, would have secured to the South the possession of Tennessee and Mississippi was employed in a wild expedition into Kentucky, which could have had only the results of a raid.

Mr. Davis extols the strategy of that operation, which, he says, "manœuvred the foe out of a large and to us important territory." This advantage, if it could be called so, was of the briefest. For this "foe" drove us out of Kentucky in a few weeks, and recovered permanently the "large and to us important territory." After General Bragg was compelled to leave Kentucky, the Federal army, which until then had been commanded by General Buell, was established at Nashville, under General Rosecrans. And General Bragg, by a very circuitous route through south-eastern Kentucky and north-eastern Tennessee, brought his troops to the neighborhood of Murfreesboro'. Mr. Davis says ["Rise and Fall," p. 384] that "the strength of the Federal army, as we have ascertained, was 65,000 men." Army returns show that it was a little less than 47,000, and Bragg's, 44,000. [See also this volume, p. 30.]

‡Reprinted by permission from the "North American Review" for Dec., 1886, Vol. 143, p. 585.

† "The Rise and Fall of the Confederate States," by Jefferson Davis.

↓ The Confederate army that fought at Shiloh was reorganized by General Beauregard at Corinth, and occupied that position until the 29th of May, 1862, when that officer led it to Tupelo in consequence of the near approach of General Halleck's vastly superior forces. There, about the middle of June, General Beauregard was compelled by

ill health to transfer his command to General Bragg. The discipline and instruction of those troops had been greatly improved at Corinth and Tupelo; so that they were in excellent condition for marches and for battles before the middle of July. They numbered 45,000. There were 22,000 other Confederate troops in Mississippi, in two bodies, one commanded by Major-General Van Dorn, the other by Major-General Price. Those two officers were independent of each other—and, strange to say, of General Bragg also.—J. E. J.


General Grant was then in northern Mississippi, with an army formed by uniting the detachments that had been occupying Corinth and various points in southern West Tennessee. He was preparing for the invasion of Mississippi, with the special object of gaining possession of Vicksburg by the combined action of his army and Admiral Porter's squadron, which was in readiness. To oppose him, Lieutenant-General Pemberton, who commanded the Department of Mississippi and East Louisiana, had an active army of 23,000 effective infantry and artillery, and above 6000 cavalry, most of it irregular. There were also intrenched camps at Vicksburg and Port Hudson, each held by about six thousand men, protecting batteries of old smooth-bore guns, which, it was hoped, would prevent the Federal war vessels from occupying the intermediate part of the Mississippi. Lieutenant-General Holmes was then encamped near Little Rock with an army of above fifty thousand men, as General Cooper, adjutant-general, reported to the President in my presence. There were no Federal forces in Arkansas at the time, except one or two garrisons.

In all the time to which the preceding relates I had been out of service from the effects of two severe wounds received in the battle of Seven Pines [May 31st, 1862]. On the 12th of November, 1862, I reported myself fit for duty. The Secretary of War replied that I would be assigned to service in Tennessee and Mississippi in a few days. Thinking myself authorized to make suggestions in relation to the warfare in which I was to be engaged, I proposed to the Secretary, in his office, that, as the Federal forces about to invade Mississippi were united in that State, ours available for its defense should be so likewise; therefore General Holmes should be ordered to unite his forces with General Pemberton's without delay. As a reply, he read me a letter of late date from himself to General Holmes, instructing that officer to make the movement just suggested, and then a note from the President directing him to countermand his order to General Holmes. A few days after this, General Randolph resigned the office of Secretary of War—unfortunately for the Confederacy. On the 24th of November Mr. Seddon, who had succeeded General Randolph as Secretary of War, assigned me to the command of the departments of General Bragg and Lieutenant-Generals E. Kirby Smith and Pemberton, each to command his department under me. In acknowledging this order, I again suggested the transfer of the army in Arkansas to Mississippi. The suggestion was not adopted or noticed.

The Government placed my headquarters at Chattanooga, but authorized me to move them as occasion might require. On the 4th of December, I received there a telegram from the adjutant-general, informing me that Lieutenant-General Pemberton was falling back before a very superior force; that "Lieutenant-General Holmes has been peremptorily ordered to reënforce him, but that, as his troops may be too late, the President urges on you the importance of sending a sufficient force from General Bragg's command to the aid of Lieutenant-General Pemberton." I replied that Lieutenant-General Holmes's troops could join the army in Mississippi much sooner than General Bragg's, and that the latter officer could not give adequate aid to the army in

Mississippi without exposing himself to inevitable defeat. And further, that there was no object in our retaining troops in Arkansas, where they could find no enemy. For these reasons I declined to weaken General Bragg without further orders to do so.

About the 9th of December the President passed through Chattanooga on his way to Murfreesboro', to decide, at General Bragg's headquarters, whether the army of Tennessee or that of Arkansas should furnish the reinforcements



LIEUTENANT-GENERAL J. C. PEMBERTON, C. S. A.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

necessary to enable the Confederacy to hold the Mississippi and its valley. He returned in two or three days and directed me to order General Bragg to send ten thousand of his men under Major-General C. L. Stevenson to report to General Pemberton. The order was given as the President's. He then set out to Mississippi, desiring me to accompany him. In Jackson, which he reached the morning of the 19th of December, he found the Legislature in session. It had been convened by Governor Pettus to bring out the remaining military resources of the State, to aid in its defense.

On the 21st and 22d Mr. Davis inspected the water-batteries and land defenses of Vicksburg, which were then very extensive, but slight—the usual defect of Confederate engineer-

ing. He also conferred with the commander, Major-General Martin L. Smith, and me, in reference to the forces required to hold that place and Port Hudson, and at the same time to oppose General Grant in the field. We agreed (General Smith and I) that at least twenty thousand more troops were necessary, and I again urged him to transfer the troops in Arkansas to Mississippi. In a friendly note to General Holmes, which I was permitted to read, Mr. Davis pointed out to him that he would benefit the service by sending twenty thousand men into Mississippi, but gave him no order; consequently no troops came.

Thus an army outnumbering that which General Grant was then commanding was left idle, while preparations were in progress, near it, for the conquest of a portion of the Confederacy so important as the valley of the Mississippi.

From Vicksburg the President visited General Pemberton's army in the extensive position it was intrenching near Grenada,—so extensive that it is fortunate for us, probably, that General Grant was prevented from trying its strength. In conversing with the President concerning the operations impending, General Pemberton and I advocated opposite modes of warfare.

On the 25th the President returned to Jackson, and on the 27th information was received from General W. W. Loring, commanding near Grenada, that General Grant's army, which had been advancing, was retiring in consequence of the destruction of the depot of supplies at Holly Springs by the gallant Van Dorn's daring and skillfully executed enterprise, surpassed by none of its character achieved during the war. This depot was to have supplied the Federal army in its march toward Vicksburg. Its destruction frustrated that design. General Van Dorn accomplished it on the 20th of December with a brigade of cavalry, attacking, defeating, and capturing a superior force. The supplies were destroyed by burning the store-houses—to which the consent of the owners was freely given. The destruction of the stores compelled General Grant to fall back and gave the Confederate Government abundant time for thorough preparations to meet his next advance. The most effective, indeed a decisive one, would have required but 12 or 15 days—the uniting Lieutenant-General Holmes's troops with Lieutenant-General Pemberton's, in Mississippi, which would have formed an effective force of little less than 75,000 men.

Before Mr. Davis returned to Richmond I represented to him that my command was a nominal one merely, and useless; because the great distance between the armies of Tennessee and Mississippi, and the fact that they had different objects and adversaries, made it impossible to combine their action; so there was no employment for me unless I should take command of one of the armies in an emergency, which, as each had its own general, was not intended or desirable. He replied that the great distance of these departments from the seat of government made it necessary that there should be an officer near them with authority to transfer troops from one to the other in emergencies. I suggested that each was too weak for its object; and that neither, therefore, could be drawn upon to strengthen the other; and that the distance between them was so great as to make such temporary transfers impracticable. These objections were disregarded, however.


The detaching of almost a fourth of General Bragg's army to Mississippi, while of no present value to that department, was disastrous to that of Tennessee, for it caused the battle of Murfreesboro'. General Rosecrans was, of course, soon informed of the great reduction of his antagonist's strength, and marched from Nashville to attack him. The battle, that of Murfreesboro' or Stone's River, occurred on the 31st of December, 1862, and the 2d of January, 1863, and was one of the most obstinately contested and bloody of the war, in proportion to the numbers engaged. [See articles to follow.] The result of this action compelled the Confederate army to fall back and place itself behind Duck River, at Manchester, Tullahoma, and Shelbyville.

Early in December Grant projected an enterprise against Vicksburg under Sherman's command. He directed that officer to embark at Memphis with about 30,000 men, descend the river with them to the neighborhood of the place, and with the coöperation of Admiral Porter's squadron proceed to reduce it. Sherman entered the Yazoo with his forces on the 26th of December, employed several days in reconnoitering, and on the 29th made a vigorous

assault upon the defensive line near Chickasaw Bayou, manned by Brigadier-General S. D. Lee's brigade, which repelled the attack.† General Pemberton reported that the Confederate loss was 150, and that of the Federals 1100.‡

The combined land and naval forces then left the Yazoo, and, entering the Arkansas, ascended it to Arkansas Post, which they captured, with its garrison of five thousand Confederate troops. In the meantime General Pemberton brought what had been his active forces into Vicksburg.

On the 20th of January all the troops destined for the operations against Vicksburg were ordered by General Grant to Milliken's Bend and Young's Point, where he joined them on the 29th. These troops were employed until April in cutting a canal through the point of land opposite Vicksburg, to enable the Federal vessels to pass it without exposure to the batteries; but the attempt was unsuccessful.



MAJOR-GENERAL MARTIN L. SMITH, C. S. A.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

In the meantime Brigadier-General Bowen was detached with three brigades to Grand Gulf, to construct batteries there; and Major-General Loring, with a similar detachment, was sent to select and fortify a position to prevent the enemy from approaching Vicksburg by the Yazoo Pass and River. He constructed a field-work for this object at the head of the Yazoo. A flotilla of 9 United States gun-boats and 20 transports, carrying 4500 troops, appeared before it on the 11th of March,

and constructed a land-battery, which, with the gun-boats, cannonaded the fort several days; but the steady fire of the little work [Fort Pemberton] compelled the assailants to draw off and return to the Mississippi.

On the 22d of January, while inspecting the works for the defense of Mobile, then in course of construction, I received orders by telegraph from the President to go to General Bragg's headquarters "with the least delay." A letter from the President delivered to me in Chattanooga told for what service. It was to ascertain if General Bragg had so far lost the confidence of the army as to make it expedient to remove him from command. After making the necessary investigation thoroughly, I came to the conclusion that there was no ground for the general's removal, so reported, and resumed the inspection at Mobile. While so employed, I received a telegram from the Secretary of War, in which he ordered me to direct General Bragg to report at the War

† Besides Lee's brigade, which met the main attack, three brigades of the Confederates were engaged, commanded respectively by Brigadier-Generals John Gregg, J. C. Vaughn, and S. M. Barton [see p. 462].—EDITORS.

‡ According to the "Official Records" (Vol. XVII., Pt. I, pp. 625 and 668), the Union loss was 208 killed, 1005 wounded, 563 missing,—total, 1776; that of the Confederates, 63 killed, 134 wounded, 10 missing,—total, 207.—EDITORS.

Department for conference ; and to assume, myself, direct charge of the army in middle Tennessee. On my return to Tullahoma under this order, I learned that the general was devoting himself to Mrs. Bragg, who was supposed to be at the point of death. So the communication of the order to him was postponed, and the postponement and the cause reported to the Secretary. Mrs. Bragg's condition improved, however ; but before it became such as to permit General Bragg to return to military duty, I had become unfit for it, and was compelled to retain him in the command of the Army of Tennessee and put myself under the care of a surgeon. This sickness continued for weeks, and was *reported repeatedly*.

The United States naval officers had already ascertained that their iron-clads could pass the Confederate batteries without great danger. Moreover, as General Pemberton had reported, the wooden vessels *Hartford* and *Albatross* had passed Port Hudson while most of our guns were engaged with the other vessels of Admiral Farragut's squadron. This reduced the value of our water-batteries greatly. Yet, in the first half of April, General Pemberton became convinced that General Grant had abandoned the design against Vicksburg and was preparing to reëmbark his forces, perhaps to join General Rosecrans ; and on April 11th he expressed the belief that most of those troops were being withdrawn to Memphis, and stated that he himself was assembling troops at Jackson to follow this movement. This was approved. On the 17th, however, he reported that the Federal army had resumed its offensive operations. He also reported that General Grant was occupying New Carthage, and that there were nine Federal gun-boats between Vicksburg and Port Hudson.

Colonel B. H. Grierson [Federal] set out from La Grange on the 17th of April on his noted raid through Mississippi, terminating at Baton Rouge, May 2d. The mischief reported was the burning of some bridges, engines, and cars near Newton, the destruction of ammunition and cars at Hazellhurst, and the burning of the railroad depot and cars at Brookhaven. Several brigades of infantry were detached to protect such property ; but fruitlessly, of course.

Admiral Porter's squadron, and three transports towing barges, passed Vicksburg on the night of April 16th, and ran down to Hard Times, where the army was ; and six more transports and barges followed on the night of the 22d. On the two occasions, one transport was sunk, another burned, and six barges rendered unserviceable by the fire of the batteries.

General Grant's plan seems to have been to take possession of Grand Gulf, and thence operate against Vicksburg ; for Admiral Porter's squadron commenced firing upon the Confederate works early in the morning of the 29th, and the Thirteenth Corps was ready to seize them as soon as their guns should be silenced ; but as their fire had slackened but little at 6 o'clock, Grant changed his plan and sent his troops and transports to the landing-place, six miles from Bruinsburg, on the east bank of the river. The four divisions of the Thirteenth Corps were ferried to that point during the day of the 30th.

General Bowen, at Grand Gulf, observed this, and led parts of his three brigades (five thousand men) to the road from Bruinsburg to Port Gibson, four miles in advance of the latter. By admirable conduct and great advan-

tages of ground, this handful delayed the advance of the Thirteenth Corps six or eight hours. Lieutenant-General Pemberton informed me of this engagement by telegraph during the fighting, adding: "I should have large reënforcements." I replied immediately: "If General Grant's army lands on this side of the river, the safety of Mississippi depends on beating it. For that object you should unite your whole force." And I telegraphed again next day: "If Grant's army crosses, unite all your forces to beat it. Success will give you back what was abandoned to win it." In transmitting General Pemberton's call for reënforcements to the Secretary of War, I said: "They cannot be sent from here without giving up Tennessee."

On the 3d Bowen's troops abandoned Grand Gulf and returned to Vicksburg. On the same day the Seventeenth Corps joined the Thirteenth at Willow Springs, where the two waited for the Fifteenth, which came up on the 8th. The army then marched toward Raymond, the Seventeenth Corps leaving first, and the Fifteenth second.

In the evening of May 9th I received, by telegraph, orders to proceed at once to Mississippi and take chief command of the forces there, and to arrange to take with me, for temporary service, or to have follow without delay, three thousand good troops. I replied instantly: "Your dispatch of this morning received. I shall go immediately, although unfit for service," and took the first train, which was on the morning of the 10th. At Lake Station, on the 13th, I found a telegram from General Pemberton, dated the 12th, informing me that the enemy was apparently moving in heavy force on Edwards's depot, which, as he said, "will be the battle-field if I can carry forward sufficient force, leaving troops enough to secure the safety of this place [Vicksburg]." This was the first intelligence of the Federal army received from General Pemberton since the first of the month.

I arrived in Jackson at nightfall, exhausted by an uninterrupted journey of four days, undertaken from a sick-room; in consequence of which Major Mims, chief quartermaster of the department, the first officer who reported to me, found me in bed. He informed me, among other military occurrences, that two brigades had marched into the town an hour or two before. Brigadier-General Gregg, their senior officer, reported to me soon after that he had been ordered from Port Hudson to Raymond by General Pemberton, but had been driven from that place the day before by the Federal Seventeenth Corps; and, in obedience to the general's instructions for such an event, had fallen back to Jackson, accompanied by Brigadier-General W. H. T. Walker, whom he had met on the way, marching to join him with his brigade. The latter had just come from General Beauregard's department [South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida]. There were about six thousand men in the two brigades.

He said further that Colonel Wirt Adams, of the cavalry, had informed him that General Pemberton's forces were at Edwards's depot, 20 miles from Vicksburg, and his headquarters at Bovina, 8 miles from that place; that the Seventeenth Corps (McPherson's) had moved that day from Raymond to Clinton, 9 or 10 miles from Jackson, on the road to Vicksburg. He added that General Maxey's brigade from Port Hudson was expected in Jackson next

day. I had passed General Gist's during that day, on its way from Charleston. The arrival of these troops, and, as I hoped, 3000 from Tennessee, would increase the force in Jackson to near 15,000 men. The most important measure to be executed then was the junction of these reinforcements with the army. For that object, an order in writing was sent without delay to General Pemberton by Captain Yerger, who volunteered to bear it, to move to Clinton at once and attack a Federal corps there, the troops in Jackson to coöperate; to beat that detachment and establish communication, that he might be reinforced. It was delivered at Bovina early next morning, and General Pemberton replied promptly that he "moved at once with his whole available force"; but in the ride of ten or twelve miles to his camp at Edwards's depot he determined to disobey my order, and on his arrival assembled a council of war, which he informed of that intention, and consulted upon the measure to be substituted for the movement to Clinton. It was decided to move southward to a point on the road by which General Grant's forces had advanced, which would have made it impossible for the troops then in Jackson and other expected reinforcements to join Pemberton's army.

Mr. Davis says of this ["Rise and Fall," II., pp. 404-5]:

"When he [Johnston] reached Jackson, learning that the enemy was between that place and the position occupied by General Pemberton's forces, about thirty miles distant, he halted there and opened correspondence with General Pemberton, from which confusion and consequent disasters resulted, which might have been avoided had he, with or without his reinforcements, proceeded to General Pemberton's headquarters in the field."

Mr. Davis knew that I had been sick five or six weeks when ordered to Mississippi, and therefore he had no right to suppose that I was able to make a night ride of thirty miles, after a journey of four days. He knew, too, that my course, which he now condemns, was the only one offering us a hope of success; for he indorsed on a letter of mine, giving a brief account of these events to the Secretary of War: "Do not perceive why a junction was not attempted, which would have made our force nearly equal in number to the estimated strength of the enemy; and might have resulted in a total defeat under circumstances which rendered retreat or reinforcement to him scarcely practicable." It would be doing injustice to Mr. Davis's intelligence to think that he really believes that I am chargeable with the consequences of the disobedience of my indispensable order, or that he is ignorant that our only hope of success lay in the execution of that order, and that to disobey it was to ruin us.

After the decision of the council of war, General Pemberton remained at Edwards's depot at least 24 hours; and instead of marching in the morning of the 14th, his movement was commenced so late on the 15th that he bivouacked at night but three or four miles from the ground he had left. Here, soon after nightfall, the camp-fires of a division were pointed out to him, but he took no measures in consequence. Soon after sunrise on the 16th he received an order from me, the second one, to march toward Clinton that our forces might be united. He made preparations to obey it, and, in acknowledging it, described the route he intended to follow; but he remained

passive five or six hours, before a single Federal division, until near noon, when General Grant, having brought up six other divisions, attacked him. Notwithstanding the enemy's great superiority of numbers, General Pemberton maintained a spirited contest of several hours, but was finally driven from the field. This was the battle of Baker's Creek, or Champion's Hill. The Confederate troops retreated toward Vicksburg, but bivouacked at night near the Big Black, one division in some earth-works in front of the bridge, the other a mile or two in rear of it. Loring, whose division was in the rear, in quit-

ting the field, instead of crossing Baker's Creek, turned southward, and by a skillfully conducted march eluded the enemy, and in three days joined the troops from the east, assembling near Jackson. On the near approach of the pursuing army next morning, the troops in front of the bridge abandoned the intrenchments and retreated rapidly to Vicksburg, accompanied by the division that had been posted west of the river. Information of this was brought to me in the evening of that day, and I immediately wrote to General Pemberton that, if invested in Vicksburg, he must ultimately surrender; and that, instead of losing both troops and place, he must save the troops by evacuating Vicksburg and marching to



VICKSBURG COURT HOUSE, A LANDMARK DURING THE SIEGE. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN IN 1863.

the north-east. The question of obeying this order was submitted by him to a council of war, which decided that "it was impossible to withdraw the troops from that position with such *morale* and material as to be of further service to the Confederacy." This allegation was refuted by the courage, fortitude, and discipline displayed by that army in the long siege.

The investment of the place was completed on the 19th; on the 20th Gist's brigade from Charleston, on the 21st Ector's and McNair's from Tennessee, and on the 23d Maxey's from Port Hudson joined Gregg's and Walker's near Canton. This force was further increased on the 3d of June by the arrival of Breckinridge's division and Jackson's (two thousand) cavalry from the Army of Tennessee, and Evans's brigade from Charleston. These troops, except the cavalry, having come by railroad, were not equipped for the service before them: that of rescuing the garrison of Vicksburg. They required artillery, draught horses and mules, wagons, ammunition, and provisions, all in large numbers and quantity; the more because it was necessary to include the Vicksburg troops in our estimates.

According to Lieutenant-General Pemberton's report of March 31st, 1863 (the only one I can find), he had then present for duty 2360 officers and 28,221 enlisted men. These were the troops that occupied Vicksburg and the camp at Edwards's depot when General Pemberton received my order dated May 13th. There were, besides, above two thousand cavalry in the northern and south-western parts of the State.

I have General Grant's reports of May 31st and June 30th, 1863. The first shows a force of 2991 officers and 47,500 enlisted men present for duty; the second, 4412 officers and 70,866 enlisted men present for duty. The so-called siege of Vicksburg was little more than a blockade. But one vigorous assault was made, which was on the third day.

Mr. Davis represents that General Pemberton's operations were cramped by a want of cavalry, for which I was responsible. He had cavalry enough; but it was used near the extremities of the State against raiding parties, instead of being employed against the formidable invasion near the center. Mr. Davis accepts that officer's idea that a large body of cavalry could have broken General Grant's communication with the Mississippi, and so defeated his enterprise. But Grant had no communication with the Mississippi. His troops supplied themselves from the country around them.

He accuses me of producing "confusion and consequent disasters" by giving a written order to Lieutenant-General Pemberton, which he terms opening correspondence. But as that order, dated May 13th, was disobeyed, it certainly produced neither confusion nor disaster. But "consequent disaster" was undoubtedly due to the disobedience of that order, which caused the battle of Champion's Hill. When that order was written, obedience to it, which would have united all our forces, might have enabled us to contend with General Grant on equal terms, and perhaps to win the campaign. Strange as it may now seem, Mr. Davis thought so at the time, as the indorsement already quoted proves distinctly.

A proper use of the available resources of the Confederacy would have averted the disasters referred to by Mr. Davis. If, instead of being sent on the wild expedition into Kentucky, General Bragg had been instructed to avail himself of the dispersed condition of the Federal troops in northern Mississippi and west Tennessee, he might have totally defeated the forces with which General Grant invaded Mississippi three months later. Those troops were distributed in Corinth, Jackson, Memphis, and intermediate points, while his own were united, so that he could have fought them in detail, with



COLONEL S. H. LOCKETT, C. S. A.,
CHIEF ENGINEER OF THE VICKSBURG DEFENSES.
FROM AN OIL PORTRAIT.

as much certainty of success as can be hoped for in war. And such success would have prevented the military and naval combination which gave the enemy control of the Mississippi and divided the Confederacy, and would have given the Confederacy the ascendancy on that frontier. It is evident, and was so then, that the three bodies of Confederate troops in Mississippi in July, 1862, should have been united under General Bragg. The army of above 65,000 men so formed could not have been seriously resisted by the Federal forces, not only greatly inferior to it in numbers, but so distributed that the various parts could have been attacked separately, and certainly defeated, probably destroyed.

Even after this failure the Confederates were stronger to repel invasion than the Federals to invade. By uniting their forces in Arkansas with those in Mississippi, an army of above 70,000 men would have been formed, to meet General Grant's of 43,000. In all human probability such a force would have totally defeated the invading army, and not only preserved Mississippi but enabled us to recover Tennessee.

But if there were some necessity known only to the President to keep the Confederate troops then in Arkansas on that side of the Mississippi, he could have put General Pemberton on at least equal terms with his antagonist, by giving him the troops in April actually sent to him late in May. This would have formed an army of above fifty thousand men. General Grant landed two corps, less than 30,000 men, on the 30th of April and 1st and 2d of May; and it was not until the 8th of May that the arrival of Sherman's corps increased his force to about 43,000 men. The Confederate reënforcements could have been sent as well early in April as late in May; and then, without bad generalship on our part, the chances of success would have been in our favor, decidedly.

THE DEFENSE OF VICKSBURG.

BY S. H. LOCKETT, C. S. A., CHIEF ENGINEER OF THE DEFENSES.

THE occupation of Vicksburg was the immediate result of the fall of New Orleans on the 25th of April, 1862.† The first military operations were the laying out and construction of some batteries for heavy guns, by Captain (afterward Colonel) D. B. Harris of the Confederate States Engineers,‡ the work being mostly done by a force of hired negroes. These batteries were located chiefly below the city; their positions were well chosen; they had fine command of the river against a fleet coming from below.


‡ The first troops to go to Vicksburg were from Camp Moore, a rendezvous of the forces which had recently evacuated New Orleans. They were Allen's 4th Louisiana and Thomas's 28th Louisiana. These regiments were soon followed by Marks's 27th Louisiana, De Clomet's 26th Louisiana, Richardson's 17th Louisiana, Morrison's 31st Louisiana, all infantry; and Beltzhoover's Louisiana regiment of artillery, and Ogden's Louisiana battalion of artillery. After these came Mellon's regiment and Balfour's battalion of Mississippi troops. The staff-officers were Major Devereux, Assistant Adjutant-General; Major Girault, Inspector-General; Lieutenant-Colonel Ivey, Chief of Artillery; Captain McDon-

ald, Chief of Ordnance, and Lieutenants Harrod and Frost, Aides-de-camp. These troops and officers constituted the garrison of Vicksburg from the beginning to the end of operations. The troops had but recently had a fearful baptism of fire in the fierce bombardment by Admiral Farragut of Forts Jackson and St. Philip, and the batteries of the Chalmette. They were already veterans, and many of them were skilled artillerists.

—S. H. L.

On the 20th of June, 1862, I was ordered from the Army of Tennessee, then under General Bragg, to report to General Smith as his Chief Engineer.

† General Beauregard claims to have sent Captain Harris to Vicksburg and to have given the orders under which that officer began the construction of the fortifications. (O. R., XV., 810.) — EDITORS.



CONFEDERATE LINES IN THE REAR OF VICKSBURG. FROM A WAR-TIME PHOTOGRAPH.

I was with him in that capacity until the 1st of November, when I was made, by General Pemberton, Chief Engineer of the Department of Mississippi and East Louisiana, of which General Pemberton had just taken command. This change extended my field of operations from Holly Springs to Port Hudson, but I never relinquished immediate charge of the defenses of Vicksburg. Hence I may safely claim to have been identified with the defense almost from the beginning to the end of operations.

The series of irregular hills, bluffs, and narrow, tortuous ridges, apparently without system or order, that constitute the strong defensive position of Vicksburg, raised some two hundred feet above the level of the river, owe their character, with all their strangely complex arrangement and configuration, to the natural erosive action of water on the fine, homogeneous, calcareous silt peculiar to the lias or bluff formation.

At the time of my arrival no enemy was near, but the work of preparation was going on vigorously. The garrison was engaged in strengthening the batteries already constructed, in making bomb-proof magazines, and in mounting new guns recently arrived. Several new batteries were laid out by myself on the most commanding points above the city; these were afterward known as the "Upper Batteries." The work of making an accurate map of Vicksburg and vicinity was also begun. But we had not many days for these preliminaries. On the 26th of June the advance of Farragut's fleet arrived in sight. The next morning found it in position for bombarding. A flotilla of mortar-boats was moored close to the farther shore of the river just beyond the range of our lower batteries. A second flotilla had crept along the bank next to us with their masts so covered with the boughs of trees that we did not discover them until they were quite near. They were completely protected from our guns by the bank.


At a signal-gun from one of the iron-clads the guns were opened. I measured one of the holes made by the mortar-shells in hard, compact clay, and found it seventeen feet deep. It was a diffi-

cult matter to make bomb-proofs against such destructive engines. A few shots were fired from our batteries in answer to the challenge of the mortar-boats, but these shots were harmless, and were soon discontinued. The Federal bombardment was likewise nearly harmless. But few soldiers and citizens were killed. Vertical fire is never very destructive of life. Yet the howling and bursting shells had a very demoralizing effect on those not accustomed to them. One of my engineer officers, a Frenchman, a gallant officer who had distinguished himself in several severe engagements, was almost unmanned whenever one passed anywhere near him. When joked about it, he was not ashamed to confess: "I no like ze bomb; I cannot fight him back!"

June 28th was a memorable day. At early dawn the mortar-fleet renewed its heavy bombardment. At the same time the vessels and gun-boats moved up toward the city and opened fire with all their heavy ordnance. Under cover of this tremendous shelling the *Brooklyn* and *Hartford* and several of the iron-clads boldly pushed up stream, and went past our batteries under full headway, pouring into the city broadside after broadside with astonishing rapidity. The Confederate batteries responded with equal energy.

The results of this first encounter with the hitherto redoubtable fleet was highly gratifying to the defenders of Vicksburg. It is true the fleet got past the batteries; but the *Brooklyn* and *Octorora* were temporarily disabled. All the vessels suffered more or less, and many Federal sailors were killed and wounded, as we learned from people who lived across the river. On the Confederate side no gun was disabled, no battery injured, and only thirteen were killed or wounded. Our batteries mounted 29 guns, of which 2 were 10-inch Columbiads, the rest being old style 42 and 32 pounders. The *Brooklyn* alone carried 24 11-inch Dahlgren guns. We expected a land attack at the same time, and were prepared for it by the presence of as many as ten thousand troops, under Breckinridge, Bowen, and Preston, who had just

arrived and were in near-supporting distance. They were not called upon, however, and no troops were under fire except the brigade of General M. L. Smith. After this, for two weeks, things moved along at Vicksburg with something akin to monotony. The mortar-fleets kept up a steady bombardment, but even the citizens of the town became so accustomed to it that they went about their daily occupations. The women and children left their caves to watch the shells, and would only betake themselves to their shelters when the fire seemed to be concentrated in their particular neighborhoods. Finally the upper fleet, under Flag-Officer C. H. Davis, came down the



MAJOR-GENERAL C. L. STEVENSON, C. S. A.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

river, joined the vessels that had run our batteries, put a flotilla of mortar-boats in position, and took part in the grand but nearly harmless sport of pitching big shells into Vicksburg. During this period General Thomas Williams commenced the famous canal across the narrow neck of land in front of Vicksburg. But the water fell faster than the ditch was dug, the river refused to make a cut-off, and this effort also proved a failure.

On the 15th of July the monotony of the situation was greatly relieved by one of the most stirring episodes of the war. The little Confederate ram, *Arkansas*, under her gallant commander, I. N. Brown, came out of Yazoo River, where she had been built in imitation of the famous *Merrimac*, and ran the gauntlet of the whole upper fleet. [See article by Captain I. N. Brown, to follow.]

For several days after this the regulation bombardment was kept up. Suddenly, however, on the 25th of July, the lower fleet, big ships, gun-boats, and mortar-boats, weighed anchor and dropped down the river to a distance of several miles below their former position. On the 27th both lower and upper fleets took leave of us, and the 28th of July found Vicksburg once more freed from the presence of a hostile force.

Working parties were at once put upon the river-


batteries to repair damages and increase their strength wherever recent experience had shown it to be necessary. It was also determined to construct a line of defense in rear of Vicksburg, to prepare against an army operating upon land. As chief engineer, it became my duty to plan, locate, and lay out that line of defense. A month was spent in reconnoitering, surveying, and studying the complicated and irregular site to be fortified. No greater topographical puzzle was ever presented to an engineer. The difficulty of the situation was greatly enhanced by the fact that a large part of the hills and hollows had never been cleared of their virgin forest of magnificent magnolia-trees and dense undergrowth of cane. At first it seemed impossible to find anything like a general line of commanding ground surrounding the city; but careful study gradually worked out the problem.

The most prominent points I purposed to occupy with a system of redoubts, redans, lunettes, and small field-works, connecting them by rifle-pits so as to give a continuous line of defense. The work of construction was begun about the 1st of September with a force of negro laborers hired or impressed from the plantations of the adjacent counties. Haynes's Bluff on the Yazoo River and Warrenton, about six miles below Vicksburg, were fortified as flank protections to the main position.

On the 14th of October, 1862, Lieutenant-General John C. Pemberton took command of the Department of Mississippi and East Louisiana, establishing his headquarters at Jackson. About the same time General Grant was placed in supreme command of the Federal forces in north Mississippi. Then followed a succession of movements against Vicksburg, having for their object the turning of that point. They were all uniformly unsuccessful, and were so remote from the city, with one exception, that the garrison of Vicksburg was not involved in the operations which defeated them. I will simply mention them in the order in which they occurred. First was General Grant's advance from Memphis and Grand Junction, via Holly Springs, toward Grenada. This was defeated by the raids of Van Dorn and Forrest upon Grant's communications [December 20th and December 15th to January 3d]. He was forced to retire or starve. Next came General Sherman's attempt to get in rear of Vicksburg by the Chickasaw Bayou road, which ran from the Yazoo River bottom to the Walnut hills, six miles above the city. His column of thirty thousand men was defeated and driven back with dreadful slaughter by General S. D. Lee with one brigade of the Vicksburg garrison [December 20th to January 3d].

After this General Grant himself appeared in front of Vicksburg, occupied the river with an immense fleet and the Louisiana shore with a large army. He renewed the old style of bombardment and the work on the canal, but high water made him abandon that work and his position.

Then came the expedition, via Lake Providence and Bayou Maçon, which was defeated by natural difficulties. Next, the expedition by Yazoo Pass and Hushpucanaugh Bayou, which was stopped by Fort Pemberton,—a cotton-bale fort made by



PASSAGE, ON THE NIGHT OF APRIL 16, 1863, OF GUN-BOATS AND STEAMERS AT VICKSBURG.
FROM A SKETCH MADE BY COLONEL S. H. LOCKETT, C. S. A.


Captain P. Robinson, of the Confederate States Engineers, on the overflowed bottom-lands of the Tallahatchie and Yallahusha rivers, near their junction [February 24th to April 5th]. Here General Loring, with 3 guns and about 1500 men, turned back a large fleet and land force, and won the sobriquet of "Old Blizzards" by standing on the cotton-bale parapet and shouting "Give them blizzards, boys! Give them blizzards!" Last of these flanking expeditions was one of General Sherman and Admiral Porter, via Steele's Bayou, to reach the Sunflower and Yazoo rivers, above Haynes's Bluff [March 14th-27th]. This came near being as disastrous as that by the Chickasaw Bayou, owing to obstructions made by the Confederates and to a sudden fall in the waters.

Though these expeditions all failed, the desperate nature of most of them convinced us that General Grant was in deep earnest, and not easily discouraged. He made one more effort, which succeeded perhaps beyond his own most sanguine expectations. This had been anticipated by General Pemberton, and, to a certain extent, provided for by sending General John S. Bowen to occupy and fortify Grand Gulf. I accompanied General Bowen and located the works at Grand Gulf, leaving them in charge of Lieutenant Donnellan, of the Confederate States Engineers.


On the night of the 16th of April, 1863, a large part of the upper fleet (then commanded by Admiral David D. Porter), consisting of six gun-boats and several transports, ran the batteries at Vicksburg. Gun-boats had frequently passed the batteries during the operations of the preceding ten

months, but up to that time no one had dreamed that the ordinary river steamboats could do so. They were protected by cotton-bales and by large barges loaded with coal and forage, lashed alongside. One of the transports was fired by our shells, and burned to the water's edge in front of the city. Two other boats were partly disabled, and several of the barges were sunk. Yet eight boats succeeded in getting past both Vicksburg and Warrenton in more or less serviceable condition. The movement of the boats was soon discovered by the Confederate pickets, who nightly patrolled the river in small boats. They immediately crossed the river and fired several houses in the village of DeSoto, so as to illuminate the river. To appreciate the boldness of this action one must try to put himself in the place of these pickets, who ran great risks of being captured in landing on the opposite shore, which was occupied by the Federal forces. In addition, as soon as their work was accomplished, they were exposed to the enemy's sharp-shooters, on the now brightly lighted river, and were in the direct line of fire of the batteries of their friends. Yet they neither failed nor faltered.

Two nights later, four more boats, towing barges of large capacity, passed down the river, and joined the others at New Carthage, a village in Louisiana about half-way between Vicksburg and Grand Gulf. Here there was a fleet of formidable gun-boats, and transports and barges enough to ferry a large force across the river. This gave a serious and threatening aspect to the movement. At the same time a force under General Sherman was again menacing Haynes's Bluff; Grierson's raid




DOUBLE CAVE IN THE RIGBY HILL.



"SKY PARLOR HILL," A CONFEDERATE SIGNAL-STATION DURING THE SIEGE, AND (PICTURES ABOVE AND BELOW) CAVES OF THE KIND IN WHICH RESIDENTS OF VICKSBURG SOUGHT REFUGE DURING THE BOMBARDMENT BY THE FLEET. FROM PHOTOGRAPHS.

was playing havoc with railroads and depots of supplies in the interior of Mississippi; rumors of movements of Federal troops in north Mississippi were rife; and Port Hudson in Louisiana was threatened. General Pemberton, just previous to this time, had sent some troops from his department to General Bragg, at Tullahoma, and had others *en route* to the same destination. As soon as he became convinced that Vicksburg was seriously threatened by General Grant's last move, he strongly pleaded for the return of his troops, and made rapid dispositions of those still left, to meet the various forces operating against him. Lack of reliable information, however, made his efforts unavailing.† Before he could determine which was the real attack, and which were mere diversions, General Grant had perfected his arrangements, attacked and temporarily silenced the

batteries of Grand Gulf, and passed that point with his fleet. This was on the 29th of April. On the next day he crossed the river at Bruinsburg and obtained a lodgment on the eastern shore. Then followed in rapid succession the defeat of Bowen at Port Gibson on May 1st, the defeat of General Gregg at Raymond on the 12th, and the capture of Jackson on the 14th. Meantime General Pemberton had left Jackson and gone to Vicksburg. The writer followed him, after having laid out a line of defenses around Jackson, leaving them to be constructed by Captain Thyssens. General Pemberton first thought that Grant would turn north from Port Gibson and try to force a pas-



CAVE NEAR THE MACHINE-SHOP.

sage across Big Black River at one of the ferries. He accordingly sent about a brigade each to Hankinson's, Hall's, and Baldwin's ferries, and ordered field-works to be thrown up at these crossings.

After taking measures to establish works for the defense of the important points on our main line of communications at the railroad bridge and

† General Pemberton claims that the transfer of his cavalry to Bragg, in Tennessee, by General Johnston's orders, deprived him of the means of ascertaining the


Federal movements in time to meet them effectively. This afterward became a subject of controversy between Generals Johnston and Pemberton.—EDITORS.

Edwards's depot, I returned to Vicksburg with Captain Winter's company of sappers and miners and put them to work on the rear line of defenses, with orders to make necessary repairs and put everything in good condition.

At last General Pemberton became convinced that General Grant's intention was to march up the east bank of Big Black River, to strike the railroad at or near Edwards's depot, and thus cut his communications with Jackson. To prevent this, and at the same time to defeat Grant, if possible, he concentrated all of his forces at Edwards's depot, excepting General Forney's division which was left in Vicksburg, and General Smith's which was posted at and near the railroad bridge. On the 12th of May, under the orders of General Pemberton, I went to Edwards's depot to put the Confederate forces in position upon the ground selected for them to occupy, covering all the approaches from the south and east. The army here assembled consisted of three divisions: Bowen's on the right, Loring's in the center, and C. L. Stevenson's on the left, numbering about 18,000 men. Some slight field-works had been thrown up at favorable points. The position was naturally a strong one, on high ground, with the cultivated valley of Baker's Creek in its front. Here General Pemberton wished to wait to be attacked by Grant. There can be no doubt that if he had been allowed to do so a desperate and bloody battle would have been fought on that ground, the issue of which might have been different from that of the two unfortunate engagements which did actually occur. The army remained at Edwards's depot from the 13th to the 15th. During this time General Pemberton received numerous dispatches from President Davis, and from General J. E. Johnston, who had recently arrived at Jackson. I saw, or heard read, most of these dispatches. They were very conflicting in their tenor, and neither those of Mr. Davis nor those of General Johnston exactly comported with General Pemberton's views. He then made the capital mistake of trying to harmonize instructions from his superiors diametrically opposed to each other, and at the same time to bring them into accord with his own judgment, which was adverse to the plans of both. Mr. Davis's idea was to hold Vicksburg at all hazard, and not to endanger it by getting too far from it. Johnston's plan was to cut loose from Vicksburg altogether, manœuvre so as to avoid a general engagement with Grant until the Confederate forces could be concentrated, and then beat him. Pemberton wished to take a strong position on the line of the Big Black and wait for an attack, believing that it would be successfully resisted, and that then the tables could be turned upon Grant in a very bad position, without any base of supplies, and without a well-protected line of retreat. As I have said, none of these plans was carried out, but a sort of compromise or compound of all these attempts, resulting in the unfortunate battle of Baker's Creek, or Champion's Hill, and the disgraceful stampede of Big Black bridge.

Pemberton moved out from Edwards's depot in obedience to a dispatch from General Johnston, ordering him to attack in the rear a force which he

supposed General Johnston was going to engage in front. Instead of this, he encountered Grant's victorious army returning, exultant and eager for more prizes, from the capture of Jackson. Pemberton's army, which was making a retrograde movement at the time, was put into line of battle by being faced to the right with infantry, artillery, baggage, and ordnance wagons just as they were. In a few minutes after this disposition was made, his extreme left, previously the head of his column, was actively engaged with largely superior numbers. Under all the circumstances the Confeder-



BRIGADIER-GENERAL EDWARD HIGGINS, C. S. A.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

ates made a gallant fight, but they were driven from the field with heavy loss in killed, wounded, and captured, and a considerable loss of arms and ammunition. Stevenson's division bore the brunt of this battle and suffered the heaviest losses. Bowen's division sustained its reputation by making one of its grand old charges, in which it bored a hole through the Federal army, and finding itself unsupported turned around and bored its way back again. Loring's division did not coöperate with the other two, through some misunderstanding or misconception, and was scarcely engaged at all during the fight. Tilghman's brigade of this division covered the road by which the Confederates retreated late in the afternoon. While in the discharge of this duty General Tilghman was killed.

Our beaten forces, except Loring's division, retreated across Baker's Creek and took position at nightfall at Big Black bridge; part of the forces, Bowen's division and Vaughn's brigade, being put in position in the *tête-de-pont* on the east bank of the river, and part on the bluffs on the west. Loring's division was moved by its commander, by the right flank, around the Federal army, and finally, after a loss of most of its cannon and wagons, joined General Johnston at Jackson.

The affair of Big Black bridge was one which an ex-Confederate participant naturally dislikes to record. The Federals engaged us early in the

morning from a copse of woods on our left. I was standing on the railroad bridge at the time, and soon saw signs of unsteadiness in our men, and reporting the fact to General Pemberton, received orders to prepare to destroy the bridges. Fencible rails and loose cotton saturated with turpentine were piled on the railroad bridge, and a barrel of spirits of turpentine placed on the steamer *Dot*, which was swung across the river and used as a bridge. About 9 o'clock our troops on the left (Vaughlin's brigade) broke from their breastworks and came pell-mell toward the bridges. Bowen's men, seeing themselves unsupported, followed the example, and soon the whole force was crossing the river by the bridges and by swimming, hotly pursued by the Federals. I was on the *Dot* at the time.



EFFECT OF THE GUN-BOAT SHELLS
ON VICKSBURG HOUSES. FROM
A SKETCH MADE THE DAY
OF THE SURRENDER.

Waiting until all the Confederates in sight were across the river I touched a match to the barrel of turpentine, and with the aid of one of my lieutenants tipped it over. In a moment the boat was in a blaze. The railroad bridge

was likewise fired, and all immediate danger of pursuit prevented.

After the stampede at the bridge orders were issued for the army to fall back to Vicksburg, Major-General Stevenson being placed in command of the retreating forces. General Pemberton rode on himself to Bovina, a small railroad station about two and a half miles from the river. I was the only staff-officer with him. He was very much depressed by the events of the last two days, and for some time after mounting his horse rode in silence. He finally said: "Just thirty years ago I began my military career by receiving my appointment to a cadetship at the U. S. Military Academy, and to-day—the same date—that career is ended in disaster and disgrace." I strove to encourage him, urging that things were not so bad as they seemed to be; that we still had two excellent divisions (Smith's and Forney's) which had not been engaged and were, therefore, fresh and not demoralized; that they could occupy our lines at Vicksburg, covering especially the approaches from the position now occupied by the Federal forces, which they would naturally follow;

‡ The defenses were divided into three districts as follows: *First*: General Stevenson's line, Captain P. Robinson, chief engineer, with Captain J. J. Conway, Captain James Couper, Lieutenant A. W. Gloster, Lieutenant R. R. Sonthard, and Sergeant W. B. H. Saunders as assistants. *Second*: The rest of the rear line: Captain D. Wintter, chief engineer, with Captain James Hogue, Lieutenant E. McMahon, Lieutenant F. Gillooly, Lieutenant S. McD. Vernon, and Lieutenant Blessing as assistants. *Third*: The river front commanded by Colonel Edward Higgins, First Lieutenant William O. Flynn, engineer. The working force under the direct control of the chief engineer was as follows: 26 sappers and miners of Captain Wintter's company; 8

that the rest of the troops could be put, at first, in the less exposed parts of the line, or in reserve, until they had steadied themselves; that Vicksburg was strong and could not be carried by assault; and that Mr. Davis had telegraphed to him "to hold Vicksburg at all hazard," adding that "if besieged he would be relieved." To all of which General Pemberton replied that my youth and hopes were the parents of my judgment; he himself did not believe our troops would stand the first shock of an attack. We finally reached Bovina, where the general halted, and at my earnest instance wrote an order directing me to return to Vicksburg in all possible haste, to put the place in a good state of defense. This order directed all officers, of whatsoever rank, to obey all requisitions of the chief engineer for men, materials, and labor, and to render all possible aid in carrying out his plans. Generals Forney and Smith responded heartily, and before nightfall work was under way all along the lines of defense. The main works on the rear line, already described, had, for the most part, exterior ditches from six to ten feet deep, with rampart, parapet, banquette for infantry, and embrasures and platforms for artillery. Not having been occupied they were now much washed and weakened by the winter's rains. The rifle-pits connecting the main works had suffered in the same way, while on many parts of the line these pits had never been finished.

Fatigue parties were set to work making these repairs and connections; at the same time all field-artillery, Parrott guns, and siege pieces on the river front were moved to the rear line, platforms and embrasures were prepared for them, and ammunition was placed in convenient and protected places. The field-artillery brought in by our retreating army was likewise put in position as it arrived, and the morning of the 18th found us with 102 guns ready for service on the rear line. Some portions of our front were protected by abatis of fallen trees and entanglements of telegraph wire. The river-batteries were still strong and intact, having lost none of their sea-coast guns.

The troops were placed in position as I had recommended. General C. L. Stevenson's division extended from the Warrenton road on our extreme right to the railroad; General John H. Forney's division occupied the center, from the railroad to the Graveyard road; General M. L. Smith's division filling up the space between the Graveyard road and the river on our left. General John S. Bowen's Missourians and Waul's Texas Legion were held in reserve. ‡

detailed mechanics and firemen, 4 overseers for negroes, 72 hired negroes (20 were sick), 3 four-mule teams, and 25 yoke of oxen.

About five hundred picks and shovels is perhaps a near estimate of the number of intrenching tools. They were distributed to the different brigades according to the amount of work required, and being much scattered along our long lines were considered so precious by both men and officers that when not in actual use they were hidden for fear that they would be stolen by other troops, or ordered to some other part of the line by the chief engineer. They were entirely inadequate for the work, and the men soon improvised wooden shovels, using their bayonets as picks.—S. H. L.

Early on May 18th the Federal forces appeared on the Jackson and Graveyard roads, which were covered by a part of General M. L. Smith's division posted as skirmishers and pickets outside of our main lines. The Federals were held in check, so that during the night General Smith had no difficulty in withdrawing his forces within the main line of defense. The next day, when the Federals discovered that the Confederates were gone from their position of the evening before, they came forward rapidly and took that position, with shout and cheer, and soon after rushed upon the main line of defense, apparently with perfect confidence that there would be another "walk over" such as they had had two days before at Big Black bridge. But this time they struck a rock in General Shoup's brigade which met them with so heavy and well-directed a fire that they were compelled to fall back. A second time they came forward in greater numbers and with more boldness and determination, but with even more fatal results. They were repulsed with great loss, leaving five stand of colors close to our lines and the ground being strewn with their dead and wounded. These assaults extended from Shoup's position toward our right so as to include a part of Forney's division. Thus they were met by troops which had not been in any of the recent disastrous engagements, and were not in the least demoralized. These men stood to their arms like true soldiers, and helped to restore the *morale* of our army.

The 20th and 21st of May were occupied by the Federal forces in completing their line, at an average distance of about eight hundred yards from our works. The Confederates utilized the time in putting up traverses against enfilade fires, and in making covered approaches from the camps in rear to the line of works. Many a man and officer had already been picked off by the quick-sighted Federal sharp-shooters, while passing along our lines or between them and the cooking-camps. It took several days for our men to learn the caution necessary to protect themselves.

On the 22d of May the gun-boats moved up within range and opened fire upon the river front. At the same time several dense columns of troops assaulted our lines in the rear. These assaults covered the right of General Smith's position, where General Shoup's brigade was posted, the whole of General Forney's front, and that of Stephen D. Lee's brigade of Stevenson's division. The assaults were made with great determination and admirable courage by the Federal soldiers. Once, twice,

three times they came forward and recoiled from the deadly fire poured upon them by the Confederates, who were now thoroughly restored to their old-time confidence and aroused to an enthusiastic determination to hold their lines. Every assault was repulsed with terrible loss to the attacking parties. At two points on the line — on General Forney's and General S. D. Lee's front — the Federals obtained a lodgment and planted their colors on our parapet; but the brave fellows paid for their success by being either killed or captured and having their colors fall into our hands. On General Lee's line they even succeeded in capturing one of our detached works and drove out the men who held it. But it was retaken in a few minutes by a charge of Waul's Legion, led by Colonel Pettus of Alabama. The losses on both sides were severe; several thousand men, estimated by us



FIRST MONUMENT THAT STOOD
ON THE SPOT OF THE INTER-
VIEW BETWEEN GENERALS
GRANT AND PEMBERTON.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.



MONUMENT NOW ON THE SPOT OF THE INTERVIEW
BETWEEN GENERALS GRANT AND PEMBERTON.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

at 3500, were left dead and wounded between the lines.

On the 25th the Federal dead and some of their wounded in the fight of the 22d were still in our front and close to our lines. The dead had become offensive and the living were suffering fearful agonies. General Pemberton, therefore, under a flag of truce, sent a note to General Grant, proposing a cessation of hostilities for two and a half hours, so that the dead and dying men might receive proper attention. This was acceded to by General Grant, and from six o'clock until nearly dark both parties were engaged in performing funeral rites and deeds of mercy to the dead and wounded Federal soldiers. On this occasion I met General Sherman for the first time. Naturally, the officers of both armies took advantage of the truce to use their eyes to the best possible advantage. I was on the Jackson road redan, which had been terribly



LOGAN'S DIVISION ENTERING VICKSBURG BY THE JACKSON ROAD, JULY 4, 1863.
FROM A SKETCH MADE AT THE TIME.

pounded and was the object of constant attention from a battery of heavy guns in its immediate front. The Federals were moving toward it in a zigzag approach [see p. 540], and were already in uncomfortable proximity to it. While standing on the parapet of this work a Federal orderly came up to me and said that General Sherman wished to speak to me. Following the orderly, I reached a group of officers standing some two hundred yards in front of our line. One of these came forward, introduced himself as General Sherman, and said: "I saw that you were an officer by your insignia of rank, and have asked you to meet me, to put into your hands some letters intrusted to me by Northern friends of some of your officers and men. I thought this would be a good opportunity to deliver this mail before it got too old." To this I replied: "Yes, General, it would have been very old, indeed, if you had kept it until you brought it into Vicksburg yourself." "So you think, then," said the general, "I am a very slow mail route." "Well, rather," was the reply, "when you have to travel by regular approaches, parallels, and zigzags." "Yes," he said, "that is a slow way of getting into a place, but it is a very sure way, and I was determined to deliver those letters sooner or later."

The general then invited me to take a seat with him on an old log near by, and thus the rest of the time of the truce was spent in pleasant conversation. In the course of it the general remarked: "You have an admirable position for defense here, and you have taken excellent advantage of the ground." "Yes, General," I replied, "but it is equally as well adapted to offensive operations,

and your engineers have not been slow to discover it." To this General Sherman assented. Intentionally or not, his civility certainly prevented me from seeing many other points in our front that I as chief engineer was very anxious to examine.

The truce ended, the sharpshooters immediately began their work and kept it up until darkness prevented accuracy of aim. Then the pickets of the two armies were posted in front of their respective lines, so near to each other that they whiled away the long hours of the night-watch with social chat. Within our lines the pick and shovel were the weapons of defense until the next morning.

On the night of the 26th, while we were trying to place an obstruction across the swamp between our right and the river, our working party and its support had a sharp engagement with a detachment of Federals who came to see what we were doing. We captured one hundred of our inquisitive friends, and retired without putting in the obstruction. At other parts of the line the work of making traverses, changing guns to more available points, making covered ways along the line and to the rear, and repairing damages, went on as vigorously as our means would allow.

The events of the 27th of May were varied by an attack on our river batteries by the fleet. The *Cincinnati* was badly crippled, and before reaching her former moorings she sank in water not deep enough to cover her deck. She was still within range of our guns, so that the efforts made by the Federals to dismantle her and remove her armament were effectually prevented.

By this time the Federal commander was evidently convinced that Vicksburg had to be taken

by regular siege operations. By the 4th of June the Federals had advanced their parallels to within 150 yards of our line. From them they commenced several double saps against our most salient works — the Jackson road redan, the Graveyard road redan, the Third Louisiana redan, on the left of the Jackson road, and the lunette on the right of the Baldwin's Ferry road. In each of these the engineer in charge was ordered to place thundering barrels and loaded shells with short-time fuses, as preparations for meeting assaults. The stockade redan and the stockade on its left, which had been constructed across a low place in our line, had by this time been nearly knocked to pieces by the enemy's artillery. A new line was therefore made to take its place when it should be no longer tenable. So, too, retrenchments, or inner lines, were ordered at all points where breaches seemed imminent or the enemy more than ordinarily near. These retrenchments served us excellently before the siege was terminated.

By the 8th of June, in spite of all efforts to prevent them, the enemy's sap-rollers had approached within sixty feet of two of our works. A private soldier suggested a novel expedient by which we succeeded in destroying the rollers. He took a piece of port-fire, stuffed it with cotton saturated with turpentine, and fired it from an old-fashioned large-bore musket into the roller, and thus set it on fire. Thus the enemy's sappers were exposed and forced to leave their sap and begin a new one some distance back. After this they kept their sap-rollers wet, forcing us to other expedients. ☆ Our next effort was counter-mining. From the ditches of all the threatened works counter-mines were started on the night of the 13th of June. The Third Louisiana redan was located on a very narrow ridge and had no ditch. The counter-mines for it were therefore started from within by first sinking a vertical shaft, with the intention of working out by an inclined gallery under the enemy's sap. Before this work was completed the Federal sappers succeeded in getting under the salient of the redan, and on the 25th they exploded a small mine, but the charge was too small to do much damage. Nevertheless, it tore off the vortex of the redan, and made what the Federals thought was a practicable breach. Into it they poured in strong force as soon as the explosion had expended itself. But they were met by a deadly volley from our men posted behind the retrenchment prepared for this emergency, and after heavy loss were compelled to retire. Six of our counter-miners were buried by this explosion.

On the same day we exploded two of our counter-mines and completely destroyed the enemy's sap-rollers, filled up their saps, and forced them to abandon a parallel very close to our line. Two days later we exploded another mine prematurely, without injury to the enemy, as they had not approached as near our works as we supposed. It was very difficult to determine distances under

ground, where we could hear the enemy's sappers picking, picking, picking, so very distinctly that it hardly seemed possible for them to be more than a few feet distant, when in reality they were many yards away.

On the 29th of June the enemy had succeeded in getting close up to the parapet of the Third Louisiana redan. We rolled some of their unexploded 13-inch shells down upon them and annoyed them so much as to force them to stop operations. At night they protected themselves against this method of attack by erecting a screen in front of their sap. This screen was made of heavy timbers, which even the shells could not move. I finally determined to try the effect of a barrel of powder. One containing 125 pounds was obtained, a time-fuse set to fifteen seconds was placed in the bung-hole, was touched off by myself with a live coal, and the barrel was rolled over the parapet by two of our sappers. The barrel went true to its destination and exploded with terrific force. Timbers, gabions, and fascines were hurled into the air in all directions and the sappers once more were compelled to retire. They renewed their operations, however, at night, and in a few days succeeded in establishing their mine under the redan, which they exploded at 1:30 o'clock P. M. on the 1st of July. The charge was enormous — one and a quarter tons, as I subsequently learned from the Federal engineer. The crater made was about twenty feet deep and fifty feet in diameter. The redan was virtually destroyed, and the explosive effect extended back far enough to make a breach of nearly twenty feet width in the retrenchment across the gorge of the work. We expected an assault, but previous experience had made the enemy cautious. Instead, they opened upon the work a most terrific fire from everything that could be brought to bear upon it. Only a few minutes before the explosion I had been down in our counter-mine and had left seven men there, only one of whom was ever seen again; he, a negro, was blown over into the Federal lines but not seriously hurt [see p. 527]. The next thing for us to do was to stop the breach in our retrenchment. This we first tried to accomplish by heaving dirt into the breach with shovels from the two sides, but the earth was swept away by the storm of missiles faster than it could be placed in position. We then tried sand-bags, but they, too, were torn to shreds and scattered. Finally I sent for some tent flies and wagon covers, and with these great rolls of earth were prepared under cover and pushed into place, until at last we had something between us and the deadly hail of shot and shell and minie-balls. Playing into that narrow breach for nearly six hours were 2 9-inch Dahlgren guns, a battery of large Parrotts, 1 or more batteries of field-guns, a Cohorn mortar, and the deadliest fire of musketry ever witnessed by any of us there present. We stopped the breach, but lost in killed and wounded nearly one hundred men by the explosion and the subsequent fusillade. This was really the last

☆ I think this may be the origin of General Grant's notion that we had explosive bullets. I certainly never heard of anything of the sort, and most surely would

have made some use of them if we had had them in circumventing the Federal engineers. — S. H. L. [See statement of General Grant, p. 522.]

stirring incident of the siege. On the 2d of July we exploded one of our mines somewhat prematurely, and we had ready for explosion 11 others, containing from 100 to 125 pounds of powder, and extending at a depth of 6 to 9 feet for a distance of from 18 to 20 feet in front of our works. The fuses were set and everything was primed and ready for the approach of the Federal sappers, but on the 3d of July the flag of truce stopped all operations on both sides, and the efficiency of our preparations was not put to the test.

The Federal engineers had similar preparations made for our destruction at several points. Their men had gradually closed up to our lines so that at some portions, for a hundred yards or more, the thickness of our parapet was all that separated us. Fighting by hand-grenades was all that was possible at such close quarters. As the Federals had the hand-grenades and we had none, we obtained our supply by using such of theirs as failed to explode, or by catching them as they came over the parapet and hurling them back.

The causes that led to the capitulation are well known. We had been from the beginning short of ammunition, and continued so throughout in spite of the daring exploits of Lamar Fontaine, Captain E. J. Sanders, and Courier Walker, who floated down the river on logs and brought, respectively, 18,000, 20,000, and 200,000 caps. We were short of provisions, so that our men had been on quarter rations for days before the close of the siege; had eaten mule meat, and rats, and young shoots of cane, with the relish of epicures dining on the finest delicacies of the table. We were so short-handed that no man within the lines had ever been off duty more than a small part of each day; and in response to inquiries of the lieutenant-general commanding, every general officer and colonel had reported his men as physically exhausted and unfit for any duty but simply standing in the trenches and firing. Our lines were badly battered, many of our guns were dismounted, and the Federal forces were within less than a minute of our defenses, so that a single dash could have precipitated them upon us in overwhelming numbers. All of these facts were brought out in the council of war on the night of the 2d of July. After that General Pemberton said he had lost all hopes of being relieved by General Johnston; he had considered every possible plan of relieving ourselves, and to his mind there were but two alternatives—either to surrender while we still had ammunition enough left to give us the right to demand terms, or to sell our lives as dearly as possible in what he knew must be a hopeless effort to cut our way through the Federal lines. He then asked each officer present to give his vote on the question, *surrender or not?* Beginning with

the junior officer present, all voted to surrender but two,—Brigadier-General S. D. Lee and Brigadier-General Baldwin,—and these had no reasons to offer. After all had voted General Pemberton said: "Well, gentlemen, I have heard your votes and I agree with your almost unanimous decision, though my own preference would be to put myself at the head of my troops and make a desperate effort to cut our way through the enemy. That is my only hope of saving myself from shame and disgrace. Far better would it be for me to die at the head of my army, even in a vain effort to force the enemy's lines, than to surrender it and live and meet the obloquy which I know will be heaped upon me. But my duty is to sacrifice myself to save the army which has so nobly done its duty to defend Vicksburg. I therefore concur with you and shall offer to surrender this army on the 4th of July." Some objection was made to the day, but General Pemberton said: "I am a Northern man; I know my people; I know their peculiar weaknesses and their national vanity; I know we can get better terms from them on the 4th of July than any other day of the year. † We must sacrifice our pride to these considerations." And thus the surrender was brought about.


During the negotiations we noticed that General Grant and Admiral Porter were communicating with each other by signals from a tall tower on land and a mast-head on Porter's ship. Our signal-service men had long before worked out the Federal code on the principle of Poe's "Gold Bug," and translated the messages as soon as sent. We knew that General Grant was anxious to take us all as prisoners to the Northern prison-pens. We also knew that Porter said that he did not have sufficient transportation to carry us, and that in his judgment it would be far better to parole us and use the fleet in sending the Federal troops to Port Hudson and other points where they were needed. This helped to make General Pemberton more bold and persistent in his demands, and finally enabled him to obtain virtually the terms of his original proposition.

A few minutes after the Federal soldiers marched in, the soldiers of the two armies were fraternizing and swapping yarns over the incidents of the long siege. One Federal soldier seeing me on my little white pony, which I had ridden every day to and from and along the lines, sang out as he passed: "See here, Mister,—you man on the little white horse! Danged if you ain't the hardest feller to hit I ever saw; I've shot at you more'n a hundred times!"

General Grant says there was no cheering by the Federal troops. My recollection is that on our right a hearty cheer was given by one Federal division "for the gallant defenders of Vicksburg!"

† Being constantly at headquarters I was cognizant of every step in the proceedings. I went with General M. L. Smith to General Grant's headquarters with one of the messages, and was present at the final council of war.—S. H. L.

† General Pemberton's report repeats this statement; but General Grant has pointed out [see p. 315] that but for the unexpected delays in the negotiations, begun at 10 A. M. on the 3d of July, the surrender would have taken place on that day instead of on the 4th.—EDITORS.



VICKSBURG FROM THE NORTH — AFTER THE SURRENDER. FROM A SKETCH MADE AT THE TIME.

THE VICKSBURG CAMPAIGN.†


BY ULYSSES S. GRANT, GENERAL, U. S. A.

IT is generally regarded as an axiom in war that all great armies moving in an enemy's country should start from a base of supplies, which should be fortified and guarded, and to which the army is to fall back in case of disaster. The first movement looking to Vicksburg and the force defending it as an objective was begun early in November, 1862, and conformed to this axiom. [See map, p. 442.] It followed the line of the Mississippi Central Railroad, with Columbus, Kentucky, as a base, and soon after it started, a coöperating column was moved down the Mississippi River on transports, with Memphis as its base. Both these movements failing, the entire Army of the Tennessee was transferred to the neighborhood of Vicksburg, and landed on the opposite or western bank of the river at Milliken's Bend. The Mississippi flows through a low alluvial bottom many miles in width, and is very tortuous in its course, running to all points of the compass, sometimes within a few miles. This valley is bounded on the east side by a range of high land rising in some places more than two hundred feet above the bottom. At points the river runs up to the bluffs, washing their base. Vicksburg is built on the first high land on the eastern bank below Memphis, and four hundred miles from that place by the windings of the river.

The winter of 1862-63 was unprecedented for continuous high water in the Mississippi, and months were spent in ineffectual efforts to reach high land above Vicksburg from which we could operate against that stronghold, and in making artificial waterways through which a fleet might pass, avoiding the batteries to the south of the town, in case the other efforts should fail.


In early April, 1863, the waters of the Mississippi having receded sufficiently to make it possible to march an army across the peninsula opposite

† "Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant." Copyright, 1884, by U. S. Grant.



FROM GENERAL BADEAU'S "MILITARY HISTORY OF ULYSSES S. GRANT": D. APPLETON & CO., N. Y.

Vicksburg, I determined to adopt this course, and moved my advance to a point below the town. It was necessary, however, to have transports below, both for the purpose of ferrying troops over the river and to carry supplies. These had necessarily to run the batteries. Under the direction of Admiral Porter this was successfully done. On the 29th, Grand Gulf, the first bluff



FUNERAL ON THE LEVEE AT THE DUCKPORT CANAL, APRIL, 1863. FROM A WAR-TIME SKETCH.

south of Vicksburg on the east side of the river, and about fifty miles below, was unsuccessfully attacked by the navy. The night of the same day the batteries of that place were run by the navy and transports, again under the direction of Admiral Porter, and on the following day the river was crossed by the troops, and a landing effected at Bruinsburg, some nine miles below.

I was now in the enemy's country, with a vast river and the stronghold of Vicksburg between me and my base of supplies. I had with me the Thirteenth Corps, General McClernand commanding, and two brigades of Logan's division of the Seventeenth Corps, General McPherson commanding; in all not more than twenty thousand men to commence the campaign with. These were soon reënforced by the remaining brigade of Logan's division and by Crocker's division of the Seventeenth Corps. On the 7th of May I was further reënforced by Sherman with two divisions of his, the Fifteenth Corps. My total force was then about thirty-three thousand men. The enemy occupied Grand Gulf, Vicksburg, Haynes's Bluff, and Jackson, with a force of nearly sixty thousand men. My first problem was to capture Grand Gulf to use as a base, and then if possible beat the enemy in detail outside the fortifications of Vicksburg. Jackson is fifty miles east of Vicksburg, and was connected with it by a railroad. Haynes's Bluff is eleven miles north, and on the Yazoo River, which empties into the Mississippi some miles above the town.

Bruinsburg is two miles from high ground. The bottom at that point is higher than most of the low land in the valley of the Mississippi, and a good road leads to the bluff. It was natural to expect the garrison from Grand Gulf to come out to meet us, and prevent, if they could, our reaching this



REAR-ADMIRAL PORTER'S FLOTILLA PASSING THE VICKSBURG BATTERIES, NIGHT OF APRIL 16, 1863, THE FLAG-SHIP "BENTON" LEADING, FOLLOWED BY THE "LOUISVILLE," "LAFAYETTE," "GENERAL PRICE," "MOUND CITY," "PITTSBURG," "CARONDELET," AND "TUSCUMBIA"; AND THE TRANSPORTS "HENRY CLAY," "FOREST QUEEN," AND "SILVER WAVE." FROM A WAR-TIME SKETCH.

solid base. Bayou Pierre enters the Mississippi just above Bruinsburg; and as it is a navigable stream, and was high at the time, in order to intercept us they had to go by Port Gibson, the nearest point where there was a bridge to cross upon. This more than doubled the distance from Grand Gulf to the high land back of Bruinsburg. No time was to be lost in securing this foothold. Our transportation was not sufficient to move all the army across the river at one trip or even two. But the landing of the Thirteenth Corps and one division of the Seventeenth was effected during the day, April 30th, and early evening. McClernand was advanced as soon as ammunition and two days' rations (to last five) could be issued to his men. The bluffs were reached an hour before sunset, and McClernand was pushed on, hoping to reach Port Gibson and save the bridge spanning the Bayou Pierre before the enemy could get there; for crossing a stream in the presence of an enemy is always difficult. Port Gibson, too, is the starting-point of roads to Grand Gulf, Vicksburg, and Jackson.

McClernand's advance met the enemy about five miles south of Port Gibson at Thompson's plantation. There was some firing during the night, but nothing rising to the dignity of a battle until daylight. The enemy had taken a strong natural position with most of the Grand Gulf garrison, numbering about seven or eight thousand men, under General Bowen. His hope was to hold me in check until reënforcements under Loring could reach him from Vicksburg; but Loring did not come in time to render much assistance

south of Port Gibson. Two brigades of McPherson's corps followed McClelland as fast as rations and ammunition could be issued, and were ready to take position upon the battle-field whenever the Thirteenth Corps could be got out of the way.

The country in this part of Mississippi stands on edge, as it were, the roads running along the ridges except when they occasionally pass from one ridge to another. Where there are no clearings, the sides of the hills are covered with a very heavy growth of timber, and with undergrowth, and the ravines are filled with vines and canebrakes, almost impenetrable. This makes it easy for an inferior force to delay, if not defeat, a far superior one.


Near the point selected by Bowen to defend, the road to Port Gibson divides, taking two ridges, which do not diverge more than a mile or two at the widest point. These roads unite just outside the town. This made it necessary for McClelland to divide his force. It was not only divided, but it was separated by a deep ravine of the character above described. One flank could not reinforce the other except by marching back to the junction of the roads. McClelland put the divisions of Hovey, Carr, and A. J. Smith upon the right-hand branch, and Osterhaus on the left. I was on the field by 10 A. M., and inspected both flanks in person. On the right the enemy, if not being pressed back, was at least not repulsing our advance. On the left, however, Osterhaus was not faring so well. He had been repulsed, with some loss. As soon as the road could be cleared of McClelland's troops I ordered up McPherson, who was close upon the rear of the Thirteenth Corps with two brigades of Logan's division. This was about noon. I ordered him to send one brigade (General John E. Smith's was selected) to support Osterhaus, and



REAR-ADMIRAL PORTER'S FLOTILLA ARRIVING BELOW VICKSBURG ON THE NIGHT OF APRIL 16, 1863.—IN THE FOREGROUND GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN GOING IN A YAWL TO THE FLAG-SHIP "BENTON."

to move to the left and flank the enemy out of his position. This movement carried the brigade over a deep ravine to a third ridge, and when Smith's troops were seen well through the ravine Osterhaus was directed to renew his front attack. It was successful and unattended by heavy loss. The enemy was sent in full retreat on their right, and their left followed before sunset.

While the movement to our left was going on, McClernand, who was with his right flank, sent me frequent requests for reënforcements, although the force with him was not being pressed. I had been upon the ground, and knew it did not admit of his engaging all the men he had. We followed up our victory until night overtook us, about two miles from Port Gibson; then the troops went into bivouac for the night.



MAJOR-GENERAL WILLIAM W. LORING, C. S. A.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

We started next morning [May 2d] for Port Gibson as soon as it was light enough to see the road. We were soon in the town, and I was delighted to find that the enemy had not stopped to contest our crossing further at the bridge, which he had burned. The troops were set to work at once to construct a bridge across the South Fork of the Bayou Pierre. At this time the water was high, and the current

rapid. What might be called a raft-bridge was soon constructed from material obtained from wooden buildings, stables, fences, etc., which sufficed for carrying the whole army over safely. Colonel James H. Wilson, a member of my staff, planned and superintended the construction of this bridge, going into the water and working as hard as any one engaged. Officers and men generally joined in this work. When it was finished the army crossed, and marched eight miles beyond to the North Fork that day. One brigade of Logan's division was sent down the stream to occupy the attention of a rebel battery which had been left behind, with infantry supports, to prevent our repairing the burnt railroad bridge. Two of his brigades were sent up the bayou to find a crossing, and to reach the North Fork to repair the bridge there. The enemy soon left when he found we were building a bridge elsewhere. Before leaving Port Gibson we were reënforced by Crocker's division, McPherson's corps, which had crossed the Mississippi at Bruinsburg and come up without stopping, except to get two days' rations. McPherson still had one division west of the Mississippi River guarding the road from Milliken's Bend to the river below until Sherman's command should relieve it.

When the movement from Bruinsburg commenced we were without a wagon-train. The train, still west of the Mississippi, was carried around,

with proper escort, by a circuitous route from Milliken's Bend to Hard Times, seventy or more miles below, and did not get up for some days after the battle of Port Gibson. My own horses, headquarters' transportation, servants, mess-chest, and everything except what I had on, were with this train. General A. J. Smith happened to have an extra horse at Bruinsburg, which I borrowed, with a saddle-tree without upholstering further than stirrups. I had no other for nearly a week.

It was necessary to have transportation for ammunition. Provisions could be taken from the country; but all the ammunition that can be carried on the person is soon exhausted when there is much fighting. I directed therefore, immediately on landing, that all the vehicles and draught animals, whether horses, mules, or oxen, in the vicinity should be collected and loaded to their capacity with ammunition. Quite a train was collected during the 30th, and a motley train it was. In it could be found fine carriages, loaded nearly to the tops with boxes of cartridges that had been pitched in promiscuously, drawn by mules with plow-harness, straw-collars, rope lines, etc.; long-coupled wagons, with racks for carrying cotton bales, drawn by oxen, and everything that could be found in the way of transportation on a plantation, either for use or pleasure. The making out of provision returns was stopped for the time. No formalities were to retard our progress until a position was secured, when time could be spared to observe them.†

During the night of the 2d of May the bridge over the North Fork was repaired, and the troops commenced crossing at 5 the next morning. Before the leading brigade was over, it was fired upon by the enemy from a commanding position; but they were soon driven off. It was evident that the enemy was covering a retreat from Grand Gulf to Vicksburg. Every



MAJOR-GENERAL J. S. BOWEN, C. S. A.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

† "It was at Port Gibson I first heard through a Southern paper of the complete success of Colonel Benjamin H. Grierson, who was making a raid through central Mississippi [from La Grange, Tennessee, to Baton Rouge, Louisiana]. He had started from La Grange, April 17th, with three regiments of about 1700 men. On the 21st he had detached Colonel Hatch with one regiment to destroy the railroad between Columbus and Macon and then return to La Grange. Hatch had a sharp

fight with the enemy at Columbus and retreated along the railroad, destroying it at Okolona and Tupelo, and arriving in La Grange April 26th. Grierson continued his movement with about 1000 men, breaking the Vicksburg and Meridian railroad and the New Orleans and Jackson railroad, arriving at Baton Rouge May 2d. This raid was of great importance, for Grierson had attracted the attention of the enemy from the main movement against Vicksburg."—From "Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant."

commanding position from this (Grindstone) crossing to Hankinson's Ferry, over the Big Black, was occupied by the retreating foe to delay our progress. McPherson, however, reached Hankinson's Ferry before night, seized the ferry-boat, and sent a detachment of his command across and several



MAJOR-GENERAL ANDREW J. SMITH. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

miles north on the road to Vicksburg. When the junction of the road going to Vicksburg with the road from Grand Gulf to Raymond and Jackson was reached, Logan, with his division, was turned to the left toward Grand Gulf. I went with him a short distance from this junction. McPherson had encountered the largest force yet met since the battle of Port Gibson, and had a skirmish nearly approaching a battle; but the road Logan had taken enabled him to come up on the enemy's right flank, and they soon gave way. McPherson was ordered to hold Hankinson's Ferry, and the road back to Willow Springs, with one division; General McClernand who was now in

the rear was to join in this, as well as to guard the line back down the bayou. I did not want to take the chances of having an enemy lurking in our rear.

On the way from the junction to Grand Gulf, where the road comes into the one from Vicksburg to the same place, six or seven miles out, I learned that the last of the enemy had retreated past that place on their way to Vicksburg. I left Logan to make the proper disposition of his troops for the night, while I rode into the town with an escort of about twenty cavalry. Admiral Porter had already arrived with his fleet. The enemy had abandoned his heavy guns and evacuated the place.

When I reached Grand Gulf, May 3d, I had not been with my baggage since the 27th of April, and, consequently, had had no change of underclothing, no meal except such as I could pick up sometimes at other headquarters, and no tent to cover me. The first thing I did was to get a bath, borrow some fresh underclothing from one of the naval officers, and get a good meal on the flag-ship. Then I wrote letters to the general-in-chief informing him of our present position, dispatches to be telegraphed from Cairo, orders to General Sullivan, commanding above Vicksburg, and gave orders to all my corps commanders. About 12 o'clock at night I was through my work,

and started for Hankinson's Ferry, arriving there before daylight. While at Grand Gulf I heard from Banks, who was on the Red River,[‡] and he said that he could not be at Port Hudson before the 10th of May, and then with only fifteen thousand men. Up to this time my intention had been to secure Grand Gulf as a base of supplies, detach McClelland's corps to Banks, and coöperate with him in the reduction of Port Hudson.

The news from Banks forced upon me a different plan of campaign from the one intended. To wait for his coöperation would have detained me at least a month. The reënforcements would not have reached 10,000 men, after deducting casualties and necessary river-guards, at all high points close to the river, for over 300 miles. The enemy would have strengthened his position and been reënforced by more men than Banks could have brought. I therefore determined to move independently of Banks, cut loose from my base, destroy the rebel force in rear of Vicksburg, and invest or capture the city.

Grand Gulf was accordingly given up as a base, and the authorities at Washington were notified. I knew well that Halleck's caution would lead him to disapprove this course; but it was the only one that gave any chance of success. The time it would take to communicate with Washington and get a reply would be so great that I could not be interfered with until it was demonstrated whether my plan was practicable. Even Sherman, who afterward ignored bases of supplies other than what were afforded by the country while marching through four States of the Confederacy, with an army more than twice as large as mine at this time, wrote me from Hankinson's Ferry, advising me of the impossibility of supplying our army over a single road. He urged me to "stop all troops till your army is partially supplied with wagons, and then act as quick as possible; for this road will be jammed, as sure as life." To this I replied: "I do not calculate upon the possibility of supplying the army with full rations from Grand Gulf. I know it will be impossible without constructing additional roads. What I do expect is to get up what rations of hard bread, coffee, and salt we can, and make the country furnish the balance." We started from Bruinsburg with an average of about two days' rations, and received no more from our own supplies for some days; abundance was found in the meantime. A delay would give the enemy time to reënforce and fortify.

McClelland's and McPherson's commands were kept substantially as they were on the night of the 2d, awaiting supplies to give them three days' rations in haversacks. Beef, mutton, poultry, and forage were found in abundance. Quite a quantity of bacon and molasses was also secured from the country, but bread and coffee could not be secured in quantity sufficient for all the men. Every plantation, however, had a run of stone, propelled by mule-power, to grind corn for the owners and their slaves. All these were kept running while we were stopping day and night, and when we were marching, during the night, at all plantations covered by the troops. But the product was taken by the troops nearest by; so that the majority of the command

[‡] Banks reached Alexandria on the 7th of May, and was acting in concert with Farragut's and Porter's fleet to control the waters of Red River.—EDITORS.

was destined to go without bread until a new base was established on the Yazoo, above Vicksburg.

While the troops were awaiting the arrival of rations, I ordered reconnoissances made by McClernand and McPherson, with a view of leading the enemy to believe that we intended to cross the Big Black and attack the city at once.

On the 6th Sherman arrived at Grand Gulf, and crossed his command that night and the next day. Three days' rations had been brought up from

Grand Gulf for the advanced troops, and were issued. Orders were given for a forward movement the next day. Sherman was directed to order up Blair, who had been left behind to guard the road from Milliken's Bend to Hard Times with two brigades.

The quartermaster at Young's Point was ordered to send 200 wagons with General Blair, and the commissary was to load them with hard bread, coffee, sugar, salt, and 100,000 pounds of salt meat.

On the 3d Hurlbut, who had been left at Memphis, was ordered to send four regiments from his command to Milliken's Bend to relieve Blair's division, and on



MAJOR-GENERAL RICHARD J. OGLESBY. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

the 5th he was ordered to send Lauman's division in addition, the latter to join the army in the field. The four regiments were to be taken from troops near the river, so that there would be no delay.

During the night of the 6th McPherson drew in his troops north of the Big Black and was off at an early hour on the road to Jackson, via Rocky Springs, Utica, and Raymond. That night he and McClernand were both at Rocky Springs, ten miles from Hankinson's Ferry. McPherson remained there during the 8th, while McClernand moved to Big Sandy and Sherman marched from Grand Gulf to Hankinson's Ferry. The 8th McPherson moved to a point within a few miles of Utica; McClernand and Sherman remained where they were. On the 10th McPherson moved to Utica; Sherman to Big Sandy,—McClernand was still at Big Sandy. The 11th McClernand was at Five Mile Creek; Sherman at Auburn; McPherson five miles advanced from Utica. May 12th McClernand was at Fourteen Mile Creek; Sherman at Fourteen Mile Creek; McPherson at Raymond, after a battle. ¶

¶ "After McPherson crossed the Big Black at Hankinson's Ferry, Vicksburg could have been approached and besieged by the south side. It is not probable, however, that Pemberton would have

permitted a close besiegement. The broken nature of the ground would have enabled him to hold a strong defensible line from the river south of the city to the Big Black, retaining possession of the

Up to this point our movements had been made without serious opposition. My line was now nearly parallel with the Jackson and Vicksburg Railroad, and about seven miles south of it. The right was at Raymond, eighteen miles from Jackson, McPherson commanding; Sherman in the center on Fourteen Mile Creek, his advance thrown across; McClelland to the left, also on Fourteen Mile Creek, advance across, and his pickets within two miles of Edwards's Station, where the enemy had concentrated a considerable force, and where they undoubtedly expected us to attack. McClelland's left was on the Big Black. In all our moves, up to this time, the left had hugged the Big Black closely, and all the ferries had been guarded to prevent the enemy throwing a force on our rear.

McPherson encountered the enemy, 5000 strong, with 2 batteries, under General Gregg, about 2 miles out of Raymond. This was about 2 P. M. Logan was in advance with one of his brigades. He deployed and moved up to engage the enemy. McPherson ordered the road in rear to be cleared of wagons, and the balance of Logan's division, and Crocker's, which was still farther in rear, to come forward with all dispatch. The order was obeyed with alacrity. Logan got his division in position for assault before Crocker could get up, and attacked with vigor, carrying the enemy's position easily, sending Gregg flying from the field, not to appear against our front again until we met at Jackson.

In this battle McPherson lost 66 killed, 339 wounded, and 37 missing,—nearly or quite all from Logan's division. The enemy's loss was 100 killed, 305 wounded, besides 415 taken prisoners.

I regarded Logan and Crocker as being as competent division commanders as could be found in or out of the army, and both equal to a much higher command. Crocker, however, was dying of consumption when he volunteered. His weak condition never put him on the sick-report when there was a battle in prospect, as long as he could keep on his feet. He died not long after the close of the Rebellion.

When the news reached me of McPherson's victory at Raymond about sundown, my position was with Sherman. I decided at once to turn the whole column toward Jackson and capture that place without delay. \

railroad back to that point. It was my plan, therefore, to get to the railroad east of Vicksburg, and approach from that direction. Accordingly McPherson's troops that had crossed the Big Black were withdrawn, and the movement east, to Jackson, commenced.

"As has been stated before, the country is very much broken, and the roads generally confined to the tops of the hills. The troops were moved one (sometimes two) corps at a time, to reach designated points out parallel to the railroad, and only from six to ten miles from it. McClelland's corps was kept with its left flank on the Big Black guarding all the crossings. Fourteen Mile Creek, a stream substantially parallel with the railroad, was reached, and crossings effected by McClelland and Sherman with slight loss. McPherson was to the right of Sherman, extending to Raymond. The

cavalry was used in this advance in reconnoitering to find the roads; to cover our advances, and to find the most practicable routes from one command to another, so they could support each other in case of an attack. In making this move I estimated Pemberton's movable force at Vicksburg at about eighteen thousand men, with smaller forces at Haynes's Bluff and Jackson. It would not be possible for Pemberton to attack me with all his troops at one place, and I determined to throw my army between his and fight him in detail. This was done with success, but I found afterward that I had entirely under-estimated Pemberton's strength."—From "Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant." C. L. Webster & Co.

\ "Pemberton was now on my left, with, as I supposed, about 18,000 men; in fact, as I learned afterward, with nearly 50,000. A force was also

Accordingly, all previous orders given during the day for movements on the 13th were annulled by new ones. McPherson was ordered at daylight to move on Clinton, ten miles from Jackson. Sherman was notified of my determination to capture Jackson and work from there westward. He was ordered to start at four in the morning and march to Raymond. McClelland was ordered to march with three divisions by Dillon's to Raymond. One was left to guard the crossing of the Big Black. On the 10th I received a letter from Banks, on the Red River, asking reinforcements. Porter had gone to his assistance, with a part of his fleet, on the 3d, and I now wrote to him describing my position and declining to send any troops. I looked upon side movements, as long as the enemy held Port Hudson and Vicksburg, as a waste of time and material. General Joseph E. Johnston arrived at Jackson in the night of the 13th, from Tennessee, and immediately assumed command of all the Confederate troops in Mississippi. I knew he was expecting reinforcements from the south and east. On the 6th I had written to General Halleck, "Information from the other side leaves me to believe the enemy are bringing forces from Tullahoma."

Up to this time my troops had been kept in supporting distances of each other as far as the nature of the country would admit. Reconnoissances were constantly made from each corps to enable them to acquaint themselves with the most practicable routes from one to another in case a union became necessary.

McPherson reached Clinton with the advance early on the 13th, and immediately set to work destroying the railroad. Sherman's advance reached Raymond before the last of McPherson's command had got out of the town. McClelland withdrew from the front of the enemy, at Edwards's Station, with much skill and without loss, and reached his position for the night in good order. On the night of the 13th McPherson was ordered to march at early dawn upon Jackson, only fifteen miles away. Sherman was given the same order; but he was to move by the direct road from Raymond to Jackson, which is south of the road McPherson was on, and does not approach within two miles of it at the point where it crossed the line of intrenchments which at that time defended the city. McClelland was ordered to move one division of his command to Clinton, one division a few miles beyond Mississippi Springs,—following Sherman's line,—and a third to Raymond. He was also directed to send his siege-guns, four in number, with the troops going by Mississippi Springs. McClelland's position was an advantageous one, in any event. With one division at Clinton, he was in position to reinforce McPherson at Jackson rapidly if it became necessary. The division beyond Mississippi Springs was equally available to reinforce Sherman. The one at

collected on my right at Jackson, the point where all the railroads communicating with Vicksburg connect. All the enemy's supplies of men and stores would come by that point. As I hoped in the end to besiege Vicksburg I must first destroy all possibility of aid. I therefore determined to move swiftly toward Jackson, destroy or drive any force in that direction, and then turn upon Pem-

berton. But by moving against Jackson I uncovered my own communication. So I finally decided to have none—to cut loose altogether from my base and move my whole force eastward. I then had no fears for my communications, and if I moved quickly enough could turn upon Pemberton before he could attack me in the rear."—From "Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant." C. L. Webster & Co.


Raymond could take either road. He still had two other divisions farther back now that Blair had come up, available within a day at Jackson. If this last command should not be wanted at Jackson, they were already one day's march from there on their way to Vicksburg, and on three different roads leading to the latter city. But the most important consideration in my mind was to have a force confronting Pemberton if he should come out to attack my rear. This I expected him to do; as shown farther on, he was directed by Johnston to make this very move.

I notified General Halleck that I should attack the State capital on the 14th. A courier carried the dispatch to Grand Gulf, through an unprotected country.

Sherman and McPherson communicated with each other during the night, and arranged to reach Jackson at the same hour. It rained in torrents during the night of the 13th and the fore part of the day of the 14th. The roads were intolerable, and in some places on Sherman's line, where the land was low, they were covered more than a foot deep with water. But the troops never murmured. By 9 o'clock Crocker, of McPherson's corps, who was now in advance, came upon the enemy's pickets and speedily drove them in upon the main body. They were outside of the intrenchments, in a strong position, and proved to be the troops that had been driven out of Raymond. Johnston had been reënforced during the night by Georgia and South Carolina regiments, so that his force amounted to eleven thousand men, and he was expecting still more.

Sherman also came upon the rebel pickets some distance out from the town, but speedily drove them in. He was now on the south and south-west of Jackson, confronting the Confederates behind their breastworks; while McPherson's right was nearly two miles north, occupying a line running north and south across the Vicksburg Railroad. Artillery was brought up and reconnoissances made preparatory to an assault. McPherson brought up Logan's division, while he deployed Crocker's for the assault. Sherman made similar dispositions on the right. By 11 A.M. both were ready to attack. Crocker moved his division forward, preceded by a strong skirmish line. These troops at once encountered the enemy's advance and drove it back on the main body, when they returned to their proper regiment, and the whole division charged, routing the enemy completely and driving him into this main line. This stand by the enemy was made more than two miles outside of his main fortifications. McPherson followed up with his command until within range of the guns of the enemy from their intrenchments, when he halted to bring his command into line, and reconnoiter to determine the next move. It was now about noon.

While this was going on, Sherman was confronting a rebel battery which enfiladed the road on which he was marching—the Mississippi Springs road—and commanded a bridge spanning the stream over which he had to pass. By detaching right and left the stream was forced, and the enemy flanked and speedily driven within the main line. This brought our whole line in front of the enemy's line of works, which was continuous on the



MAP OF THE BATTLES OF RAYMOND, JACKSON, CHAMPION'S HILL, AND BIG BLACK RIVER BRIDGE.

north, west, and south sides, from the Pearl River north of the city to the same river south. I was with Sherman. He was confronted by a sufficient force to hold us back. Appearances did not justify an assault where we were. I had directed Sherman to send a force to the right, and to reconnoiter as far as to the Pearl River. This force — Tuttle's division — not returning, I rode to the right with my staff, and soon found that the enemy had left that part of the line. Tuttle's movement or McPherson's pressure had, no doubt, led Johnston to order a retreat, leaving only the men at the guns to retard us while he was getting away. Tuttle had seen this, and, passing through the lines without resistance, came up in rear of the artillery confronting Sherman, and captured them, with ten pieces of artillery. I rode immediately to the State House, where I was soon followed by Sherman. About the same time McPherson discovered that the

enemy was leaving his front, and advanced Crocker, who was so close upon the enemy that they could not move their guns or destroy them. He captured seven guns, and, moving on, hoisted the National flag over the Confederate capital of Mississippi. Stevenson's brigade was sent to cut off the Confederate retreat, but was too late or not expeditious enough.

Our loss in this engagement was: McPherson, 36 killed, 229 wounded, 3 missing; Sherman, 6 killed, 22 wounded, and 4 missing. The enemy lost 845 killed, wounded, and captured. Seventeen guns fell into our hands, and the enemy destroyed by fire their storehouses, containing a large amount of commissary stores. On this day Blair reached New Auburn and joined McClermand's Fourth Division. He had with him two hundred wagons loaded with rations, the only commissary supplies received during the entire campaign. I slept that night in the room that Johnston had occupied the night before.

About 4 in the afternoon I sent for the corps commanders, and directed the disposition to be made of their troops. Sherman was to remain in Jackson until he destroyed that place as a railroad center and manufacturing city of military supplies. He did the work most effectually. Sherman and I went together into a manufactory which had not ceased work on account of the battle, nor for the entrance of Yankee troops. Our presence did not seem to attract the attention of either the manager, or of the operatives (most of whom were girls). We looked on awhile to see the tent-cloth which they were making roll out of the looms, with C. S. A. woven in each bolt. There was an immense amount of cotton in bales stacked outside. Finally I told Sherman I thought they had done work enough. The operatives were told they might leave and take with them what cloth they could carry. In a few minutes cotton and factory were in a blaze. The proprietor visited Washington, while I was President, to get his pay for this property, claiming that it was private. He asked me to give him a statement of the fact that his property had been destroyed by National troops, so that he might use it with Congress where he was pressing, or proposed to press, his claim. I declined.

On the night of the 13th Johnston sent the following dispatch to Pemberton at Edwards's Station:

"I have lately arrived, and learn that Major-General Sherman is between us with four divisions at Clinton. It is important to establish communication, that you may be reënforced. If practicable, come up in his rear at once. To beat such a detachment would be of immense value. All the troops you can quickly assemble should be brought. Time is all-important."

This dispatch was sent in triplicate by different messengers. One of the messengers happened to be a loyal man, who had been expelled from Memphis some months before, by Hurlbut, for uttering disloyal and threatening sentiments. There was a good deal of parade about this expulsion, ostensibly as a warning to those who entertained the sentiments he expressed; but Hurlbut and the expelled man understood each other. He delivered his copy of Johnston's dispatch to McPherson, who forwarded it to me.

Receiving this dispatch on the 14th, I ordered McPherson to move promptly in the morning back to Bolton, the nearest point where Johnston could reach

the road. Bolton is about twenty miles west of Jackson. I also informed McClernand of the capture of Jackson, and sent him the following orders:

"It is evidently the design of the enemy to get north of us and cross the Big Black, and beat us into Vicksburg. We must not allow them to do this. Turn all your forces toward Bolton Station, and make all dispatch in getting there. Move troops by the most direct road from wherever they may be on the receipt of this order."

And to Blair I wrote:

"Their design is evidently to cross the Big Black and pass down the peninsula between the Big Black and Yazoo rivers. We must beat them. Turn your troops immediately to Bolton; take all the trains with you. Smith's division, and any other troops now with you, will go to the same place. If practicable, take parallel roads, so as to divide your troops and train."

Johnston stopped on the Canton road, only six miles north of Jackson, the night of the 14th. He sent from there to Pemberton dispatches announcing the loss of Jackson, and the following dispatch [given here in part.—EDITORS]:

"Can he [Grant] supply himself from the Mississippi? Can you not cut him off from it, and above all, should he be compelled to fall back for want of supplies, beat him? As soon as the reinforcements are all up, they must be united to the rest of the army. I am anxious to see a force assembled that may be able to inflict a heavy blow upon the enemy."

The concentration of my troops was easy, considering the character of the country. McPherson moved along the road parallel with and near the railroad. Of McClernand's command one division (Hovey's) was on the road McPherson had to take, but with a start of four miles; one (Osterhaus's) was at Raymond, on a converging road that intersected the other near Champion's Hill; one (Carr's) had to pass over the same road with Osterhaus's, but, being back at Mississippi Springs, would not be detained thereby; the fourth (Smith's, with Blair's division) was near Auburn, with a different road to pass over. McClernand faced about and moved promptly. His cavalry from Raymond seized Bolton by half-past 9 in the morning, driving out the enemy's pickets and capturing several men.

The night of the 15th Hovey was at Bolton; Carr and Osterhaus were about three miles south, but abreast, facing west; Smith was north of Raymond, with Blair in his rear.

McPherson's command, with Logan in front, had marched at 7 o'clock, and by 4 reached Hovey and went into camp. Crocker bivouacked just in Hovey's rear on the Clinton road. Sherman, with two divisions, was in Jackson, completing the destruction of roads, bridges, and military factories. I rode in person out to Clinton. On my arrival I ordered McClernand to move early in the morning on Edwards's Station, cautioning him to watch for the enemy, and not to bring on an engagement unless he felt very certain of success.

I naturally expected that Pemberton would endeavor to obey the orders of his superior, which I have shown were to attack us at Clinton. This, indeed, I knew he could not do, but I felt sure he would make the attempt to reach that point. It turned out, however, that he had decided his superior's plans were impracticable, and consequently determined to move south from Edwards's Station, and get between me and my base. I, however, had no

base, having abandoned it more than a week before. On the 15th Pemberton had actually marched south from Edwards's Station; but the rains had swollen Baker's Creek, which he had to cross, so much that he could not ford it, and the bridges were washed away. This brought him back to the Jackson road, on which there was a good bridge over Baker's Creek. Some of his troops were marching until midnight to get there. Receiving here early on the 16th a repetition of his order to join Johnston at Clinton, he concluded to obey, and sent a dispatch to his chief, informing him of the route by which he might be expected.

About 5 o'clock in the morning (16th) two men who had been employed on the Jackson and Vicksburg Railroad were brought to me. They reported that they had passed through Pemberton's army in the night, and that it was still marching east. They reported him to have 80 regiments of infantry and 10 batteries; in all about 25,000 men.

I had expected to leave Sherman at Jackson another day in order to complete his work. But, getting the above information, I sent him orders to move with all dispatch to Bolton, and to put one division, with an ammunition train, on the road at once, with directions to its commander to march with all possible speed until he came up to our rear. Within an hour after receiving this order, Steele's division was on the road. At the same time I dispatched to Blair, who was near Auburn, to move with all speed to Edwards's Station. McClernand was directed to embrace Blair in his command for the present. Blair's division was a part of the Fifteenth Army Corps (Sherman's); but as it was on its way to join its corps, it naturally struck our left first, now that we had faced about and were moving west. The Fifteenth Corps, when it got up, would be on our extreme right. McPherson was directed to get his trains out of the way of the troops, and to follow Hovey's division as closely as possible. McClernand had two roads, about three miles apart, converging at Edwards's Station, over which to march his troops. Hovey's division of his corps had the advance on a third road (the Clinton) still farther north. McClernand was directed to move Blair's and A. J. Smith's divisions by the southernmost of these roads, and Osterhaus and Carr by the middle road. Orders were to move cautiously, with skirmishers in the front to feel for the enemy. Smith's division, on the most southern road, was the first to encounter the enemy's pickets, who were speedily driven in. Osterhaus, on the middle road, hearing the firing, pushed his skirmishers forward, found the enemy's pickets, and forced them back to the main line. About the same time Hovey encountered the enemy on the northern or direct wagon road from Jackson to Vicksburg. McPherson was hastening up to join Hovey, but was embarrassed by Hovey's trains occupying the roads. I was still back at Clinton. McPherson sent me word of the situation and expressed the wish that I was up. By 7:30 I was on the road and proceeded rapidly to the front, ordering all trains that were in front of troops off the road. When I arrived Hovey's skirmishing amounted almost to a battle.

McClernand was in person on the middle road, and had a shorter distance to march to reach the enemy's position than McPherson. I sent him word by

a staff-officer to push forward and attack. These orders were repeated several times without apparently expediting McClelland's advance.

Champion's Hill, where Pemberton had chosen his position to receive us, whether taken by accident or design, was well selected. It is one of the highest points in that section, and commanded all the ground in range. On the east side of the ridge, which is quite precipitous, is a ravine, running first north, then westerly, terminating at Baker's Creek. It was grown up thickly with large trees and undergrowth, making it difficult to penetrate with troops, even when not defended. The ridge occupied by the enemy terminated abruptly where the ravine turns westerly. The left of the enemy occupied the north end of this ridge. The Bolton and Edwards's Station road turns almost due south at this point, and ascends the ridge, which it follows for about a mile, then, turning west, descends by a gentle declivity to Baker's Creek, nearly a mile away. On the west side the slope of the ridge is gradual, and is cultivated from near the summit to the creek. There was, when we were there, a narrow belt of timber near the summit, west of the road.

From Raymond there is a direct road to Edwards's Station, some three miles west of Champion's Hill. There is one also to Bolton. From this latter road there is still another, leaving it about three and a half miles before reaching Bolton, and leading direct to the same station. It was along these two roads that three divisions of McClelland's corps, and Blair, of Sherman's, temporarily under McClelland, were moving. Hovey, of McClelland's command, was with McPherson, farther north on the road from Bolton, direct to Edwards's Station. The middle road comes into the northern road at the point where the latter turns to the west, and descends to Baker's Creek; the southern road is still several miles south and does not intersect the others until it reaches Edwards's Station. Pemberton's lines covered all these roads and faced east. Hovey's line, when it first drove in the enemy's pickets, was formed parallel to that of the enemy, and confronted his left.

By eleven o'clock the skirmishing had grown into a hard-contested battle. Hovey alone, before other troops could be got to assist him, had captured a battery of the enemy. But he was not able to hold his position, and had to abandon the artillery. McPherson brought up his troops as fast as possible — Logan in front — and posted them on the right of Hovey and across the flank of the enemy. Logan reënforced Hovey with one brigade from his division; with his other two he moved farther west to make room for Crocker, who was coming up as rapidly as the roads would admit. Hovey was still being heavily pressed, and was calling on me for more reënforcements. I ordered Crocker, who was now coming up, to send one brigade from his division. McPherson ordered two batteries to be stationed where they nearly enfiladed the enemy's line, and they did good execution.

From Logan's position now a direct forward movement would carry him over open fields in rear of the enemy and in a line parallel with them. He did make exactly this move, attacking, however, the enemy through the belt of woods covering the west slope of the hill for a short distance. Up to this

time I had kept my position near Hovey, where we were the most heavily pressed; but about noon I moved with a part of my staff by our right, around, until I came up with Logan himself. I found him near the road leading down to Baker's Creek. He was actually in command of the only road over which the enemy could retreat; Hovey, reinforced by two brigades from McPherson's command, confronted the enemy's left; Crocker, with two brigades, covered their left flank; McClelland, two hours before, had been within two and a half miles of their center with two divisions, and two divisions—Blair's and A. J. Smith's—were confronting the rebel right; Ransom, with a brigade of McArthur's division, of the Seventeenth Corps (McPherson's), had crossed the river at Grand Gulf a few days before and was coming up on their right flank. Neither Logan nor I knew that we had cut off the retreat of the enemy. Just at this juncture a messenger came from Hovey, asking for more reinforcements. There were none to spare. I then gave an order to move McPherson's command by the left flank around to Hovey. This uncovered the Confederate line of retreat, which was soon taken advantage of by the enemy. ☆

During all this time Hovey, reinforced as he was by a brigade from Logan and another from Crocker, and by Crocker gallantly coming up with two other brigades on his right, had made several assaults, the last one about the time the road was opened to the rear. The enemy fled precipitately. This was between 3 and 4 o'clock. I rode forward, or rather back, to where the middle road intersects the north road, and found the skirmishers of Carr's division just coming in. Osterhaus was farther south, and soon after came up with skirmishers advanced in like manner. Hovey's division, and McPherson's two divisions with him, had marched and fought from early dawn, and were not in the best condition to follow the retreating foe. I sent orders to Osterhaus to pursue the enemy, and to Carr, whom I saw personally, I explained the situation, and directed him to pursue vigorously as far as the Big Black, and to cross it if he could, Osterhaus to follow him. The pursuit was continued until after dark.

The battle of Champion's Hill lasted about four hours of hard fighting, preceded by two or three hours of skirmishes, some of which rose almost to the dignity of battle. Every man of Hovey's division and of McPherson's two divisions was engaged during the battle. No other part of my command was engaged at all, except that (as described before). Osterhaus's and A. J. Smith's had encountered the rebel advanced pickets as early as 7:30. Their

☆ Dr. William M. Beach of London, Ohio, sends to the editors this anecdote of General Grant:

"At the time of the Vicksburg campaign I was the Assistant Surgeon of the 78th Ohio Regiment; but I had been detailed by J. H. Boncher, Medical Director of the 17th Army Corps, as the Division Hospital Director of Logan's division. I had a regular service of men and wagons; and at the battle of Champion's Hill—when my division had been assigned to its position—I chose an abandoned farm-house and its surroundings as a proper place to establish our hospital, and immediately proceeded in its preparation. My position was in the rear of our left wing, and not far in the rear of Hovey's

right wing. About the time I was fairly ready to receive the wounded the line had advanced across an open field, and had swung to the right and front nearly a quarter of a mile. The steady roar of battle had rolled from Hovey's front by this time to that of Logan's, who was steadily advancing, and where the sound of the conflict was now simply *terrible*. Grant and his staff, coming from the left, dismounted at the front gate, within twenty feet of where I was standing. He had scarcely dismounted, when,—more clearly and distinctly hearing the fury of the contest on our right,—leisurely taking his cigar from his mouth, he turned slowly to one of his staff and said, '*Go down to Logan and tell him he is making history to-day.*'"

EDITORS.



positions were admirable for advancing upon the enemy's line. McClernand, with two divisions, was within a few miles of the battle-field long before noon, and in easy hearing. I sent him repeated orders by staff-officers fully competent to explain to him the situation. These traversed the road separating us, without escort, and directed him to push forward, but he did not come. Instead of this he sent orders to Hovey, who belonged to his corps, to join on to his right flank. Hovey was bearing the brunt of the battle at the time. To obey the order he would have had to pull out from the front of the enemy and march back as far as McClernand had to advance to get into battle, and substantially over the same ground. Of course, I did not permit Hovey to obey the order of his intermediate superior.

We had in this battle about fifteen thousand men actually engaged. This excludes those that did not get up—all of McClernand's command except Hovey. Our loss was 410 killed, 1844 wounded, and 187 missing.

“It is true, in front of McClernand there was a small force of the enemy, and posted in a good position behind a ravine, obstructing his advance; but if he had moved to the right by the

road my staff-officers had followed, the enemy must either have fallen back or been cut off.”—From “Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant.” C. L. Webster & Co.

Hovey alone lost twelve hundred killed, wounded, and missing,—one-third of his division.

Had McClelland come up with reasonable promptness, or had I known the ground as I did afterward, I cannot see how Pemberton could have escaped with any organized force. As it was he lost over 3000 killed and wounded, and about 3000 captured in battle and in pursuit. Loring's division, which was the right of Pemberton's line, was cut off from the retreating army, and never got back into Vicksburg. Pemberton himself fell back that night to the Big Black River. His troops did not stop before midnight, and many of them left before the general retreat commenced, and no doubt a good part of them returned to their homes. Logan alone captured 1300 prisoners and 11 guns. Hovey captured 300, under fire, and about 700 in all, exclusive of 500 sick and wounded, whom he paroled, thus making 1200.

McPherson joined in the advance as soon as his men could fill their cartridge-boxes, leaving one brigade to guard our wounded. The pursuit was continued as long as it was light enough to see the road. The night of the 16th of May found McPherson's command bivouacked from two to six miles west of the battle-field, along the line of the road to Vicksburg. Carr and Osterhaus were at Edwards's Station, and Blair was about three miles southeast. Hovey remained on the field where his troops had fought so bravely and bled so freely. Much war material abandoned by the enemy was picked up on the battle-field, among it thirty pieces of artillery. I pushed through the advancing column with my staff, and kept in advance until after night. Finding ourselves alone we stopped and took possession of a vacant house. As no troops came up we moved back a mile or more, until we met the head of the column just going into bivouac on the road. We had no tents, so we occupied the porch of a house which had been taken for a rebel hospital, and which was filled with wounded and dying who had been brought from the battle-field we had just left.

While a battle is raging one can see his enemy mowed down by the thousand and the ten thousand, with great composure. But after the battle these scenes are distressing, and one is naturally disposed to do as much to alleviate the suffering of an enemy as of a friend.

We were now assured of our position between Johnston and Pemberton, without the possibility of a junction of their forces. Pemberton might indeed have made a night march to the Big Black, crossed the bridge there, and, by moving north on the west side, have eluded us, and finally returned to Johnston. But this would have given us Vicksburg. It would have been his proper move, however, and the one Johnston would have made had he been in Pemberton's place. In fact, it would have been in conformity with Johnston's orders to Pemberton.

Sherman left Jackson with the last of his troops about noon on the 16th, and reached Bolton, twenty miles west, before halting. His rear-guard did not get in until 2 A. M. the 17th, but renewed their march by daylight. He paroled his prisoners at Jackson, and was forced to leave his own wounded,—in care of surgeons and attendants however. At Bolton he was informed of



GENERAL BLAIR'S DIVISION CROSSING BIG BLACK RIVER. FROM A WATER-COLOR.

our victory. He was directed to commence the march early next day, and to diverge from the road he was on, to Bridgeport, on the Big Black River, some eleven miles above where we expected to find the enemy. Blair was ordered to join him there with the pontoon train as early as possible.

This movement brought Sherman's corps together, and at a point where I hoped a crossing of the Big Black might be effected, and Sherman's corps used to flank the enemy out of his position in our front, and thus open a crossing for the remainder of the army. I informed him that I would endeavor to hold the enemy in my front while he crossed the river.

The advanced division, Carr's (McClelland's corps), resumed the pursuit at 3:30 A. M. on the 17th, followed closely by Osterhaus; McPherson bringing up the rear with his corps. As I expected, the enemy was found in position on the Big Black. The point was only six miles from that where my advance had rested for the night, and was reached at an early hour. Here the river makes a turn to the west, and has washed close up to the high land. The east side is a low bottom, sometimes overflowed at very high water, but was cleared and in cultivation. A bayou runs irregularly across this low land, the bottom of which, however, is above the surface of the Big Black at ordinary stages. When the river is full, water runs through it, converting the point of land into an island. The bayou was grown up with timber, which the enemy had felled into the ditch. All this time there was a foot or two of water in it. The rebels had constructed a parapet along the inner bank of this bayou, by using cotton bales from the plantation close by and throwing dirt over them. The whole was thoroughly commanded from the

height west of the river. At the upper end of the bayou there was a strip of uncleared land, which afforded a cover for a portion of our men. Carr's division was deployed on our right, Lawler's brigade forming his extreme right, and reaching through these woods to the river above. Osterhaus's division was deployed to the left of Carr, and covered the enemy's entire front. McPherson was in column on the road, the head close by, ready to come in whenever he could be of assistance.


While the troops were standing as here described, an officer from Banks's staff † came up and presented me with a letter from General Halleck, dated the 11th of May. It had been sent by the way of New Orleans to Banks to forward to me. It ordered me to return to Grand Gulf, and to coöperate from there with Banks, against Port Hudson, and then to return with our combined forces to besiege Vicksburg. I told the officer that the order came too late, and that Halleck would not give it then if he knew our position. The bearer of the dispatch insisted that I ought to obey the order, and was giving arguments to support his position, when I heard great cheering to the right of our line, and, looking in that direction, saw Lawler, in his shirt-sleeves, leading a charge upon the enemy. I immediately mounted my horse and rode in the direction of the charge, and saw no more of the officer who delivered the dispatch, I think not even to this day.

The assault was successful. But little resistance was made. The enemy fled from the west bank of the river, burning the bridge behind them, leaving the men and guns on the east side to fall into our hands. Many tried to escape by swimming the river. Some succeeded and some were drowned in the attempt. Eighteen guns were captured, and 1751 prisoners. Our loss was 39 killed, 237 wounded, and 3 missing. The enemy probably lost but few men except those captured and drowned. But for the successful and complete destruction of the bridge, I have but little doubt that we should have followed the enemy so closely as to prevent his occupying his defenses around Vicksburg.

As the bridge was destroyed and the river was high, new bridges had to be built. It was but little after 9 o'clock A. M. when the capture took place. As soon as work could be commenced, orders were given for the construction of three bridges. One was taken charge of by Lieutenant Peter C. Hains, of the Engineer Corps, one by General McPherson himself, and one by General Ransom, a most gallant and intelligent volunteer officer. My recollection is that Hains built a raft-bridge; McPherson a pontoon, using cotton bales in large numbers for pontoons; and that Ransom felled trees on opposite banks of the river, cutting only on one side of the tree, so that they would fall with their tops interlacing in the river, without the trees being entirely severed from their stumps. A bridge was then made with these trees to support the roadway. Lumber was taken from buildings, cotton-gins, and wherever found, for this purpose. By 8 o'clock on the morning of the 18th all three bridges were complete and the troops were crossing.

Sherman reached Bridgeport about noon of the 17th, and found Blair with

† Brigadier-General William Dwight, afterward of Banks's staff. According to Banks, Dwight reported that Grant said "he would give me 5000 men, but that I should not wait for them."—EDITORS.



FROM GENERAL BAGEAU'S "MILITARY HISTORY OF ULYSSES S. GRANT," D. APPLETON & CO., N. Y.

the pontoon train already there. A few of the enemy were intrenched on the west bank, but they made little resistance, and soon surrendered. Two divisions were crossed that night, and the third the following morning.

On the 18th I moved along the Vicksburg road in advance of the troops, and as soon as possible joined Sherman. My first anxiety was to secure a base of supplies on the Yazoo River above Vicksburg. Sherman's line of march led him to the very point on Walnut Hills occupied by the enemy the December before, when he was repulsed. Sherman was equally anxious with myself. Our impatience led us to move in advance of the column, and well up with the advanced skirmishers. There were some detached works along the crest of the hill. These were still occupied by the enemy, or else the garrison from Haynes's Bluff had not all got past on their way to Vicksburg. At all events, the bullets of the enemy whistled by thick and fast for a short time. In a few minutes Sherman had the pleasure of looking down from the spot coveted so much by him the December before,—on the ground where his command lay so helpless for offensive action [Chickasaw Bayou]. He turned to me, saying that up to this minute he had felt no positive assurance of success. This, however, he said, was the end of one of the greatest campaigns in history, and I ought to make a report of it at once. Vicksburg was not yet captured, and there was no telling what might happen before it was taken; but whether captured or not, this was a complete and successful campaign. I do not claim to quote Sherman's language, but the substance only. My reason for mentioning this incident will appear farther on.

McPherson, after crossing the Big Black, came into the Jackson and Vicksburg road which Sherman was on, but to his rear. He arrived at night near the lines of the enemy, and went into camp. McClernand moved by the direct road near the railroad to Mount Albans, and then turned to the left, and put his troops on the road from Baldwin's Ferry to Vicksburg. This brought him south of McPherson. I now had my three corps up to the works built for the defense of Vicksburg on three roads,—one to the north, one to the east, and one to the south-east of the city. By the morning of May 19th the investment was as complete as my limited number of troops would allow. Sherman was on the right and covered the high ground from where it overlooked the Yazoo as far south-east as his troops would extend. McPherson joined on to his left, and occupied ground on both sides of the Jackson road. McClernand took up the ground to his left, and extended as far toward Warrenton as he could, keeping a continuous line.

On the 19th there was constant skirmishing with the enemy while we were getting into better position. The enemy had been much demoralized by his defeats at Champion's Hill and the Big Black, and I believed would not make much effort to hold Vicksburg. Accordingly at 2 o'clock I ordered an assault. It resulted in securing more advanced positions for all our troops, where they were fully covered from the fire of the enemy.

The 20th and 21st were spent in strengthening our position, and in making roads in rear of the army, from Yazoo River, or Chickasaw Bayou. Most of the army had now been for three weeks with only five days' rations issued by

the commissary. They had an abundance of food, however, but began to feel the want of bread. I remember, that in passing around to the left of the line on the 21st, a soldier, recognizing me, said in rather a low voice, but yet so that I heard him, "*Hard-tack!*" In a moment the cry was taken up all along the line, "*Hard-tack! Hard-tack!*" I told the men nearest to me that we had been engaged ever since the arrival of the troops in building a road over which to supply them with everything they needed. The cry was instantly changed to cheers. By the night of the 21st all the troops had full rations issued to them. The bread and coffee were highly appreciated.

I now determined on a second assault. Johnston was in my rear, only fifty miles away, with an army not much inferior in numbers to the one I had with me, and I knew he was being reënforced. There was danger of his coming to the assistance of Pemberton, and, after all, he might defeat my anticipations of capturing the garrison, if, indeed, he might not prevent the capture of the city. The immediate capture of Vicksburg would save sending me the reinforcements, which were so much wanted elsewhere, and would set free the army under me to drive Johnston from the State. But the first consideration of all was: the troops believed they could carry the works in their front, and would not have worked so patiently in the trenches if they had not been allowed to try.

The attack was ordered to commence on all parts of the line at 10 o'clock A. M. on the 22d with a furious cannonading from every battery in position. All the corps commanders set their time by mine, so that all might open the engagement at the same minute. The attack was gallant, and portions of each of the three corps succeeded in getting up to the very parapets of the enemy, and in planting their battle-flags upon them; but at no place were we able to enter. General McClernand reported that he had gained the enemy's intrenchments at several points, and wanted reënforcements. I occupied a position from which I believed I could see as well as he what took place in his front, and I did not see the success he reported. But his request for reinforcements being repeated, I could not ignore it, and sent him Quinby's division of the Seventeenth Corps. Sherman and McPherson were both ordered to renew their assaults as a diversion in favor of McClernand. This last attack only served to increase our casualties, without giving any benefit whatever. As soon as it was dark, our troops that had reached the enemy's line and had been obliged to remain there for security all day, were withdrawn, and thus ended the last assault on Vicksburg.

I now determined upon a regular siege,—to "out-camp the enemy," as it were, and to incur no more losses. The experience of the 22d convinced officers and men that this was best, and they went to work on the defenses and approaches with a will. With the navy holding the river the investment of Vicksburg was complete. As long as we could hold our position, the enemy was limited in supplies of food, men, and munitions of war, to what they had on hand. These could not last always.

The crossing of troops at Bruinsburg commenced April 30th. On the 18th of May the army was in rear of Vicksburg. On the 19th, just twenty days

after the crossing, the city was completely invested and an assault had been made: five distinct battles—besides continuous skirmishing—had been fought and won by the Union forces; the capital of the State had fallen, and its arsenals, military manufactories, and everything useful for military purposes had been destroyed; an average of about 180 miles had been marched by the troops engaged; but 5 days' rations had been issued, and no forage; over 6000 prisoners had been captured, and as many more of the enemy had been killed or wounded; 27 heavy cannon and 61 field-pieces had fallen into our hands; 250 miles of the river, from Vicksburg to Port Hudson, had become ours. The Union force that had crossed the Mississippi River up to this time was less than 43,000 men. One division of these—Blair's—only arrived in time to take part in the battle of Champion's Hill, but was not engaged there; and one brigade—Ransom's—of McPherson's corps reached the field after the battle. The enemy had at Vicksburg, Grand Gulf, Jackson, and on the roads between these places, over sixty thousand men. They were in their own country, where no rear-guards were necessary. The country is admirable for defense, but difficult to conduct an offensive campaign in. All their troops had to be met. We were fortunate, to say the least, in meeting them in detail: at Port Gibson, 7000 or 8000; at Raymond, 5000; at Jackson, from 8000 to 11,000; at Champion's Hill, 25,000; at the Big Black, 4000. A part of those met at Jackson were all that were left of those encountered at Raymond. They were beaten in detail by a force smaller than their own, upon their own ground. Our loss up to this time was:


	<i>Killed.</i>	<i>Wounded.</i>	<i>Missing.</i>
Port Gibson	131	719	25
South Fork, Bayou Pierre	..	1	..
Skirmishes, May 3d	1	9	..
Fourteen Mile Creek	6	24	..
Raymond	66	339	37
Jackson	42	251	7
Champion's Hill	410	1844	187
Big Black	39	237	3
Bridgeport	..	1	..
Total [In all, 4379]	695	3425	259

Of the wounded many were but slightly so, and continued on duty. Not half of them were disabled for any length of time.†

After the unsuccessful assault on the 22d, the work of the regular siege began. Sherman occupied the right, starting from the river above Vicksburg; McPherson the center (McArthur's division now with him); and McClelland the left, holding the road south to Warrenton. Lauman's division arrived at this time and was placed on the extreme left of the line.

In the interval between the assaults of the 19th and 22d, roads had been completed from the Yazoo River and Chickasaw Bayou, around the rear of the army, to enable us to bring up supplies of food and ammunition; ground

† The revised statements (unpublished "Official Records," Vol. XXIV., part I., p. 167) show that the aggregate Union losses, including the above, from May 1st to July 4th, were: killed, 1514; wounded, 7395; captured or missing, 453,—total, 9362.—EDITORS.



HEADQUARTERS OF THE UNION SIGNAL CORPS, VICKSBURG. FROM A WAR-TIME PHOTOGRAPH.

had been selected and cleared, on which the troops were to be encamped, and tents and cooking utensils were brought up. The troops had been without these from the time of crossing the Mississippi up to this time. All was now ready for the pick and spade. With the two brigades brought up by McArthur, which reached us in rear of Vicksburg, and Lauman's division brought from Memphis, and which had just arrived, we had now about forty thousand men for the siege. Prentiss and Hurlbut were ordered to send forward every man that could be spared. Cavalry especially was wanted to watch the fords along the Big Black, and to observe Johnston. I knew that Johnston was receiving reënforcements from Bragg, who was confronting Rosecrans in Tennessee. Vicksburg was so important to the enemy that I believed he would make the most strenuous efforts to raise the siege, even at the risk of losing ground elsewhere.

My line was more than fifteen miles long, extending from Haynes's Bluff to Vicksburg, thence south to Warrenton. The line of the enemy was about seven. In addition to this, having an enemy at Canton and Jackson, in our rear, who was being constantly reënforced, we required a second line of defense facing the other way. I had not troops enough under my command to man these. But General Halleck appreciated the situation, and, without being asked, forwarded reënforcements with all possible dispatch.

The ground about Vicksburg is admirable for defense. On the north it is about two hundred feet above the Mississippi River at the highest point, and very much cut up by the washing rains; the ravines were grown up with cane and underbrush, while the sides and tops were covered with a dense forest. Farther south the ground flattens out somewhat, and was in cultivation. But here, too, it was cut by ravines and small streams. The enemy's line of defense followed the crest of a ridge, from the river north of

the city, eastward, then southerly around to the Jackson road, full three miles back of the city; thence in a south-westerly direction to the river. Deep ravines of the description given lay in front of these defenses.

As there is a succession of gullies, cut out by rains, along the side of the ridge, the line was necessarily very irregular. To follow each of these spurs with intrenchments, so as to command the slopes on either side, would have lengthened their line very much. Generally, therefore, or in many places, their line would run from near the head of one gully nearly straight to the head of another, and an outer work, triangular in shape, generally open in the rear, was thrown up on the point; with a few men in this outer work they commanded the approaches to the main line completely.

The work to be done to make our position as strong against the enemy as his was against us, was very great. The problem was also complicated by our wanting our line as near that of the enemy as possible. We had but four engineer officers with us. Captain F. E. Prime, of the Engineer Corps, was the chief, and the work at the beginning was mainly directed by him. His health soon gave out, when he was succeeded by Captain Cyrus B. Comstock, also of the Engineer Corps. To provide assistants on such a long line, I directed that all officers who had been graduated at West Point, where they had necessarily to study military engineering, should, in addition to their other duties, assist in the work.

The chief quartermaster and the chief commissary were graduates. The chief commissary, now the commissary-general of the army [General Robert Macfeely], begged off, however, saying that there was nothing in engineering that he was good for, unless he would do for a sap-roller. As soldiers require rations while working in the ditches as well as when marching and fighting, and we would be sure to lose him if he was used as a sap-roller, I let him off. The general is a large man,—weighs two hundred and twenty pounds, and is not tall.

We had no siege-guns except six 32-pounders, and there were none in the West to draw from. Admiral Porter, however, supplied us with a battery of navy-guns, of large caliber, and with these, and the field-artillery used in the campaign, the siege began. The first thing to do was to get the artillery in batteries, where they would occupy commanding positions; then establish the camps, under cover from the fire of the enemy, but as near up as possible; and then construct rifle-pits and covered ways, to connect the entire command by the shortest route. The enemy did not harass us much while we were constructing our batteries. Probably their artillery ammunition was short; and their infantry was kept down by our sharpshooters, who were always on the alert and ready to fire at a head whenever it showed itself above the rebel works.

In no place were our lines more than six hundred yards from the enemy. It was necessary, therefore, to cover our men by something more than the ordinary parapet. To give additional protection sand-bags, bullet-proof, were placed along the tops of the parapets, far enough apart to make loop-holes for musketry. On top of these, logs were put. By these means the men were

enabled to walk about erect when off duty, without fear of annoyance from sharp-shooters. The enemy used in their defense explosive musket-balls, thinking, no doubt, that, bursting over the men in the trenches, they would do some execution; but I do not remember a single case where a man was injured by a piece of one of the shells. When they were hit, and the ball exploded, the wound was terrible. In these cases a solid ball would have hit as well. Their use is barbarous, because they produce increased suffering without any corresponding advantage to those using them. [See p. 491.]

The enemy could not resort to the method we did to protect their men, because we had an inexhaustible supply of ammunition to draw upon, and used it freely. Splinters from the timber would have made havoc among the men behind.

There were no mortars with the besiegers, except what the navy had in front of the city; but wooden ones were made by taking logs of the toughest wood that could be found, boring them out for six or twelve pounder shells, and binding them with strong iron bands. These answered as coehorns, and shells were successfully thrown from them into the trenches of the enemy.



WOODEN COEHORN ON GRANT'S
LINES. FROM A SKETCH MADE
AT THE TIME.

The labor of building the batteries and intrenching was largely done by the pioneers, assisted by negroes who came within our lines and who were paid for their work, but details from the troops had often to be made. The work was pushed forward as rapidly as possible, and when an advanced position was secured and covered from the fire of the enemy, the batteries were advanced. By the 30th of June there were 220 guns in position, mostly light field-pieces, besides a battery of heavy guns belonging to, manned, and commanded by the navy. We were now as strong for defense against the garrison of Vicksburg as they were against us. But I knew that Johnston was in our rear, and was receiving constant reënforcements from the east. He had at this time a larger force than I had prior to the battle of Champion's Hill.

As soon as the news of the arrival of the Union army behind Vicksburg reached the North, floods of visitors began to pour in. Some came to gratify curiosity; some to see sons or brothers who had passed through the terrible ordeal; members of the Christian and Sanitary Commissions came to minister to the wants of the sick and the wounded. Often those coming to see a son or brother would bring a dozen or two of poultry. They did not know how little the gift would be appreciated; many soldiers had lived so much on chickens, ducks, and turkeys, without bread, during the march, that the sight of poultry, if they could get bacon, almost took away their appetite. But the intention was good.

Among the earliest arrivals was the Governor of Illinois [Yates], with most of the State officers. I naturally wanted to show them what there was of most interest. In Sherman's front the ground was the most broken and most



POSITION OF HOVEY'S DIVISION OF MCCLERNAND'S CORPS. FROM A LITHOGRAPH.

In the foreground is the siege-battery; below is the wooded ravine; from left to right are seen the camps of the 34th Indiana, 29th Wisconsin, 11th Indiana, 46th Indiana, and 25th Indiana; half-way to the summit are

the rifle-pits of Hovey's division, confronting Confederate works and forts on the farthest ridge, which was a part of the Confederate line held by General C. L. Stevenson.

wooded, and more was to be seen without exposure. I therefore took them to Sherman's headquarters and presented them. Before starting out to look at the lines—possibly while Sherman's horse was being saddled—there were many questions asked about the late campaign, about which the North had been so imperfectly informed. There was a little knot about Sherman and around me, and I heard Sherman repeating in the most animated manner what he had said to me, when we first looked down from Walnut Hills upon the land below, on the 18th of May, adding: "Grant is entitled to every bit of the credit for the campaign; I opposed it. I wrote him a letter about it." But for this speech it is not likely that Sherman's opposition would have ever been heard of. His untiring energy and great efficiency during the campaign entitled him to a full share of all the credit due for its success. He could not have done more if the plan had been his own.

On the 26th of May I sent Blair's division up the Yazoo to drive out a force of the enemy supposed to be between the Big Black and the Yazoo. The country was rich, and full of supplies of both fruit and forage. Blair was instructed to take all of it. The cattle were to be driven in for the use of our army, and the food and forage to be consumed by our troops or destroyed by fire; all bridges were to be destroyed, and the roads rendered as nearly impassable as possible. Blair went forty-five miles, and was gone almost a week. His work was effectually done. I requested Porter at this time to send the Marine brigade—a floating nondescript force which had been assigned to his command, and which proved very useful—up to Haynes's Bluff to hold it until reinforcements could be sent.



POSITION OF QUINBY'S DIVISION OF McPHERSON'S CORPS. FROM A LITHOGRAPH.

On the ridge in the background are Confederate forts connected by breastworks, and on the right is pictured the blowing up, June 25th, of the Confederate works on the Jackson road, in front of General Logan's division. The Union rifle-pits are at the farther edge of the

ravine, in which the troops were protected. On the left is Battery Archer, 2 siege-guns; center, 12th Wisconsin Battery; right, 6th Wisconsin Battery. The trees in front of the explosion mark the scene of the conference between Grant and Pemberton.

On the 26th I also received a letter from Banks, asking me to reënforce him with ten thousand men at Port Hudson. ¶ Of course I could not comply with his request, nor did I think he needed them. He was in no danger of an attack by the garrison in his front, and there was no army organizing in his rear to raise the siege. On the 3d of June a brigade from Hurlbut's command arrived, General Nathan Kimball commanding. ¶ It was sent to Mechanicsburg, some miles north-east of Haynes's Bluff, and about midway between the Big Black and the Yazoo. A brigade of Blair's division and twelve hundred cavalry had already, on Blair's return from up the Yazoo, been sent to the same place—with instructions to watch the crossings of the Big Black River, to destroy the roads in his (Blair's) front, and to gather or destroy all supplies.

On the 7th of June our little force of colored and white troops across the Mississippi, at Milliken's Bend, were attacked by about three thousand men from Richard Taylor's Trans-Mississippi command. With the aid of the gunboats these were speedily repelled. I sent Mower's brigade over with instructions to drive the enemy beyond the Tensas bayou; and we had no further

¶ On May 25th General Grant wrote to General Banks that it seemed to him advisable to collect as large a force at Vicksburg as possible, and says, "I would be pleased, General, to have you come, with such force as you are able to spare." In the same letter General Grant makes this statement:

"When I commenced writing this it was my intention to propose sending you, if you will furnish transportation, 8000 or 10,000 men to coöperate with you on Port Hudson; but, whilst writing, a courier came in from my cavalry, stating that a force of the enemy are now about thirty miles north-east of here. . . . At present, therefore, I do not deem it prudent to send off any men I have, or even safe, . . ."

On May 23d, 1863, General Halleck wrote to General Banks:

"I assure you that the Government is exceedingly disappointed that you and General Grant are not acting in conjunction. It thought to secure that object by authorizing you to assume the entire command as soon as you and General Grant could unite."

In Halleck's instructions, dated November 9th, 1862, General Banks was authorized "to assume control of any military forces from the Upper Mississippi which may come within your command. . . . You will exercise superior authority as far as you may ascend the river. . . ."

EDITORS.

¶ General Kimball was wounded at Fredericksburg, and on recovering was assigned to the command of a division in the West.—EDITORS.



POSITION OF LOGAN'S DIVISION OF MCPHERSON'S CORPS. FROM A LITHOGRAPH.

In the middle-ground is seen the main line of works, which on the right ascends the hill to the White House at the end of the curtain of trees. On the ridge to the left of the White House is the Union sap leading to the

exploding mine under the Confederate fort near the Jackson road. Between the Union and Confederate lines, a little to the left of the center, are the trees that mark the conference between Grant and Pemberton.

trouble in that quarter during the siege. This was the first important engagement of the war in which colored troops were under fire. ☆ These were very raw, having all been enlisted since the beginning of the siege, but they behaved well.

On the 8th of June a full division arrived from Hurlbut's command, under General Sooy Smith. It was sent immediately to Haynes's Bluff, and General C. C. Washburn was assigned to the general command at that point.

On the 11th a strong division arrived from the Department of the Missouri under General Herron, which was placed on our left. This cut off the last possible chance of communication between Pemberton and Johnston, as it enabled Lauman to close up on McClelland's left, while Herron intrenched from Lauman to the water's edge. At this point the water recedes a few hundred yards from the high land. Through this opening, no doubt, the Confederate commanders had been able to get messengers under cover of night.

On the 14th General Parke arrived with two divisions of Burnside's corps, † and was immediately dispatched to Haynes's Bluff. These latter troops — Herron's and Parke's — were the reinforcements already spoken of, sent by Halleck in anticipation of their being needed. They arrived none too soon.

I now had about seventy-one thousand men. More than half were disposed of across the peninsula, between the Yazoo, at Haynes's Bluff, and the

☆ Colored troops had been under fire on the 27th of May at Port Hudson.—EDITORS.

† These troops came from the Department of the Ohio (Burnside), June 14th to 17th, having

been transferred from the Army of the Potomac in the previous March. After Vicksburg they returned to Burnside's command and took part in the East Tennessee campaign.—EDITORS.

Big Black, with the division of Osterhaus watching the crossings of the latter river farther south and west, from the crossing of the Jackson road to Baldwin's Ferry, and below.

There were eight roads leading into Vicksburg, along which and the immediate sides of which our work was specially pushed and batteries advanced; but no commanding point within range of the enemy was neglected.

On the 17th I received a letter from General Sherman and on the 18th one from McPherson, saying that their respective commands had complained to them of a fulsome congratulatory order published by General McClernand to the Thirteenth Corps, which did great injustice to the other troops engaged in the campaign.


This order had been sent north and published, and now papers containing it had reached our camps. The order had not been heard of by me, and certainly not by troops outside of McClernand's command, until brought in this way. I at once wrote McClernand, directing him to send me a copy of this order. He did so, and I at once relieved him from the command of the Thirteenth Army Corps, and ordered him back to Springfield, Illinois. The publication of his order in the press was in violation of War Department orders and also of mine.

On the 22d of June positive information was received that Johnston had crossed the Big Black River for the purpose of attacking our rear, to raise the siege and release Pemberton. The correspondence between Johnston and Pemberton shows that all expectation of holding Vicksburg had by this time passed from Johnston's mind. I immediately ordered Sherman to the command of all the forces from Haynes's Bluff to the Big Black River. This amounted now to quite half the troops about Vicksburg. Besides these, Herron's and A. J. Smith's divisions were ordered to hold themselves in readiness to reënforce Sherman. Haynes's Bluff had been strongly fortified on the land side, and on all commanding points from there to the Big Black, at the railroad crossing, batteries had been constructed. The work of connecting by rifle-pits, where this was not already done, was an easy task for the troops that were to defend them.

We were now looking west, besieging Pemberton, while we were also looking east to defend ourselves against an expected siege by Johnston. But as against the garrison of Vicksburg we were as substantially protected as they were against us. When we were looking east and north we were strongly fortified, and on the defensive. Johnston evidently took in the situation and wisely, I think, abstained from making an assault on us, because it would simply have inflicted loss on both sides without accomplishing any result.

We were strong enough to have taken the offensive against him; but I did not feel disposed to take any risk of loosing our hold upon Pemberton's army, while I would have rejoiced at the opportunity of defending ourselves against an attack by Johnston.

From the 23d of May the work of fortifying and pushing forward our position nearer to the enemy had been steadily progressing. At three points on the Jackson road in front of Ransom's brigade a sap was run up to the



THE FIGHT IN THE CRATER AFTER THE EXPLOSION OF THE UNION MINE UNDER THE CONFEDERATE FORT ON THE JACKSON ROAD, JUNE 25, 1863. FROM A LITHOGRAPH.

To the right and left are seen part of the approaches from the main Union line at the White House, as shown in the plan on p. 540.

enemy's parapet, and by the 25th of June we had it undermined and the mine charged. The enemy had countermined, but did not succeed in reaching our mine. At this particular point the hill on which the rebel work stands rises abruptly. Our sap ran close up to the outside of the enemy's parapet. In fact, this parapet was also our protection. The soldiers of the two sides occasionally conversed pleasantly across this barrier; sometimes they exchanged the hard bread of the Union soldiers for the tobacco of the Confederates; at other times the enemy threw over hand-grenades, and often our men, catching them in their hands, returned them.


Our mine had been started some distance back down the hill, consequently when it had extended as far as the parapet it was many feet below it. This caused the failure of the enemy in his search to find and destroy it. On the 25th of June, at 3 o'clock, all being ready, the mine was exploded. A heavy artillery fire all along the line had been ordered to open with the explosion. The effect was to blow the top of the hill off and make a crater where it stood. The breach was not sufficient to enable us to pass a column of attack through. In fact, the enemy, having failed to reach our mine, had thrown up a line farther back, where most of the men guarding that point were placed. There were a few men, however, left at the advance line, and others working in the counter-mine, which was still being pushed to find ours. All that were there were thrown into the air, some of them coming down on our side, still alive. I remember one colored man, who had been under ground at work, when the explosion took place, who was thrown to our side. He was

not much hurt, but was terribly frightened. Some one asked him how high he had gone up. "Dunno, Massa, but t'ink 'bout tree mile," was the reply. General Logan commanded at this point, and took this colored man to his quarters, where he did service to the end of the siege.

As soon as the explosion took place the crater was seized upon by two regiments of our troops who were near by, under cover, where they had been placed for the express purpose. The enemy made a desperate effort to expel them, but failed, and soon retired behind the new line. From here, however, they threw hand-grenades, which did some execution. The compliment was returned by our men, but not with so much effect. The enemy could lay their grenades on the parapet, which alone divided the contestants, and then roll them down upon us; while from our side they had to be thrown over the parapet, which was at considerable elevation. During the night we made efforts to secure our position in the crater against the missiles of the enemy, so as to run trenches along the outer base of their parapet, right and left; but the enemy continued throwing their grenades, and brought boxes of field ammunition (shells) the fuses of which they would light with port-fires, and throw them by hand into our ranks. We found it impossible to continue this work. Another mine was consequently started, which was exploded on the 1st of July, destroying an entire rebel redan, killing and wounding a considerable number of its occupants, and leaving an immense chasm where it stood. No attempt to charge was made this time, the experience of the 25th admonishing us. Our loss in the first affair was about thirty killed and wounded. The enemy must have lost more in the two explosions than we did in the first. We lost none in the second.

From this time forward the work of mining and of pushing our position nearer to the enemy was prosecuted with vigor, and I determined to explode no more mines until we were ready to explode a number at different points and assault immediately after. We were up now at three different points, one in front of each corps, to where only the parapet of the enemy divided us.

At this time an intercepted dispatch from Johnston to Pemberton informed me that Johnston intended to make a determined attack upon us, in order to relieve the garrison of Vicksburg. I knew the garrison would make no forcible effort to relieve itself. The picket lines were so close to each other — where there was space enough between the lines to post pickets — that the men could converse. On the 21st of June I was informed, through this means, that Pemberton was preparing to escape, by crossing to the Louisiana side under cover of night; that he had employed workmen in making boats for that purpose; that the men had been canvassed to ascertain if they would make an assault on the "Yankees" to cut their way out; that they had refused, and almost mutinied, because their commander would not surrender and relieve their sufferings, and had only been pacified by the assurance that boats enough would be finished in a week to carry them all over. The rebel pickets also said that houses in the city had been pulled down to get material to build these boats with. Afterward this story was



IN THE SAPS BETWEEN THE WHITE HOUSE AND
THE VICKSBURG CRATER, JULY 2, 1863. FROM
A SKETCH MADE AT THE TIME.

verified. On entering the city we found a large number of very rudely constructed boats.

All necessary steps were at once taken to render such an attempt abortive. Our pickets were doubled; Admiral Porter was notified so that the river might be more closely watched; material was collected on the west bank of the river to be set on fire and light up the river if the attempt was made; and batteries were established along the levee crossing the peninsula on the Louisiana side. Had the attempt been made, the garrison of Vicksburg would have been drowned or made prisoners on the Louisiana side. General Richard Taylor was expected on the west bank to coöperate in this movement, I believe, but he did not come, nor could he have done so with a force sufficient to be of service. The Mississippi was now in our possession from its source to its mouth, except in the immediate front of Vicksburg and Port Hudson. We had nearly exhausted the country, along a line drawn from Lake Providence to opposite Bruinsburg. The roads west were not of a character to draw supplies over for any considerable force.

By the 1st of July our approaches had reached the enemy's ditch at a number of places. At ten points we could move under cover to within from five to 100 yards of the enemy. Orders were given to make all preparations for assault on the 6th of July. The debouches were ordered widened, to afford easy egress, while the approaches were also to be widened to admit the troops to pass through four abreast. Plank and sand-bags, the latter filled with cotton packed in tightly, were ordered prepared, to enable the troops to cross the ditches.

On the night of the 1st of July Johnston was between Brownsville and the Big Black, and wrote Pemberton from there that about the 7th of the month an attempt would be made to create a diversion to enable him to cut his way out. Pemberton was a prisoner before this message reached him.

On July 1st Pemberton, seeing no hope of outside relief, addressed the following letter to each of his four division commanders:

"Unless the siege of Vicksburg is raised, or supplies are thrown in, it will become necessary very shortly to evacuate the place. I see no prospect of the former, and there are many great, if not insuperable, obstacles in the way of the latter. You are, therefore, requested to inform me with as little delay as possible as to the condition of your troops, and their ability to make the marches and undergo the fatigues necessary to accomplish a successful evacuation."

Two of his generals suggested surrender, and the other two practically did the same; they expressed the opinion that an attempt to evacuate would fail. Pemberton had previously got a message to Johnston suggesting that he should try to negotiate with me for a release of the garrison with their arms. Johnston replied that it would be a confession of weakness for him to do so; but he authorized Pemberton to use his name in making such an arrangement.

On the 3d, about 10 o'clock A. M., white flags appeared on a portion of the rebel works. Hostilities along that part of the line ceased at once. Soon two persons were seen coming toward our lines bearing a white flag. They proved to be General Bowen, a division commander, and Colonel Montgomery, aide-de-camp to Pemberton, bearing the following letter to me:

"I have the honor to propose an armistice for —— hours, with the view to arranging terms for the capitulation of Vicksburg. To this end, if agreeable to you, I will appoint three commissioners, to meet a like number to be named by yourself, at such place and hour to-day as you may find convenient. I make this proposition to save the further effusion of blood, which must otherwise be shed to a frightful extent, feeling myself fully able to maintain my position for a yet indefinite period. This communication will be handed you, under a flag of truce, by Major-General John S. Bowen."

It was a glorious sight to officers and soldiers on the line where these white flags were visible, and the news soon spread to all parts of the command. The troops felt that their long and weary marches, hard fighting, ceaseless watching by night and day in a hot climate, exposure to all sorts of weather, to diseases, and, worst of all, to the gibes of many Northern papers that came to them, saying all their suffering was in vain, Vicksburg would never be taken, were at last at an end, and the Union sure to be saved.

Bowen was received by General A. J. Smith, and asked to see me. I had been a neighbor of Bowen's in Missouri, and knew him well and favorably before the war; but his request was refused. He then suggested that I should meet Pemberton. To this I sent a verbal message saying that if Pemberton desired it I would meet him in front of McPherson's corps, at 3 o'clock that afternoon. I also sent the following written reply to Pemberton's letter:


"Your note of this date is just received, proposing an armistice for several hours, for the purpose of arranging terms of capitulation through commissioners to be appointed, etc. The useless effusion of blood you propose stopping by this course can be ended at any time you may choose, by the unconditional surrender of the city and garrison. Men who have shown so much endurance and courage as those now in Vicksburg will always challenge the respect of an adversary, and I can assure you will be treated with all the respect due to prisoners of war. I do not favor the proposition of appointing commissioners to arrange the terms of capitulation, because I have no terms other than those indicated above."

At 3 o'clock Pemberton appeared at the point suggested in my verbal message, accompanied by the same officers who had borne his letter of the morning. Generals Ord, McPherson, Logan, A. J. Smith, and several officers of my staff accompanied me. Our place of meeting was on a hill-side within a few hundred feet of the rebel lines. Near by stood a stunted oak-tree, which was made historical by the event. It was but a short time before the last vestige of its body, root, and limb had disappeared, the fragments being taken as trophies. Since then the same tree has furnished as many cords of wood, in the shape of trophies, as "The True Cross."

Pemberton and I had served in the same division during a part of the Mexican war. I knew him very well, therefore, and greeted him as an old acquaintance. He soon asked what terms I proposed to give his army if it surrendered. My answer was the same as proposed in my reply to his letter. Pemberton then said, rather snappishly, "The conference might as well end," and turned abruptly as if to leave. I said, "Very well." General Bowen, I saw, was very anxious that the surrender should be consummated. His manners and remarks while Pemberton and I were talking showed this. He

now proposed that he and one of our generals should have a conference. I had no objection to this, as nothing could be made binding upon me that they might propose. Smith and Bowen accordingly had a conference, during which Pemberton and I, moving some distance away toward the enemy's lines, were in conversation. After a while Bowen suggested that the Confederate army should be allowed to march out, with the honors of war, carrying their small-arms and field-artillery. This was promptly and unceremoniously rejected. The interview

here ended, I agreeing, however, to send a letter giving final terms by 10 o'clock that night. I had sent word to Admiral Porter soon after the correspondence with Pemberton had commenced, so that hostilities might be stopped on



FIRST CONFERENCE BETWEEN GRANT AND PEMBERTON, JULY 3, 1863.
FROM A SKETCH MADE AT THE TIME.

Grant and Pemberton met near the tree and went aside to the earth-work, where they sat in conference. To their right is a group of four, including General John S. Bowen, C. S. A., General A. J. Smith, General James B. McPherson, and Colonel L. M. Montgomery. Under the tree are Chief-of-Staff John A. Rawlins, Assistant Secretary of War Charles A. Dana, and Theodore R. Davis, special artist, who made the above and many other sketches of the Vicksburg siege, in this work.—EDITORS.



GENERAL GRANT.

MASTER FRED. D. GRANT, CHARLES A. DANA,
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF WAR.UNION HEADQUARTERS, JULY 3. GENERAL GRANT RECEIVING GENERAL PEMBERTON'S MESSAGE.
FROM A SKETCH MADE AT THE TIME.

In his "Personal Memoirs" (C. L. Webster & Co.) General Grant says: "On leaving Bruinsburg for the front I left my son Frederick, who had joined me a few weeks before, on board one of the gun-boats asleep, and hoped to get away without him until after Grand Gulf should fall into our hands; but on waking up he learned that I had gone, and being guided by the sound of the battle raging at Thompson's Hill—called the battle of Port Gibson—found his way to where I was. He had no horse to ride at the time, and I had no facilities for even preparing a meal. He therefore foraged around the best he could until we reached Grand Gulf. Mr. C. A. Dana, then an officer of the War Department, accompanied me on the Vicksburg campaign and through a

portion of the siege. He was in the same situation as Fred so far as transportation and mess arrangements were concerned. The first time I call to mind seeing either of them, after the battle, they were mounted on two enormous horses, grown white from age, equipped with dilapidated saddles and bridles. Our trains arrived a few days later, after which we were all perfectly equipped. My son accompanied me throughout the campaign and siege, and caused no anxiety either to me or to his mother, who was at home. He looked out for himself and was in every battle of the campaign. His age, then not quite thirteen, enabled him to take in all he saw, and to retain a recollection of it that would not be possible in more mature years."

the part of both army and navy. It was agreed on my parting with Pemberton that they should not be renewed until our correspondence should cease.

When I returned to my headquarters I sent for all the corps and division commanders with the army immediately confronting Vicksburg. (Half the army was from eight to twelve miles off, waiting for Johnston.) I informed them of the contents of Pemberton's letters, of my reply, and the substance of the interview, and was ready to hear any suggestion; but would hold the power of deciding entirely in my own hands. This was the nearest to a "council of war" I ever held. Against the general and almost unanimous judgment of the council I sent the following letter:

"In conformity with agreement of this afternoon I will submit the following proposition for the surrender of the city of Vicksburg, public stores, etc. On your accepting the terms proposed I will march in one division as a guard, and take possession at 8 A. M. to-morrow. As soon as rolls can be made out and paroles be signed by officers and men, you will be allowed to march out of our lines, the officers taking with them their side-arms and clothing; and the field, staff, and cavalry officers one horse each. The rank and file will be allowed all their clothing, but

no other property. If these conditions are accepted, any amount of rations you may deem necessary can be taken from the stores you now have, and also the necessary cooking-utensils for preparing them. Thirty wagons also, counting two-horse or mule teams as one, will be allowed to transport such articles as cannot be carried along. The same conditions will be allowed to all sick and wounded officers and soldiers as fast as they become able to travel. The paroles for these latter must be signed, however, whilst officers present are authorized to sign the roll of prisoners."

By the terms of the cartel then in force, prisoners captured by either army were required to be forwarded, as soon as possible, to either Aiken's Landing below Dutch Gap, on the James River, or to Vicksburg, there to be exchanged, or paroled until they could be exchanged. There was a Confederate Commissioner at Vicksburg, authorized to make the exchange. I did not propose to take him prisoner, but to leave him free to perform the functions of his office. Had I insisted upon an unconditional surrender, there would have been over thirty-odd thousand men to transport to Cairo, very much to the inconvenience of the army on the Mississippi; thence the prisoners would have had to be transported by rail to Washington or Baltimore; thence again by steamer to Aiken's—all at very great expense. At Aiken's they would have to be paroled, because the Confederates did not have Union prisoners to give in exchange. Then again Pemberton's army was largely composed of men whose homes were in the south-west; I knew many of them were tired of the war and would get home just as soon as they could. A large number of them had voluntarily come into our lines during the siege and requested to be sent north where they could get employment until the war was over and they could go to their homes.

Late at night I received the following reply to my last letter :

"I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of this date, proposing terms of capitulation for this garrison and post. In the main, your terms are accepted; but, in justice both to the honor and spirit of my troops manifested in the defense of Vicksburg, I have to submit the following amendments, which, if acceded to by you, will perfect the agreement between us. At 10 o'clock A. M. to-morrow I propose to evacuate the works in and around Vicksburg, and to surrender the city and garrison under my command, by marching out with my colors and arms, stacking them in front of my present lines, after which you will take possession. Officers to retain their side-arms and personal property, and the rights and property of citizens to be respected."

This was received after midnight; my reply was as follows :

"I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of 3d July. The amendment proposed by you cannot be acceded to in full. It will be necessary to furnish every officer and man with a parole signed by himself, which, with the completion of the roll of prisoners, will necessarily take some time. Again, I can make no stipulations with regard to the treatment of citizens and their private property. While I do not propose to cause them any undue annoyance or loss, I cannot consent to leave myself under any restraint by stipulations. The property which officers will be allowed to take with them will be as stated in my proposition of last evening; that is, officers will be allowed their private baggage and side-arms, and mounted officers one horse each. If you mean by your proposition for each brigade to march to the front of the lines now occupied by it, and stack arms at 10 o'clock A. M., and then return to the inside and there remain as prisoners until properly paroled, I will make no objection to it. Should no notification be received of your acceptance of my terms by 9 o'clock A. M.,

I shall regard them as having been rejected, and shall act accordingly. Should these terms be accepted, white flags should be displayed along your lines to prevent such of my troops as may not have been notified from firing upon your men."

Pemberton promptly accepted these terms.

During the siege there had been a good deal of friendly sparring between the soldiers of the two armies, on picket and where the lines were close together. All rebels were known as "Johnnies"; all Union troops as "Yanks." Often "Johnny" would call, "Well, Yank, when are you coming into town?" The reply was sometimes: "We propose to celebrate the 4th of July there." Sometimes it would be: "We always treat our prisoners with kindness and do not want to hurt them"; or, "We are holding you as prisoners of war while you are feeding yourselves." The garrison, from the commanding general down, undoubtedly expected an assault on the 4th. They knew from the temper of their men it would be successful when made, and that would be a greater humiliation than to surrender. Besides it would be attended with severe loss to them.

The Vicksburg paper, which we received regularly through the courtesy of the rebel pickets, said prior to the 4th, in speaking of the "Yankee" boast that they would take dinner in Vicksburg that day, that the best receipt for cooking rabbit was, "First ketch your rabbit." The paper at this time, and for some time previous, was printed on the plain side of wall paper. The last was issued on the 4th and announced that we had "caught our rabbit."

I have no doubt that Pemberton commenced his correspondence on the 3d for the twofold purpose; first, to avoid an assault, which he knew would be successful, and second, to prevent the capture taking place on the great national holiday,—the anniversary of the Declaration of American Independence. Holding out for better terms, as he did, he defeated his aim in the latter particular.

On the 4th, at the appointed hour, the garrison of Vicksburg marched out of their works, and formed line in front, stacked arms, and marched back in good order. Our whole army present witnessed this scene without cheering.

Logan's division, which had approached nearest the rebel works, was the first to march in, and the flag of one of the regiments of his division was soon floating over the court-house. Our soldiers were no sooner inside the lines than the two armies began to fraternize. Our men had had full rations from the time the siege commenced to the close. The enemy had been suffering, particularly toward the last. I myself saw our men taking bread from their haversacks and giving it to the enemy they had so recently been engaged in *starving out*. It was accepted with avidity and with thanks.

Pemberton says in his report: "If it should be asked why the 4th of July was selected as the day for surrender, the answer is obvious. I believed that upon that day I should obtain better terms. Well aware of the vanity of our foe, I knew they would attach vast importance to the entrance, on the 4th of July, into the stronghold of the great river, and that, to gratify their national vanity, they would yield then what could not be extorted from them at any other time." This does not support my view of his reasons for selecting the

day he did for surrendering. But it must be recollected that his first letter asking terms was received about 10 o'clock, A. M., July 3d. It then could hardly be expected that it would take 24 hours to effect a surrender. He knew that Johnston was in our rear for the purpose of raising the siege, and he naturally would want to hold out as long as he could. He knew his men would not resist an assault, and one was expected on the 4th. In our interview he told me he had rations enough to hold out some time—my recollection is two weeks. It was this statement that induced me to insert in the terms that he was to draw rations for his men from his own supplies.

On the 3d, as soon as negotiations were commenced, I notified Sherman, and directed him to be ready to take the offensive against Johnston, drive him out of the State, and destroy his army if he could. Steele and Ord were directed at the same time to be in readiness to join Sherman as soon as the surrender took place. Of this Sherman was notified.

I rode into Vicksburg with the troops, and went to the river to exchange congratulations with the navy upon our joint victory. At that time I found that many of the citizens had been living under-ground. The ridges upon which Vicksburg is built, and those back to the Big Black, are composed of a deep yellow clay, of great tenacity. Where roads and streets are cut through, perpendicular banks are left, and stand as well as if composed of stone. The magazines of the enemy were made by running passage-ways into this clay at places where there were deep cuts. Many citizens secured places of safety for their families by carving out rooms in these embankments. A door-way in these cases would be cut in a high bank, starting from the level of the road or street, and after running in a few feet a room of the size required was carved out of the clay, the dirt being removed by the door-way. In some instances I saw where two rooms were cut out, for a single family, with a door-way in the clay wall separating them. Some of these were carpeted and furnished with considerable elaboration. In these the occupants were fully secure from the shells of the navy, which were dropped into the city, night and day, without intermission. [See "Naval Operations," p. 551.]

I returned to my old headquarters outside in the afternoon, and did not move them into the town until the 6th. On the afternoon of the 4th I sent Captain William M. Dunn, of my staff, to Cairo, the nearest point where the telegraph could be reached, with a dispatch to the general-in-chief. It was as follows:

"The enemy surrendered this morning. The only terms allowed is their parole as prisoners of war. This I regard as a great advantage to us at this moment. It saves, probably, several days in the capture, and leaves troops and transports ready for immediate service. Sherman, with a large force, moves immediately on Johnston, to drive him from the State. I will send troops to the relief of Banks, and return the Ninth Army Corps to Burnside."

At the same time I wrote to General Banks informing him of the fall, and sending him a copy of the terms, also saying I would send him all the troops he wanted to insure the capture of the only foothold the enemy now had on the Mississippi River. General Banks had a number of copies of this letter printed, or at least a synopsis of it, and very soon a copy fell into the hands

of General Gardner, who was then in command of Port Hudson. Gardner at once sent a letter to the commander of the National forces, saying that he had been informed of the surrender of Vicksburg and telling how the information reached him. He added that if this was true it was useless for him to hold out longer. General Banks gave him assurances that Vicksburg had been surrendered, and General Gardner surrendered unconditionally on the 9th of July.¹ Port Hudson, with nearly 6000 prisoners, 51 guns, and 5000 small-arms and other stores, fell into the hands of the Union forces. From that day on, the river remained under National control.

Pemberton and his army were kept in Vicksburg until the whole could be paroled. The paroles were in duplicate, by organization (one copy for each, National and Confederate), signed by the commanding officers of the companies or regiments. Duplicates were also made for each soldier, and signed by each individually, one to be retained by the soldier signing, and one to be retained by us. Several hundred refused to sign their paroles, preferring to be sent north as prisoners to being sent back to fight again. Others again kept out of the way, hoping to escape either alternative.

Pemberton appealed to me in person to compel these men to sign their paroles, but I declined. It also leaked out that many of the men who had signed their paroles intended to desert and go to their homes as soon as they got out of our lines. Pemberton, hearing this, again appealed to me to assist him. He wanted arms for a battalion, to act as guards in keeping his men together while being marched to a camp of instruction, where he expected to keep them until exchanged. This request was also declined. It was precisely what I expected and hoped that they would do. I told him, however, I would see that they marched beyond our lines in good order. By the 11th, just one week after the surrender, the paroles were completed, and the Confederate garrison marched out. Many deserted; fewer of them were ever returned to the ranks to fight again than would have been the case had the surrender been unconditional and the prisoners been sent to the James River to be paroled.

As soon as our troops took possession of the city, guards were established along the whole line of parapet, from the river above to the river below. The prisoners were allowed to occupy their old camps behind the intrenchments. No restraint was put upon them, except by their own commanders. They were rationed about as our own men, and from our supplies. The men of the two armies fraternized as if they had been fighting for the same cause. When they passed out of the works they had so long and so gallantly defended, between lines of their late antagonists, not a cheer went up, not a remark was made that would give pain. I believe there was a feeling of sadness among the Union soldiers at seeing the dejection of their late antagonists.

The day before the departure the following order was issued:

"Paroled prisoners will be sent out of here to-morrow. They will be authorized to cross at the railroad-bridge and move from there to Edwards's Ferry,² and on by way of Raymond. Instruct the commands to be orderly and quiet as these prisoners pass, to make no offensive remarks, and not to harbor any who fall out of ranks after they have passed."

¹ See article on Port Hudson, to follow.—EDITORS.

² Meant Edwards's Station.—U. S. G.

On the 8th a dispatch was sent from Washington by Halleck, saying:

"I fear your paroling the prisoners at Vicksburg without actual delivery to a proper agent, as required by the seventh article of the cartel, may be construed into an absolute release, and that the men will immediately be placed in the ranks of the enemy. Such has been the case elsewhere. If these prisoners have not been allowed to depart, you will detain them until further orders."

Halleck did not know that they had already been delivered into the hands of Major Watts, Confederate Commissioner for the Exchange of Prisoners.

At Vicksburg 31,600 prisoners were surrendered, together with 172 cannon, about 60,000 muskets, and a large amount of ammunition. The small-arms of the enemy were far superior to the bulk of ours. Up to this time our troops at the west had been limited to the old United States flint-lock muskets changed into percussion, or the Belgian musket imported early in the war — almost as dangerous to the person firing it as to the one aimed at — and a few new and improved arms. These were of many different calibers, a fact that caused much trouble in distributing ammunition during an engagement. The enemy had generally new arms, which had run the blockade, and were of uniform caliber. After the surrender I authorized all colonels, whose regiments were armed with inferior muskets, to place them in the stack of captured arms, and replace them with the latter. A large number of arms, turned in to the ordnance department as captured, were these arms that had really been used by the Union army in the capture of Vicksburg.

In this narrative I have not made the mention I should like of officers, dead and alive, whose services entitle them to special mention. Neither have I made that mention of the navy which its services deserve. Suffice it to say, the close of the siege found us with an army unsurpassed, in proportion to its numbers, taken as a whole, officers and men. A military education was acquired which no other school could have given. Men who thought a company was quite enough for them to command properly, at the beginning, would have made good regimental or brigade commanders; most of the brigade commanders were equal to the command of a division, and one, Ransom, would have been equal to the command of a corps at least. Logan and Crocker ended the campaign fitted to command independent armies.

General F. P. Blair joined me at Milliken's Bend, a full-fledged general, without having served in a lower grade. He commanded a division in the campaign. I had known Blair in Missouri, where I had voted against him in 1858 when he ran for Congress. I knew him as a frank, positive, and generous man, true to his friends even to a fault, but always a leader. I dreaded his coming. I knew from experience that it was more difficult to command two generals desiring to be leaders, than it was to command one army, officered intelligently, and with subordination. It affords me the greatest pleasure to record now my agreeable disappointment in respect to his character. There was no man braver than he, nor was there any who obeyed all orders of his superior in rank with more unquestioning alacrity. He was one man as a soldier, another as a politician.

I was very
 glad to give the Garrison of Vicksburg the time I did. There was
 a cartel in operation at that time which required either party to exchange
 or parole all prisoners captured either at Vicksburg or at a point on
 the James river within ten days after capturing or so soon thereafter
 as practicable. This would have used all the transportation we
 had for a month. The men had shown so well that I did not want
 to humiliate them, I believe that consideration for their feelings
 would make them less dangerous for during the continuance of hostil-
 ities, and better citizens after the war was over.

I am very much obliged to you General for your courtesy
 in sending me these papers. Very truly yours,
 W. A. Wright.

FROM A LETTER TO GEN. MARCUS J. WRIGHT, C. S. A., DATED NEW YORK, NOV. 30, 1864.

The navy, under Porter, was all it could be, during the entire campaign. Without its assistance the campaign could not have been successfully made with twice the number of men engaged. It could not have been made at all, in the way it was, with any number of men, without such assistance. The most perfect harmony reigned between the two arms of the service. There never was a request made, that I am aware of, either of the flag-officer or any of his subordinates, that was not promptly complied with.

The campaign of Vicksburg was suggested and developed by circumstances. The elections of 1862 had gone against the prosecution of the war: voluntary enlistments had nearly ceased, and the draft had been resorted to; this was resisted, and a defeat, or backward movement, would have made its execution impossible. A forward movement to a decisive victory was necessary. Accordingly I resolved to

get below Vicksburg, unite with Banks against Port Hudson, and make New Orleans a base; and, with that base and Grand Gulf as a starting-point, move our combined forces against Vicksburg. Upon reaching Grand Gulf, after rinning its batteries and fighting a battle, I received a letter from Banks informing me that he could not be at Port Hudson under ten days, and then with only fifteen thousand men. The time was worth more than the reënforcements; I therefore determined to push into the interior of the enemy's country.

With a large river behind us, held above and below by the enemy, rapid movements were essential to success. Jackson was captured the day after a new commander had arrived, and only a few days before large reënforcements were expected. A rapid movement west was made; the garrison of Vicksburg was met in two engagements and badly defeated, and driven back into its stronghold and there successfully besieged.



THE WHITE HOUSE, OR SHIRLEY, AT THE ENTRANCE TO M'PHERSON'S SAPS AGAINST THE "THIRD LOUISIANA REDAN," VICKSBURG. FROM A WAR-TIME SKETCH.

THE VICKSBURG MINE.

BY ANDREW HICKENLOOPER, BREVET BRIGADIER-GENERAL, U. S. V., CHIEF ENGINEER
OF THE SEVENTEENTH ARMY CORPS.

AFTER the failure of the general assault on May 22d, orders were issued to commence regular siege operations. General J. B. McPherson occupied the center with the Seventeenth Army Corps, covering the main Jackson road, on which the Confederates had constructed the most formidable redoubt on the entire line, and intrusted its defense to the 3d Louisiana, a veteran regiment. Because of its strength, commanding position, and heavy armament, this redoubt became the main objective point of the engineer-

ing operations of the Seventeenth Army Corps. It was approachable only over a broad, flat ridge, forming a comparatively level plateau, extending eastwardly from the fort for a distance of almost five hundred yards before descending into one of the numerous ravines or depressions which extended in almost every conceivable direction over the ground lying between the contending armies. The Third Division, commanded by General Logan, occupied the position immediately in front of the fort, and upon these troops—more

especially those of the brigade commanded by General M. D. Leggett, working under the direction of the chief engineer of the corps—was imposed the greater part of the labor.

The "pioneers" of the corps were at once sent to the caue-brakes, swamps, and lowlands in the rear to construct sap-rollers, gabions, and fascines, and details of 150 men for day and the same number for night duty were made for work on the main sap, which was commenced on the Jackson road at a point about 150 feet south-east of a large frame plantation house, known as the White House, which for some unexplained reason had been left standing by the enemy. Up to this point troops could be marched in comparative safety under cover of the intervening hills, supplemented by the construction of parapets at exposed points. The line of the first section was selected during the night of the 23d under cover of an attack made upon the enemy's pickets. Upon this line the workmen were placed at intervals of about five feet, each equipped with a gabion, pick, and

shovel, with instructions to cover themselves securely and dig a connection through to the adjoining burrow before daylight. The day relief was engaged in deepening and widening the sap thus commenced, and on the

following night the second section was laid out and occupied in the same manner.

On the 25th of May the Confederate commander sent in a


flag of truce, for the purpose of tendering permission to bury the Federal dead who had fallen in front of their works during the heroic assault of the 22d, which was gladly accepted. This incident afforded the chief engineer a much-needed opportunity of closely inspecting the ground to be passed over, of fixing the salient points in his mind, and of determining upon the general direction of the various sections of the sap. The highest point between the fort and the White House was selected as a spot upon which to locate a battery and "place at arms" (afterward known as Battery Hickenlooper), the guns of which rendered valuable service in covering the extensions of the sap beyond that point. Two 8-inch naval guns located in battery south-east of this point also rendered effective service in silencing the guns of the Confederate fort; thus leaving the Union soldiers exposed only to the ever-vigilant sharp-shooters of the enemy. Not even a hand could be safely raised above the parapets; and heavy rope shields, or aprons, were hung in front of the embrasures for the protection of the gunners while they were sighting their pieces. A favorite amusement of the soldiers was to place a cap on the end of a ramrod and to raise it just above the head-logs, betting on the number of bullets which would pass through it within a given time.

The sap-roller, used to protect the workmen from an enfilading fire during the opening of each section of the sap, was a wicker casing five feet in diameter by ten feet in length compactly filled with cotton. The roller was several times found to be on fire, and on the night of June 9th it was totally consumed; but through what agency was, at the time, a great mystery. After the capitulation it was ascertained that cotton saturated with turpentine and placed in the hollow of a minie-ball had been fired from a musket into the packing of the roller. [See p. 491.]

It was difficult for the sharp-shooters to reach the Confederates by direct firing, and the artillerymen found it impossible to gange their shells so as to cause the explosion immediately behind the Confederate parapets. To overcome this latter difficulty, when the sap reached the vicinity of the

fort we caused "Cochoru mortars" to be made from short sections of gum-tree logs bored out and hooped with iron bands. These novel engines of warfare, being accurately charged with just sufficient powder to lift six or twelve pound shells over the parapet and drop them down immediately behind, proved exceedingly effective.

The general plan of conducting the work with flying-sap by night and deepening and widening by day was pushed forward with the utmost energy until June 22d, when the head of the sap reached the outer ditch surrounding the fort. A few days previous an order had been issued for all men in the corps having a practical knowledge of coal-mining to report to the chief engineer. Out of those reporting thirty-six of the strongest and most experienced were selected and divided into two shifts for day and night duty, and each shift was divided into





LOGAN. McPHERSON.
EXPLOSION OF THE MINE UNDER THE CONFEDERATE FORT ON THE JACKSON ROAD.
FROM A SKETCH MADE AT THE TIME.

The foreground shows the Union sap near the White House, where stand Generals McPherson, Logan, and Leggett with three other officers. In the distance is seen

"Coonskin's" Tower, a lookout and perch for sharpshooters, adjoining Battery Hickenlooper, near which were massed the troops that charged into the crater.

three reliefs. On the night of the 22d these men, properly equipped with drills, short-handled picks, shovels, etc., under the immediate command of Lieutenant Russell of the 7th Missouri and Sergeant Morris of the 32d Ohio, commenced the mining operations by driving a gallery, four feet in width by five feet in height, in at right angles to the face of the parapet of the fort. Each relief worked an hour at a time, two picking, two shoveling, and two handing back the grain-sacks filled with earth, which were deposited in the ditch until they could be carried back. The main gallery was carried in 45 feet, and then a smaller gallery extended in on the same line 15 feet, while from the end of the main gallery two others were

run out on either side at angles of 45 degrees for a distance of 15 feet. The soil through which this gallery was driven was a reddish clay of remarkable tenacity, easily cut and requiring but little bracing. So rapidly was this work executed that on the morning of the 25th the miners commenced depositing the powder, 800 pounds at the extreme end of the main gallery and 700 pounds at the end of each of the lateral galleries, making a total of 2200 pounds. From each of these deposits there were laid two strands of safety fuse,—obtained, as was the powder, from the navy,—this duplication being made to cover the possible contingency of one failing to burn with the desired regularity and speed. These six strands were cut

! Coonskin's Tower, according to Brevet Brigadier-General William E. Strong, was built under the direction of Second-Lieutenant Henry C. Foster, of Company B, 23d Indiana Volunteers. A newspaper slip sent to the editors by General Hickenlooper contains the following account of "Coonskin" (Lieutenant Foster), which W. P. Davis, who was Lieutenant-Colonel of the 23d Indiana, says is substantially correct:

"He was an unerring shot, and wore a cap made of racoon fur. From this he was called 'Coonskin' the Seventeenth Corps through, and wherever he was, woe to the Confederate head that appeared above a parapet. 'Coonskin' went out once in the night-time, crept up toward the Confederate defenses and built himself a burrow in the ground, with a peep-hole in it. There he would frequently take provisions with him, and stay several days at a time, watching for

Confederates. At length he built 'Coonskin's Tower.' The Jackson and Vicksburg railway had been torn up for miles in the rear of Vicksburg, and railway iron and cross-ties lay all about. Taking advantage of the night hours, Coonskin built himself a tower of the loose railroad ties. Learned in backwoods lore, he knew how to construct the genuine pioneer log-cabin. Working several nights, he at length built the tower so high that by climbing toward its top he could actually look over the Confederate parapets. He could see the men inside the works. Then, taking aim through the chinks of the logs, he would pick off the enemy. The tower was a terror to the Confederates. They could not use their artillery against it, that having been already quite silenced by the Union batteries. All they could do was to fire musket-balls at it, which whistled around its corners or buried themselves in its logs."

EDITORS.


to exactly the same length, and having been carefully laid, the earth, which had been previously removed in grain-sacks, was carried back and deposited in the most compact manner possible, and well braced by heavy timbers, beyond the junction point of the three galleries. From this point out to the entrance it was more loosely packed in. The Confederate garrison, surmising the object in view, were active in efforts to thwart the purpose of the Union forces by throwing hand-grenades and rolling shells with lighted fuses over their parapet down into the trench in front of the fort. They also countermined in hopes of tapping the gallery. So near were they to the attainment of this object that during the last day the miners could distinctly hear the conversation and orders given in the counter-mine.

The powder was brought up in barrels and kept in the main sap at a safe distance from the enemy's hand-grenades and shells, and there opened and placed in grain-sacks, each one of which contained about 25 pounds. These were taken upon the backs of the miners, who made the run over the exposed ground during the intervals between the explosion of the enemy's shells; and so well timed were these movements that, although it required nearly one hundred trips with the dangerous loads, all were lauded in the mine without a single accident.

The commanding general having been advised on the day previous that the work would be completed before 3 P. M. of the 25th, general orders were issued directing each corps commander to order up the reserves and fully man the trenches, and immediately following the explosion to open with both artillery and musketry along the entire twelve miles of investing line; under cover of which the assaulting columns, composed of volunteers from the 31st and 45th Illinois, preceded by ten picked men from the pioneer corps under charge of the chief engineer, were to move forward and take possession of the fort. For an hour or two previous to the time of the explosion the scene from "Battery Hickenlooper," where General Grant and his subordinate commanders had taken their positions, was one of the most remarkable ever witnessed. As far as the eye could reach to the right and left could be seen the long winding columns of blue moving to their assigned positions behind the besiegers' works. Gradually as the hour of 3 approached the booming of artillery and incessant rattle of musketry, which had been going on day and night for thirty days, suddenly subsided, and a deathlike and op-

pressive stillness pervaded the whole command. Every eye was riveted upon that huge redoubt standing high above the adjoining works. At the appointed moment it appeared as though the whole fort and connecting outworks commenced an upward movement, gradually breaking into fragments and growing less bulky in appearance, until it looked like an immense fountain of finely pulverized earth, mingled with flashes of fire and clouds of smoke, through which could occasionally be caught a glimpse of some dark objects,—men, gun-carriages, shelters, etc. Fire along the entire line instantly opened with great fury, and amidst the din and roar of 150 cannon and the rattle of 50,000 muskets the charging column moved forward to the assault. [See p. 527.] But little difficulty was experienced in entering the crater, but the moment the assaulting forces attempted to mount the artificial parapet, which had been formed by the falling débris about midway across the fort, completely commanded by the Confederate artillery and infantry in the rear, they were met by a withering fire so severe that to show a head above the crest was certain death. Two lines were formed on the slope of this parapet, the front line raising their muskets over their heads and firing at random over the crest while the rear rank were engaged in reloading. But soon the Confederates began throwing short-fused shells over the parapet, which, rolling down into the crater crowded with the soldiers of the assaulting column, caused the most fearful destruction of life ever witnessed under like circumstances. The groans of the dying and shrieks of the wounded became fearful, but bravely they stood to their work until the engineers constructed a casemate out of the heavy timbers found in the crater, and upon which the earth was thrown until it was of sufficient depth to resist the destructive effects of the exploding shells. As soon as this work was completed, and a parapet was thrown up across the crater on a line with the face of the casemate, the troops were withdrawn to the new line beyond the range of exploding shells. The crater being secured, again the miners were set at work running a new gallery under the left wing of the fort. This mine was exploded on the 1st of July, leaving the fort a total wreck.

In the meantime the main sap had been widened sufficiently to admit of the convenient movement of troops in "column of fours" during the contemplated assault, the necessity for which was happily avoided by the surrender on the following day.



VICKSBURG, FROM THE RIVER. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.



ARRIVAL OF GENERAL GRANT AT GENERAL PEMBERTON'S VICKSBURG HOUSE, JULY 4, 1863. FROM A SKETCH MADE AT THE TIME.

THE TERMS OF SURRENDER.

I. BY JOHN C. PEMBERTON, LIEUTENANT-GENERAL, C. S. A.

PHILADELPHIA, June 12, 1875.

DEAR SIR:—I give you with pleasure my version of the interview between General Grant and myself on the afternoon of July 3, 1863, in front of the Confederate lines at Vicksburg.

If you will refer to the first volume of Badeau's life of U. S. Grant, you will find a marked discrepancy between that author's account of it and mine. I do not fear, however, to trust to the honest memory of any officer then present to confirm the statement I shall make.

Passing over all preceding events, I come at once to the circumstance that brought about the personal interview referred to.

Feeling assured that it was useless to hope longer for assistance from General Johnston, either to raise the siege of Vicksburg or to rescue the garrison, I summoned division and brigade commanders, with one or two others, to meet in my quarters on the night of the 2d of July. All the correspondence that had taken place during the siege between General Johnston and myself

was laid before these officers. After much consideration it was advised that I address a note to General Grant, proposing the appointment of commissioners to arrange terms of capitulation.

The following, having been read to the council and approved, was sent to General Grant under a flag of truce by the hands of Major-General J. S. Bowen, on the morning of the 3d:

"VICKSBURG, July 3d, 1863. MAJOR-GENERAL GRANT, Commanding United States Forces near Vicksburg, Mississippi. GENERAL: I have the honor to propose to you an armistice of ——— hours, with a view to arrange terms of capitulation of Vicksburg. To this end, if agreeable to you, I will appoint three commissioners to meet a like number, to be named by yourself, at such place and hour to-day as you may find convenient. I make this proposition to save further effusion of blood, which must otherwise be shed to a frightful extent, feeling myself fully able to maintain my position for a yet indefinite period. This communication will be handed you under flag of truce by Major-General John S. Bowen. I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant, JOHN C. PEMBERTON, Lieutenant-General Commanding."

For this letter, addressed to Lieutenant-Colonel John P. Nicholson, the American editor of the *Comte de Paris's* "History of the Civil War," we are indebted to General Marcus J. Wright, Agent of the War Department for the Collection of Confederate Records. See General Grant's reply, addressed to General Pemberton, p. 545; also his paper, "The Vicksburg Campaign," p. 493.—EDITORS.

Among General Pemberton's papers was found a copy of the following letter, accompanied by a note stating that the original had "miscarried and was never received, but General Johnston was kind enough to furnish me a copy":

"June 27, 1863. GENERAL PEMBERTON: Your dispatch of the 22d received. General E. K. Smith's troops have been mismanaged, and have fallen back to Delhi. I have sent a special messenger, urging him to assume direct command. The determined spirit you manifest and his expected co-operation encourage me to hope that something may yet be done to save Vicksburg and to postpone both of the modes suggested of merely extricating the garrison. Negotiations with Grant for the relief of the garrison, should they become necessary, must be made by you. It would be a confession of weakness on my part, which I ought not to make, to propose them. When it becomes necessary to make terms, they may be considered as made under my authority.—J. E. JOHNSTON, General."

In due time the following reply was handed to me:

"HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE, NEAR VICKSBURG, July 3d, 1863. LIEUTENANT-GENERAL JOHN C. PEMBERTON, Commanding Confederate Forces, etc. GENERAL: Your note of this date is just received, proposing an armistice for several hours for the purpose of arranging terms of capitulation through commissioners to be appointed, etc. The needless effusion of blood you propose stopping by this course can be ended at any time you may choose, by an unconditional surrender of the city and garrison. Men who have shown so much endurance and courage as shown now in Vicksburg, will always challenge the respect of an adversary, and I can assure you will be treated with all the respect due to prisoners of war. I do not favor the proposition of appointing commissioners to arrange the terms of capitulation, because I have no terms other than those indicated above. I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant, U. S. GRANT, Major-General."

I at once expressed to General Bowen my determination not to surrender unconditionally. He then stated that General Grant would like to have an interview with me if I was so disposed, and would meet me at a designated point between the two lines at 3 P. M. that day. I was not aware that the suggestion had originated with General Bowen, but acceded to the proposed meeting at the joint request of my four division commanders.

On reaching the place appointed, accompanied by Major-General Bowen and Colonel Montgomery, then temporarily serving on my personal staff, I found General Grant and a number of his generals and other officers already arrived and dismounted. To the general himself, with whom my acquaintance dated as far back as the Mexican war,—as well as to several of the group who surrounded him,—I was formally introduced by General Bowen.

After a few remarks and inquiries on either side, a pause ensued, which was prolonged on my part in expectation that General Grant would introduce the subject, the discussion of which I supposed to be the object of our meeting. Finding that he did not do so, I said to him that I understood that he had expressed a wish to have a personal interview with me. He replied that he had not. I was much surprised, and, turning to General Bowen, remarked, "Then there is a misunderstanding; I certainly understood differently." The matter, however, was satisfactorily explained to me in a few words, the mistake, no doubt, having been my own. Again addressing General Grant, I said: "In your letter this morning you state that you have no other terms than an unconditional surrender." He answered promptly, "I have no other." To this I rejoined: "Then, sir, it is unnecessary that you and I should hold any further conversation; we will go to fighting again at once"; and I added: "I can assure you, sir, you will bury many more of your men before you will enter Vicksburg." General Grant did not, as Badeau represents, reply, "Very well," nor did he "turn off." He did not change his position, nor did he utter a word. The movement to withdraw, so far as there was any movement, was on my part, and was accompanied by the remark that if he

(General Grant) supposed that I was suffering for provisions he was mistaken, that I had enough to last me for an indefinite period, and that Port Hudson was better supplied than Vicksburg. General Bowen made no suggestion whatever in regard to a consultation between any parties during this interview, as he is represented to have done by Badeau; but General Grant *did* at this time propose that he and I should step aside, and on my assenting, he added that if I had no objection, he would take with him Generals McPherson and A. J. Smith. I replied, certainly, and that General Bowen and Colonel Montgomery would accompany me. General Grant then suggested that these gentlemen withdraw and see whether, on consultation, they could not arrive at some satisfactory arrangement. It will be readily understood that I offered no objection to this course, as it was, in fact, a withdrawal by General Grant from the position he had so unqualifiedly assumed, to wit, unconditional surrender—and it really submitted, as I had desired it should, the discussion of the question of terms to a commission, although that commission was now necessarily an *impromptu* one.

Pending the interchange of views by the officers named, General Grant and I remained apart from them, conversing only upon topics that had no relation to the important subject that brought us together. The terms which this commission agreed to propose were in the main those that were afterward proffered by General Grant, and eventually accepted by me. During this discussion I stated to him that as he declined to appoint commissioners when invited to do so by me, it was now his part to propose the terms. He agreed to this, and said I should hear from him by 10 P. M. When about to part I notified General Grant that I held myself in no manner pledged to any agreement, but should consult my division and brigade commanders. He replied that I must understand him in the like manner, and that he, too, should consult his corps commanders. With this our interview ended.

Mr. Badeau's statement is a misrepresentation of the facts as they occurred, and, whether intentional or otherwise, conveys false impressions to his readers. If he was present at the interview he knows, if he was absent, he could readily have ascertained, that after General Grant's verbal declaration that he had no other terms than unconditional surrender, all suggestions and all overtures looking to terms arose directly from General Grant himself, and neither directly nor indirectly from me or my subordinates. There was no display by General Grant as to the result of this interview, nor did he feel indifferent. On the night of the 3d of July a dispatch was intercepted by my signal-officer from Admiral Porter to General Grant. The former inquired as to the chances of a surrender on the 4th. General Grant replied through the same medium, mentioning in a general way the terms offered, stating that the arrangement was *against his feelings*, but that his officers advised it on the ground that it would free his river transportation for other

important uses, etc., etc. If this message was sent it should be found in the reports of the signal-officers. Will you have it looked up? No doubt

both these gentlemen remember the circumstances. I am, Colonel, very truly yours,

J. C. PEMBERTON.

II. BY ULYSSES S. GRANT, GENERAL, U. S. A.

THE following letter, dated New York, November 30th, 1884, and printed for the first time in "The Century" magazine for August, 1887, was addressed to General Marcus J. Wright, Agent of the War Department for the Collection of Confederate Records, by whose permission it is here given, from the original manuscript.—EDITORS.

DEAR GENERAL: Herewith I send you General Pemberton's account of the surrender of Vicksburg. As the written matter [printed above] is "Copy," and supposing you have what it has been copied from, I do not return it, though I will if you inform me that you want it.

A gentleman from Philadelphia sent me the same matter I return herewith, last summer. I probably left the paper at Long Branch, but do not know certainly. All there is of importance in the matter of the surrender of Vicksburg is contained in the correspondence between General Pemberton and myself. The fact is, General Pemberton, being a Northern man commanding a Southern army, was not at the same liberty to surrender an army that a man of Southern birth would be. In adversity or defeat he became an object of suspicion, and felt it. Bowen was a Southern man all over, and knew the garrison of Vicksburg had to surrender or be captured, and knew it was best to stop further effusion of blood by surrendering. He did all he could to bring about that result.

Pemberton is mistaken in several points. It was Bowen that proposed that he and A. J. Smith should talk over the matter of the surrender and submit their views. Neither Pemberton nor I objected, but we were

not willing to commit ourselves to accepting such terms as they might propose. In a short time those officers returned. Bowen acted as spokesman; what he said was substantially this: The Confederate army was to be permitted to march out with the honors of war, carrying with them their arms, colors, and field-batteries. The National troops were then to march in and occupy the city, and retain the siege-guns, small-arms not in the hands of the men, all public property remaining. Of course I rejected the terms at once. I did agree, however, before we separated, to write Pemberton what terms I would give. The correspondence is public and speaks for itself. I held no council of war; hostilities having ceased, officers and men soon became acquainted with the reason why. Curiosity led officers of rank—most all the general officers—to visit my headquarters with the hope of getting some news. I talked with them very freely about the meeting between General Pemberton and myself, our correspondence, etc., but in no sense was it a council of war. I was very glad to give the garrison of Vicksburg the terms I did. There was a cartel in existence at that time which required either party to exchange or parole all prisoners either at Vicksburg or at a point on the James River within ten days after captures or as soon thereafter as practicable. This would have used all the transportation we had for a month. *The men had behaved so well that I did not want to humiliate them. I believed that consideration for their feelings would make them less dangerous foes during the continuance of hostilities, and better citizens after the war was over.*

I am very much obliged to you, General, for your courtesy in sending me these papers. Very truly yours,

U. S. GRANT.

III. CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN GENERAL PEMBERTON AND GENERALS GRANT AND BLAIR.

General Pemberton to General Grant: †

WARRENTON, FAUQUIER, VIRGINIA, January 30, 1874. HIS EXCELLENCY, U. S. GRANT, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES. SIR: A statement of some historic significance and of considerable interest to me personally, has lately come to my notice in a way that induces me to address you as the single individual competent to confirm or refute it. I am aware that I have no claim to your special consideration; should you, however, deem it not improper to respond to my inquiry, I shall feel myself indebted to your kindness. The statement I refer to was from a general officer of the Army of the Tennessee, and was in the words following:

"It was generally understood in our army that General Johnston's courier, conveying dispatches to you previous to the battle of Baker's Creek or Champion Hills, betrayed his dispatches to General Grant, and also your answers to General Johnston's orders. I do not know positively from General Grant these facts, but the matter was spoken of by the officers of our army in such a way as to leave no doubt in my mind."

Permit me to add that this information has tended to confirm my own suspicion, excited at the time by the (otherwise) inexplicable delay in

the receipt of General Johnston's dispatch of the 14th of May, which, as you, sir, are probably aware, was not handed to me until after 5 P. M. on the 16th, when my army was in full retreat. My inquiry is confined simply to two points: first, the truth (or reverse) of the facts discussed by the officers of the Army of the Tennessee; second, the correctness (or the reverse) of my surmises as to the dispatch of the 14th, above referred to. I am, sir, most respectfully your obedient servant,

J. C. PEMBERTON.

General Grant to General Pemberton:

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, January 31, 1874. GENERAL J. C. PEMBERTON, Warrenton, Virginia. General: Your letter of yesterday was duly received this morning, and the President authorizes me to say that the statement of the officer to which you refer was correct, and he thinks you are also correct as to your surmises in regard to the delay in receipt of your dispatch. He says the dispatches were brought in our lines and given to General McPherson, and by him immediately brought to headquarters. I have the honor to remain, sir, your obedient servant,


LEVI P. LUCKEY, Secretary.

† On the 19th of January, 1874, General Pemberton addressed a letter, substantially to the same effect, to General Frank P. Blair, whose reply follows General Grant's.—EDITORS.

General Blair to General Pemberton :

ST. LOUIS, January 24, 1874. GENERAL J. C. PEMBERTON, Fauquier County, Virginia. DEAR GENERAL: I take pleasure, in answer to your letter of the 19th of January, in saying that it was generally understood in our army that General J. Johnston's courier, conveying dispatches to you previous to the battle of Baker's Creek or Champion Hills, betrayed his dispatches to General

Grant, and also your answers to General Johnston's orders, so that, in fact, General Grant had the most precise information as to your movements and those of General Johnston. I do not know positively from General Grant these facts, but the matter was spoken of by the officers of our army in such a way as to leave no doubt in my mind. Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
FRANK P. BLAIR.



CONFEDERATE RIVER-BATTERY ON THE RIDGE SOUTH OF VICKSBURG. FROM A SKETCH MADE AFTER THE SURRENDER.

THE OPPOSING FORCES IN THE VICKSBURG CAMPAIGN.

May 1st—July 4th, 1863.

The composition, losses, and strength of each army as here stated give the gist of all the data obtainable in the Official Records. K stands for killed; w for wounded; m w for mortally wounded; m for captured or missing; c for captured.

UNION FORCES: ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE, Maj.-Gen. Ulysses S. Grant.

Escort: A, 4th Ill. Cav., Capt. Embury D. Osband. *Engineers:* 1st Batt. Eng. Regt. of the West, Maj. W. Tweeddale.

NINTH ARMY CORPS (joined June 14-17), Maj.-Gen. John G. Parke.

FIRST DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Thomas Welsh.

First Brigade, Col. Henry Bowman: 36th Mass., Lieut.-Col. John B. Norton; 17th Mich., Lieut.-Col. Constant Luce; 27th Mich., Col. Dorus M. Fox; 45th Pa., Col. John I. Curtin. *Third Brigade*, Col. Daniel Leasure: 2d Mich., Col. William Humphrey; 8th Mich., Col. Frank Graves; 20th Mich., Lieut.-Col. W. Huntington Smith; 79th N. Y., Col. David Morrison; 100th Pa., Lieut.-Col. Mathew M. Dawson. *Artillery:* D, Pa., Capt. G. W. Durell.

SECOND DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Robert B. Potter.

First Brigade, Col. Simon G. Griffin: 6th N. H., Lieut.-Col. Henry H. Pearson; 9th N. H., Col. Herbert B. Titus; 7th R. I., Col. Zenas R. Bliss. *Second Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Edward Ferrero: 35th Mass., Col. Sumner Carruth; 11th N. H., Lieut.-Col. Moses N. Collins; 51st N. Y., Col. Charles W. Le Gendre; 51st Pa., Col. John F. Hartranft. *Third Brigade*, Col. Benjamin C. Christ: 29th Mass., Lieut.-Col. Joseph H. Barnes; 46th N. Y., Col. Joseph Gerhardt; 50th Pa., Lieut.-Col. Thomas S. Brenholtz. *Artillery:* L, 2d N. Y., Capt. Jacob Roemer.

ARTILLERY RESERVE, E, 2d U. S., Lieut. Samuel N. Benjamin.

THIRTEENTH ARMY CORPS, Maj.-Gen. John A. McClelland, Maj.-Gen. Edward O. C. Ord.

Escort: L, 3d Ill. Cav., Capt. David R. Sparks.

Pioneers: Indpt. Co., Ky. Inf., Capt. Wm. F. Patterson. NINTH DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Peter J. Osterhaus (w).

Brig.-Gen. Albert L. Lee, Brig.-Gen. Peter J. Osterhaus. Staff loss: Big Black Bridge, w, 1.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Theophilus T. Garrard, Brig.-Gen. Albert L. Lee (w), Col. James Keigwin: 118th Ill., Col. John G. Fonda; 49th Ind., Col. James Keigwin, Maj. Arthur J. Hawhe, Lieut.-Col. Joseph H. Thornton; 69th Ind., Col. Thomas W. Bennett, Lieut.-Col. Oran Perry; 7th Ky., Maj. H. W. Adams, Lieut.-Col. John Lucas, Col. Reuben May; 120th Ohio, Col. Marens M. Spiegel. Brigade loss: Port Gibson, k, 18; w, 102; m, 3=123. Champion's Hill, k, 11; w, 44; m, 13=68. Big Black Bridge, w, 1. Vicksburg, assault May 19th, k, 1; w, 28=29; assault May 22d, k, 15; w, 87=102. *Second Brigade*, Col. Lionel A. Sheldon, Col. Daniel W. Lindsey: 54th Ind., Col. Fielding Mansfield; 22d Ky., Lieut.-Col. George W. Monroe; 16th Ohio, Capt. Eli W. Botsford, Maj. Milton Mills; 42d Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Don A. Pardee, Maj. William H. Williams, Col. Lionel A. Sheldon; 114th Ohio, Col. John Cradlebaugh (w), Lieut.-Col. John H. Kelly. Brigade loss: Port Gibson, k, 15; w, 66=81. Champion's Hill, k, 6; w, 42; m, 13=61. Big Black Bridge, k, 10; w, 14; m, 1=25. Vicksburg, assault May 19th, k, 1; w, 34=35; assault May 22d, k, 14; w, 63; m, 1=78. *Cavalry:* 2d Ill. (5 co's), Lieut.-Col. Daniel B. Bush, Jr.; 3d Ill. (3 co's), Capt. John L. Campbell; 6th Mo. (7 co's), Col. Clark Wright. Cavalry loss: Champion's Hill, k, 2; w, 2=4. *Artillery*, Capt. Jacob T. Foster: 7th Mich., Capt. Charles H. Lanphere; 1st Wis., Lieut. Charles B. Kimball, Lieut. Oscar F. Nutting. Artillery loss: Port Gibson, k, 3; w, 7=10. Big Black Bridge, w, 4.

TENTH DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Andrew J. Smith.

Escort: C, 4th Ind. Cav., Capt. Andrew P. Gallagher.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Stephen G. Burbridge: 16th Ind., Col. Thomas J. Lucas, Maj. James H. Redfield; 60th Ind., Col. Richard Owen; 67th Ind., Lieut.-Col. Theodore E. Buchler; 83d Ohio, Col. Frederick W. Moore; 96th Ohio, Col. Joseph W. Vance; 23d Wis., Col. Joshua J. Guppy, Lieut.-Col. William F. Vilas. *Brigade loss*: Port Gibson, w. 8. *Champion's Hill*, w. 16. *Big Black Bridge*, w. 1; m. 1=2. *Vicksburg*, assault May 19th, k. 2; w. 15=17; assault May 22d, k. 14; w. 82; m. 2=98. *Second Brigade*, Col. William J. Landrau: 77th Ill., Col. David P. Grier; 97th Ill., Col. Friend S. Rutherford, Lieut.-Col. Lewis D. Martin; 130th Ill., Col. Nathaniel Niles; 19th Ky., Lieut.-Col. John Cowan, Maj. Josiah J. Mann; 48th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Job R. Parker, Col. Peter J. Sullivan. *Brigade loss*: Port Gibson, k. 2; w. 21; m. 8=31. *Champion's Hill*, w. 6. *Vicksburg*, assault May 19th, k. 3; w. 15=18; assault May 22d, k. 44; w. 210; m. 30=284. *Artillery*: Mercantile (Ill.) Battery, Capt. Patrick H. White; 17th Ohio, Capt. Ambrose A. Blount, Capt. Charles S. Rice. *Artillery loss*: *Champion's Hill*, w. 3. *Vicksburg*, assault May 22d, w. 3. **TWELFTH DIVISION**, Brig.-Gen. Alvin P. Hovey.

Escort: C, 1st Ind. Cav., Lieut. James L. Carey.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. George F. McGinnis: 11th Ind., Col. Daniel Macauley (w), Lieut.-Col. William W. Darnall; 24th Ind., Col. William T. Spieley (w); 34th Ind., Col. Robert A. Cameron, Lieut.-Col. William Swaim (m w), Maj. Robert B. Jones, Col. Robert A. Cameron; 46th Ind., Col. Thomas H. Bringham; 29th Wis., Col. Charles R. Gill, Lieut.-Col. William A. Greene. *Brigade loss*: Port Gibson, k. 30; w. 187; m. 1=218. *Champion's Hill*, k. 103; w. 507; m. 26=636. *Second Brigade*, Col. James R. Slack: 87th Ill., Col. John E. Whiting; 47th Ind., Lieut.-Col. John A. McLaughlin; 24th Iowa, Col. Eber C. Byam, Lieut.-Col. John Q. Wilds; 28th Iowa, Col. John Connell; 56th Ohio, Col. William H. Raynor. *Brigade loss*: Port Gibson, k. 16; w. 62; m. 11=89. *Champion's Hill*, k. 108; w. 365; m. 93=566. *Artillery*: A, 1st Mo., Capt. George W. Schofield; 2d Ohio, Lieut. Augustus Beach; 16th Ohio, Capt. James A. Mitchell (m w), Lieut. George Murdock, Lieut. Russell P. Twist. *Artillery loss*: Port Gibson, w. 3.

FOURTEENTH DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Eugene A. Carr.

Escort: G, 3d Ill. Cav., Capt. Enos McPhail (k), Capt. Samuel S. Marrett.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. William P. Benton, Col. Henry D. Washburn, Col. David Shunk: 33d Ill., Col. Charles E. Lippincott; 99th Ill., Col. George W. K. Bailey, Lieut.-Col. Lemuel Parke; 8th Ind., Col. David Shunk, Maj. Thomas J. Brady; 18th Ind., Col. Henry D. Washburn, Capt. Jonathan H. Williams; 1st U. S. (siege guns), Maj. Maurice Maloney. *Brigade loss*: Port Gibson, k. 28; w. 134=162. *Champion's Hill*, k. 1; w. 2=3. *Big Black Bridge*, k. 1; w. 22; m. 1=24. *Vicksburg*, assault May 22d, k. 61; w. 273; m. 7=341. *Second Brigade*, Col. Charles L. Harris, Col. William M. Stone, Brig.-Gen. Michael K. Lawler: 21st Iowa, Col. Samuel Merrill (w), Lieut.-Col. Cornelius W. Dunlap (k), Maj. Saluc G. Van Ande; 22d Iowa, Col. William M. Stone (w), Lieut.-Col. Harvey Graham (w and e), Maj. Joseph B. Atherton, Capt. Charles N. Lee; 23d Iowa, Col. William H. Kinsman (k), Col. Samuel L. Glasgow; 11th Wis., Lieut.-Col. Charles A. Wood, Col. Charles L. Harris, Maj. Arthur Platt. *Brigade loss*: Port Gibson, k. 13; w. 88=101. *Big Black Bridge*, k. 27; w. 194=221. *Vicksburg*, assault May 22d, k. 54; w. 285; m. 29=368. *Artillery*: A, 2d Ill., Lieut. Frank B. Feuton, Capt. Peter Davidson; 1st Ind., Capt. Martin Klaus. *Artillery loss*: Port Gibson, k. 2. *Big Black Bridge*, k. 1. *Vicksburg*, assault May 22d, w. 1.

FIFTEENTH ARMY CORPS, Maj.-Gen. William T. Sherman.

FIRST DIVISION, Maj.-Gen. Frederick Steele.

First Brigade, Col. Francis H. Manter, Col. Bernard G. Farrar: 13th Ill., Col. Adam B. Gorgas; 27th Mo., Col. Thomas Curly; 29th Mo., Col. James Peckham; 30th Mo., Lieut.-Col. Otto Schadt; 31st Mo., Col. Thomas C. Fletcher, Maj. Frederick Jaensch, Lieut.-Col. Samuel P. Simpson; 32d Mo., Maj. Abraham J. Seay. *Brigade loss*: *Vicksburg*, assault May 19th, k. 1; w. 9=10; assault

May 22d, k. 2; w. 5=7. *Second Brigade*, Col. Charles R. Woods: 25th Iowa, Col. George A. Stone; 31st Iowa, Col. William Smyth, Maj. Theodore Stimming; 3d Mo., Lieut.-Col. Theodore Neumann; 12th Mo., Col. Hugo Wangelin; 17th Mo., Col. Francis Hassendel (m w), Lieut.-Col. John F. Cramer; 76th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. William B. Woods. *Brigade loss*: *Vicksburg*, assault May 19th, k. 1; w. 3=4; assault May 22d, k. 37; w. 145; m. 8=190. *Third Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. John M. Thayer: 4th Iowa, Col. James A. Williamson, Lieut.-Col. George Burten; 9th Iowa, Maj. Don A. Carpenter, Capt. Frederick S. Washburn, Col. David Carskaddon; 26th Iowa, Col. Milo Smith; 30th Iowa, Col. Charles H. Abbott (k), Col. William M. G. Torrence. *Brigade loss*: *Vicksburg*, assault May 19th, k. 7; w. 43=50; assault May 22d, k. 35; w. 119; m. 1=155. *Artillery*: 1st Iowa, Capt. Henry H. Griffiths; F, 2d Mo., Capt. Clemens Landgraeber; 4th Ohio, Capt. Louis Hoffmann. *Artillery loss*: *Vicksburg*, assault May 22d, w. 1. *Cavalry*: Kane County (Ill.) Company, Lieut. Thomas J. Beebe; D, 3d Ill., Lieut. Jonathan Kershner.

SECOND DIVISION, Maj.-Gen. Frank P. Blair, Jr.

First Brigade, Col. Giles A. Smith: 113th Ill., Col. George B. Hoge, Lieut.-Col. John W. Paddock; 116th Ill., Col. Nathan W. Tupper; 6th Mo., Lieut.-Col. Ira Boutell, Col. James H. Blood; 8th Mo., Lieut.-Col. David C. Coleman; 13th U. S. (1st Battalion), Capt. Edward C. Washington (m w), Capt. Charles Ewing, Capt. Charles C. Smith. *Brigade loss*: *Vicksburg*, assault May 19th, k. 37; w. 164; m. 1=202; assault May 22d, k. 20; w. 81; m. 1=102. *Second Brigade*, Col. Thomas Kilby Smith, Brig.-Gen. J. A. J. Lightburn: 55th Ill., Col. Osear Mahmborg; 127th Ill., Col. Hamilton N. Eldridge; 83d Ind., Col. Benjamin J. Spooner; 54th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Cyrus W. Fisher; 57th Ohio, Col. Amiens V. Rice, Lieut.-Col. Samuel R. Mott. *Brigade loss*: *Vicksburg*, assault May 19th, k. 29; w. 125; m. 1=155; assault May 22d, k. 11; w. 45=56. *Third Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Hugh Ewing: 30th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. George H. Hildt, Col. Theodore Jones; 37th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Louis von Blessingh, Maj. Charles Hipp, Col. Edward Siber; 47th Ohio, Col. Augustus C. Parry; 4th W. Va., Col. James H. Dayton. *Brigade loss*: *Vicksburg*, assault May 19th, k. 54; w. 194; m. 6=254; assault May 22d, k. 25; w. 116; m. 3=144. *Artillery*: A, 1st Ill., Capt. Peter P. Wood; B, 1st Ill., Capt. Samuel E. Barrett, Lieut. Israel P. Rumsey; H, 1st Ill., Capt. Levi W. Hart; 8th Ohio, Capt. James F. Putnam. *Artillery loss*: *Vicksburg*, assault May 19th, w. 2; assault May 22d, k. 2. *Cavalry*: A and B, Thielemann's (Ill.) Battalion, Capt. Milo Thielemann; C, 10th Mo., Capt. D. W. Ballou, Lieut. Ben. Joel.

THIRD DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. James M. Tuttle.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Ralph P. Buckland, Col. William L. McMillen: 114th Ill., Col. James W. Judy; 93d Ind., Col. De Witt C. Thomas; 72d Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Le Roy Crockett (w), Maj. Charles G. Eaton; 95th Ohio, Col. William L. McMillen, Lieut.-Col. Jefferson Brumbaek. *Brigade loss*: Jackson, k. 4; w. 9=13. *Vicksburg*, assault May 19th, k. 4; w. 30=34; assault May 22d, w. 9. *Second Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Joseph A. Mower: 47th Ill., Col. John N. Cromwell (k), Lieut.-Col. Samuel R. Baker; 5th Minn., Col. Lucius F. Hubbard; 11th Mo., Col. Andrew J. Weber (m w), Lieut.-Col. William L. Barnum; 8th Wis., Col. George W. Robbins. *Brigade loss*: Jackson, k. 1; w. 9; m. 3=13. *Vicksburg*, assault May 22d, k. 17; w. 136; m. 29=182. *Third Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Charles L. Matthes, Col. Joseph J. Woods: 8th Iowa, Col. James L. Geddes; 12th Iowa, Col. Joseph J. Woods, Lieut.-Col. Samuel R. Edginton; 35th Iowa, Col. Sylvester G. Hill. *Brigade loss*: Jackson, k. 1; w. 1; m. 1=3. *Vicksburg*, assault May 19th, k. 1; w. 1=2; assault May 22d, w. 5. *Artillery*, Capt. Nelson T. Spoor; E, 1st Ill., Capt. Allen C. Waterhouse; 2d Iowa, Lieut. Joseph R. Reed. *Artillery loss*: Jackson, w. 3. *Vicksburg*, assault May 22d, k. 1; w. 4=5. *Cavalry*: 4th Iowa, Lieut.-Col. Simeon D. Swan.

SIXTEENTH ARMY CORPS (detachment), Maj.-Gen. Cadwallader C. Washburn.

FIRST DIVISION (joined June 12th), Brig.-Gen. Win. Sooy Smith.

Escort: B, 7th Ill. Cav., Capt. Henry C. Forbes.

First Brigade, Col. John M. Loomis: 26th Ill., Maj. John B. Harris; 90th Ill., Col. Timothy O'Meara; 12th Ind., Col. Reuben Williams; 100th Ind., Lieut.-Col. Albert Heath. *Second Brigade,* Col. Stephen G. Hicks: 40th Ill., Maj. Hiram W. Hall; 103d Ill., Col. Willard A. Dickerman; 15th Mich., Col. John M. Oliver; 46th Ohio, Col. Charles C. Walcutt. *Third Brigade,* Col. Joseph R. Cockerill: 97th Ind., Col. Robert F. Catterson; 99th Ind., Col. Alexander Fowler; 53d Ohio, Col. Wells S. Jones; 70th Ohio, Maj. Wm. B. Brown. *Fourth Brigade,* Col. Wm. W. Sanford: 48th Ill., Lieut.-Col. Lucien Great-house; 6th Iowa, Col. John M. Corse. *Artillery,* Capt. Wm. Cogswell: F, 1st Ill., Capt. John T. Cheuey; I, 1st Ill., Lieut. Wm. N. Lansing; Cogswell, Ill., Lieut. Henry G. Eddy; 6th Ind., Capt. Michael Mueller.

FOURTH DIVISION (joined May 13th to 20th, and temporarily attached to Fifteenth Corps), Brig.-Gen. Jacob G. Lauman.

First Brigade, Col. Isaac C. Pugh: 41st Ill., Lieut.-Col. John H. Nale; 53d Ill., Lieut.-Col. Seth C. Earl; 3d Iowa, Col. Aaron Brown; 33d Wis., Col. Jonathan B. Moore. *Second Brigade,* Col. Cyrus Hall: 14th Ill., Lieut.-Col. Wm. Cain, Capt. Augustus H. Cornman; 15th Ill., Col. Geo. C. Rogers; 46th Ill., Col. Benj. Dornblaser; 76th Ill., Col. Samuel T. Busey; 53d Ind. (transferred to Third Brigade June 22d), Col. Walter Q. Gresham. *Third Brigade,* Col. Geo. E. Bryant, Col. Amory K. Johnson: 28th Ill., Maj. Heman Rhodes; 32d Ill., Col. John Logan, Lieut.-Col. Wm. Hunter; 12th Wis., Lieut.-Col. DeWitt C. Poole, Col. Geo. E. Bryant. *Cavalry:* F and I, 15th Ill., Maj. James G. Wilson. *Artillery,* Capt. Geo. C. Gunbart: E, 2d Ill., Lieut. Geo. L. Nispel; K, 2d Ill., Capt. Benj. F. Rodgers; 5th Ohio, Lieut. Anthony B. Burtou; 7th Ohio, Capt. Silas A. Burnap; 15th Ohio, Capt. Edward Spear, Jr.

PROVISIONAL DIVISION (joined June 3d), Brig.-Gen. Nathan Knibball.

Engelmann's Brigade, Col. Adolph Engelmann: 43d Ill., Lieut.-Col. Adolph Dengler; 61st Ill., Maj. Simou P. Ohr; 106th Ill., Maj. John M. Hunt; 12th Mich., Col. Wm. H. Graves. *Richmond's Brigade,* Col. Jonathan Richmond: 18th Ill., Col. Daniel H. Brush; 54th Ill., Col. Greenville M. Mitchell; 126th Ill., Maj. Wm. W. Wilshire; 22d Ohio, Col. Oliver Wood. *Montgomery's Brigade,* Col. Milton Montgomery: 40th Iowa, Col. John A. Garrett; 3d Minn., Col. Chauncey W. Griggs; 25th Wis., Lieut.-Col. Samuel J. Nasmith; 27th Wis., Col. Conrad Krez.

SEVENTEENTH ARMY CORPS, Maj.-Gen. James B. McPherson.

Escort: 4th Co. Ohio Cav., Capt. John S. Foster. Loss: Port Gibson, w, 1.

THIRD DIVISION, Maj.-Gen. John A. Logan.

Escort: A, 2d Ill. Cav., Lieut. William B. Cummins.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. John E. Smith, Brig.-Gen. Mortimer D. Leggett: 20th Ill., Lieut.-Col. Evan Richards (k), Maj. Daniel Bradley; 31st Ill., Col. Edwin S. McCook (w), Lieut.-Col. John D. Rees (m w), Maj. Robert N. Pearson; 45th Ill., Col. Jasper A. Maltby; 124th Ill., Col. Thomas J. Sloan; 23d Ind., Lieut.-Col. William P. Davis. Brigade loss: Port Gibson, k, 5; w, 27=32. Raymond, k, 35; w, 175; m, 25=235. Champion's Hill, k, 22; w, 104; m, 9=135. Vicksburg, assault May 22d, k, 7; w, 72; m, 2=81. *Second Brigade,* Brig.-Gen. Elias S. Dennis, Brig.-Gen. Mortimer D. Leggett, Col. Manning F. Force: 30th Ill., Lieut.-Col. Warren Shedd; 20th Ohio, Col. Maunung F. Force, Capt. Francis M. Shaklee; 68th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. John S. Snook (k), Col. Robert K. Scott; 78th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Greenberry F. Wiles. Brigade loss: Port Gibson, w, 3. Raymond, k, 10; w, 75=85. Champion's Hill, k, 21; w, 189=210. Vicksburg, assault May 22d, w, 6. *Third Brigade,* Brig.-Gen. John D. Stevenson: 8th Ill., Col. John P. Post, Lieut.-Col. Robert H. Sturgess; 17th Ill., Lieut.-Col. Francis M. Smith, Maj. Frank F. Peats; 81st Ill., Col. James J. Dolins (k), Col. Franklin Campbell; 7th Mo., Maj. Edwin Wakefield, Lieut.-Col. William S. Oliver (w), Capt. Robert Buchanan, Capt. William B. Collins; 32d Ohio, Col. Benjamin F. Potts. Brigade loss: Port Gibson, k, 1; w, 8; m, 2=11. Raymond, k, 18; w, 85; m, 12=115.

Champion's Hill, k, 7; w, 36; m, 18=61. Vicksburg, assault May 22d, k, 34; w, 238=272. *Artillery,* Maj. Charles J. Stollbrand: D, 1st Ill., Capt. Henry A. Rogers (k), Lieut. George J. Wood, Capt. Frederick Sparrestrom; G, 2d Ill., Capt. Frederick Sparrestrom, Lieut. John W. Lowell; L, 2d Ill., Capt. William H. Bolton; 8th Mich., Capt. Samuel De Golyer (m w), Lieut. Theodore W. Lockwood; 3d Ohio, Capt. William S. Williams. Artillery loss: Port Gibson, w, 2. Raymond, w, 1. Champion's Hill, k, 1.

SIXTH DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. John McArthur.

Escort: G, 1st Ill. Cav., Lieut. Stephen S. Tripp.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Hugh T. Reed: 1st Kan., Col. William Y. Roberts; 16th Wis., Col. Benjamin Allen. *Second Brigade,* Brig.-Gen. Thomas E. G. Ransom: 11th Ill., Lieut.-Col. Garrett Nevins (k), Lieut.-Col. James H. Coates; 72d Ill., Col. Frederick A. Starring; 95th Ill., Col. Thomas W. Humphrey, Lieut.-Col. Leander Blauden; 14th Wis., Col. Lyman M. Ward; 17th Wis., Lieut.-Col. Thomas McMahon, Col. Adam G. Malloy. Brigade loss: Vicksburg, assault May 19th, k, 14; w, 110=124; assault May 22d, k, 57; w, 275; m, 32=364. *Third Brigade,* Col. William Hall, Col. Alexander Chambers: 11th Iowa, Lieut.-Col. John C. Abercrombie, Col. William Hall; 13th Iowa, Col. John Shau; 15th Iowa, Col. William W. Belknap; 16th Iowa, Lieut.-Col. Addison H. Sanders. Brigade loss: Vicksburg, assault May 22d, k, 1; w, 2=3. *Artillery,* Maj. Thomas D. Maurice: F, 2d Ill., Capt. John W. Powell; 1st Minn., Lieut. Henry Hunter, Capt. William Z. Clayton; C, 1st Mo., Capt. Charles Mann; 10th Ohio, Capt. Hamilton B. White, Lieut. William L. Newcomb.

SEVENTH DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Marcellus M. Crocker, Brig.-Gen. Isaac F. Quinby, Brig.-Gen. John E. Smith.

Escort: F, 4th Mo. Cav., Lieut. Alexander Mueller.

Loss: Raymond, k, 1; w, 1=2.

First Brigade, Col. John B. Sanborn: 48th Ind., Col. Norman Eddy; 59th Ind., Col. Jesse I. Alexander; 4th Minn., Lieut.-Col. John E. Tourtellotte; 18th Wis., Col. Gabriel Bouck. Brigade loss: Jackson, k, 4; w, 33=37. Champion's Hill, k, 5; w, 51=56. Vicksburg, assault May 22d, k, 36; w, 176; m, 2=214. *Second Brigade,* Col. Samuel A. Holmes, Col. Green B. Raum: 56th Ill., Col. Green B. Raum, Capt. Pinckney J. Welsh; 17th Iowa, Col. David B. Hillis, Col. Clark R. Weyer, Maj. John F. Waldeu; 10th Mo., Lieut.-Col. Leonidas Horney (k), Maj. Francis C. Deimling; E, 24th Mo., Lieut. Daniel Driscoll; 80th Ohio, Col. Matthias H. Bartilson, Maj. Preen. Metham. Brigade loss: Jackson, k, 30; w, 182; m, 3=215. Champion's Hill, k, 12; w, 87; m, 4=103. Vicksburg, assault May 22d, k, 1; w, 11=12. *Third Brigade,* Col. George B. Boomer (k), Col. Holden Putnam, Brig.-Gen. Charles L. Matthes: 93d Ill., Col. Holden Putnam, Lieut.-Col. Nicholas C. Buswell, Col. Holden Putnam; 5th Iowa, Lieut.-Col. Ezekiel S. Sampson, Col. Jabez Banbury; 10th Iowa, Col. William E. Small; 26th Mo., Capt. Benjamin D. Dean. Brigade loss: Jackson, k, 1; w, 10=11. Champion's Hill, k, 111; w, 388; m, 11=510. Vicksburg, assault May 19th, k, 2; w, 3=5; assault May 22d, k, 14; w, 100=114. *Artillery,* Capt. Frank C. Sands, Capt. Henry Dillon; M, 1st Mo., Lieut. Junius W. MacMurray; 11th Ohio, Lieut. Fletcher E. Armstrong; 6th Wis., Capt. Henry Dillon, Lieut. Samuel F. Clark; 12th Wis., Capt. William Ziekerick. Artillery loss: Jackson, w, 2. Champion's Hill, w, 2.

HERRON'S DIVISION (joined June 11), Maj.-Gen. Francis J. Herron.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Wm. Vandever: 37th Ill., Col. John C. Black; 26th Ind., Col. John G. Clark; 20th Iowa, Col. Wm. McE. Dye; 34th Iowa, Col. George W. Clark; 38th Iowa, Col. D. Henry Hughes; E, 1st Mo. Art'y, Capt. Nelson Cole; F, 1st Mo. Art'y, Capt. Joseph Foust. *Second Brigade,* Brig.-Gen. Wm. W. Orme: 94th Ill., Col. John McNulta; 19th Iowa, Lieut.-Col. Daniel Kent; 20th Wis., Col. Henry Bertram; B, 1st Mo. Art'y, Capt. Martin Welfey.

UNATTACHED CAVALRY, Col. Cyrus Bussey: 5th Ill., Maj. Thomas A. Apperson; 3d Iowa, Maj. Oliver H. P. Scott; 2d Wis., Col. Thomas Stephens.

DISTRICT NORTH-EAST LOUISIANA.—Brig.-Gen. Elias S. Dumas.

DETACHED BRIGADE, Col. George W. Neeley; 63d Ill., Col. Joseph B. McCown; 108th Ill., Lieut.-Col. Charles Turner; 120th Ill., Col. George W. McKaig; 131st Ill., Col. George W. Neeley, Maj. Joseph L. Purvis; 10th Ill. Cav. (4 co's), Maj. Elvis P. Shaw.

AFRICAN BRIGADE, Col. Isaac J. Shepard.

Post of Milliken's Bend, Col. Hiram Seofield; 8th La., Col. Hiram Seofield; 9th La., Col. Herman Lieb, Maj. Erastus N. Owen, Lieut.-Col. Charles J. Paine; 11th La., Col. Edwin W. Chamberlain, Lieut.-Col. Cyrus Sears; 13th La., Lieut. H. Knoll; 1st Miss., Lieut.-Col. A. Watson Webber; 3d Miss., Col. Richard H. Ballinger.

Post of Goodrich's Landing, Col. Wm. F. Wood; 1st Ark., Lieut.-Col. James W. Campbell; 10th La., Lieut.-Col. Frederick M. Crandall.

Grant's losses during the campaign were:

ENGAGEMENTS.	Kill'd.	Wound- ed.	Capt- ured or Miss'g.	Total.
Port Gibson	131	719	25	875
Raymond	66	339	37	442
Jackson	42	251	7	300
Champion's Hill	410	1,844	187	2,441
Big Black Bridge	39	237	3	279
Assault of May 19	157	777	8	942
Assault of May 22	502	2,550	147	3,199
Siege Operations	104	419	7	530
Miscellaneous Skirmishes	63	259	32	354
Aggregate	1,514	7,395	453	9,362

The effective force ranged from 43,000 at the beginning to 75,000 at the close of the campaign.

CONFEDERATE FORCES: Lieut.-General John C. Pemberton.

FIRST DIVISION, ☆ Maj.-Gen. W. W. Loring.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Lloyd Tilghman (k), Col. A. E. Reynolds; 1st Confederate Battalion, Maj. G. H. Forney; 6th Miss., Col. Robert Lowry; 15th Miss., Col. M. Farrell; 20th Miss., Col. D. R. Russell; 23d Miss., Col. J. M. Wells; 26th Miss., Col. A. E. Reynolds, Maj. T. F. Parker; Miss. Battery, Capt. J. J. Cowan; Miss. Battery, Capt. Jacob Culbertson. Brigade loss: Champion's Hill, k, 5; w, 10; m, 42=57. *Second Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Winfield S. Featherston; 3d Miss., Col. T. A. Mellon; 22d Miss., Lieut.-Col. H. J. Reid; 31st Miss., Col. J. A. Orr; 33d Miss., Col. D. W. Hurst; 1st Miss. Battalion Sharpshooters, Maj. W. A. Rayburn. Brigade loss: Champion's Hill, w, 2; m, 1=3. *Third Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Abram Buford; 27th Ala., Col. James Jackson; 35th Ala., Col. Edward Goodwin; 54th Ala., Col. Alpheus Baker (w); 55th Ala., Col. John Snodgrass; 9th Ark., Col. Isaac L. Dunlop; 3d Ky. (4 co's), Maj. J. H. Bowman; 7th Ky., Col. Edward Crossland; 12th La., Col. T. M. Scott; Pointe Coupée (La.) Artillery, Capt. Alcide Bouanchand. Brigade loss: Champion's Hill, k, 11; w, 49=60.

STEVENSON'S DIVISION, Maj.-Gen. Carter L. Stevenson. Staff loss: Champion's Hill, k, 1.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Seth M. Barton; 40th Ga., Col. Abda Johnson, Lieut.-Col. Robert M. Young; 41st Ga., Col. William E. Curtiss; 42d Ga., Col. R. J. Henderson; 43d Ga., Col. Skidmore Harris (k), Capt. M. M. Grantham; 52d Ga., Col. C. D. Phillips (m), Maj. John J. Moore; Miss. Battery (Hudson's), Lieut. Milton H. Trantham; La. Battery (Pointe Coupée Artillery), Section Co. A, Lieut. John Yoist; La. Battery (Pointe Coupée Artillery), Co. C, Capt. Alexander Chust. Brigade loss: Champion's Hill, k, 58; w, 106; m, 737=901. *Second Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. E. D. Tracy (k), Col. Isham W. Garrott, Brig.-Gen. Stephen D. Lee; 20th Ala., Col. Isham W. Garrott (k), Col. Edward W. Pettus; 23d Ala., Col. F. K. Beck; 30th Ala., Col. Charles M. Shelley, Capt. John C. Francis; 31st Ala., Col. D. B. Hundley (w), Lieut.-Col. T. M. Arrington, Maj. G. W. Mathieson; 46th Ala., Col. Michael L. Woods (c), Capt. George E. Brewer; Ala. Battery, Capt. James F. Waddell. Brigade loss: Port Gibson, k, 18; w, 112; m, 142=272. Champion's Hill, k, 53; w, 152; m, 609=814. Vicksburg (siege), k, 79; w, 177; m, 7=263. *Third Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Alfred Cumming; 34th Ga., Col. James A. W. Johnson; 36th Ga., Col. Jesse A. Glenn, Maj. Charles E. Broyles; 39th Ga., Col. J. T. McConnell (w), Lieut.-Col. J. F. B. Jackson; 56th Ga., Col. E. P. Watkins (w), Lieut.-Col. J. T. Slaught-ter; 57th Ga., Lieut.-Col. C. S. Guyton, Col. William Barkuloo; Ga. Battery (Cherokee Artillery), Capt. M. Van Der Corput. Brigade loss: Champion's Hill, k, 121; w, 269; m, 605=995. Vicksburg (siege), k, 22; w, 74=96. *Fourth Brigade*, Col. A. W. Reynolds; 3d Tenn. (Prov.

Army), Col. N. J. Lillard; 31st Tenn., Col. William M. Bradford; 43d Tenn., Col. James W. Gillespie; 59th Tenn., Col. William L. Eakin; 3d Md. Battery, Capt. F. O. Claiborne (k), Capt. John B. Rowan. Brigade loss: Champion's Hill, m, 152. Big Black Bridge, m, 12. Vicksburg (siege), k, 14; w, 25; m, 14=53. *Texas Legion*, Col. T. N. Waul; 1st Battalion (infantry), Maj. Eugene S. Bol-ling; 2d Battalion (infantry), Lieut.-Col. James Wrigley; Cav. Battalion, Lieut. Thomas J. Cleveland; Art'y Co., Capt. J. Q. Wall. Legion loss: Vicksburg (siege), k, 47; w, 190; m, 8=245. *Attached Troops*: C, 1st Tenn. Cav. (Carter's), Capt. R. S. Vandye; Va. Battery (Botetourt Art'y), Capt. J. W. Johnston, Lieut. James P. Wright.

FORNEY'S DIVISION, Maj.-Gen. John H. Forney.

Hébert's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Louis Hébert; 3d La., Lieut.-Col. S. D. Russell, Maj. David Pierson (w); 21st La., Col. Charles H. Herriek (m w), Lieut.-Col. J. T. Plattsmier; 36th Miss., Col. W. W. Witherspoon; 37th Miss., Col. O. S. Holland; 38th Miss., Capt. D. B. Seal; 43d Miss., Col. Richard Harrison; 7th Miss. Battalion, Capt. A. M. Dozier; C, 2d Ala. Art'y Battalion, Lieut. John R. Selater; Ark. (Appeal) Battery, Capt. W. N. Hogg (k), Lieut. R. N. Cotten. Brigade loss: Vicksburg (siege), k, 219; w, 455; m, 21=695. *Moore's Bri-gade*, Brig.-Gen. John C. Moore; 37th Ala., Col. J. F. Dowdell; 40th Ala., Col. John H. Higley; 42d Ala., Col. John W. Portis, Lieut.-Col. Thomas C. Lanier; 1st Miss. Light Art'y (Batteries A, C, D, E, G, and I), Col. William T. Withers; 35th Miss., Col. William S. Barry, Lieut.-Col. C. R. Jordan; 40th Miss., Col. W. B. Colbert; 2d Tex., Col. Ashbel Smith; Ala. Battery, Capt. H. H. Sengstak; La. Battery (Pointe Coupée Art'y), Capt. William A. Davidson. Brigade loss: Vicksburg (siege), k, 121; w, 304=425.

SMITH'S DIVISION, Maj.-Gen. Martin L. Smith.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. W. E. Baldwin; 17th La., Col. Robert Richardson; 31st La., Col. S. H. Griffin (k), Lieut.-Col. James W. Draughon; 4th Miss., Lieut.-Col. T. W. Adaire (w), Capt. Thomas P. Nelson; 46th Miss., Col. C. W. Sears; Tenn. Battery, Capt. Thomas F. Tobin. Brigade loss: Port Gibson, k, 12; w, 48; m, 27=87. *Vaughn's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. J. C. Vaughn; 60th Tenn., Capt. J. W. Baehman; 61st Tenn., Lieut.-Col. James G. Rose; 62d Tenn., Col. John A. Rowan. *Third Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Francis A. Shoup; 26th La., Col. Winchester Hall (w), Lieut.-Col. William C. Crow; 27th La., Col. L. D. Marks (m w), Lieut.-Col. L. L. McLaurin (k), Capt. Joseph T. Hatcher; 28th La., Col. Allen Thomas; Ark. Battery (McNally's). Brigade loss: Vicksburg (siege), k, 107; w, 199=306. *Mississippi State Troops* (under Vaughn's command), Brig.-Gen. John V. Harris; 5th Reg't, Col. H. C. Robinson; 3d Battalion, Lieut.-Col. Thomas A. Burgin. *Attached Troops*: 14th

☆ The major portion of this division was separated from Pemberton after the battle of Champion's Hill, and joined the forces with General Joseph E. Johnston (Pemberton's superior officer) at Jackson, Mississippi.—EDITORS.

Miss. Art'y Battalion, Maj. M. S. Ward; Miss. Partisan Rangers, Capt. J. S. Smyth.

BOWEN'S DIVISION, Maj.-Gen. John S. Bowen.

First (Missouri) Brigade, Col. Francis M. Cockrell; 1st and 4th Mo., Col. A. C. Riley; 2d Mo., Lieut.-Col. P. S. Senteny (k), Maj. Thomas M. Carter; 3d Mo., Lieut.-Col. F. L. Hubbell (m w), Col. W. R. Gause, Maj. J. K. McDowell; 5th Mo., Lieut.-Col. R. S. Bevier, Col. James McCown; 6th Mo., Col. Eugene Erwin (k), Maj. Stephen Cooper; Mo. Battery (Guibor's), Lieut. William Corkery, Lieut. Cornelius Heffernan; Mo. Battery, Capt. John C. Landis, Lieut. John M. Langan; Mo. Battery (Wade's), Lieut. Rich. C. Walsh. Brigade loss: Port Gibson, k, 13; w, 97; m, 96 = 206. Champion's Hill, k, 65; w, 293; m, 242 = 600. Big Black Bridge, k, 2. Vicksburg (siege), k, 113; w, 446 = 559. *Second Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Martin E. Green (k), Col. T. P. Dockery; 15th Ark., Capt. Caleb Davis; 19th Ark., Col. T. P. Dockery, Capt. James K. Norwood; 20th Ark., Col. D. W. Jones; 21st Ark., Col. J. E. Cravens, Capt. A. Tyler; 1st Ark. Cav. Battalion (dismounted), Capt. John J. Clark; 12th Ark. Battalion Sharpshooters, Capt. Griff. Bayne (w), Lieut. John S. Bell; 1st Mo. Cav. (dismounted), Col. Elijah Gates, Major William C. Parker; 3d Mo. Cav. (dismounted), Captain Felix Lotspeich; 3d Mo. Battery, Captain William E. Dawson; Mo. Battery (Lowe's), Lieutenant Thomas B. Catron; Stirman's Battalion, Colonel Ras. Stirman. Brigade loss: Port Gibson, k, 17; w, 83; m, 122 = 222. Champion's Hill, k, 65; w, 137; m, 65 = 268. Big Black Bridge, k, 1; w, 9; m, 1012 = 1022.

RIVER-BATTERIES, Col. Edward Higgins: 1st La. Artillery, Lieut.-Col. D. Beltzhoover; 8th La. Artillery Battalion, Maj. F. N. Ogden; 23d La., Capt. Samuel Jones; 1st Tenn. Artillery, Col. A. Jackson, Jr.; Tenn. Battery, Capt. J. B. Caruthers; Tenn. Battery, Capt. T. N. Johnston; Tenn. Battery, Capt. J. P. Lynch; Miss. Battery (Vaiden), Capt. S. C. Bains.

MISCELLANEOUS TROOPS: 54th Ala. (detachment), Lieut. Joel P. Abney; City Guards, Capt. E. B. Martin; Miss. Cavalry, Col. Wirt Adams.

JOHNSTON'S FORCES (engaged only at Raymond and Jackson), General Joseph E. Johnston (in chief command of the departments of Generals Bragg, E. Kirby Smith, and Pemberton).

Gregg's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. John Gregg; 1st Tenn. Battalion, Maj. S. H. Colms; 3d Tenn., Col. C. H. Walker; 16th and 30th Tenn., Col. R. W. MacGavock (k), Lieut.-Col. James J. Turner; 41st Tenn., Col. R. Farquharson; 50th Tenn., Lieut.-Col. T. W. Beaumont (w); 7th Tex., Col. H. B. Granbury; Mo. Battery, Capt. H. M. Bledsoe. Brigade loss: Raymond, k, 73; w, 251; m, 190 = 514. *Gist's Brigade*, Col. Peyton H. Colquitt; 46th Ga. (5 co's), Capt. T. B. Hancock; 41st Miss., Lieut.-Col. W. L. Doss; 24th S. C., Lieut.-Col. Ellison Capers; Miss. Bat'y, Capt. J. A. Hoskins. Brigade loss: Jackson, k, 17; w, 64; m, 118 = 198. *Walker's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. W. H. T. Walker; 1st Bat'n Ga. Sharpshooters, Maj. A. Shaaff; Ga. Bat'y, Capt. R. Martin. *Unattached*, 3d Ky. (mounted), Col. A. P. Thompson; 8th Ky. (mounted), Col. H. B. Lyon.

After Grant's withdrawal from Jackson to Vicksburg the reinforcements received by Johnston consisted of the brigades of Rust and Maxey from Port Hudson; Ector's and McNair's brigades and the divisions of Breekinridge and W. H. Jackson from Tennessee; Evans's brigade from Charleston; and the division of Loring from the force under Pemberton. [See p. 487.] On June 4th Johnston's effectives numbered, according to his own report, 24,000. [See also pp. 478, 479, 480.]—EDITORS.

Incomplete reports of Confederate losses from May 1st to July 3d, inclusive, aggregate 1260 killed, 3572 wounded, and 4227 captured or missing = 9059. Complete returns would doubtless swell the number to over 10,000. According to the parole lists on file in the War Department the number surrendered on July 4th was 29,491. Of course this included all the non-combatants. Pemberton's greatest available force, including the troops confronting Grant at Raymond and Jackson, probably numbered over 40,000. General Grant estimated it at nearly 60,000. General Pemberton says in his official report that when he moved within the defenses of Vicksburg his effective aggregate did not exceed 28,000.



WRECK OF THE "STAR OF THE WEST," IN THE TALLAHATCHIE RIVER, OPPOSITE THE SITE OF PORT PEMBERTON. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN IN 1887.

It was the steamer *Star of the West* that was used in the unsuccessful effort to reënforce Fort Sumter in January, 1861. She was seized by the Confederates at Indianola, Texas, in April, 1861. [See Vol. I, p. 625.] S. B. Morgan, of Greenwood, Mississippi, wrote to the editors,

January 12th, 1888, that the *Star of the West* was sunk in the Tallahatchie on March 13th, 1863, under the parapet of Fort Pemberton, to prevent Union gun-boats, that had entered by way of Yazoo Pass, from passing from the Tallahatchie into the Yazoo River. [See map, p. 442.]

NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE VICKSBURG CAMPAIGN.

BY PROFESSOR JAMES RUSSELL SOLEY, U. S. N.

BY the 1st of July, 1862, the Mississippi had been traversed by the fleet of Davis from Cairo down, and by that of Farragut from the Passes up, and the only point where the Confederates retained a strong foothold was at Vicksburg. The objects of the river operations were to establish communication from the Ohio to the Gulf, and to cut off the important supplies drawn by the Confederacy from Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas. The commanders of the Mississippi squadron during this period were, first, Charles Henry Davis, and later, David D. Porter, the transfer of the command taking place October 15th, 1862. The operations of the navy at this time were unique in maritime warfare in the energy and originality with which complex conditions were met.

After the defeat of Montgomery's flotilla at Memphis, on the 6th of June, by the combined forces of Flag-Officer Davis and Colonel Ellet [see Vol. I., pp. 449-459], the Mississippi squadron remained at Memphis for three weeks. Immediately after the battle Davis had formed the project of sending a force up the Arkansas and White rivers to cut off the Confederate gun-boats which were supposed to have taken refuge there, among them the *Van Dorn*, the only vessel remaining of Montgomery's flotilla. Davis did not know that the *Van Dorn* had made her way into the Yazoo. There were, however, two Confederate gun-boats in White River, the *Maurepas* and *Pontchartrain*, which had previously been in the flotilla of Hollins at Island Number Ten—the former under Lieutenant Joseph Fry and the latter under Lieutenant John W. Dunnington.

On the 10th Davis received a telegram from General Halleck urging him to open communication by way of Jacksonport with General Curtis, then moving through Arkansas toward the Mississippi. Davis accordingly altered his plan, and directed that the expedition should confine its operations to the White River. The force detached for the purpose was composed of the iron-clads *Mound City* and *St. Louis*, and the wooden gun-boats *Conestoga* and *Tyler*, under Commander A. H. Kilty, of the *Mound City*, and the 46th Indiana, Colonel Graham N. Fitch. Ascending the White River, the expedition arrived on the evening of the 16th in the neighborhood of St. Charles, ninety miles from the mouth. [See map, p. 442.]

Anticipating this movement, Hindman had taken steps to obstruct the channel at this point, where the first bluffs touch the river. One hundred men, under Captain A. M. Williams, C. S. Engineers, were the only force which could be spared for the defense of the place, and their only arms were thirty-five Enfield rifles which Hindman had impounded at Memphis. Lieutenant Dunnington had placed two rifled 32-pounders in battery on the bluffs, and had manned them with part of the crew of the *Pontchartrain*. Finally, Fry had stationed the *Maurepas* in the river below.

The approach of Kilty's gun-boats was first discovered on the afternoon of June 16th. Expecting an immediate attack, Fry placed the *Maurepas* across the stream and prepared to defend her. Finding that the gun-boats remained below, Fry now landed his guns and scuttled his ship, sinking her across the channel. Two transports also were sunk, and the imperfect obstruction thus created was completed about daylight. During the night a small rifled Parrott gun was placed in position four hundred yards below Dunnington's battery, under Midshipman F. M. Roby. Two rifled Parrott 8-pounders were also moved up soon after daylight, and placed near Roby's gun, and the three guns were manned by the crew of the *Maurepas*, and fought personally by Fry, the senior officer present. Below this second battery Captain Williams was stationed with his thirty-five men, those without arms having been sent to the rear. He was presently reënforced by the 12-pounder howitzer from the *Maurepas*, manned by some of her crew. The total force under Fry's command comprised the men with Williams, and 79 seamen from the two gun-boats,—in all, 114 persons, to resist the attack of Fitch's Indiana regiment, and four gun-boats, two of them iron-clads. Rarely has it happened to such a feeble force to accomplish so much by a determined resistance.

Early on the morning of June 17th the troops landed about two miles below the bluffs. At half-past 8 the gun-boats advanced to the attack, the *Mound City* ahead, followed closely by the *St. Louis*, the *Lexington* and the *Conestoga* bringing up the rear. They moved slowly, endeavoring to discover the enemy's position, but in total ignorance of the whereabouts of his guns, which were covered by the trees and bushes on the bluffs. About 9 o'clock Williams's men were engaged by Fitch's skirmishers. The firing disclosed the enemy's advanced position, and the gun-boats opened a heavy fire of grape and shell upon it, compelling Williams to fall back. Fry's battery of four light guns, manned by the crew of the *Maurepas*, now became engaged with the gun-boats. At 10 Dunnington opened with his rifled 32-pounders. Kilty had now to some extent made out the location of the Confederate guns, and, moving up, replied with a rapid fire, aimed carefully in what was supposed to be the direction of the batteries, the vessel taking a position at point-blank range from both of them. At the same time Fitch sent word to him that the troops were ready to storm the batteries, unless he desired to silence them with the gun-boats. Kilty, unfortunately for himself and his crew, gallantly decided on the latter course.

The *Mound City* had been in position less than half an hour, about 600 yards from the batteries, when one of the 32-pounder rifle shot, directed by the skillful and experienced eye of Lieutenant Dunnington, penetrated the port casemate of the *Mound City* just forward of the armor, or, as Colonel Fitch rather comically described it in his report, "the larboard forequarter of the gun-boat," and, after killing 8 men at the gun, struck the steam-drum, and went through it directly fore and aft. At the time, the *Mound City* was turning her wheel over slowly, and, being in slack water, the wheel kept on turning until the steam was exhausted, and the boat slowly forged ahead, running her nose directly under the battery. Lieutenant Blodgett immedi-

ately ran up in the *Conestoga*, with great gallantry, and making fast to the *Mound City*, towed her away from the bank and out of action. Fitch, seeing the catastrophe, and apprehensive lest another fortunate shot from the enemy should deprive him of his support afloat, gave the signal to cease firing, and assaulted the works simultaneously in front and in flank. They were quickly carried; Dunnington and Williams made good their retreat, but Fry, who was badly wounded, was taken prisoner with about thirty of his men. General Hindman reported the Confederate loss as 6 killed, 1 wounded, and 8 missing.

The scene on board the *Mound City*, upon the explosion of the steam-drum, was beyond description. The gun-deck was at once filled with scalding steam, and many of the crew were instantly killed,—literally cooked alive. Others, in an agony of pain, jumped into the water, where they were shot at by sharp-shooters from the bluff, under orders from Dunnington and Williams. The boats from the other vessels put off at once to the rescue, and were riddled with shot while picking up their comrades. Out of 175 officers and men on board the *Mound City*, only 23 answered to their names at the roll-call that evening, and these were men and boys that were in the shell-room and magazine when the explosion took place. The only officers unhurt were Dominy, the first master, and McElroy, the gunner. Eighty-two men perished in the casemate, 43 were killed in the water or drowned, and 25 were severely wounded. The latter, among whom was the gallant Kilty, were sent at once to Memphis in the *Conestoga*. The *Mound City* remained at St. Charles, under First Master John H. Duble, of the *Conestoga*, with a crew of one hundred of Fitch's men, her injuries being temporarily repaired.

The expedition continued up White River as far as Crooked Point Cut-off, 63 miles above St. Charles, where the gun-boats were compelled to turn back by the falling of the water. Halleck and Grant meantime had decided to increase Fitch's command by the addition of two regiments, which sailed for White River on the 26th of June, under convoy of the *Conestoga*. Commander John A. Winslow, of *Kearsarge-Alabama* fame, who was at this time in command of the forces afloat in White River, was ordered to give additional convoy as far up as the state of the water would permit. The bulk of the naval force was then withdrawn, the *Lexington* remaining to support Fitch in his subsequent operations up the river. Curtis reached Helena on the 13th of July without communicating with the gun-boats. [See p. 445.]

During the months of May and June, 1862, Farragut's fleet had been slowly working up from New Orleans, receiving the surrender of the principal cities on the way, and having an occasional encounter with the Confederate batteries along the river. None of the latter were at this time of any great importance, although those at Grand Gulf inflicted some damage on two of the gun-boats which attacked them on June 9th. No serious obstruction, however, to the passage of the river from Cairo to the sea now existed, except at Vicksburg.

The advance division of Farragut's squadron under Commander Lee in the *Oneida* had summoned Vicksburg to surrender on the 18th of May, but had met with a refusal. Farragut, arriving soon after, held a consultation with



COLONEL CHARLES RIVERS ELLET.
FROM AN AMEROTYPE.

General Williams, who commanded a small detachment of Butler's army, and the two came to the conclusion that they had not enough men to make an attempt on Vicksburg with any hope of success, and Farragut went back to New Orleans.

Soon after, Farragut received pressing instructions from the Navy Department to attack Vicksburg, and in consequence returned up the river with his squadron, the mortar-boats under Porter, and 3000 troops under Williams. On the night of the 26th of June Porter placed his mortar-boats in position, nine on the eastern and eight on the western bank, the latter, as at New Orleans, being dressed with bushes to prevent an accurate determination of their position. The next day they opened upon Vicksburg. On the 28th Farragut passed the batteries

with all the vessels of his fleet, except the *Brooklyn*, *Katahdin*, and *Kennebec*, which dropped back, owing to a too rigid adherence to their original orders. No impression of any consequence was made on the forts, nor were the ships materially injured, notwithstanding the great advantage which the forts possessed in their plunging fire. The *Hartford* was principally damaged by the battery above the town, which was able to rake a passing ship in a position from which the latter could not reply. Farragut, in his report of July 2d, sums up the situation with the phrase:

"The forts can be passed, and we have done it, and can do it again as often as may be required of us. It will not, however, be an easy matter for us to do more than silence the batteries for a time, as long as the enemy has a large force behind the hills to prevent our landing and holding the place."

While Farragut with the Western Gulf Squadron, so called, was passing the batteries at Vicksburg, the Mississippi flotilla was still at Memphis, except the rams now commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Alfred W. Ellet, which had left Memphis about the 20th, and arrived above Vicksburg on the afternoon of the 24th. Here Ellet opened communication with Farragut across the neck of land opposite Vicksburg. Farragut replied, suggesting the coöperation of Davis's iron-clads. Davis received this message at Memphis on the 28th, and the next day started down the river. During the interval, Ellet's audacity was rewarded by another extraordinary success. Taking the *Monitor* and the *Lancaster*, the latter under Charles Rivers Ellet, a mere boy nineteen years of age, he steamed fifty miles up the Yazoo River. Ellet was in perfect ignorance of what he might find there, whether batteries, gun-

boats, or torpedoes. His rams carried no armament. As a matter of fact there were at the time in the river two of Hollins's former fleet, the *Polk* and the *Livingston*, and the last of Montgomery's vessels, the *Van Dorn*. These were tied up abreast of a battery at Liverpool Landing, and above them was a barrier made from a raft. The *Arkansas* was at Yazoo City above the barrier, completing her preparations. The officer in charge at Liverpool Landing, Commander Robert F. Pinkney, on the approach of the rams set fire to his three gun-boats, and the purpose of Ellet's visit being thus easily accomplished, he withdrew again to the Mississippi. ☆

Davis arrived above Vicksburg on the 1st of July, and joined Farragut with four gun-boats and six mortar-boats. The fleets remained here at anchor for several days, while the army was attempting to make a cut-off across the neck of the land opposite Vicksburg, and thus create a new channel out of range of the batteries on the bluffs. During this time Porter continued his daily bombardment. Beyond this nothing was attempted, there being no force of troops to make it worth while.

While matters were in this condition, it was resolved between the two flag-officers that a detachment of gun-boats should make a reconnoissance in force up the Yazoo River. The shoalness and narrowness of the stream led them to take vessels of the upper squadron in preference to those of the lower, and the following were selected: the *Carondelet*, Commander Henry Walke; *Tyler*, Lieutenant William Gwin, and *Queen of the West*. The *Arkansas*, an armored ram with a heavy battery, was known to be up the river, and Farragut in his report mentions her as one of the objects of investigation. The fleet met the ram as she was descending the river at a point six miles from its mouth [see p. 572]. The *Queen of the West*, which had no weapons except her ram and the muskets of the sharp-shooters, and possibly a borrowed howitzer, immediately rounded to and proceeded down the river. The *Tyler*, a very vulnerable wooden gun-boat, also retreated, placing herself under the protection of the *Carondelet*. The latter therefore became the principal antagonist of the Confederate ram. It now became a question for Walke of the *Carondelet* to decide whether he would advance to meet the *Arkansas* bows on, trusting to the skillful management of the helm to avoid a ram-thrust, or would retreat, engaging her with his stern guns. He chose the latter course. †

☆ Lieutenant-Colonel Alfred W. Ellet soon after received a brigadier-general's commission, with instructions to organize and equip the Mississippi Marine Brigade for future work in patrolling the river. He also received commissions for such of his men as he chose to recommend. Charles Rivers Ellet, though but nineteen years of age, received a colonel's commission, and succeeded to the command of the ram fleet which his father, Charles Ellet, Jr., had created.—EDITORS.

† In a note to the editors Admiral Walke states:

"When the *Tyler* was passing the *Carondelet*, I hailed the commander of the *Tyler*, and ordered him to go down to our fleet and report the arrival of the *Arkansas*; but the *Tyler* ran under the protection of the

Carondelet. The latter, while advancing, fired several rounds of her bow-guns and all her starboard broadside guns at the *Arkansas*, which, returning the fire, raked the *Carondelet* from stem to stern, striking her forward three times. One shot glanced on the forward plating, one went through it and broke up, one from forward passed through the officers' rooms on the starboard side, and through the captain's cabin. Being a stern-wheel boat, the *Carondelet* required room and time to turn around. To avoid being sunk immediately, she turned and retreated. I was not such a simpleton as to 'take the bull by the horns,' to be fatally rammed, and sacrifice my command through fear of the criticisms of any man, or the vaunting opinion of much less-experienced officers. If I had continued fighting, bows on, in that narrow river, a collision, which the enemy desired, would have been inevitable, and would have sunk the *Carondelet* in a few minutes."



THE CONFEDERATE RAM "ARKANSAS" RUNNING THROUGH THE UNION FLEET AT VICKSBURG, JULY 15, 1862.

The *Arkansas* was decidedly the superior vessel. Apart from the fact that she was larger, and had at the beginning of the contest somewhat greater speed, she had a more efficient battery, and a far more complete and impenetrable armor protection. Indeed the Eads gun-boats, of which the *Carondelet* was one, were by no means fully armored, their two and one-half inch plating on the casemate covering only the forward end and that part of the sides abreast of the machinery. The stern was not armored at all. The side armor had no heavy backing, and such as it was could only ward off a shot directly abeam. It was by no means a complete protection to the boilers, as was shown in the catastrophe at St. Charles. The *Arkansas* on the other hand had three inches of railroad iron surrounding her casemate, with a heavy backing of timber and cotton bales. She had, besides, her ram, which experience had shown was a weapon much to be dreaded. However, the position adopted by Walke was the one which, by exposing his weakest point, gave the enemy the benefit of his superiority. The *Carondelet*, instead of presenting her armored bow, armed with three rifled guns, 30, 50, and 70 pounders, presented her unarmored stern, armed with two smooth-bore 32-pounders. That she escaped total destruction in the running fight of an hour or so that ensued with the two 8-inch guns in the *Arkansas's* bow is little short of a miracle. Walke made a very good fight of it, and both he and Gwin of the *Tyler*, who pluckily supported the *Carondelet*, inflicted much injury on their antagonist, riddling her smoke-stack so as nearly to destroy her speed, wounding her captain twice, damaging her wheel, and killing her Yazoo pilot. When near the mouth of the river, the *Carondelet's*

steering gear was disabled and she ran in close to the bank, where the water was too shoal for the *Arkansas* to follow her. The latter, therefore, passed her, the two vessels exchanging broadsides, and the *Arkansas* continued on her course to Vicksburg.

Her approach caught the two flag-officers fairly napping. Notwithstanding their knowledge of her presence in the Yazoo, and the heavy firing that had been heard for more than an hour, there was, out of the combined fleet of twenty vessels or thereabouts, but one that had steam up, the captured ram *General Bragg*, and she did nothing. The *Arkansas* dashed boldly through the mass of clustered vessels, receiving the broadside of each ship as she passed, and delivering her fire rapidly in return. Her audacity was rewarded by success, for though she was badly battered, she was neither stopped nor disabled. On the other hand, her shot, penetrating the boiler of the ram *Lancaster*, used up that vessel and caused considerable loss of life among her crew. The *Benton*, Davis's flagship, got under way after Brown had passed, and followed him "at her usual snail's pace," to borrow Davis's phrase, without overtaking him. In a few minutes the *Arkansas* was under the guns of Vicksburg.

A week before, on the 7th of July, Farragut had written to the department that he hoped "soon to have the pleasure of recording the combined attack by army and navy, for which we all so ardently long." In the course of the week that had elapsed these hopes had been pretty well extinguished. The canal had turned out a failure, and the prospect that a considerable force of troops would arrive had been growing every day more remote. Before the *Arkansas* made her appearance, therefore, Farragut had already been meditating a return down the river, and the falling of the water and the prevalence of sickness in his crews admonished him to hasten. He also wished to damage the *Arkansas* in the rush by, so as to recover in some measure the prestige lost through her successful passage of the fleet. Preparations were therefore made for the descent on that very afternoon.

Already on the 10th Porter had left his station below Vicksburg with twelve of his mortar-boats, which were to be sent round to the James River. Most of the gun-boats of the mortar-flotilla went with him to tow the schooners down. The force that remained was composed of six mortar-schooners, under Commander W. B. Renshaw, with the ferry-boat *Westfield*. On the afternoon of the 15th these were moved up into position on the west bank of the river (with the exception of one, the *Sidney C. Jones*, which had run on shore and was blown up), and by half-past 3 they were engaged with the batteries. Davis, in the river above, also stationed three of his vessels, the *Benton*, *Louisville*, and *Cincinnati*, in position to attack the upper batteries, and to aid in covering Farragut's passage. Toward 7 in the evening the fleet got under way, consisting of the four sloops, the *Hartford*, *Richmond*, *Oneida*, and *Iroquois*, four gun-boats, and the ram *Sumter*, which Davis had lent for the special purpose of attacking the *Arkansas*. The fleet made a gallant dash past the batteries, meeting with little loss, but the attack on the *Arkansas* was a failure, for she had shifted her position and could not be readily distinguished

by the flashes of the guns. A single 11-inch shot, however, reached the ram and inflicted very serious injury, especially to the engine.

Early on the morning of the 22d, Farragut's reunited squadron being now at anchor below Vicksburg, another attempt was made on the *Arkansas*. While the upper and the lower fleets were drawing the fire of the batteries in their neighborhood, the *Essex*, under Commodore William D. Porter, started down the river, followed by the *Queen of the West*, Lieutenant-Colonel A. W. Ellet. The crew of the *Arkansas* was small, but they were skillfully handled. The assailants tried to ram her in succession, but as each came on the beak of the Confederate was turned toward them, and they only succeeded in giving a glancing blow, and, sheering off, ran on the bank. Extricating themselves with difficulty, they withdrew as rapidly as they could from their perilous position, the *Essex* going below and the *Queen*, temporarily disabled, resuming her station with the upper squadron. One shot from the *Essex* did serious damage on board the *Arkansas*.

The *Essex* and *Sumter* were now permanently detained below Vicksburg. Shortly after the last engagement Farragut sailed down the river with Williams and his troops. Davis had expected Farragut's departure, but he had relied on the occupation by the land forces of the point opposite Vicksburg, by which he communicated with his vessels below. As these had now departed, nothing could be gained by staying longer in the neighborhood. Davis accordingly withdrew to Helena, and for the next four months Vicksburg was left unmolested.

Williams remained at Baton Rouge, with the *Essex*, *Kineo*, *Katahdin*, and *Sumter*, while Farragut continued to New Orleans with the rest of his fleet. At daylight on the 5th of August, Baton Rouge was unsuccessfully attacked by the Confederates under General John C. Breckinridge, and on the 6th the *Arkansas* was destroyed. [See pp. 579 and 583.] The remaining events of the summer of 1862 were of little importance. Early in August a reconnoissance showed that the White River had fallen three feet and was impracticable for gun-boats. Later in the month a more important expedition was sent down the river. It was composed of the *Benton*, *Mound City*, and *Bragg*, together with four of Ellet's rams, the *Switzerland*, *Monarch*, *Samson*, and *Lioness*, all under Lieutenant-Commander Phelps, with a detachment of troops under Colonel Charles R. Woods. At Milliken's Bend, thirty miles above Vicksburg, the Confederate transport steamer *Fairplay* was captured, loaded with a heavy cargo of arms and ammunition. The gun-boats then penetrated far up the Yazoo River, and two of the rams even ascended the Sunflower for twenty miles. When the expedition returned to Helena, it had destroyed or captured a vast quantity of military supplies. It taught the Confederates a lesson, however, and it was a long time before the Federal fleet could again enter the Yazoo with impunity.

The experience of the gun-boats in the White River showed the necessity of obtaining light-draught vessels for service in the uncertain channels of the tributaries of the Mississippi, and each additional operation in these rivers

confirmed the impression. As early as the 27th of June Davis had urgently recommended this step, and his recommendations, sustained by the earnest appeals of other officers, resulted in the creation of the "tin-clads," or "light-draughts," which during the next year performed invaluable service.

On the 15th of October Davis was relieved of this command, having been appointed Chief of the Bureau of Navigation at the Navy Department. He was succeeded by Porter. Two important and much-needed changes in organization took place about this time, the first being the formal transfer of the squadron on the 1st of October from the War Department, under which it had first come into existence, to the Navy Department, which henceforth exercised exclusive direction of it. The second was the order of the Secretary of War of November 8th, directing Ellet to report "for orders and duty" to Porter. These two changes made the vessels in the Mississippi for the first time a homogeneous naval force, and swept away all the complications of command which had hitherto vexed and harassed its commander-in-chief.

Porter, as acting rear-admiral, assumed command of the Mississippi squadron at the naval depot at Cairo, which was now the headquarters. He received from Davis intact the squadron as it had come from Foote — the *Benton*, the seven Eads iron-clads, and the three Rodgers gun-boats. He had also Ellet's nine rams and several very valuable captured vessels, including the *Eastport*, and Montgomery's rams captured at Memphis — the *Bragg*, *Pillow*, *Price*, and *Little Rebel*. The only vessels that had been withdrawn were the *Essex* and *Sumter*, now in the river below Vicksburg. Porter was also getting at this very time an accession to his force in the new tin-clads, — the *Brilliant*, *Rattler*, *Romeo*, *Juliet*, *Marmora*, *Signal*, and others, — and an equally important accession of iron-clads, the *Lafayette* and *Choctaw*, altered steam-boats of great power, and the newly (and rather badly) constructed boats, *Chillicothe*, *Indianola*, and *Tuscumbia*.

On the 21st of November Porter issued orders from Cairo to Captain Henry Walke, then in command of the gun-boats patrolling the river below Helena, to enter the Yazoo and destroy the batteries as far up as possible. Accordingly, on the 11th of December the *Marmora* and *Signal* entered the river for twenty miles. They found that in the interval since Phelps's raid in August, the Confederates had been by no means idle. The channel was full of scows and floats, indicating torpedoes, one of which exploded near the *Signal*, while another was discharged by musket-balls from the *Marmora*. Next day, as the river was rising, the light-draughts went in again, supported by two iron-clads, the *Cairo*, Lieutenant-Commander T. O. Selfridge, and the *Pittsburgh*, Lieutenant Hoel. The *Queen of the West* also went in. About a dozen miles up, the *Cairo* was struck by two torpedoes, one exploding under her bow, the other under her quarter. She sank in twelve minutes, disappearing completely save the tops of her smoke-stacks. The discipline of the crew was perfect, the men remaining at quarters until they were ordered away, and no lives were lost. Several torpedoes were removed before the expedition returned to the mouth of the river.

The object of both these expeditions was to prepare for the attack on

Chickasaw Bluffs. On December 23d, Porter, who had now come down from Cairo, went up the Yazoo with the *Benton*, *Tyler*, and *Lexington*, three tin-clads, and two rams. By three days' incessant labor, under musketry fire from the banks, the fleet worked up to a point within range of the enemy's heavy batteries at Haynes's Bluff, whose fire the *Benton* sustained for two hours. The ship was not much damaged, but her commander, Gwin, one of the best officers in the squadron, was mortally wounded.

After the failure of the army at that point (December 29th) came the expedition against Arkansas Post. The vessels detailed by Porter for this movement were the iron-clads *De Kalb*, Lieutenant-Commander John G. Walker, *Louisville*, Lieutenant-Commander Elias K. Owen, and *Cincinnati*, Lieutenant George M. Bache; the ram *Monarch*, Colonel C. R. Ellet; the gun-boats *Black Hawk*, Lieutenant-Commander K. R. Breese, and *Tyler*, Lieutenant-Commander James W. Shirk; and the tin-clads, *Rattler*, Lieutenant-Commander Watson Smith, and *Glide*, Lieutenant S. E. Woodworth. McClelland's force, comprising Sherman's and Morgan's corps, accompanied the fleet in transports. As a feint the vessels ascended the White River, crossing over to the Arkansas by the cut-off. On the 9th of January the army landed three miles below the fort.

Fort Hindman was a square bastioned work, standing at a bend of the river, sufficiently high to command the surrounding country. It was commanded by Lieutenant Dunnington, who had done such good service at St. Charles, and defended by troops under General Churchill. On the side facing the river were three casemates, two of them at the angles containing each a 9-inch gun, and the intermediate one an 8-inch. On the opposite side the approaches were defended by a line of trenches a mile in length, beginning at the fort and terminating in an impassable swamp. [See map and cuts, pp. 452, 453.] In the main work and in the trenches were mounted fourteen lighter pieces, several of them rifled. Two or three outlying works were built on the levee below the fort, but these were exposed to an enfilading fire from the gun-boats, and at the first attack by the latter were promptly abandoned.

On the afternoon and night of the 10th, the army marched up past the abandoned outworks, and took position about one thousand yards from the fort. On the afternoon of the same day the three iron-clads advanced to within 300 or 400 yards of the fort and opened with their heavy guns. When they had become hotly engaged, Porter moved up the *Black Hawk* and the *Lexington*, together with the light-draughts, which threw in a destructive fire of shrapnel and rifle-shells. When the guns on the river-side had been partly silenced, Lieutenant-Commander Smith in the *Rattler* was ordered to pass the fort and enfilade it, which he did in a very gallant and handsome manner. The *Rattler* suffered somewhat, being raked by a heavy shell, and having her cabin knocked to pieces. After passing the fort she was entangled in the snags above and obliged to return. As night came on and the troops were not yet in position, the vessels were withdrawn, and tied up to the bank below.

The next day at 1 o'clock the army was reported ready, and the fleet moved up to a second attack. The same disposition was made of the vessels. All of the casemate-guns were silenced, No. 3, which was in the casemate assigned to the *Cincinnati*, being reduced to a complete wreck. At the same time the troops gradually advanced, and were just preparing for a final assault, when white flags were run up all along the works. Lieutenant Dunnington surrendered to Porter, and General Churchill to McClernand.



On the 30th of January Grant assumed command of the army before Vicksburg. The enemy's right flank rested on the Yazoo Valley, a vast tract of partly overflowed country, oval in shape, two hundred miles long, and intersected by innumerable streams and bayous. This oval valley was bounded by the Mississippi on the west, and on the north, east, and south by what was in reality one long stream, known in its successive parts as the Coldwater, Tallahatchie, and Yazoo rivers. The bounding streams made the valley almost an island, the only break in their continuity being at the northern end of the valley, at Yazoo Pass, a bayou which had formerly connected the Coldwater with the Mississippi, but which had been closed by the erection of a levee several years before. The greater part of the valley was impassable for troops, and the streams were deemed impassable for vessels. The district was a rich storehouse of Confederate supplies, which were carried in small vessels through obscure passages and channels to Yazoo City, and thence to Vicksburg. At Yazoo City also, protected from assault by torpedoes and by the forts at Haynes's Bluff, was a large navy-yard, where several gun-boats were in course of erection.

Porter's plan was to cut the levee at Yazoo Pass, thus restoring the entrance and raising the water in the rivers, and by this means to get in the rear of Yazoo City before the enemy could prepare his defenses. Involving, as it did, a circuit of some two hundred miles through the tributary streams in the enemy's country, it was an audacious and original conception, but still a sagacious piece of naval strategy.

General Grant adopted the plan, and on the 2d of February the work of cutting the levee was begun by Colonel James Harrison Wilson of the Engineers. On the evening of the 3d a mine was exploded in the remaining portion of the embankment, and the waters of the Mississippi rushed through in a torrent, cutting a passage forty yards wide, and sweeping everything before them. The difference in the levels was eight or nine feet, and some days elapsed before the new entrance was practicable for vessels. The first reconnoissance developed the fact that the Confederates had already been vigilant enough to block the way to the Coldwater by felling trees on the banks of the Pass. The removal of these occasioned a further delay of two weeks, when time was of great importance.

The naval expedition, which was commanded by Lieutenant-Commander Watson Smith, was composed of two iron-clads, the *Chillicothe*, Lieutenant-Commander James P. Foster, and the *DeKalb*, Lieutenant-Commander John G. Walker, and the tin-clads *Rattler*, *Forest Rose*, *Romeo*, *Marmora*, *Signal*, and *Petrel*. To these were added two vessels of the ram fleet, the *Fulton* and

Lioness. The only troops at first ordered to accompany the vessels were four thousand men comprising the division under Brigadier-General L. F. Ross, which, being delayed by the want of boats, only left Helena on the 23d, arriving a week later at the Coldwater. Meantime, as the feasibility of the project became more apparent, Grant enlarged his plan, and McPherson's corps,



THE "BLACKHAWK," ADMIRAL PORTER'S
FLAG-SHIP, VICKSBURG, 1863.

about 30,000 men, was ordered up, but, owing to delays, only a small part of this force under Brigadier-

General I. F. Quinby took part in the movement.

On the 28th of February Smith's flotilla reached the Coldwater. Notwithstanding the work which had been done by the army pioneers in removing obstructions, the progress of the flotilla had been excessively slow,—hardly more than three miles a day. The tortuous windings of the stream, which imposed the utmost caution on the vessels navigating them in a swift

current, and the overhanging branches of the dense growth of trees lining the banks, which damaged the smoke-stacks and light upper works, made the passage slow and difficult, and caused a number of mishaps. There appears to be little doubt, however, that if the gun-boats had been pushed they might have got on considerably faster, perhaps with a saving of three or four days. In the Coldwater they made better time, though still moving slowly, and they only reached the Tallahatchie on the 6th of March. After four days more of rather dilatory navigation, they arrived at the junction of the Tallahatchie and the Yazoo. The transports were close behind them.

The Confederates had put to the fullest use the time given them by Smith's dilatory advance. A hastily constructed work of earth and cotton bales, called Fort Pemberton, was thrown up at the junction of the Tallahatchie and Yazoo, and though barely completed when the gun-boats arrived, it was armed and garrisoned, and in condition to receive them. The old *Star of the West*, of Fort Sumter fame, was sunk in the river as an obstruction. [See p. 550.] The *Chillicothe* and *DeKalb* attacked the fort on three different days, but their guns alone were not enough to reduce it, and the troops under Ross could find no firm ground for a landing. The *Chillicothe* was badly racked by the enemy's fire, showing plainly her defective construction. Smith, who had started on the expedition in failing health, was now sent back in the *Rattler* (he died shortly after), and the command of the vessels fell to Foster of the *Chillicothe*. Finding that nothing more could be accomplished, Foster decided to return. On the way back he met General Quinby's troops descending the Tallahatchie, and at that officer's request steamed down again to Fort Pemberton. On the 5th of April the expedition withdrew, and on the 10th arrived in the Mississippi, about two months after it had started.

About the middle of March, before the Yazoo Pass expedition returned, Porter decided to try another route, through a series of narrow streams and bayous which made a circuitous connection between the Mississippi and the Sunflower, a tributary of the Yazoo River. Steele's Bayou was a sluggish stream which entered the Mississippi a few miles above the mouth of the Yazoo. Black Bayou, which was little better than a narrow ditch, connected Steele's Bayou with Deer Creek, a tortuous river with a difficult and shallow channel. A second lateral bayou, called Rolling Fork, connected Deer Creek with the Sunflower. From Rolling Fork the way was easy, but the difficulties of reaching that point were such that no commander with less than Porter's indefatigable energy and audacious readiness to take risks that promised a bare chance of success, would have ventured on the expedition.

The flotilla, consisting of the remaining five Eads gun-boats, the *Carondelet*, *Cincinnati*, *Louisville*, *Mound City*, and *Pittsburgh*, started on the 14th of March, Porter commanding in person, while a coöperating detachment of troops under Sherman marched through the swamps. After overcoming obstacles that would have been insurmountable to almost any other commander, it arrived early at Rolling Fork. Here Porter was attacked by a small force, which was evidently only the advance-guard of a large army on


its way up from Vicksburg. Sherman could not come to his assistance, being himself entangled in the swamp. At the same time Porter learned that detached parties of the enemy were felling trees in his rear, which would shortly render the bayous impassable, and place his five iron-clads in a position from which they could not be extricated. Under these circumstances, he wisely abandoned all thought of farther advance, and after dropping down Deer Creek until he fell in with the army, he succeeded, notwithstanding the additional obstructions which had been placed in the rivers, in retracing his course; and on the 24th of March, after almost incredible difficulties, his iron-clads arrived safe in the Mississippi.

While the two expeditions were at work in the Yazoo Valley, a series of detached operations had been going on below Vicksburg. The portion of the river that was virtually held by the enemy, from Vicksburg to Port Hudson, included the outlet of the Red River, by which provisions and stores from Louisiana and Texas, arms and ammunition from the Rio Grande, and detachments of men, were forwarded through the trans-Mississippi country. On the 2d of February Porter sent the *Queen of the West*, under Colonel Charles R. Ellet, to the Red River. Her passage of the Vicksburg batteries alone and by daylight—for her start had been delayed for necessary repairs—was made in the true Ellet fashion. She was struck thrice before she got abreast of the town. At this point she turned and delivered a ram-thrust at the enemy's steamer *Vicksburg*, which lay at one of the wharves, and damaged her badly; a second attempt to ram was prevented by a conflagration in the cotton bales which Ellet had placed around his deck. These were quickly pitched overboard, the ram dashed past the lower batteries, and though struck a dozen times by the enemy's shot, in an hour or two she was ready for active operations and started down the river.


For once the Confederates were fairly taken by surprise, and before they knew of his approach, Ellet had run down one hundred miles to the Red River and pounced upon three heavily laden store-ships. These were burned, and the *Queen*, ascending again until near Vicksburg, coaled from a barge which Porter had set adrift the night before, and which had passed the batteries without mishap. A tender was also found in the *De Soto*, a little ferry-boat captured by the army. With her the *Queen* started on February 10th on a second raid, burning and destroying as occasion offered. Without meeting any serious opposition, this novel expedition proceeded down the Mississippi, up the Red River, down the Atchafalaya, and back again, then farther up the Red River. The Confederate ram *Webb*, which was regarded as its most dangerous antagonist, was nowhere to be seen. But the catastrophe was coming. On the 14th, some fifty miles from the river-mouth, Ellet captured a transport, the *Era* No. 5. Leaving her at this point, the *Queen* hastened up again, followed by the *De Soto*, but in rounding a bend of the river she ran aground under a 4-gun battery, whose fire made havoc with her, finally cutting her steam-pipe. Part of the crew made for the *De Soto* in a boat, and the remainder, Ellet among them, jumped overboard on cotton bales, and drifted down the stream. Upon reaching the *Era*, the *De Soto*,

which had lost her rudder, was burned, the floating contingent was picked up, and the prize, now manned by the crews of the abandoned vessels, made her way to the Mississippi.

Shortly before this Porter had sent down the iron-clad *Indianola*, under Lieutenant-Commander George Brown, to support Ellet in his isolated position. She had passed Vicksburg and Warrenton at night without a scratch, and descending the river met the *Era* coming up. Both vessels continued on their way, the *Era* to Vicksburg, and the *Indianola* to the mouth of Red River, where she lay for three days. She then moved up toward Vicksburg, the two coal barges



which she had brought with her being lashed alongside. While she was working slowly up, the Confederates, who had meantime repaired the *Queen*, fitted out an expedition composed of their prize, together with the *Webb* and two cotton-clad steamers. These followed the *Indianola* and overtook her a short distance below Warrenton. Engaging



THE UNION VESSELS "MISSISSIPPI" AND "WINONA"
AT BATON ROUGE.

her at night, which gave them peculiar advantages, they succeeded in ramming her seven times, disabling her steering gear, and opening at last one great hole in her side. The Union vessel, reduced to a sinking condition, was then run ashore and surrendered.

A day or two later, Porter, whose buoyancy of spirit never deserted him, set adrift from his anchorage a dummy-monitor, constructed out of a coal-barge surmounted by barrels. The incident was in the nature of a stupendous joke, but it had very practical results. The dummy passed the Vicksburg batteries under a terrific fire. When the *Queen of the West*, acting as a picket to the grounded *Indianola*, saw this new antagonist coming she only stopped to give the alarm, and fled down the river. The supposed monitor stuck fast a mile or two above the *Indianola*, but the Confederate officer in charge of the work on board the latter did not wait for an attack, but set fire to the recent prize, which was in great part destroyed.

Less than three weeks after, on the 14th of March, Farragut ran the batteries at Port Hudson. ☆ Most of his fleet, including the *Richmond*, *Monongahela*, *Genesee*, and *Kineo*, failed to get through, and the *Mississippi* was burnt; † but the *Hartford* and *Albatross* made the passage, and, coming up to Vicksburg, communicated with the vessels above. At Farragut's request, General Ellet sent two of his rams, the *Lancaster* and *Switzerland*, to join the *Hartford*. The *Lancaster* was sunk in passing the batteries, but the *Switzerland* managed to get through. From this time the Union forces retained control of the mouth of the Red River and the adjacent waters of the Mississippi.

The navy was now called upon to coöperate with General Grant's plan of attacking Vicksburg by the left and rear. Porter rapidly made his preparations to descend the river, and on the night of April 16th started with seven of his iron-clads, the *Benton*, *Lafayette*, and *Tuscumbia*, and the Eads gun-boats *Carondelet*, *Louisville*, *Mound City*, and *Pittsburgh*. The ram *General Price* and three transports laden with stores accompanied the fleet. The passage was one of the most brilliant and successful of the many dashes of this kind that were made on the river. Some of the vessels lost the coal-barges which they carried alongside, and all met with various mischances and damages, but the only casualty of importance was the sinking of one of the transports. About a week later six more transports ran the batteries. Of these also one was sunk.

From now on to the fall of Vicksburg, for over two months, Porter was in command of three detached fleets, acting from three distinct bases of operation—one the squadron which had remained above Vicksburg, and which was

☆ In a letter to the editors Rear-Admiral T. A. Jenkins says, in reference to Farragut's plan of an attack on Port Hudson :

"The great importance, not to say necessity, of co-operation by a part of the military forces, in so far, at the least, as to cause a diversion upon the enemy's rear, was decided upon, whereupon the commanding general (Banks) was conferred with with great frequency, until at last in the early part of March, 1863, it was arranged that a considerable force (8000 or 10,000) of all arms should rendezvous at Baton Rouge, preparatory to moving to the rear of the Port Hudson works, a little time before the vessels should move from Poplar Island, which lay just out of range of the Port Hudson heavy guns. After a review of the military forces at Baton Rouge, and after Admiral Farragut had attended to the minutest details of inspection of the vessels,—the removal of the sick, the necessary changes of officers and men, and last, but most difficult at that time, the employment of a sufficient number of competent river pilots,—the vessels got under way in their usual order of steaming, led by the *Hartford*, and stood up to Poplar Island, where the *Essex* and the bomb-vessels were lying. During a brief stay here, the commanders of the vessels were called on board and their instructions were repeated to them. Every contingency, even the most minute, every casualty that could or might happen, was discussed, and proposed remedies pointed out. On the night of the 14th of March, at dark, everything was prepared for a quiet, and it was hoped unperceived, movement of the vessels up the river. Near the last moment before the actual firing commenced, Admiral Farragut's attention was called to an approaching river steamer with flaring lights and steam-whistles blowing. He was

calm, but the lights and noise of the little steamer ruffled him a good deal. He saw at once that the enemy's attention had been specially called to him and his little squadron. The commander of the steamer came within speaking distance, reporting that General Banks's army was within 'five miles of the rear of the Port Hudson works.' That was all. The *Hartford* moved up against a current of three to five knots, while her greatest speed was not exceeding seven knots. The noise and flaring lights of the messenger steamer had evidently put the enemy on both sides of the river on the alert, for a shot from one of the enemy's lower batteries soon whistled harmlessly overhead, and, as if by magic, at the next moment the piles of pine-knots placed on the right bank of the river blazed up, illuminating for a time the entire breadth of the river, making the dark hulls of the vessels as they passed between the immense piles of burning pine a target for the Port Hudson gunners. The smoke of the guns in battery and on shipboard soon obscured these lights, and the darkness of Erebus and the noises of Pandemonium followed and continued, until the *Hartford*, with her little cockle-shell consort (the *Albatross*) anchored out of range of the enemy's guns, abreast of a huge pine-knot fire, to which the rebels before leaving added a small wooden building."

† The *Mississippi* passed the lower batteries, but, running at high speed, struck on the spit opposite Port Hudson. Failing after half an hour to get her off, and being under fire of three batteries, Captain Melancton Smith had the sick and wounded taken off with the crew, and then set fire to the ship. At 3 A. M. she floated off, drifting through the fleet, and half an hour later blew up.—EDITORS.

now to operate along the Yazoo River, the second that which had passed the batteries and was occupied with the river from Vicksburg 25 miles or more to Grand Gulf, and the third the vessels in Red River. Porter moved from one to the other as occasion required. His first duty lay at Grand Gulf, which was really the southern extremity of the Vicksburg forts. The batteries were well armed, and one hundred or more feet above the river. On the 29th of April the seven iron-clads of the lower fleet engaged them for four hours, silencing them, but not destroying the guns. As the elevation of the batteries made it impossible for the fleet to capture them, the army was landed lower down the river, which resulted in the evacuation of Grand Gulf on the 3d of May. †

As Grant advanced into the interior, Porter turned his attention to the Red River. For the last fortnight Farragut had been blockading the river with

† Rear-Admiral Henry Walke writes as follows to the editors regarding this engagement, in which he commanded the *Lafayette* :


"To one approaching Grand Gulf on the river from the northward, six miles above, Bald Head presents a very formidable appearance. Rising abruptly 180 feet, surrounded by hills higher still, and with the wide gulf beneath, it is not unlike a little Gibraltar, as it is called. Here the river turns due west, and the principal fortification was on the Point of Rocks, a precipitous bluff about fifty feet high, at the foot of Bald Head. Three-quarters of a mile east of it is the mouth of Big Black River, which was defended with two 8-inch Columbiads. Here the gulf is about a mile and a half wide, and two hundred yards north or in front of the Point of Rocks there is a shoal which becomes an island at low water. The lower fort of heavy guns was three-quarters of a mile west of Bald Head and four hundred yards from the river, and sixty feet above the river at its ordinary level. The battery on the Point of Rocks mounted two 100-pounder rifles, one 64-pounder shell gun, and one 30-pounder rifle. A sunken road connected this fort with the batteries below. Seven or eight guns of smaller and various caliber were mounted on high points between them. The lower fort mounted one 100-pounder rifle, two 8-inch shell guns, and two 32-pounders.

"The fleet, under Rear-Admiral Porter, got into line at 7:30 A. M. of the 29th, steaming down to the Grand Gulf batteries, the *Pittsburgh*, Lieutenant W. R. Hoel, leading; then the *Louisville*, Lieutenant-Commander E. K. Owen; *Carondelet*, Lieutenant J. M. Murphy; *Mound City*, Lieutenant-Commander Byron Wilson (attacking the lower batteries); *Lafayette*, Captain Henry Walke; *Benton* (flag-ship), Lieutenant J. A. Greer, and *Tuscumbia*, Lieutenant-Commander J. W. Shirk; steaming slowly with a current of five or six knots, 150 yards apart and 100 yards from the shore, except the *Lafayette*, which rounded to above the fort on the Point of Rocks, ran into the shoal water, and took a flanking position 600 yards north-east from it. The battle was commenced by the leading gun-boat, *Pittsburgh*, at 7:55 A. M.; the other gun-boats followed in succession four minutes after. All the gun-boats fired into the upper fort with their bow and broadside guns as they passed up or down. The *Pittsburgh* rounded to opposite the battery of light guns half-way between the upper and lower batteries; the *Louisville* next below, the *Carondelet* next, opposite the lower battery, and the *Mound City* just below the lower battery. The flag-steamers *Benton* and the *Tuscumbia* gallantly opened fire close under the Point of Rocks at 8:15 with their bow and broadside guns, rounded to, heading up the river, the enemy firing on them with musketry. At 9 a shell entered the *Benton's* starboard quarter, setting her on fire; it was soon extinguished. At 9:05 a shell from No. 5 gun carried

away the enemy's flag-staff; at 10 the admiral made signal for the *Lafayette* to assist the boats below; at 10:10 the *Benton* was caught in the eddy; in turning around she dropped fifteen hundred yards and then ran into shore to turn around with her head up stream; continuing the engagement, she steamed up to the batteries on the bluffs again. At 12:25 the *Benton* went up the river to communicate with General Grant, who was on a tug above with three of McClernand's divisions on transports.

"In the engagement the *Benton* fired 347 shot and shell, and was struck 47 times, nearly every shot penetrating her iron plating. The *Tuscumbia*, following the *Benton*, engaged the upper batteries until noon. She was obliged to drop out of action about noon, and landed about four miles below Grand Gulf, having been struck by shot, shell, grape, and shrapnel eighty-one times, two shells having exploded inside her turret. As the *Lafayette* approached the upper battery at 8:15 A. M., ahead of the *Benton* and *Tuscumbia*, she fired 11-inch and 9-inch shell into it, but in turning to take her position on the other side of the port, she was whirled around so quickly between the swift current and the counter-current, that her gunners could not get good aim with broadside guns, but as soon as she turned her 100-pounder rifles on the battery in a flanking position in the eddy, every shell seemed to strike the mark; but even there it was difficult to hold her steady for good aim. After firing 35 rounds, about 9 A. M. her 11-inch bow guns were turned upon the fort and fired with such precision that we expected to silence it, as their fire was dying away. This was the position our whole squadron should have taken, but it was not known that that part of the gulf was navigable. The heaviest guns of the enemy could point to the northward and westward, but not to the eastward, where the *Lafayette* was exempt from that terrible battering which the *Benton* and *Tuscumbia* received, while they were revolving at the mercy of the currents, in constant danger of running ashore.

"At 9:20 A. M. the admiral made a preconcerted signal for the *Lafayette* to go to the assistance of the gun-boats at the lower batteries, thinking no doubt that his two heaviest vessels could silence the upper fort. This move was not after the lower batteries were silenced (as has been stated), but about two hours before. The *Lafayette* proceeded immediately with all speed and rounded to about 10 A. M. opposite the lower battery. She joined battle with the gun-boats there, firing her 11-inch shell from her bow guns into it and to bring her head up stream and her starboard side guns to bear on it quickly. The pilot ran her low into the bank of the river under the fort. She continued firing with the starboard broadside guns within five hundred yards of the lower fort, and with the other gun-boats continued firing on the lower batteries, enfilading the upper fort until 11:30,



UPPER BATTERIES. "LOUISVILLE." "PITTSBURGH." "MOUND CITY." MIDDLE AND LOWER BATTERIES.
 "BENTON." "TUSCUMBIA." "CARONDELET." "LAFAYETTE."

BATTLE OF GRAND GULF (SECOND POSITION), APRIL 29-30, 1863.

the *Hartford* and *Albatross*, a service of great importance in view of the active operations on foot along the river, and at the end of that time he was joined by a detached force of gun-boats which had been operating in the Teche, and which had reached Red River through the Atchafalaya. Banks was then moving against Alexandria, and a light squadron was formed to go up and coöperate with him. At this juncture Porter arrived with three iron-clads, and with these and a part of Farragut's detached squadron he steamed up to Alexandria, where Banks arrived on May 7th. After clearing out the Red River and its tributary the Black, and destroying much property, the expedition returned, Banks going to Port Hudson and Porter returning to his old station above Vicksburg.

The Yazoo River now became for a short time the central point of Porter's operations. Nothing had been done there since December except a demonstration during the attack of April 29-30 on Grand Gulf, which, though conducted with spirit and gallantry, was really only a feint to prevent the enemy from reënforcing his works below Vicksburg. In the fortnight that had elapsed, however, Grant's environment of the town on the east had cut off Haynes's Bluff and the whole Yazoo Valley above it. Porter immediately sent up the *De Kalb*, *Choctaw*, and four light-draughts under Lieutenant-Com-

when the lower batteries were silenced, and all the gun-boats, except the *Pittsburgh*, steamed close to and passed the Point of Rocks (which had not been silenced), raking it with their bow guns. The *Benton* had just then gone up the river.

"The remainder of the squadron continued firing on the upper fort. The *Lafayette* took her former position, flanking the fort. The *Louisville*, *Mound City*, and *Carondelet* steamed around in a circle, firing as they

bore in front of the fort. The *Pittsburgh* remained in her original position, raking it with her bow guns from the west. The enemy, thus involved, fought desperately to the last; their guns, ceasing one by one at long intervals, were at last silent; whereupon the admiral made signal for his squadron to follow his motions. But the fort, as if to give us notice that it was not silenced, fired the last gun after we had started to go up the river."

mander K. R. Breese to open communication. Pushing on to Haynes's Bluff the *De Kalb*, Lieutenant-Commander John G. Walker, in advance, it was found that evacuation had already begun, and the small force left in the works hastily abandoned them. The fortifications were of great strength and covered a large area. On the 20th Walker with the *De Kalb* and *Choctaw* and three of the light-draughts, steamed up to Yazoo City. The work of destruction, begun by the retreating enemy, was completed by the gun-boats. The navy-yard, a large and well-equipped establishment, and the only one now remaining to the Confederates, with its mills and machine-shops and its stores of lumber, was burned, as were also three formidable vessels then in course of construction. A second expedition under Walker, a few days later, struck out into the tributary streams, the Sunflower, Rolling Fork, and the smaller bayous, burning the transports that had taken refuge there. Several steamers were sunk by the enemy on Walker's approach, and three were captured and burnt by his vessels. Navigation in the Yazoo Valley was broken up, and the destruction of military supplies and provisions was enormous.

During Grant's assault on the 22d of May, the fleet below Vicksburg kept up a heavy fire on the hill and water batteries, and during the siege the mortar-boats were incessantly at work, shelling the city and the batteries. From time to time the gun-boats joined in the bombardment, notably on May 27th and June 20th. On the first of these occasions, the *Cincinnati*, Lieutenant George M. Bache, engaged alone the battery on Fort Hill, the principal work above Vicksburg, while the other iron-clads, under Commander Woodworth, were similarly occupied below. The fire from the upper battery was too much for the *Cincinnati*, which sank not far from the shore, losing a considerable number of her crew. On the second occasion three heavy guns mounted on scows were placed in position on the point opposite Vicksburg, where they did good execution under Lieutenant-Commander F. M. Ramsay, enfilading the rifle-pits in front of Sherman's position and rendering them untenable. The lower squadron also took part in this bombardment. In addition to the work of the squadron afloat, when the army called for siege-guns thirteen heavy cannon were landed from the gun-boats and placed in position in the rear of Vicksburg, where they were constantly and efficiently worked by naval crews, first under Selfridge, and later under Walker. At the same time the squadron was engaged in the duty of patrolling the rivers, keeping open lines of communication, convoying transports, and coöperating with troops in beating off the enemy at detached points.


On the 25th of May Banks, who had returned with his army from Alexandria, had invested Port Hudson, which had been subjected for several nights previous to a bombardment from the *Essex* and the mortar flotilla, under Commander Caldwell. During the month of June a naval battery of 9-inch guns, under Lieutenant-Commander Edward Terry of the *Richmond*, rendered efficient service in the siege operations. On the 8th of July Port Hudson surrendered and the Mississippi was now clear of obstructions to its mouth.

Besides the main operations at Vicksburg and Port Hudson, the navy had been occupied from time to time in detached bodies at other points. A cut-off,

at the mouth of the Arkansas, ingeniously made by Selfridge in April, had contributed materially to the facility of operations at that place. In May Lieutenant-Commander Wilson in the *Mound City* effectually destroyed a water-battery at Warrenton. In June an attack was made on Milliken's Bend by Confederate troops from Arkansas under Taylor, and the garrison was driven from their works to the levee. At this critical moment Ramsay, in the *Choctaw*, turned his guns on the successful assailants, and though

unable to see the enemy on account of the intervening bank, he hailed the troops on shore to ascertain their position; and so well placed were the hundred or more shell and shrapnel that he fired that the Confederates were soon in full retreat.

Finally, on the 4th of July, the day of the fall of Vicksburg, General Holmes made his attack on Helena [see pp. 455-6] with a force of about 8000 men, then garrisoned by 4000 under B. M. Prentiss. The enemy had placed batteries in opposition above and below the town, and, making a spirited attack in front, succeeded in carrying a portion of the outlying works. The garrison fought stubbornly, but were heavily outnumbered. The wooden gun-boat *Tyler*, under Lieutenant-Comman-



LIEUTENANT-COMMANDER JAMES M. PRICHETT.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

der James M. Prichett, had been covering the approach by the old town road, but seeing the strategic points of the enemy's position, Prichett with masterly skill placed his vessel where her bow and stern guns could reach the batteries above and below, while her broadside enfiladed the ravines down which the enemy was pouring in masses. The gun-boat's rapid discharge of shrapnel and shell told heavily upon the Confederates, who, after sustaining it for a time, fled in disorder, Prentiss's men pursuing them with the bayonet. The destructive fire of the *Tyler* caused an unusually severe loss.

The fall of Vicksburg was followed by successful gun-boat raids, one in July under Selfridge in the Red, Black, and Tensas rivers, the other in August under Bache in White River. General Herron and Lieutenant-Commander Walker also proceeded up the Yazoo and retook Yazoo City, but with the loss of the *De Kalb*, destroyed by torpedoes near Yazoo City. [See p. 580.] The vessel sank in fifteen minutes, but all hands were saved. Porter accepted the misfortune with that true understanding of the business of war which had been the secret of so much of his success — that without taking risks you cannot achieve results.

GULF OPERATIONS IN 1862 AND 1863.†

BY PROFESSOR JAMES RUSSELL SOLEY, U. S. N.

THE regular monotony of the blockade of Mobile by the West Gulf squadron was interrupted only by the two successful passages of the *Oreto* or *Florida*, under Commander J. N. Maffitt, C. S. N., past the blockading squadron, inward on the 4th of September, 1862, and outward on the 16th of January, 1863. The first passage was made in broad daylight, under the disguise of an English gun-vessel, at a time when the *Oreto* was short-handed, the captain and crew ill, and the battery incapable of resistance. As a bold dash, it was hardly paralleled during the war. The second passage was made at night, without disguise, after the squadron had received full warning, and had been reinforced specially to capture the cruiser.

On the Texas coast the blockade was only of moderate efficiency, and in the summer of 1862 Farragut determined to convert it at the principal points into an occupation. With this object, he sent out three expeditions. The first, under Acting-Lieutenant J. W. Kittredge, successfully attacked Corpus Christi August 16th-18th, but having no troops to hold the place withdrew to the bay. The second expedition, composed of the *Kensington* and *Rachel Seaman*, under Acting-Master Frederick Crocker, was sent in September to Sabine Pass, a point of great importance in blockade-running operations on account of the neighboring railroad, and at that time under purely formal blockade. Crocker ascended the river, captured the fort at Sabine City, destroyed the railroad bridge, and broke up a Confederate camp. Raids in the passes resulted in the capture of the steamer *Dan* and the schooner *Velocity*, which were left with the *Rachel Seaman* to maintain the blockade.

The third and most important expedition, under Commander W. B. Renshaw, composed of the ferry-boats *Westfield* and *Clifton*, the latter under Lieutenant-Commander R. L. Law; the *Harriet Lane*, Commander J. M. Wainwright, and the *Owasco*, Lieutenant-Commander John Guest, took possession of Galveston in October without a conflict. Colonel Burrell, with only 260 men, was sent to hold the town. The flotilla, which carried a heavy armament, was disposed about the harbor and bay, and held the town for two months, but without proper precautions against attack.

At daybreak on the 1st of January, 1863, General Magruder, commanding the Confederate forces in Texas, made a vigorous attack on the city. The bridge by which alone troops could march to the town, and which might easily have been destroyed, was left unguarded. The Confederates, early in the night, planted batteries unobserved just outside the town, and abreast of the *Harriet Lane*, which lay in a narrow channel near the shore. A little farther to the eastward, abreast of the town, were the gun-boat *Sachem* and the yacht *Corypheus*. A mile farther down the bay were the *Clifton* and *Owasco*, and two miles away the *Westfield*, Renshaw's vessel. The enemy had two cotton-clad

steamers, the *Bayou City* and *Neptune*, the first carrying a rifled 32-pounder, and the second two howitzers. Each had from 150 to 200 sharpshooters.

Of the vessels the *Harriet Lane* bore the brunt of the attack, the *Owasco* being the only one of her consorts that lent any assistance. The *Bayou City's* rifle burst at the third fire, and the *Neptune* stove in her bow in an attempt to ram, and sank on the flats. The *Bayou City* then ran alongside the *Harriet Lane* and opened a withering musketry fire from behind the cotton-bales, in which Commander Wainwright was killed and his first-lieutenant, Lea, mortally wounded. The Confederates then carried the *Lane* by boarding, the officer in command surrendering without serious attempt at resistance. Hostilities were now suspended awaiting an answer from Renshaw to the demand for a surrender of all the vessels. The *Clifton* carried this message to the *Westfield*, and took back Renshaw's refusal, after which she executed her orders, which were to take the vessels out of the harbor. Meantime the enemy had moved up their lines. Burrell surrendered the town, and the *Westfield*, getting aground, was set on fire at Renshaw's order, and blew up prematurely, killing Renshaw and several of his men. Law, of the *Clifton*, now the senior officer, immediately steamed away, and the blockade was raised. (See also pp. 586-7.)

On the 8th the blockade was resumed by Commodore Bell, with the *Brooklyn*, *Hatteras*, and several gun-boats. On the 11th the *Hatteras* was sent after the *Alabama*, supposed to be a blockade-runner. The *Alabama*, after drawing the *Hatteras* away from her consorts, sank her in a fifteen-minute fight.

On the 21st of January the blockading force at Sabine Pass, composed of the sailing-ship *Morning Light*, and the schooner *Velocity*, was attacked by two cotton-clad steamers, and, being unable to manœuvre, surrendered. The blockade was resumed the next day by the *New London* and *Cayuga*.

After the fall of Port Hudson, General Banks took up the question of Texas. His first plan was to land at Sabine Pass and strike the railroad. The expedition was composed of troops under Franklin, and the *Clifton*, *Sachem*, *Granite City*, and *Arizona* under Lieutenant Crocker. On the 8th of September the gun-boats moved up the pass to attack the enemy's fort. The *Clifton* ran ashore, and soon after got a shot in her boiler. The *Sachem's* boiler also was penetrated, and both vessels surrendered after heavy loss. The remainder retreated.

Banks now decided to attack Texas near the Rio Grande, and his troops, escorted by the *Monongahela* and other vessels under Commander J. H. Strong, landed at Brazos November 2d. Brownsville, Corpus Christi, Aransas, and Fort Esperanza at Pass Cavallo, were captured, but owing to the lack of troops to hold the various points, no further operations were attempted.

† See Vol. II., p. 13.

THE CONFEDERATE GUN-BOAT "ARKANSAS."

BY HER COMMANDER, ISAAC N. BROWN, CAPTAIN, C. S. N.


AFTER the Appomattox capitulation, the observance of which, nobly maintained by General Grant, crowns him as the humane man of the age, I took to the plow, as a better implement of reconstruction than the pen; and if I take up the latter now, it is that justice may be done to the men and the memory of the men of the *Arkansas*.

On the 28th of May, 1862, I received at Vicksburg a telegraphic order from the Navy Department at Richmond to "proceed to Greenwood, Miss., and assume command of the Confederate gun-boat *Arkansas*, and finish and equip that vessel without regard to expenditure of men or money." I knew that such a vessel had been under construction at Memphis, but I had not heard till then of her escape from the general wreck of our Mississippi River defenses. Greenwood is at the head of the Yazoo River, 160 miles by river from Yazoo City. It being the season of overflow, I found my new command four miles from dry land. Her condition was not encouraging. The vessel was a mere hull, without armor; the engines were apart; guns without carriages were lying about the deck; a portion of the railroad iron intended as armor was at the bottom of the river, and the other and far greater part was to be sought for in the interior of the country. Taking a day to fish up the sunken iron, I had the *Arkansas* towed to Yazoo City, where the hills reach the river. Here, though we were within fifty miles of the Union fleets, there was the possibility of equipment. Within a very short time after reaching Yazoo City we had two hundred men, chiefly from the nearest detachment of the army, at work on the deck's shield and hull, while fourteen blacksmith forges were drawn from the neighboring plantations and placed on the bank to hasten the iron-work. Extemporized drilling-machines on the steamer *Capitol* worked day and night fitting the railway iron for the bolts which were to fasten it as armor. This iron was brought from many points to the nearest railroad station and thence twenty-five miles by wagons. The trees were yet growing from which the gun-carriages had to be made—the most difficult work of all, as such vehicles had never been built in Mississippi. I made a contract with two gentlemen of Jackson to pay each his own price for the full number of ten. The executive officer, Mr. Stevens, gave the matter his particular attention, and in time, along with the general equipment, we obtained five good carriages from each contractor. This finishing, armoring, arming, and equipment of the *Arkansas* within five weeks' working-time under the hot summer sun, from which we were unsheltered, and under the depressing thought that there was a deep channel, of but six hours' steaming between us and the Federal fleet, whose guns were within hearing, was perhaps not inferior under all the circumstances to the renowned effort of Oliver Hazard Perry in cutting a fine ship from

the forest in ninety days. We were not a day too soon, for the now rapid fall of the river rendered it necessary for us to assume the offensive without waiting for the apparatus to bend the railway iron to the curve of our quarter and stern, and to the angles of the pilot-house. Though there was little thought of showing the former, the weakest part, to the enemy, we tacked boiler-plate iron over it for appearance' sake, and very imperfectly covered the pilot-house shield with a double thickness of one-inch bar iron. Our engines' twin screws, one under each quarter, worked up to eight miles an hour in still water, which promised about half that speed when turned against the current of the main river. We had at first some trust in these, not having discovered the way they soon showed of stopping on the center at wrong times and places; and as they never both stopped of themselves at the same time, the effect was, when one did so, to turn the vessel round, despite the rudder. Once, in the presence of the enemy, we made a circle, while trying to make the automatic stopper keep time with its sister-screw.

The *Arkansas* now appeared as if a small sea-going vessel had been cut down to the water's edge at both ends, leaving a box for guns amidships. The straight sides of the box, a foot in thickness, had over them one layer of railway iron; the ends closed by timber one foot square, planked across by six-inch strips of oak, were then covered by one course of railway iron laid up and down at an angle of thirty-five degrees. These ends deflected overhead all missiles striking at short range, but would have been of little security under a plunging fire. This shield, flat on top, covered with plank and half-inch iron, was pierced for 10 guns—3 in each broadside and 2 forward and aft. The large smoke-stack came through the top of the shield, and the pilot-house was raised about one foot above the shield level. Through the latter led a small tin tube by which to convey orders to the pilot. } The battery was respectable for that period of the war: 2 8-inch 64-pounders at the bows; 2 rifled 32s (old smooth-bores banded and rifled) astern; and 2 100-pounder Columbiads and a 6-inch naval gun in each broadside.—10 guns in all, which, under officers formerly of the United States service, could be relied on for good work, if we could find the men to load and fire. We obtained over 100 good men from the naval vessels lately on the Mississippi, and about 60 Missourians from the command of General Jeff Thompson. These had never served at great guns, but on trial they exhibited in their new service the cool courage natural to them on land. They were worthily commanded, under the orders of our first lieutenant, by Captain Harris. Our officers were Lieutenants Stevens, Grimball, Gift, Barbot, Wharton, and Read, all of the old service, and Chief Engineer City, Acting Masters Milliken and Phillips, of the Volunteer Navy, and

} In this action 68 shot-holes were made in the stack, and 4 minie-balls passed through the tin tube.—I. N. B.



BUILDING THE "ARKANSAS."

Midshipmen Seales, [†] R. H. Bacot, Tyler, and H. Cenas. The only trouble they ever gave me was to keep them from running the *Arkansas* into the Union fleet before we were ready for battle. On the 12th of July we sent our mechanics ashore, took our Missourians on board, and dropped below Satartia Bar, within five hours of the Mississippi. I now gave the executive officer a day to organize and exercise his men.

The idea exists that we made "a run," or "a raid," or in some way an "attack by surprise" upon the Union fleet. I have reason to think that we were expected some hours before we came. [‡]


On Monday A. M., July 14th, 1862, we started from Satartia. Fifteen miles below, at the mouth of Sunflower River, we found that the steam from our imperfect engines and boiler had penetrated our forward magazine and wet our powder so as to render it unfit for use. We were just opposite the site of an old saw-mill, where the opening in the forest, dense everywhere else, admitted the sun's rays. The day was clear and very hot; we

[†] Dabney M. Seales was from the Naval Academy at Annapolis; he distinguished himself afterward in the *Shenandoah*, and is now a prominent lawyer of Memphis.—I. N. B.

[‡] A Federal letter relating to the *Arkansas*, and evidently press correspondence, was captured by Confederates at Greenville, Miss. It began by saying, "Last night at 10 o'clock [it seems to have been written on the day of the combat] two deserters from Grandpré's sharpshooters at the Yazoo, who had stolen a skiff, came alongside the admiral's ship, the *Hartford*, and reported that the *Arkansas* had entered the raft and would be down at daylight to attack the fleet. Upon this a council of

made fast to the bank, head down-stream, landed our wet powder (expecting the enemy to heave in sight every moment), spread tarpaulins over the old saw-dust and our powder over these. By constant shaking and turning we got it back to the point of ignition before the sun sank below the trees, when, gathering it up, we crowded all that we could of it into the after magazine and resumed our way, guns cast loose and men at quarters, expecting every moment to meet the enemy. I had some idea of their strength, General Van Dorn, commanding our forces at Vicksburg, having written to me two days before that there were then, I think he said, thirty-seven men-of-war in sight and more up the river. Near dark we narrowly escaped the destruction of our smoke-stack from an immense overhanging tree. From this disaster we were saved by young Grimball, who sprang from the shield to another standing tree, with rope's-end in hand, and made it fast. We anchored near Haynes's Bluff at midnight and rested till 3 A. M., when we got up anchor for the fleet, hoping

war was immediately [that night] called on board the *Hartford*," etc., etc. The same letter, bearing every internal evidence of truth and sincerity, went on to say, "At daylight [following the night council] the little tug which [Admiral] Davis had sent up the Yazoo as a lookout came down like a streak of lightning, screaming, 'The *Arkansas* is coming! The *Arkansas* is coming!'" and then follows the account of excitement and preparation. Now all this may have been only in the imagination of the correspondent, but there was a detachment of our sharpshooters under Captain Grandpré at the raft, and we *did* enter and pass through it as stated. [See also p. 556.]—I. N. B.



THE CONFEDERATE RAM "ARKANSAS," ALONGSIDE THE UNION GUN-BOAT "CARONDELET."

to be with it at sunrise, but before it was light we ran ashore and lost an hour in getting again afloat. At sunrise we gained Old River—a lake caused by a “cut-off” from the Mississippi; the Yazoo enters this at the north curve, and, mingling its deep waters with the wider expanse of the lake, after a union of ten miles, breaks through a narrow strip of land, to lose itself finally in the Mississippi twelve miles above Vicksburg. We were soon to find the fleet midway between these points, but hid from both by the curved and wooded eastern shore. As the sun rose clear and fiery out of the lake on our left, we saw a few miles ahead, under full steam, three Federal vessels in line approaching. These, as we afterward discovered, were the iron-clad *Carondelet*, Captain Henry Walke,¹ the wooden gun-boat *Tyler*, Lieutenant William Gwin, and a ram, the *Queen of the West*, Lieutenant James M. Hunter. Directing our pilot to stand for the iron-clad, the center vessel of the three, I gave the order not to fire our bow guns, lest by doing so we should diminish our speed, relying for the moment upon our broadside guns to keep the ram and the *Tyler* from gaining our quarter, which they seemed eager to do. I had determined, despite our want of speed, to try the ram or iron prow upon the foe, who were gallantly approaching; but when less than half a mile separated us, the *Carondelet* fired a wildly aimed bow gun, backed round, and went from the *Arkansas* at a speed which at once perceptibly increased the space between us. The *Tyler* and ram followed

this movement of the iron-clad, and the stern guns of the *Carondelet* and the *Tyler* were briskly served on us. Grimball and Gift, with their splendid sixty-fours, were now busy at their work, while Barbot and Wharton watched for a chance shot abeam. Read chafed in silence at his rifles. The whole crew was under the immediate direction of the first lieutenant, Henry Stevens, a religious soldier, of the Stonewall Jackson type, who felt equally safe at all times and places. I was on the shield directly over our bow guns, and could see their shot on the way to the *Carondelet*, and with my glasses I thought that I could see the white wood under her armor. This was satisfactory, for I knew that no vessel afloat could long stand rapid raking by 8-inch shot at such short range. We soon began to gain on the chase, yet from time to time I had to steer first to starboard, then to port, to keep the inquisitive consorts of the *Carondelet* from inspecting my boiler-plate armor. This gave the nearer antagonist an advantage, but before he could improve it he would be again brought ahead. While our shot seemed always to hit his stern and disappear, his missiles, striking our inclined shield, were deflected over my head and lost in air. I received a severe contusion on the head, but this gave me no concern after I had failed to find any brains mixed with the handful of clotted blood which I drew from the wound and examined. A moment later a shot from the *Tyler* struck at my feet, penetrated the pilot-house, and, cutting off a section of the wheel, mortally hurt

¹ The commander of the *Carondelet* and I had been friends in the old navy and messmates on a voyage around the world.—I. N. B.

Chief Pilot Hodges and disabled our Yazoo River pilot, Shacklett, who was at the moment much needed, our Mississippi pilots knowing nothing of Old River. James Brady, a Missourian of nerve and equal to the duty, took the wheel, and I ordered him to "keep the iron-clad ahead." All was going well, with a near prospect of carrying out my first intention of using the ram, this time at a great ad-



CAPTAIN I. N. BROWN, C. S. N. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

vantage, for the stern of the *Carondelet* was now the objective point, and she seemed to be going slow and unsteady. Unfortunately the *Tyler* also slowed, so as to keep near his friend, and this brought us within easy range of his small-arms. I saw with some concern, as I was the only visible target outside our shield, that they were firing by volleys. I ought to have told Stevens to hold off Grimball and Gift from the iron-clad till they could finish the *Tyler*, but neither in nor out of battle does one always do the right thing. I was near the hatchway at the moment when a minie-ball, striking over my left temple, tumbled me down among the guns. I awoke as if from sleep, to find kind hands helping me to a place among the killed and wounded. I soon regained my place on the shield. I found the *Carondelet* still ahead, but much nearer, and both vessels entering the willows, which grew out on the bar at the inner curve of the lake. To have run into the mud, we drawing 13 feet (the *Carondelet* only 6), would have ended the matter with the *Arkansas*. The *Carondelet's* position could only be accounted for by supposing her steering apparatus destroyed. The deep water was on our starboard bow, where at some distance I saw the *Tyler* and the ram, as if awaiting our further entanglement. I gave the order "hard a-port and depress port guns." So near were we to the chase that this action of the helm brought us alongside, and our port broadside caused her to heel to port and then roll back so deeply as to take the water over her deck forward

of the shield. Our crew, thinking her sinking, gave three hearty cheers. In swinging off we exposed our stern to the *Carondelet's* broadside, and Read at the same time got a chance with his rifles. The *Carondelet* did not return this fire of our broadside and stern guns. Had she fired into our stern when we were so near, it would have destroyed or at least have disabled us.

Though I stood within easy pistol-shot, in uniform, uncovered, and evidently the commander of the *Arkansas*, no more notice was taken of me by the *Carondelet* than had been taken of my ship when, to escape running into the mud, I had exposed the *Arkansas* to being raked. Their ports were closed, no flag was flying, not a man or officer was in view, not a sound or shot was heard. She was apparently "disabled."

We neither saw nor felt the *Carondelet* again, but turned toward the spiteful *Tyler* and the wary ram. As these were no longer a match for the *Arkansas*, they very properly took advantage of a speed double our own to gain the shelter of their fleet, the *Tyler* making good practice at us while in range with her pivot gun, and getting some attention in the same way from our bows. Under the ordinary circumstances of war we had just got through with a fair hour's work; but knowing what was ahead of us, we had to regard it in the same light as our Missouri militia did, as "a pretty smart skirmish."

On gaining the Mississippi, we saw no vessels but the two we had driven before us. While following these in the direction of Vicksburg I had the opportunity of inspecting engine and fire rooms, where I found engineers and firemen had been suffering under a temperature of 120° to 130°. The executive officer, while attending to every other duty during the recent firing, had organized a relief party from the men at the guns, who went down into the fire-room every fifteen minutes, the others coming up or being, in many instances, hauled up, exhausted in that time; in this way, by great care, steam was kept to service gauge, but in the conflict below the fire department broke down. The connection between furnaces and smoke-stack (technically called the breechings) were in this second conflict shot away, destroying the draught and letting the flames come out into the shield, raising the temperature there to 120°, while it had already risen to 130° in the fire-room. It has been asked why the *Arkansas* was not used as a ram. The want of speed and of confidence in the engines answers the question. We went into action in Old River with 120 pounds of steam, and though every effort was made to keep it up, we came out with but 20 pounds, hardly enough to turn the engines.

Aided by the current of the Mississippi, we soon approached the Federal fleet—a forest of masts and smoke-stacks—ships, rams, iron-clads, and other gun-boats on the left side, and ordinary river steamers and bomb-vessels along the right. To any one having a real ram at command the genius of havoc could not have offered a finer view, the panoramic effect of which was intensified by the city of men spread out with innumerable tents opposite

Such was the fact.—EDITORS.

on the right bank. We were not yet in sight of Vicksburg, but in every direction, except astern, our eyes rested on enemies. I had long known the most of these as valued friends, and if I now had any doubts of the success of the *Arkansas* they were inspired by this general knowledge rather than from any awe of a particular name. It seemed at a glance as if a whole navy had come to keep me away from the heroic city,—six or seven rams,



LIEUTENANT JOHN GRIMBALL, C. S. N.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

four or five iron-clads, without including one accounted for an hour ago, and the fleet of Farragut generally, behind or inside of this fleet. The rams seemed to have been held *in reserve*, to come out between the intervals. Seeing this, as we neared the head of the line I said to our pilot, "Brady, shave that line of men-of-war as close as you can, so that the rams will not have room to gather head-way in coming out to strike us." In this way we ran so near to the wooden ships that each may have expected the blow which, if I could avoid it, I did not intend to deliver to any, and probably the rams running out at slow speed across the line of our advance received in the smoke and fury of the fight more damage from the guns of their own men-of-war than from those of the *Arkansas*.

As we neared the head of the line our bow guns, trained on the *Hartford*, began this second fight of the morning (we were yet to have a third one before the day closed), and within a few minutes, as the enemy was brought in range, every gun of the *Arkansas* was at its work. It was calm, and the smoke settling over the combatants, our men at times directed their guns at the flashes of those of their opponents. As we advanced, the line of fire seemed to grow into a circle constantly closing. The shock of missiles striking our sides was literally continuous, and as we were now surrounded,

without room for anything but pushing ahead, and shrapnel shot were coming on our shield deck, twelve pounds at a time, I went below to see how our Missouri backwoodsmen were handling their 100-pounder Columbiads. At this moment I had the most lively realization of having steamed into a real volcano, the *Arkansas* from its center firing rapidly to every point of the circumference, without the fear of hitting a friend or missing an enemy. I got below in time to see Read and Scales with their rifled guns blow off the feeble attack of a ram on our stern. Another ram was across our way ahead. As I gave the order, "Go through him, Brady!" his steam went into the air, and his crew into the river. A shot from one of our bow guns had gone through his boiler and saved the collision. We passed by and through the brave fellows struggling in the water under a shower of missiles intended for us. It was a little hot this morning all around; the enemy's shot frequently found weak places in our armor, and their shrapnel and minie-balls also came through our port-holes. Still, under a temperature of 120°, our people kept to their work, and as each one, acting under the steady eye of Stevens, seemed to think the result depended on himself, I sought a cooler atmosphere on the shield, to find, close ahead and across our way, a large iron-clad displaying the square flag of an admiral. Though we had but little head-way, his beam was exposed, and I ordered the pilot to strike him amidships. He avoided this by steaming ahead, and, passing under his stern, nearly touching, we gave him our starboard broadside, which probably went through him from rudder to prow. This was our last shot, and we received none in return.

We were now at the end of what had seemed the interminable line, and also past the outer rim of the volcano. I now called the officers up to take a look at what we had just come through and to get the fresh air; and as the little group of heroes closed around me with their friendly words of congratulation, a heavy rifle-shot passed close over our heads: it was the parting salutation, and if aimed two feet lower would have been to us the most injurious of the battle. We were not yet in sight of Vicksburg, but if any of the fleet followed us farther on our way I did not perceive it.

The *Arkansas* continued toward Vicksburg without further trouble. When within sight of the city, we saw another fleet preparing to receive us or recede from us, below: one vessel of the fleet was aground and in flames. With our firemen exhausted, our smoke-stack cut to pieces, and a section of our plating torn from the side, we were not in condition just then to begin a third battle; moreover humanity required the landing of our wounded—terribly torn by cannon-shot—and of our dead. We were received at Vicksburg with enthusiastic cheers. Immediate measures were taken to repair damages and to recruit our crew, diminished to one-half their original number by casualties, and by the expiration of service of those who had volunteered only for the trip to Vicksburg.

We had left the Yazoo River with a short supply of fuel, and after our first landing opposite the

city-hall we soon dropped down to the coal depot, where we began coaling and repairing, under the fire of the lower fleet, to which, under the circumstances, we could make no reply. Most of the enemy's shot fell short, but Renshaw, in the *West-field*, made very fine practice with his 100-pounder rifle gun, occasionally throwing the spray from his shot over our working party, but with the benefit of sprinkling down the coal dust. Getting in our coal, we moved out of range of such sharp practice, where, under less excitement, we hastened such temporary repairs as would enable us to continue the offensive. We had intended trying the lower fleet that evening, but before our repairs could be completed and our crew reinforced by suitable selections from the army, the hours of night were approaching, under the shadows of which (however favorable for running batteries) no brave man eases from choice to fight.

About sunset of the same day, a number of our antagonists of the morning, including the flag-ship *Hartford* and the equally formidable *Richmond*, were seen under full steam coming down the river. Before they came within range of the *Arkansas*, we had the gratification of witnessing the beautiful reply of our upper shore-batteries to their gallant attack. Unfit as we were for the offensive, I told Stevens to get under way and run out into the midst of the coming fleet. Before this order could be executed one vessel of the fleet sent a 160-pound wrought-iron bolt through our armor and engine-room, disabling the engine and killing, among others, Pilot Gilmore, and knocking overboard the heroic Brady, who had steered the *Arkansas* through our morning's work. This single shot caused also a very serious leak, destroyed all the contents of the dispensary (fortunately our surgeon, Dr. Washington, was just then away from his medicines), and, passing through the opposite bulwarks, lodged between the wood-work and the armor. Stevens promptly detailed a party to aid the carpenter in stopping the leak, while our bow and port-broadside guns were rapidly served on the passing vessels. So close were these to our guns that we could hear our shot crashing through their sides, and the groans of their wounded; and, incredible as it now seems, these sounds were heard with a fierce delight by the *Arkansas's* people. Why no attempt was made to ram our vessel, I do not know. Our position invited it, and our rapid firing made that position conspicuous; but as by this time it was growing dark, and the *Arkansas* close inshore, they may have mistaken us for a water-battery. We had greatly the advantage in pointing our guns, the enemy passing in line ahead, and being distinctly visible as each one for the time shut out our view of the horizon. And now this busy day, the 15th of July, 1862, was closed with the sad duty of sending ashore a second party of killed and wounded, and the rest which our exhaustion rendered necessary was taken for the night under a dropping fire of the enemy's 13-inch shells.

During the following week we were exposed day and night to these falling bombs, which did not hit the *Arkansas*, but frequently exploded under water

near by. One shell, which fell nearly under our bows, threw up a number of fish. As these floated by with the current, one of our men said: "Just look at that, will you? Why, the upper fleet is killing fish for the lower fleet's dinner!" In time we became accustomed to this shelling, but not to the idea that it was without danger; and I know of no more effective way of curing a man of the weakness of thinking that he is without the feeling of fear than for him, on a dark night, to watch two or three of these double-fused descending shells, all near each other, and seeming as though they would strike him between the eyes.

In three days we were again in condition to move and to menace at our will either fleet, thus compelling the enemy's entire force, in the terrible July heat, to keep up steam day and night. An officer of the fleet writing at this time, said: "Another council of war was held on board the admiral's [flag-ship] last night, in which it was resolved that the *Arkansas* must be destroyed at all hazards, a thing, I suspect, much easier said than done; but I wish that she was destroyed, for she gives us no rest by day nor sleep by night." We constantly threatened the offensive, and our raising steam, which they could perceive by our smoke-stack, was the signal for either fleet to fire up. As the temperature at that season was from 90° to 100° in the shade, it was clear that unless the *Arkansas* could be "destroyed" the siege, if for sanitary reasons alone, must soon be raised.

The result of our first real attempt to resume the offensive was that before we could get within range of the mortar fleet, our engine completely broke down, and it was with difficulty that we regained our usual position in front of the city.

The timely coming of the iron-clad *Essex*, fresh from the docks, and with a new crew, enabled the Union commander to attack us without risk to his regular or original blockading force. They could not have taken us at a more unprepared moment. Some of our officers and all but twenty-eight of our crew were in hospitals ashore, and we lay helplessly at anchor, with a disabled engine. I made known to the general commanding at Vicksburg the condition of our vessel, and with great earnestness personally urged him to give me, without delay, enough men to fight my guns, telling him that I expected an attack every hour. I was promised that the men (needed at the moment) should be sent to me the next day. The following morning at sunrise the *Essex*, Commodore William D. Porter, with the *Queen of the West*, no doubt the best ram of the Ellet flock (though as far as my experience went they were all ordinary sheep and equally harmless), ran down under full steam, regardless of the fire of our upper shore-batteries, and made the expected attack. We were at anchor and with only enough men to fight two of our guns; but by the zeal of our officers, who mixed in with these men as part of the guns' crews, we were able to train at the right moment and fire all the guns which could be brought to bear upon our cautiously coming assailants. With a view perhaps to avoid our bow guns, the *Essex* made the mistake, so far as her success was concerned,



COMMODORE W. D. PORTER. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

of running into us across the current instead of coming head-on with its force. At the moment of collision, when our guns were muzzle to muzzle, the *Arkansas's* broadside was exchanged for the bow guns of the assailant; a shot from one of the latter struck the *Arkansas's* plating a foot forward of the forward broadside port, breaking off the ends of the railroad bars and driving them in among our people; the solid shot followed, crossed diagonally our gun-deck, and split on the breech of our starboard after-broadside gun. This shot killed eight and wounded six of our men, but left us still half our crew. What damage the *Essex* received I did not ascertain, but that vessel drifted clear of the *Arkansas* without again firing, and after receiving the fire of our stern rifles steamed in the face and under the fire of the Vicksburg batteries to the fleet below. Had Porter at the moment of the collision thrown fifty men on our upper deck, he might have made fast to us with a hawser, and with little additional loss might have taken the *Arkansas* and her twenty men and officers. We were given time by the approaching ram to reload our guns, and this second assailant, coming also across instead of with the current, "butted" us so gently that we hardly felt the shock. The force of his blow was tempered to us no doubt by the effect of our three broadside guns,

which were fired into him when he was less than fifty feet distant. Apparently blinded by such a blow in the face, he drifted astern and ran ashore under the muzzles of Read's rifles, the bolts from which were probably lost in the immense quantity of hay in bales which seemed stowed over and around him. Getting clear of the bank, the ram wore round without again attempting to strike the *Arkansas*, and steamed at great speed up the river, receiving in passing a second broadside from our port battery, and in the excitement of getting away neglecting the caution of his advance, he brought himself within range of our deadly bow guns, from which Grimboll and Gift sent solid shot that seemed to pass through him from stem to stern. As he ran out of range he was taken in tow and was run up into the Davis fleet.

Thus closed the fourth and final battle of the *Arkansas*, leaving the daring Confederate vessel, though reduced in crew to twenty men all told for duty, still defiant in the presence of a hostile force perhaps exceeding in real strength that which fought under Nelson at Trafalgar. The conduct of our men and officers was on this occasion, as on every former trial, worthy of the American name. Moving quickly in a squad, from gun to gun, reloading, and running out each one separately, and then dividing into parties sufficient to train and fire, they were as determined and cheerful as they could have been with a full crew on board. The closeness of this contest with the *Essex* may be inferred from the circumstance that several of our surviving men had their faces blackened and were painfully hurt by the unburnt powder which came through our port-holes from the assailant's guns.

It was perhaps as much a matter of coal as of cannon, of health as of hostility, that the Union commanders had now to decide upon. If the *Arkansas* could not be destroyed, the siege must be raised, for fifty ships, more or less, could not keep perpetual steam to confine one little 10-gun vessel within her conceded control of six miles of the Mississippi River. It was, indeed, a dilemma, and doubtless the less difficult horn of it was chosen. Soon after our contribution to the *Essex's* laurels, and between sunset and sunrise, the lower fleet started for the recuperative atmosphere of salt-water, and about the same time the upper fleet—rams, bombs, and iron-clads—steamed for the North. Thus was dissipated for the season the greatest naval force hitherto assembled at one time in the New World.

Vicksburg was now without the suspicion of an immediate enemy. I had taken, with my brave associates, for the last sixty days, my share of labor and watchfulness, and I now left them for four days, only, as I supposed, to sustain without me the lassitude of inaction. Important repairs were yet necessary to the engines, and much of the iron plating had to be refastened to her shattered sides. This being fairly under way, I called, Thursday P. M., upon General Van Dorn, commanding the forces, and told him that, having obtained telegraphic permission from the Navy Department to turn over the command of the vessel temporarily

to the officer next in rank, First Lieutenant Stevens, I would go to Grenada, Miss., and that I would return on the following Tuesday A. M., by which time the *Arkansas*, I hoped, would be ready once more to resume the offensive. Almost immediately on reaching Grenada I was taken violently ill, and while in bed, unable, as I supposed, to rise, I received a dispatch from Lieutenant Stevens saying that Van Dorn required him to steam at once down to Baton Rouge to aid in a land attack of our forces upon the Union garrison holding that place. I replied to this with a positive order to remain at Vicksburg until I could join him; and without delay caused myself to be taken to the railroad station, where I threw myself on the mail-bags of the first passing train, unable to sit up, and did not change my position until reaching Jackson, 130 miles distant. On applying there for a special train to take me to Vicksburg, I learned that the *Arkansas* had been gone from that place four hours. ☆ Van Dorn had been persistent beyond all reason in his demand, and Stevens, undecided, had referred the question to a senior officer of the Confederate navy, who was at Jackson, Miss., with horses and carriages, furnished by Government in place of a flag-ship, thus commanding in chief for the Confederacy on the Mississippi, sixty miles from its nearest waters. This officer, whose war record was

yet in abeyance, had attained scientific celebrity by dabbling in the waters of the Dead Sea, at a time when I was engaged in the siege of Vera Cruz and in the general operations of the Mexican war. Ignorant or regardless of the condition of the *Arkansas*, fresh from Richmond on his mission of bother, not communicating with or informing me on the subject, he ordered Stevens to obey Van Dorn without any regard to my orders to the contrary.

Under the double orders of two commanders-in-chief to be at Baton Rouge at a certain date and hour, Stevens could not use that tender care which his engines required, and before they completed their desperate run of three hundred miles against time, the starboard one suddenly broke down, throwing the vessel inextricably ashore. This misfortune, for which there was no present remedy, happened when the vessel was within sight of Baton Rouge. Very soon after, the *Essex* was seen approaching under full steam. Stevens, as humane as he was true and brave, finding that he could not bring a single gun to bear upon the coming foe, sent all his people over the bows ashore, remaining alone to set fire to his vessel; this he did so effectually that he had to jump from the stern into the river and save himself by swimming; and with colors flying, the gallant *Arkansas*, whose decks had never been pressed by the foot of an enemy, was blown into the air.

☆ I was entirely cured by this intelligence, and immediately hurried to Pontchatoula, the nearest approach by rail to Baton Rouge, and thence arrived nearly in time to see the explosion of the *Arkansas*.—J. N. B.



DESTRUCTION OF THE CONFEDERATE RAM "ARKANSAS."

NOTE TO THE FOREGOING ARTICLE.—The condition of the *Carondelet* in the fight with the *Arkansas* is exhibited by the following extracts from the log of the vessel, here printed from the original manuscript:

"July 15th. Commences and until 4 A. M. clear and warm. At 3:30 called all hands and hove up our anchor.—EDW'D E. BRENNAND.

"From 4 to 8: At 4 got under way and proceeded up the river, gun-boat *Taylor* [Tyler] and ram *Queen of the West* following us; at 4:30 entered Yazoo River; at 5 *Taylor* and *Queen of the West* passed us; at 6 discovered a boat coming down the river; immediately went to quarters and cleared the boat for action. Rebel ram opened fire upon the *Queen of the West* and gun-boat *Taylor*, and they immediately rounded to. We found the advancing rebel boat to be a powerful gun-boat and ram. We rounded to and headed down-stream, at the same time firing upon her with all our batteries as we brought them in range. Captain Walke hailed the *Taylor* as she passed, and ordered Lieutenant-Commander Gwin to go ahead and inform the commodore of the *Arkansas's* approach. The ram made for us, and for an hour we continued a running fight (she gaining on us); distance, 500 to 50 yards. Our wheel-ropes were shot away, steam-escape pipe cut, exhaust pipe cut, cold-water supply pipe riddled with pieces of shot, and steam-gauge shot away; the boat becoming unmanageable.

"Our tiller ropes and box being shot away, the *Carondelet* was unmanageable, and ran upon a small stump after the *Arkansas* passed by us. As she passed by us we called the boarders up on deck, and we gave her our starboard broadside and bow guns, firing them as the enemy came in range. At this time the *Arkansas's* flag was down, and not hoisted again while in sight. Our backing-bell and speaking-trumpet being shot away, the pilot could not communicate readily with the engineer. By this time the ram had passed by us, and was following the *Taylor*. After remaining at the bank for a short time to repair damages we made our way down the river, and found that the rebel boat had succeeded in passing by the whole of the flotilla and rams. We received five shots

in the captain's cabin and three in the ward-room, three of the shots passing clear through the wheel-house, one lodging in the steerage mess-room, one going through wheel-house carrying away deck-pump, passing through bulkhead aft of steam drum, glancing up, passing over steam drum, striking carlines, carrying away four of them, and falling into fire-room. One going through wheel-house, carrying away steam-escape pipes, going through two coppers on the galley, through smoke-pipe, through ventilators, through bulkhead forward of fire-room, through loose timbers placed upon the bulkhead, and entering four pieces of $\frac{3}{4}$ -inch iron. One coming in captain's cabin on starboard corner, carrying away twelve carlines, striking chambers of side pipe, glancing upward and cutting exhaust pipe, and striking upper deck over engine-room and falling to the main deck. One coming in ward-room just amidships, cutting away eight carlines, passing through the chief engineer's, surgeon's, and gunner's rooms, carrying away bulkheads, and striking the deck and fetching up against the after stanchion on port side. Another shot came through starboard quarter, passing through 2d and 1st masters' room and through the captain's cabin out of the after-port. Another shot came through the iron on starboard side, breaking in casemate, and the shot breaking in pieces; two shots carrying away iron, and coming through the iron into the wood on the inside. Both cutters shot away; two boats' davits carried away; all boats' falls on starboard side shot away; three awning stanchions shot away. One shell burst on starboard side of upper deck, cutting awning in pieces and setting starboard hammock-netting on fire. We expended during the engagement one 32-pound gun, weight 43 hundred-weight, struck on the lower part of the muzzle, splitting the gun in two places: six boating pikes, one musket, three revolvers, and four cutlasses, belts, and accouterments were lost and shot to pieces during the engagement. Robert Letty, Charles A. Wiggins, Charles Schraw, and Oliver Greggs were killed. There were also 15 wounded and 16 missing. Expended ninety rifle and solid shots. . . . EDW'D E. BRENNAND, 1st Master."

The reader is also referred to Admiral Walke's statement on p. 555.—EDITORS.

CONFEDERATE TORPEDOES IN THE YAZOO.

BY ISAAC N. BROWN, CAPTAIN, C. S. N.

IT was rather by inference than by any direct orders that after the sacrifice of the *Arkansas* I was left to guard the Yazoo River. At this juncture Messrs. McDonald (or McDonough) and Ewing, acting masters in the Confederate navy, offered to aid me with torpedoes. So poor in resources were we, that in order to make a beginning I borrowed a five-gallon glass demijohn, and procuring from the army the powder to fill it and an artillery friction tube to explode it, I set these two enterprising men to work with a coil of small iron wire which they stretched from bank to bank, the demijohn filled with inflammable material being suspended from the middle, some feet below the surface of the water, and so connected with the friction tube inside as to ignite when a vessel should come in contact with the wire. Soon after it was put in position the iron-clad *Cairo* came up the river [December 12th, 1862], and, keeping the middle of the stream, hit the demijohn, and within twelve minutes went to the bottom in thirty feet of water.

Thus a belligerent vessel was first "neutralized" by an enemy's torpedo. The moral strength thus added to our defenses may be inferred from an anecdote reported to me soon after. One of our Confederate people went on board a Union gun-boat off the mouth of the Yazoo, under flag of truce, and met there an old messmate and friend,

and said banteringly to him, "Tom, why don't you go up and clean out the Yazoo?" "I would as soon think of going to — at once," was the answer, "for Brown has got the river chock-full of torpedoes."

I also made a contract with Dr. Fretwell and Mr. Norman, then at Yazoo City, for fifty or more of these destructives on Dr. Fretwell's plan—automatic action on being brought in contact with a vessel or boat. But the difficulty of procuring materials prevented the completion of the contract for the whole number in time.

On the morning of the Union advance upon Yazoo City [July 13th, 1863], I had myself placed two of these "Fretwells" half a mile below our land-battery of one rifle 6-inch gun—handled by the same men—the same gun, in fact, that had aided in the defense of Fort Pemberton. The *De Kalb* had there felt this gun, and it came twice within its range on this day,—retiring both times without unreasonable delay,—but when our sailor crew found themselves uncovered by our land force, and a whole division of Union men within rifle-range, they withdrew under orders, and the *De Kalb*, seeing our gun silent, advanced for the third time, getting as far as the torpedoes, and there suddenly disappearing beneath the waters of the Yazoo. [See also pp. 559 and 570.]

UNION VESSELS IN THE VICKSBURG OPERATIONS.

THE MISSISSIPPI FLOTILLA.—Rear-Admiral David D. Porter, commanding; Commander A. M. Pennock, Fleet Captain, Naval Station, Cairo.

GUN-BOATS.—*Benton*, Lieut.-Com. S. L. Phelps, Lieut.-Com. W. Gwin (Yazoo River, December, 1862), Lieut.-Com. J. A. Greer (Vicksburg, Grand Gulf, 16 guns; *Essex*, Com. W. D. Porter, Com. C. H. B. Caldwell (Port Hudson), Com. R. Townsend, 5 guns, 1 howitzer; July, 1862, 7 guns, 1 howitzer; June 10th, 1863, 8 guns, 2 howitzers; August 1st, 1863, 8 guns, 4 howitzers.

EDS IRON-CLADS.—*St. Louis* (Baron De Kalb), Lieut. W. McGunnegle (St. Charles), Lieut.-Com. J. G. Walker (Yazoo River, Arkansas Post, Yazoo Pass, Haynes's Bluff, Yazoo City), 13 guns (reduced to 7, May, 1863); *Cairo*, Lieut.-Com. T. O. Selfridge, 13 guns, 1 howitzer; *Carondelet*, Com. Henry Walke (action with *Arkansas*, July 15th, 1862), Lieut. J. M. Murphy (Steele's Bayou, Vicksburg, and Grand Gulf), 13 guns, 1 howitzer; May 15th, 1863, 11 guns; *Cincinnati*, Lieut.-Com. B. Wilson (Vicksburg, July, 1862), Lieut. George M. Bache (Arkansas Post, Steele's Bayou, Vicksburg, May 27th), 13 guns, 1 howitzer; *Louisville*, Com. B. M. Dove (Vicksburg, July, 1862), Lieut.-Com. E. K. Owen (Arkansas Post, Steele's Bayou, Vicksburg, and Grand Gulf), 13 guns, 1 howitzer; *Mound City*, Com. A. H. Kilty (St. Charles), Lieut.-Com. W. Gwin (Yazoo River, Grand Gulf, Aug., '62), Lieut. B. Wilson (Steele's Bayou, Vicksburg, and Grand Gulf, Warrenton), 13 guns, 1 howitzer; May 28, '63, 11 guns; July 26, '63, 13 guns; *Pittsburgh*, Act. V. Lieut. W. R. Hoel, 13 guns; Sept., '62, 12 guns, 1 howitzer; May 18, '63, 13 guns; Dec., '63, 14 guns.

LATER IRON-CLADS.—*Choctaw* (turret), Lieut.-Com. F. M. Ramsay (Haynes's Bluff, Yazoo River, Yazoo City, Milliken's Bend), April 9th, 1863, 4 guns; May, 1863, 4 guns, 2 howitzers; June 8th, 1863, 6 guns, 2 howitzers; *Lafayette*, Capt. H. Walke (Vicksburg and Grand Gulf), 6 guns, 4 howitzers; *Chillicothe*, Lieut.-Com. J. P. Foster (Yazoo Pass), 2 guns; *Indianola*, Lieut.-Com. George Brown, 4 guns; *Tuscomb*, Lieut.-Com. J. W. Shirk (Vicksburg and Grand Gulf), 5 guns.

RODGERS GUN-BOATS.—*Conestoga*, Lieut. G. W. Blodgett (St. Charles), Lieut.-Com. T. O. Selfridge, 4 guns, 1 howitzer; *Lexington*, Lieut. James W. Shirk (St. Charles, Yazoo River, Dec., '62, Arkansas Post); Lieut.-Com. S. L. Phelps (Cumberland River, Jan., '63); Lieut.-Com. Le Roy Fitch (Tennessee and Cumberland rivers); Lieut. G. M. Bache (White River), 6 guns; Sept., '62, 7 guns, 1 howitzer; *Tyler*, Lieut. William Gwin (action with *Arkansas*, July 15, '62); Lieut.-Com. J. M. Pritchett (Yazoo River, Dec., '62, Helena), 7 guns; Sept., '62, 9 guns, 1 howitzer.

ELLET RAMS.—Lieut.-Col. A. W. Ellet, Col. C. R. Ellet. (Originally employed without armament; subsequently howitzers or other light guns were mounted from time to time. Frequent changes were also made in commanding officers. Those engaged in important actions are mentioned below. The vessels were the *Fulton*, *Horner*, *Lancaster*, Lieut.-Col. J. A. Ellet (passage of Vicksburg, March 25th, 1863); *Lioness*, Master T. O'Reilly (Yazoo River, December, 1862); *Mingo*, *Monarch*, Sergt. E. W. Davis (Yazoo River raid, August, 1862), Col. C. R. Ellet (Ark. Post); *Queen of the West*, Lieut. J. M. Hunter (action of July 15th, 1862), Lieut.-Col. A. W. Ellet (July 22d, 1862), Capt. E. W. Sutherland (Yazoo River, December, 1862), Col. C. R. Ellet (Red River ernise); *Sampson*, *Switzerland*, Lieut.-Col. A. W. Ellet (Yazoo River raid, August, 1862), Col. C. R. Ellet (passage of Vicksburg, March 25th, 1863).

PRIZES.—*Alfred Robb*, Act. V. Lieut. J. Goudy, Act. Ens. W. C. Hanford, 4 howitzers; *Eastport*, Lieut.-Com. S. L. Phelps, 8 guns, 2 howitzers; *Fair Play*, Lieut.-Com. Le Roy Fitch, Act. Master Geo. J. Groves, September, 1862, 4 howitzers, May, 1863, 1 gun, 6 howitzers; *General Bragg*, Lt. Joshua Bishop, September, 1862, 2 guns, 1 howitzer; *General Pillow*, Act. Ens. J. Moyer, September, 1862, 2 howitzers; *General Price*, Com. S. E. Woodworth (Vicksburg, April-July, 1863), 4 guns; *Little*

Rebel, Act. V. Lieut. T. B. Gregory, September, 1862, 3 howitzers; March, 1863, 4 howitzers; *Sumter*, Lieut. Henry Erben (Vicksburg, July 15th, 1862), 4 guns, 1 howitzer.

TIN-CLADS.—*Brilliant*, Act. V. Lieut. C. G. Perkins, September, 1862, 4 howitzers; February, 1863, 6 howitzers; *Crick*, Act. V. Lieut. A. R. Langthorne, 6 howitzers; *Forest Rose*, Act. V. Lieut. George W. Brown, December, 1862, 2 guns, 4 howitzers; August 19th, 1863, 4 guns, 4 howitzers; *Glide*, Act. Lt. S. E. Woodworth (Ark. Post); *Juliet*, Act. V. Lieut. Ed. Shaw, 6 howitzers; *Linden*, Act. V. Lieut. T. E. Smith, Act. Master T. M. Farrell, 6 howitzers; *Marmora*, Act. V. Lieut. Robert Getty, September, 1862, 4 howitzers; December, 1862, 8 howitzers; *Petrel*, Act. Master T. McElroy, Act. V. Lieut. John Pearce; *Rattler*, Lieut.-Com. Watson Smith (Ark. Post, Yazoo Pass), Act. Master W. E. H. Fentress, 8 howitzers; *Romeo*, Act. Ens. R. B. Smith (Yazoo River, December, 1862), Act. Master T. Baldwin, 6 howitzers; *Signal*, Act. V. Lieut. John Scott, Act. V. Lieut. C. Dominy, September, 1862, 4 howitzers; May, 1863, 6 howitzers; November, 1863, 2 guns, 6 howitzers.

VARIOUS VESSELS.—*Alexandria*, Act. Master D. P. Rosenmiller, 2 howitzers; *Argosy*, Act. Ens. J. C. Morong, 7 howitzers; *Black Hawk*, Lieut.-Com. K. R. Breese (Ark. Post and Vicksburg), 9 guns, 2 howitzers; *Champion*, Act. Master Alfred Phelps, 2 guns, 2 howitzers; *Corington*, Act. V. Lieut. J. S. Hurd, Act. V. Lieut. Geo. P. Lord, 4 guns, 4 howitzers; *Curlew*, Act. Ens. H. B. O'Neill, 8 howitzers; *Exchange*, Act. V. Lieut. J. S. Hurd, 2 guns, 5 howitzers; *Fort Hindman*, Act. V. Lieut. John Pearce, 6 guns; *Hastings*, Act. V. Lieut. A. R. Langthorne, 4 guns, 4 howitzers; *Kenwood*, Act. Master John Swancy, May, 1863, 2 guns, 4 howitzers; *Key West*, Act. V. Lieut. E. M. King, May, 1863, 6 howitzers; June 16th, 1863, 8 howitzers; *Moose*, Lieut.-Com. LeRoy Fitch, 6 howitzers; *Naumkeag*, Act. Master John Rogers, 2 guns, 4 howitzers; *New Era*, Act. Master F. W. Flannery, Act. Master J. C. Bunner, 6 howitzers; *Parpaer*, Act. Master A. F. Thompson, 2 guns, 6 howitzers; *Peosta*, Act. V. Lieut. T. E. Smith, 6 guns, 8 howitzers; *Prairie Bird*, Act. V. Lieut. E. E. Brennan, 8 howitzers; *Queen City*, Act. V. Lieut. J. Goudy, Act. V. Lieut. G. W. Brown, April, 1863, 4 guns, 4 howitzers; *Reindeer*, Act. V. Lieut. H. A. Glassford, 6 howitzers; *St. Clair*, Act. V. Lieut. J. S. Hurd, Act. V. Lieut. T. B. Gregory, September, 1862, 4 howitzers; February 1863, 6 howitzers; *Silver Cloud*, Act. V. Lieut. A. F. O'Neill, 6 howitzers; *Silver Lake*, Act. Master J. C. Coyle, 6 howitzers; *Springfield*, Act. Master J. Watson, 6 howitzers; *Tawah*, Act. V. Lieut. J. Goudy, 2 guns, 6 howitzers; *Victory*, Act. Master F. Read, 6 howitzers.

MORTAR-BOATS. Gunner Eugene Mack; Ensign Miller.

AUXILIARY.—*Abraham*, Act. Ens. W. Wagner (inspection boat); *Clara Dolsen*, Lieut.-Com. T. Pattison (receiving ship at Cairo), 1 gun; *General Lyon*, Pilot R. E. Birch (dispatch boat), 2 howitzers; *Grampus*, Act. Master E. Sells (receiving ship); *Great Western* (ordnance boat), Act. V. Lieut. W. F. Hamilton; *Judge Torrence* (ordnance boat), Act. V. Lieut. J. F. Richardson; *New National*, Act. Master A. M. Grant (receiving ship), 1 howitzer; *Red Rover*, Act. Master W. R. Wells (hospital steamer), 1 gun; *Sovereign* (storeship, no battery), Act. Master T. Baldwin; *William H. Brown* (dispatch steamer), Act. V. Lieut. J. A. French.

WEST GULF SQUADRON. Passage of Port Hudson, March 14th-15th, 1863.—Rear-Admiral D. G. Farragut commanding; Capt. Thornton A. Jenkins, Fleet Captain. *Hartford* (flag-ship), Capt. James S. Palmer; *Mississippi*, Capt. Melancton Smith; *Monongahela*, Capt. J. P. McKinstry; *Richmond*, Com. James Alden; *Genesee*, Com. W. H. Macomb; *Albatross*, Lieut.-Com. John E. Hart; *Kineo*, Lieut.-Com. John Watters. Coöperating vessels of West Gulf Squadron in Red River, May, 1863: *Albatross*, Lieut.-Com. John E. Hart; *Estrella*, Lieut.-Com. A. P. Cooke; *Arizona*, Act. V. Lieut. Daniel P. Upton.

MILITARY OPERATIONS IN LOUISIANA IN 1862.‡

BY RICHARD B. IRWIN, LIEUTENANT-COLONEL, ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL, U. S. V.

ON the 1st of May General Butler took possession of New Orleans, and immediately afterward of all its outlying defenses.¶ His instructions from General McClellan, as General-in-Chief, dated February 23d, the main object of which had now been so successfully accomplished, looked to the occupation of Baton Rouge as the next step, "and the opening of communication with the northern column, bearing in mind the occupation of Jackson, Mississippi." Mobile was to follow. The whole force assigned to General Butler, for all purposes, was 18,000, but his actual force can at no time have exceeded 15,000; it was now probably about 13,000.‡

Two weeks before this the "northern column," under Pope, had been called from Fort Pillow to Corinth; consequently there was no longer a northern column to coöperate with; and Jackson, Mississippi, meant Beauregard's rear.

Promptly on the 2d of May Farragut moved the fleet up the river, and on the 8th General Butler sent Brigadier-General Thomas Williams, with 1400 men of the 4th Wisconsin and 6th Michigan regiments, and two sections of Everett's 6th Massachusetts battery. On the 12th the troops landed at Baton Rouge and took possession of the town. The advance of the fleet anchored below Vicksburg on the 18th, when Commander Lee and General Williams jointly demanded from "the authorities" the surrender of the town, which was refused.

The whole available force of the department, as things were then, could not have held Vicksburg. Farragut's guns were heavily handicapped by the extreme elevation required to reach the batteries on the bluff, 200 feet above the river, while Williams could not land till the batteries

were silenced. After a thorough reconnoissance on the 25th it was decided to drop down the river, leaving six vessels to keep up a blockade and an occasional bombardment. The Confederates now rushed the work on their batteries on the river-front, and in a short time the whole ten were completed and about 25 heavy guns mounted.‡

On the 29th of May the troops were back at Baton Rouge, where they landed and went into camp for the first time in three weeks; indeed, the men had been almost continuously on the crowded transports, in a great state of discomfort, since the 17th of April. General Butler sent up reinforcements, and with them orders "to proceed to Vicksburg with the flag-officer, and then take the town or have it burned at all hazards."

Accordingly, on the 20th of June, General Williams again set out for Vicksburg, under convoy, this time with four regiments and ten guns: the 4th Wisconsin, 30th Massachusetts, 9th Connecticut, 7th Vermont, Nims's 2d Massachusetts battery, and two sections of Everett's; leaving the 21st Indiana, 6th Michigan, the remaining section of Everett's battery, and Magee's troop of cavalry to hold Baton Rouge against a possible attack from Camp Moore, near Tangipahoa. At Ellis's Bluffs, and again at Grand Gulf, troops were landed to drive off the field-batteries that had been firing upon the gun-boats. On the 25th the troops were back at Vicksburg where the bulk of the fleet and sixteen of Commodore Porter's mortar-boats, or "bombers," as they were rather familiarly called, were now lying at anchor.

After the failure of the attack by Farragut and Porter's fleets on the 28th of June, Farragut sent an urgent appeal for aid to Halleck, at Corinth,

‡ For an account of the Naval Operations, see p. 551.

¶ General Butler at once declared martial law (by a proclamation dated May 1st), abridging the liberty of the press and placing the telegraph under military espionage. On the 6th a military commission was established to try capital and other serious offenses. On the 13th an order was issued forbidding fasting and prayer under the proclamation of Jefferson Davis; on the 15th an order (No. 28) prescribing that women guilty of insulting Union soldiers should be treated as "women of the town"; and on the 16th an order forbidding the entry and the banks from receiving Confederate money, and fixing the 27th of May as a date when all circulation of Confederate notes and bills should cease in the Department of the Gulf. William B. Mumford, who hauled down the flag which by Farragut's order had been raised over the Mint, was convicted of treason, and by General Butler's order was hanged on the 7th of June from a gallows placed under the flag-staff of the Mint. Mumford, who was a North Carolinian, though long a resident of New Orleans, addressed a vast crowd from the gallows. He spoke with perfect self-possession, and said that his offense had been committed under excitement.—EDITORS.


‡ General Butler raised, on his own motion, two good regiments of infantry, the 1st Louisiana, Colonel Richard

E. Holcomb, and 2d Louisiana, Colonel Charles J. Paine, well commanded and well officered; three excellent troops of Louisiana cavalry under fine leaders, Captains H. F. Williamson, Richard Barrett, and J. F. Godfrey; and three colored regiments with white field and staff officers, designated as the 1st, 2d, and 3d "Louisiana Native Guards" (a name "captured" by General Butler), Colonels Spencer H. Stafford, Nathan W. Daniels, and John A. Nelson. I believe these were the first negro troops mustered into the service of the United States.—R. B. I.

‡ On the way down the river a Confederate battery at Grand Gulf fired about sixty shots at short range at the transports, killing one private and wounding one officer (Captain Chauncey J. Bassett) of the 6th Michigan regiment. The gun-boat *Kineo*, Lieutenant-Commander Ransom, shelled the town, and General Williams sent four companies of the 4th Wisconsin, under Major Frederick A. Boardman, to disperse the neighboring Confederate camp. A skirmish in the dark followed, in which Lieutenant George DeKay, Aide-de-Camp to General Williams, was mortally wounded, while in front of the advance-guard.

De Kay was a most estimable young man, much loved by all that knew him, and was the first officer killed in the department.—R. B. I.

saying: "My orders, General, are to clear the river. This I find impossible without your assistance. Can you aid me in this matter to carry out the peremptory order of the President?" Unfortunately, Halleck's army was broken up; he was sending reinforcements to Curtis and Buell, and was being asked to send 25,000 men to McClellan. The Confederates, however, were able to send 10,000 men to the support of the defenders. Finally the *Arkansas* came out of the Yazoo and put an end to the operations, and the two fleets turned



their backs on each other and on Vicksburg, and on the 26th of July, abandoning the canal, the troops landed once more at Baton Rouge.


Overwork, malaria, and scurvy, the result of privation, had done their work on Williams's men; of the 3200 men that went up the river barely 800 came back fit for duty.

Van Dorn at once prepared to assume the offensive. As the last of the fleet steamed away from Vicksburg, Breckinridge set out for Camp Moore with five thousand picked men. There he was to pick up the troops under Brigadier-General Daniel Ruggles, raising the whole force to six thousand, and promptly attack Baton Rouge, in coöperation with the *Arkansas*. The plan was admirably conceived and put in motion with great promptness. As Van Dorn estimated Williams's force at 3500 (it was in fact less), with four or five of the same gun-boats that the *Arkansas* had already treated so cavalierly, he had a right to look for success.

The work on the canal had proved especially exhausting, though the troops had the help of about 1200 to 1500 negroes. By the 11th of July, the cut, originally intended to be 4 feet deep and 5 feet wide, had been excavated through the clay (with much felling of trees and grubbing of roots) to a depth of 13 feet, and a width of 18 feet; the length of the canal was about a mile and half. The grade was now about 18 inches below the river level,

Breckinridge organized his force in two divisions, the first commanded by Brigadier-General Charles Clark, consisting of the brigades of Brigadier-General B. H. Helm and Colonel T. B. Smith, 20th Tennessee; the second division under Brigadier-General Daniel Ruggles, comprising the brigades of Colonel A. P. Thompson, 3d Kentucky, and Colonel H. W. Allen, 4th Louisiana. To these forces were attached three batteries of artillery, two mounted companies and 250 Partisan Rangers.

Shortly after daylight on the 5th of August, a dense fog prevailing, Breckinridge moved to the attack, Ruggles deployed on the left of the road from Greenwell Springs to Baton Rouge, Clark on its right. Williams stood to receive the attack, his troops deployed in a single line, with reserves, covering the rear of the town. No attempt at intrenching had been made, and from the nature of the country, for the most part an elevated plateau surmounting the bluff, the line was open to attack from any direction except the river. From left to right the troops were posted thus: 4th Wisconsin beyond Bayou Grosse; 9th Connecticut next; 14th Maine at the crossing of the Bayou Sara and Greenwell Springs roads on the left of the latter; 21st Indiana on its



PRIVATE HOUSES (IN NEW ORLEANS) IN WHICH CONFEDERATE OFFICERS WERE CONFINED.

right; 6th Michigan across the Perkins and Clay Cut roads near their fork; 7th Vermont and 30th Massachusetts in reserve supporting the center and right; the batteries from left to right, Manning, Everett, Nims, with Brown in reserve.

Ruggles was soon engaged; Clark took up the attack; and falling on fiercely they at first carried everything before them. Some of the tents that were in advance of the line of battle were occupied, and Brown's two guns were captured by the

and in a few hours the water was to have been let in. Suddenly the banks began to cave, and before anything could be done to remedy this, the river, falling rapidly, was once more below the bottom of the cut. Williams at once set about collecting more hands and tools, with the purpose of carrying the cut below the lowest stage of water, forty feet if necessary; this he calculated would take three months.—R. B. I.

4th Louisiana, but immediately retaken by the 6th Michigan, together with the colors of their opponents. Then as the attack spent its vigor and developed its direction, Williams re-formed the 21st Indiana and 6th Michigan, rather roughly handled at first, on the new line. The 9th Connecticut moved by the flank to the support of their left; the 30th Massachusetts covered the interval on the left of the 6th Michigan, and the 4th Wisconsin went to the assistance of the 14th Maine, which had been stoutly holding its own against the onset of Clark. Finally the Union troops advanced to the attack, the Confederates in their turn were driven back in some disorder, and at 10 o'clock the battle was over, with the attack thrown off and the battle-field in the hands of the defenders.

The Union loss was 84 killed, 266 wounded, 33 missing, in all 383. Among the killed were Colonel George T. Roberts, 7th Vermont, and the gallant commander, Brigadier-General Thomas Williams, who fell pierced by a rifle-ball in the chest, just after giving the final order to attack. An extremely rigid disciplinarian, a thoroughly trained and most accomplished officer, and a man of the highest courage and honor, General Williams's death was long and deeply regretted in the department.

The Confederate loss was 84 killed, 315 wounded, 57 missing,—total, 456. Brigadier-General Charles Clark, commanding the First Division, was severely wounded and made prisoner, and also among the wounded were three brigade commanders, Colonels Thomas H. Hunt, A. P. Thompson, and H. W. Allen, the last two severely.

The iron-clad *Essex*, Commander William D. Porter, with the *Cayuga* and *Sumter* above the town, and the gun-boats *Kineo*, Lieutenant-Commander George M. Ransom, and *Katahdin*, Lieutenant F. A. Roe, contributed materially to the defense.

The numbers engaged cannot have been far from equal—about 2500 on either side.

When Williams fell, Colonel Thomas W. Cahill, of Connecticut, succeeded to the command. On the 6th he was relieved by Colonel Halbert E. Paine, 4th Wisconsin, who had been sent up from New Orleans by Butler on receiving the first news of the battle. Being still menaced by Breckinridge, the troops took up a new and shorter line, extending from Bayou Grosse by the tannery and penitentiary to the neighborhood of the capitol; at 3 o'clock every morning they stood to arms, and by the 13th Colonel Paine, with characteristic care and energy, had strongly intrenched the arsenal grounds, with 24 guns in position, and with the coöperation of the navy concerted every measure for an effective defense against numbers. By General Butler's orders the library and a statue of Washington, in the capitol, were packed and shipped to New Orleans. On the 20th, by Butler's orders, Baton Rouge was quietly evacuated, and the troops, with all their material, proceeded to Camp Parapet, at Carrollton, just above New Orleans, where they set to work to extend and

strengthen the old Confederate lines and put everything in good condition for defense.

Breckinridge had fallen back to Port Hudson, where, by Van Dorn's orders, the strong works were begun that were long to prove a formidable obstacle to the Union operations on the Mississippi. On the 19th of August Breckinridge was ordered by Bragg to leave the command in the hands of Ruggles and return to Mississippi.

The "Official Records" covering this period afford several strong hints of a Confederate plan for the recapture of New Orleans. Major-General Richard Taylor appears to have had that object committed to his special care when he was assigned (August 20th) to command in western Louisiana, and it seems likely that the troops of Van Dorn's department, as well as those at Mobile, were expected to take part.

Toward the end of September, Lieutenant Godfrey Weitzel, of the Engineers, having been made a brigadier-general on Butler's recommendation, was placed in command of a brigade of 4 regiments of infantry, 2 batteries and 4 troops of cavalry, and General Butler committed to his hands the preparations for dislodging Taylor's force and occupying the district of the La Fourche, important to the security of New Orleans because comprising or controlling all the fertile region between the Mississippi and the Atchafalaya. With the funds of the army, four light-draught gun-boats, the *Estrella*, *Cathoun*, *Kinsman*, and *Diana*, were quickly built, equipped, turned over to the navy, and sent to Berwick Bay, under Commander T. McKean Buchanan. When all was ready Weitzel took transports, under convoy, landed below Donaldsonville, entered the town, and on the 27th of October moved on Thibodeaux, the heart of the district. At Georgia Landing, two miles above Labadieville, he encountered the Confederates under Brigadier-General Alfred Mouton, consisting of the 18th and 33d Louisiana, Crescent and Terre Bonne regiments, Ralston's and Semmes's batteries, and 2d Louisiana Cavalry,—in all reported by Mouton as 1392 strong; they had taken up a defensive position on both sides of the bayou. After a short but spirited engagement, Mouton's force was routed and pursued about four miles. Mouton then called in his other troops, burned the bridges, and evacuated the district, Buchanan's gun-boats having been prevented by a gale from arriving in time to cut off the retreat. Mouton's report accounts for 5 killed, 8 wounded, and 186 missing,—in all, 199. Among the killed was Colonel G. P. McPheeters of the Crescent regiment.

Weitzel followed through Thibodeaux, and went into camp beyond the town. He claims to have taken 208 prisoners and 1 gun; his loss was 18 killed, 74 wounded, and 5 missing,—total, 97.

So ended operations in Louisiana for this year. Taylor continued to occupy the Teche country, and Weitzel the La Fourche, until the spring of 1863.

On the 9th of November, 1862, General N. P. Banks was assigned to the command of the Department of the Gulf to relieve General Butler.



BURNING OF THE STATE-HOUSE, BATON ROUGE, ON SUNDAY, DECEMBER 26, 1862. FROM A SKETCH MADE AT THE TIME.

THE OPPOSING FORCES AT BATON ROUGE, LA.

August 5th, 1862.

The composition, losses, and strength of each army as here stated give the gist of all the data obtainable in the "Official Records." K stands for killed; w for wounded; m w for mortally wounded; m for captured or missing; c for captured.

THE UNION FORCES: Brig.-Gen. Thomas Williams (k), Col. Thomas W. Cahill.

Troops: 9th Conn., Col. Thomas W. Cahill, Lieut.-Col. Richard Fitz-Gibbons; 21st Ind., Lieut.-Col. John A. Keith (w), Capt. James Grimsley; 14th Me., Col. Frank S. Nickerson (commanding the left wing), Lieut.-Col. Thomas W. Porter; 30th Mass., Col. Nathan A. M. Dudley (commanding the right wing), Maj. Horace O. Whittemore; 6th Mich., Capt. Charles E. Clarke; 7th Ver., Col. George T. Roberts (m w), Capt. Henry M. Porter, Lieut.-Col. Volney S. Fullam; 4th Wis., Lieut.-

Col. Sidney A. Bean; 2d Co. Mass. Cav., Captain James M. Magee; Ind. Battery (3 guns), Lieut. James H. Brown; 2d Mass. Battery, Lieut. George G. Trull; 4th Mass. Battery, Capt. Charles H. Manning; 6th Mass. Battery, Lieut. William W. Carruth.

The total Union loss was 84 killed, 266 wounded, 33 captured or missing=383. The "force engaged numbered less than 2500." (See "Official Records," Vol. XV., p. 54.)

THE CONFEDERATE FORCES: Major-Gen. John C. Breckinridge.

FIRST DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Charles Clark (w and e), Col. T. B. Smith. Staff loss: w, 2; m, 1=3.

Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Benjamin H. Helm (w), Col. Thomas H. Hunt (w), Capt. John A. Buckner; 4th Ky., Capt. John H. Millett; 5th Ky., Col. Thomas H. Hunt, Lieut.-Col. John W. Caldwell, Maj. J. C. Wickliffe; 31st Miss., Maj. H. E. Topp; 31st Ala., Col. Jephth Edwards; 4th Ala. Battalion, Lieut.-Col. John Snodgrass; Miss. Battery (Pettus's Flying Art'y), Lieut. J. R. Sweaney. Brigade loss: k, 29; w, 111; m, 3=143. *Fourth Brigade*, Col. T. B. Smith; 19th, 20th, 28th, and 45th Tenn. (Battalion), Lieut.-Col. B. F. Moore; 15th Miss. (in reserve), Maj. J. R. Binford; 22d Miss., Capt. F. Hughes (m w); Ky. Battery, Capt. Robert Cobb. Brigade loss: k, 15; w, 41; m, 3=59.

SECOND DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Daniel Ruggles.

First Brigade, Col. A. P. Thompson (w), Col. J. W. Robertson; 35th Ala., Col. J. W. Robertson, Lieut.-Col.

Edward Goodwin; 3d Ky., Capt. J. W. Bowman; 6th Ky., Lieut.-Col. M. H. Cofer; 7th Ky., Col. Edward Crossland; Sharp-shooters, Lieut. G. C. Hubbard. Brigade loss: k, 12; w, 70; m, 3=85. *Second Brigade*, Col. H. W. Allen (w), Col. Gustavus A. Breaux; 4th La. (Co. I, 39th Miss., attached), Lieut.-Col. S. E. Hunter; 30th La. (battalion), Col. Gustavus A. Breaux; La. Battalion (Stewart's Legion), Lieut.-Col. Samuel Boyd (w), Capt. Thomas Bynum; Confederate Light Battery, Capt. O. J. Semmes. Brigade loss: k, 28; w, 91; m, 47=166. UNATTACHED, La. Partisan Rangers, Col. Francis Pond, Jr., and Maj. J. De Baum.

The total Confederate loss was 84 killed, 315 wounded, and 57 captured or missing=456. General Breckinridge says ("Official Records," Vol. XV., p. 77): "I did not carry into action more than 2600 men. This estimate does not include some 200 Partisan Rangers . . . who, from the nature of the ground, took no part in the action."

THE CAPTURE OF PORT HUDSON.

BY RICHARD B. IRWIN, LIEUTENANT-COLONEL, ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL, U. S. V.

GENERAL BANKS arrived in New Orleans on the 14th of December, 1862, with the advance of a fleet of transports from New York and Hampton Roads, bringing reënforcements for the Department of the Gulf.† On the 15th he took command of the department, Butler then formally taking leave of the troops. His orders were to move up the Mississippi, in order to open the river, in coöperation with McClernand's column from Cairo. Banks was to take command of the combined forces as soon as they should meet.

On the 16th General Grover, with 12 regiments and a battery, without disembarking at New Orleans, accompanied by two batteries and two troops of cavalry from the old force, and convoyed by a detachment of Farragut's fleet under Captain James Alden, of the *Richmond*, was sent to occupy Baton Rouge. The next morning the town was evacuated by the small Confederate detachment which had been posted there, and General Grover quietly took possession. The town was held without opposition until the war ended.

An attempt followed to occupy Galveston, apparently under importunity from Brigadier-General Andrew J. Hamilton, and in furtherance of the policy that had led the Government to send him with the expedition as military governor of Texas. This resulted on the 1st of January in a military and naval disaster in which three companies of the 42d Massachusetts regiment, under Colonel Isaac S. Burrell, were taken prisoners by the Confederates under Magruder.‡

Weitzel, who was occupying the La Fourche, was strengthened so as to enable him to make the district safe in view of the projected operations on the Mississippi; a strong work was constructed at Donaldsonville commanding the head of the bayou; and intrenchments were thrown up at Brashear City to prevent, with the aid of the navy, any approach of the enemy from the direction of Berwick Bay. On the 14th of January, having crossed the bay, Weitzel ascended the Teche, accompanied by the gun-boats *Calhoun*, *Estrella*, and *Kinsman*, under Lieutenant-Commander Buchanan, forced the Confederates to destroy the gun-boat *Cotton*, and took 50 prisoners, with a loss of 6 killed and 27 wounded. Among the dead was Buchanan, who was succeeded by Lieutenant-Commander A. P. Cooke.

† These reënforcements finally included 39 regiments of infantry (of which 22 were 9-months' men), six batteries of artillery, and one battalion of cavalry.

‡ On the 21st of December three companies of the 42d Massachusetts, under Colonel Isaac S. Burrell, were dispatched from New Orleans, without disembarking. Holcomb's 2d Vermont battery was sent with them, but, waiting for its horses to arrive, did not go ashore. Burrell landed at Kuhn's wharf on the 24th, took nominal possession of the town, but really occupied only the wharf itself, protected by barricades and the 32

guns of the fleet under Commander W. B. Renshaw. Major-General J. B. Magruder, who had been barely a month in command of the district of Texas, had directed his attention as soon as he arrived to the defenseless condition of the coast, menaced as it was by the blockading fleet; thus it happened that Burrell's three companies found themselves confronted by two brigades (Scurry's and Sibley's, under Colonel Reily), an artillery regiment, 14 heavy guns, and 14 field-pieces. Magruder had also caused two improvised gun-boats to be equipped under an old California steamboat man, Captain Leon Smith; these were the *Bayou*



MAGRUDER'S MEN BOARDING THE "HARRIET LANE" AT GALVESTON. SEE FOOT-NOTE BELOW.

After providing for the garrisons and the secure defense of New Orleans, Banks organized his available forces in four divisions, commanded by Major-General C. C. Augur and Brigadier-Generals Thomas W. Sherman, William H. Emory, and Cuvier Grover. Each division was composed of three brigades with three field-batteries, and there were also two battalions and six troops of cavalry, numbering about 700 effectives, and a regiment of heavy artillery, the 1st Indiana (21st Infantry) to man the siege train. The veteran regiments that had served in the department from the beginning were distributed so as to lighten the mass and to furnish brigade commanders of some experience; of the eight colonels commanding brigades, all but two belonged

City, Captain Henry Lubbock, and *Neptune*, Captain Sangster. Early in the morning of the 1st of January Magruder, having perfected his plans, under cover of a heavy artillery fire, assaulted the position of the 42d Massachusetts with two storming parties of 300 and 500 men respectively, led by Colonels Green, Bagby, and Cook, with the remainder of the troops under Brigadier-General W. R. Seury in support. A sharp fight followed, but the defenders had the concentrated fire of the fleet to protect them; the scaling-ladders proved too short to reach the wharf, and as day began to break the assailants were about to draw off, when suddenly the Confederate gun-boats appeared on the scene, and in a few moments turned the defeat into a signal victory. The *Neptune* was disabled and sunk by the *Harriet Lane*; the *Harriet Lane*

herself was boarded and captured by the *Bayou City*; the *Westfield* ran aground and was blown up by her gallant commander, and soon the white flag, first displayed on the *Harriet Lane*, was flying from all the fleet. Thereupon Burrell surrendered. The Confederates ceased firing on him as soon as they perceived his signal; but the navy, observing that the firing on shore went on for some time, notwithstanding the naval truce, thought it had been violated; accordingly the *Clifton*, *Owasco*, and *Sachem* put to sea, preceded by the army transport steamers, the *Saxon*, which had brought the three unlucky companies of the 42d, and the *Mary A. Boardman*, with Holcomb's 2d Vermont battery still aboard. The Confederates lost 26 killed and 117 wounded; the Union troops 5 killed and 15 wounded.—R. B. I. [See also p. 571.]

to these regiments. The whole force available for active operations was about 25,000. Two-thirds were, however, new levies, and of these, again, half were nine-months' men; some were armed with guns that refused to go off, others did not know the simplest evolutions, while in one instance (afterward handsomely redeemed) the colonel was actually unable to disembark his men except by the novel command, "Break ranks, boys, and get ashore the best way you can!"

The cavalry was poor, except the six old companies, and was quite insufficient in numbers. Of land and water transportation, both indispensable to any possible operation, there was barely enough for the movement of a single division. In Washington, Banks had been led to expect that he would find in the depots, or in the country, all material required for moving his army; yet the supplies in the depots barely sufficed for the old force of the department, while the country could furnish very little at best, and nothing at all until it should be occupied. Banks had finally to send his chief quartermaster back to Washington before these deficiencies could be supplied.

Again, Banks had not been informed until he reached New Orleans that the Confederates held in force any fortified place below Vicksburg, yet Port Hudson, 135 miles above New Orleans, was found strongly intrenched, with 21 heavy guns in position, and a garrison of 12,000 men—increased to 16,000 before Banks could have brought an equal number to the attack.

Banks could not communicate with the commander of the northern column, and knew practically nothing of its movements.

Under these conditions, all concert between the coöperating forces was rendered impossible from the start, and it became inevitable that the expectations of the Government that Banks would go against Vicksburg immediately on landing in Louisiana should be doomed to disappointment.

The Confederate occupation of Port Hudson had completely changed the nature of the problem confided to General Banks for solution, for he had now to choose among three courses, each involving an im-



SHARP-SHOOTERS OF THE 75TH N. Y. VOLUNTEERS PICKING OFF THE GUNNERS OF THE CONFEDERATE GUN-BOAT "COTTON," IN THE ACTION AT BAYOU TECHÉ, LA., JANUARY 14, 1863. FROM A SKETCH MADE AT THE TIME.



RETURN OF A FORAGING PARTY OF THE 24TH CONNECTICUT VOLUNTEERS TO BATON ROUGE.
FROM A SKETCH MADE AT THE TIME.

possibility: to carry by assault a strong line of works, three miles long, impregnable on either flank and defended by 16,000 good troops; to lay siege to the place, with the certainty that it would be relieved from Mississippi and the prospect of losing his siege train in the venture; to leave Port Hudson in his rear and go against Vicksburg, thus sacrificing his communications, putting New Orleans in peril, and courting irreparable and almost inevitable disaster as the price of the remote chance of achieving a great success. No word came from Grant or McClelland.

Meanwhile Banks was trying to find a way of turning Port Hudson on the west by means of the Atchafalaya, the mouth of Red River, and the net-work of bayous, interlacing and intersecting one another, that connect the Atchafalaya with the Mississippi, in time of flood overflowing and fertilizing, at other seasons serving as highways for the whole region between the two rivers. [See map, p. 442.] The Mississippi was unusually high, the narrow and tortuous bayous were swollen and rapid; the levees, nearly everywhere neglected since the outbreak of the war, had in some places been cut by the Confederates; a large area of the country was under water; while great rafts of drift-logs added to the difficulty of navigation occasioned by the scarcity of suitable steamers and skilled pilots. Every attempt to penetrate the bayous having failed, Banks was just turning his attention to the preparations for gaining the same end by a movement from Berwick Bay by the Atchafalaya or Teche, when the news came that two of Ellet's rams, the *Queen of the West*

and *Indianola*, after successfully running the batteries of Vicksburg, had been captured by the Confederates. These gun-boats must therefore be reckoned with in any movement on or beyond the Atchafalaya, while their presence above Port Hudson as a hostile force, in place of the reënforcement expected from Admiral Porter, greatly increased the anxiety Admiral Farragut had for some time felt to pass the batteries of Port Hudson with part of his fleet, control the long reach above, and cut off the Confederate supplies from the Red River country. General Banks fell in with the admiral's plans, and, concentrating 17,000 men at Baton Rouge, moved to the rear of Port Hudson on the 14th of March, with the divisions of Augur, Emory, and Grover, for the purpose of coöperating with the fleet by dividing the attention of the garrison and gaining a flank fire of artillery on the lower batteries on the bluff. The field-returns showed 12,000 men in line after providing for detachments and for holding Baton Rouge. Admiral Farragut had intended to pass the batteries on the 15th, in the gray of the morning, but at the last moment saw reason to change this plan and moved to the attack before midnight. In a naval affair like this the coöperation of the army could not have been very effective at best; the change of hour left us little more than spectators and auditors of the battle between the ships and the forts. The *Hartford* and *Albatross* passed up comparatively uninjured, but in the smoke and darkness the rest of the fleet could not go by, and the *Mississippi*, stranding, was set on fire and blown up — the grandest display of fireworks I ever witnessed, and the costliest. [See p. 566.]

This gave the navy command of the mouth of Red River, and, accordingly, Banks at once reverted to the execution of his former plan, — a turning movement by the Atchafalaya. That involved disposing of Taylor's force of about 4000 or 5000 men encamped and intrenched on the Teche below Franklin. Our force was so much stronger than Taylor's as to suggest the idea of capturing him in his position, by getting in his rear, simultaneously with a front attack; and this was particularly to be desired, as otherwise he might retire indefinitely into the vast open country behind him and return at his leisure at some inopportune moment. So perfectly was the movement masked that Taylor was actually preparing to attack the force in his front (Weitzel) when the main army began crossing Berwick Bay.

Weitzel crossed on the 9th; Emory followed; they then bivouacked on the west bank to wait for Grover's movement. So few were the facilities that it took Grover two days to embark. Six hours more were lost by a dense fog, and four by the stranding of the *Arizona*. When the proposed landing-place at Madame Porter's plantation was reached after dark, the road was found to be under water and impassable, but a practicable way was discovered six miles farther up the lake, at McWilliams's plantation. There the landing began early on the 13th, and with great difficulty, owing to the shallowness of the water, was completed by 4 o'clock in the afternoon. Favored by the woods and undergrowth, which concealed their numbers, Vincent's 2d Louisiana and Reily's 4th Texas Cavalry, with a section of Cornay's battery, delayed the advance until Dwight's brigade, supported by two regiments of Birge's and



MARCH OF THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS BY THE BAYOU SARA ROAD TOWARD PORT HUDSON,
SATURDAY, MARCH 14, 1863. FROM A SKETCH MADE AT THE TIME.

by Closson's battery, went out and drove them away. At 6 the division took up the line of march to the Teche and bivouacked at nightfall on Madame Porter's plantation, five miles distant.

Meanwhile Banks had moved Emory and Weitzel slowly up the Teche, seeking to hold Taylor's forces in position until Grover could gain their rear. Taylor fell back behind the intrenched lines below Centreville known as Fort Bisland, and there a brisk engagement took place on the 13th, Banks only seeking to gain a good position on both sides of the bayou, and to occupy the enemy's attention, while he listened in vain for Grover's guns, which were to have been the signal for a direct and determined attack in front.

At night, knowing that Grover's movement must certainly have been seen and reported during his passage up Grand Lake and surmising some miscarriage, Banks gave orders to carry the works by assault at daylight. However, early in the night, Taylor ordered his whole force to fall back on Franklin; the sounds of the movement were heard, and toward daylight reconnoitering parties discovered the evacuation. Banks's whole force at once moved in pursuit.

Early in the morning Taylor met Grover advancing against his line of retreat, which here follows the great bow of the Teche, known as Irish Bend, struck Birge's brigade in flank, forced Grover to develop, and with the

assistance of the *Diana*† held him just long enough to make good the retreat.

Taylor had made a gallant fight and had extricated himself cleverly. His reports show his whole force to have been 5000. Grover had about the same. We lost at Bisland 40 killed and 184 wounded,—total, 224; at Irish Bend, 49 killed, 274 wounded, 30 missing,—total, 353. The losses of the Confederates are not reported, but they destroyed their two gun-boats and all their transport steamers except one, which we captured, and their troops began to disperse soon after passing Franklin. We captured many prisoners on the march. Their gun-boats came down the Atchafalaya too late to dispute Grover's landing, were defeated by our flotilla, under Lieutenant-Commander A. P. Cooke, and the *Queen of the West* was destroyed. On the 20th Butte-à-la-Rose, with sixty men and two heavy guns, surrendered to Cooke, and the same day Banks occupied Opelousas.

Here he received his first communication from General Grant, dated before Vicksburg, March 23d, and sent through Admiral Farragut. This opened a correspondence, the practical effect of which was to cause General Banks to conform his movements to the expectation that General Grant would send an army corps to Bayou Sara to join in reducing Port Hudson.

Banks moved on to Alexandria, on the Red River, to push Taylor farther out of the way. Taylor retired toward Shreveport. On the 14th of May the

† A Union gun-boat captured by the Confederates and afterward set on fire and destroyed by them, as mentioned above.—EDITORS.



THE BAGGAGE TRAIN OF GENERAL AUGUR'S DIVISION CROSSING BAYOU MONTECINO ON THE MARCH TO PORT HUDSON. FROM A SKETCH MADE AT THE TIME.

whole command marched on Simsport, crossed the Atchafalaya, and moved to Bayou Sara, where the advance of the army crossed the Mississippi on the night of the 23d and moved immediately to the rear of Port Hudson.

There communication was made with Augur's two brigades, which had established themselves in position on the 21st, after a brisk engagement, known as the battle of Plains Store, [†] just in time, apparently, to prevent the evacuation, which had been ordered by General Johnston and afterward countermanded by President Davis. With Augur we found T. W. Sherman and two brigades from New Orleans.

When the investment was completed on the 26th, we had about 14,000 men of all arms in front of the works, and behind them the Confederates had about 7000, under Major-General Frank Gardner. Part of the garrison (three brigades, as it proved) was known to have gone to succor Vicksburg, and all reports, apparently confirmed by the comparative feebleness of the attack on Augur at Plains Store, indicated a reduction even greater than had actually taken place. Nothing was known, of course, of the phenomenal success of Grant's operations, nor could it have been surmised, while his precarious position in the event of a defeat or even a serious check was obvious enough; the magnitude of the Confederate forces in Mississippi and the energy habitual to their commanders everywhere, added an additional reason against delay. Finally the troops themselves, elated by their success in the Teche campaign, were in the best of spirits for an immediate attack. For these reasons General Banks, with the full concurrence of all his commanders, save one, ordered a general assault to be made on the morning of the 27th of May.

Early in the morning Weitzel, who commanded the right wing on this day, moved to the attack in two lines, Dwight at first leading, and steadily drove the Confederates in his front into their works. Thus unmasked, the Confederate artillery opened with grape and canister, but our batteries, following the infantry as closely as possible, soon took commanding positions within 200 and 300 yards of the works that enabled them to keep down the enemy's fire. The whole fight took place in a dense forest of magnolias, mostly amid a thick undergrowth, and among ravines choked with felled or fallen timber, so that it was difficult not only to move but even to see; in short, in the phrase of the day, the affair was "a gigantic bush-whack." Soon after Weitzel's movement began Grover, on his left, moved to the attack at two points, but only succeeded in gaining and holding commanding positions within about two hundred yards of the works. This accomplished, and no sound of battle coming from his left, Grover determined to wait where he was for the attack that had been expected in that quarter, or for further orders, and Weitzel conformed his action to Grover's: properly in both cases, although it was afterward made apparent that had Weitzel continued to press his attack a few minutes longer he would probably have broken through the Confederate defense and taken their whole line in reverse. To make a diversion, Dwight caused the two colored regiments on the extreme

[†] Augur lost 15 killed, 71 wounded, 14 missing,—total, 100; the Confederates, 89.



OPENING OF THE NAVAL ATTACK ON PORT HUDSON, MARCH 13, 1863.

right to form for the attack; they had hardly done so when the extreme left of the Confederate line opened on them, in an exposed position, with artillery and musketry and forced them to abandon the attempt with great loss. In Augur's front the Confederate works were in full view, but the intervening plain was obstructed by tangled abatis of huge trees felled with their great branches spread as if to receive us with open arms, and these obstructions were commanded by the fire of nearly a mile of the works. His movement had therefore been meant for a demonstration, mainly in aid of Sherman, to be converted into a real attack if circumstances should favor; but as the morning wore away and no sound came from Sherman, General Banks rode to the left and gave fresh orders for that assault; then, returning to the center about two o'clock, he ordered Augur to attack simultaneously. At the word Chapin's brigade moved forward with great gallantry, but was soon caught and cruelly punished in the impassable abatis. Sherman gallantly led his division on horseback, surrounded by his full staff, likewise mounted, but though the ground in his front was less difficult than that which Augur had to traverse, it was very exposed, and the formation was, moreover, broken by three parallel lines of fence. No progress was possible, and when night fell the result was that we had gained commanding positions, yet at a fearful cost.


The next day a regular siege was begun. Grover was assigned to the command of the right wing, embracing his own and Paine's divisions and Weitzel's brigade; while Dwight was given command of Sherman's division, raised to three brigades by transferring regiments. From left to right, from this time, the lines were held in the order of Dwight, Augur, Paine, Grover, and Weitzel.

On the 14th of June, time still pressing, the lines being everywhere well advanced, the enemy's artillery effectually controlled by ours, every available man having been brought up, and yet our force growing daily less by casualties and sickness, Taylor menacing our communications on the west bank of the Mississippi, and the issue of Grant's operations before Vicksburg in suspense, Banks ordered a second assault to be delivered simultaneously at daybreak on the left and center, preceded by a general cannonade of an hour's duration. Dwight's attack on the left was misdirected by its guides and soon came to naught. Paine attacked with great vigor at what proved to be the strongest point of the whole work, the priest-cap near the Jackson road. He himself almost instantly fell severely wounded at the head of his division, and this attack also ended in a disastrous repulse, our men being unable to cross the crest just in front of the work, forming a natural glacis so swept by the enemy's fire that in examining the position afterward I found this grass-crowned knoll shaved bald, every blade cut down to the roots as by a hoe.

Our loss in the two assaults was nearly 4000, including many of our best and bravest officers. The heat, especially in the trenches, became almost insupportable, the stench quite so, the brooks dried up, the creek lost itself in the pestilential swamp, the springs gave out, and the river fell, exposing to the tropical sun a wide margin of festering ooze. The illness and mortality were enormous. The labor of the siege, extending over a front of seven miles, pressed so severely upon our numbers, far too weak for such an undertaking, that the men were almost incessantly on duty; and as the numbers for duty diminished, of course the work fell the more heavily upon those that remained. From first to last we had nearly 20,000 men of all arms engaged before Port Hudson, yet the effective strength of infantry and artillery at no time exceeded 13,000, and at the last hardly reached 9000, while even of these every other man might well have gone on the sick-report if pride and duty had not held him to his post.

Meanwhile Taylor with his forces, reorganized and reënforced until they again numbered four or five thousand, had crossed the Atchafalaya at Morgan's Ferry and Berwick Bay, surprised and captured the garrisons at Brashear City and Bayou Boeuf almost without resistance, menaced Donaldsonville, carried havoc and panic through the La Fourche, and finally planted batteries on the Mississippi to cut off our communication with New Orleans. At Donaldsonville, however, an assault by about 1500 Texans was repulsed by about 200 men, including convalescents, under Major J. D. Bullen, 28th Maine, and at La Fourche Crossing Taylor's forces suffered another check at the hands of a detachment under Lieutenant-Colonel Albert Stickney, 47th Massachusetts. Otherwise Taylor, whose operations were conducted with marked skill and vigor, had everything his own way. In New Orleans great was the excitement when it was known that the Confederate forces were on the west bank within a few miles of the city; but fortunately the illness that had deprived Emory's division of its commander in the field had given New

✧ Aided by the gun-boats *Princess Royal*, Commander M. B. Woolsey, and *Winona*, Lieutenant-Commander A. W. Weaver.



Orleans a commander of a courage and firmness that now, as always, rose with the approach of danger, with whom difficulties diminished as they drew near, and whose character had earned the respect of the inhabitants. Still by the 4th of July things were at such a pass that General Emory plainly told General Banks he must choose between Port Hudson and New Orleans. However, Banks was convinced that Port Hudson must be in his hands within three days.

His confidence was justified. At last on the 7th of July, when the sap-head was within 16 feet of the priest-cap, and a storming party of 1000 volunteers had been organized, led by the intrepid Birge, and all preparations had been made for springing two heavily charged mines, word came from Grant that Vicksburg had surrendered. Instantly an aide was sent to the "general-of-the-trenches" bearing duplicates in "flimsy" of a note from the adjutant-general announcing the good news. One of these he was directed to toss into the Confederate lines. Some one acknowledged the receipt by calling back, "That's another damned Yankee lie!" Once more the cheers of our men rang out as the word passed, and again the forest echoed with the strains of the "Star-spangled Banner" from the long-silent bands. Firing died away, the men began to mingle in spite of everything, and about 2 o'clock next morning came the long, gray envelope that meant *surrender*.

Formalities alone remained; these were long, but the articles were signed on the afternoon of the 8th; a moment later a long train of wagons loaded with rations for the famished garrison moved down the Clinton road, and on the morning of the 9th a picked force of eight regiments, under Brigadier-General George L. Andrews, marched in with bands playing and colors flying; the Confederates stacked arms and hauled down their flag, and the National ensign floated in its stead. By General Banks's order, General Gardner's sword was returned to him in the presence of his men in recognition of the heroic defense—a worthy act, well merited.

But, stout as the defense had been, the besiegers had on their part displayed some of the highest qualities of the soldier; among these valor in attack, patient endurance of privation, suffering, and incredible toil, and perseverance under discouragement. And to defenders and besiegers it is alike unjust to say, even though it has been said by the highest authority, that Port Hudson surrendered only because Vicksburg had fallen. The simple truth is that Port Hudson surrendered because its hour had come. The garrison was literally starving. With less than 3000 famished men in line, powerful mines beneath the salients, and a last assault about to be delivered at 10 paces, what else was left to do?

With the post there fell into our hands 6340 prisoners, 20 heavy guns, 31 field-pieces, about 7500 muskets, and two river steamers.☆ Many of the guns were ruined, some had been struck over and over again, and the depots and magazines were empty. The garrison also lost about 500 prisoners or

☆ *Starlight* and *Red Chief*, found aground in Thompson's Creek, floated and brought into the river by the ingenuity and skill of Major Joseph Bailey, 4th Wisconsin, whose success here led to its repetition on the Red River the next year, when Admiral Porter's fleet was rescued.—R. B. I.

deserters before the surrender, and about 700 killed and wounded. Our loss was 707 killed, 3336 wounded, 319 missing,—total, 4362.

The army was greatly assisted by Admiral Farragut's fleet above and below Port Hudson, and directly by two fine batteries forming part of the siege-works, manned by seamen under Lieutenant-Commander Edward Terry.

While the ceremonies of capitulation were going on, Weitzel led Augur's division aboard the transports and hastened to Donaldsonville to drive Taylor out of the La Fourche. Grover followed. On the 13th, at Koch's plantation, Green and Major suddenly fell upon Weitzel's advance, composed of Dudley's brigade and Dwight's under Colonel Joseph S. Morgan, and handled them roughly. We lost 50 killed, 223 wounded, 186 missing,—total, 465,—as well as 2 guns, while Green's loss was 3 killed and 30 wounded. As the gun-boats could not be got round to Berwick Bay in time to cut off Taylor, he crossed Berwick Bay on the 21st with all his spoils that he could carry away and took post on the lower Teche, until in September the Nineteenth Corps, reorganized and placed under the command of Franklin, once more advanced into the Teche country and drove him back toward Opelousas.

After the fall of Vicksburg and Port Hudson, Grant sent Herron's division, and the Thirteenth Corps under Ord, to report to Banks. Banks went to Vicksburg to consult with Grant, and Grant came to New Orleans; together they agreed with Admiral Farragut in urging an immediate attack on Mobile. This was the only true policy; success would have been easy and must have influenced powerfully the later campaigns that centered about Chattanooga and Atlanta; but for reasons avowedly political rather than military, the Government ordered, instead, an attempt to "plant the flag at some point in Texas." The unaccountable failure at Sabine Pass followed,† then the occupation of the Texan coast by the Thirteenth Corps. So the favorable moment passed and 1863 wore away.

† In September a detachment of the Nineteenth Corps, under Franklin, convoyed by the navy, was sent by sea to effect a landing at Sabine Pass, and thence operate against Houston and Galveston;

but the gun-boats meeting with a disaster in an encounter with the Confederate batteries, the expedition returned to New Orleans without having accomplished anything.—R. B. I.

THE OPPOSING FORCES AT PORT HUDSON, LA.

May 23d–July 8th, 1863.

The composition, losses, and strength of each army as here stated give the gist of all the data obtainable in the Official Records. K stands for killed; w for wounded; m w for mortally wounded; m for captured or missing; c for captured.

THE UNION ARMY.

NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS.—Major-General Nathaniel P. Banks.

FIRST DIVISION, Maj.-Gen. Christopher C. Augur.

First Brigade, Col. Edward P. Chapin (k), Col. Charles J. Paine; 2d La., Col. Charles J. Paine, Lieut.-Col. Charles Everett; 21st Me., Col. Elijah D. Johnson; 48th Mass., Col. Eben F. Stone; 49th Mass., Lieut.-Col. Burton D. Deming (k), Maj. Charles T. Plunkett; 116th N. Y., Capt. John Higgins. *Brigade loss*: k, 94; w, 412; m, 20 = 526. *Second Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Godfrey Weitzel (also commanding the right wing, a provisional division, etc.), Col. Stephen Thomas; 12th Conn., Lieut.-Col. Frank H. Peck (w); 75th N. Y., Col. Robert B. Merritt;

114th N. Y., Col. Elisha B. Smith (m w), Lieut.-Col. Samuel R. Per Lee; 160th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. John B. Van Petteu; 8th Vt., Col. Stephen Thomas, Lieut.-Col. Charles Dillingham. *Brigade loss*: k, 67; w, 406; m, 16 = 489. *Third Brigade*, Col. Nathan A. M. Dudley; 30th Mass., Lieut.-Col. William W. Bullock; 50th Mass., Col. Carlos P. Messer; 161st N. Y., Col. Gabriel T. Harrower; 174th N. Y., Maj. George Keating. *Brigade loss*: k, 5; w, 47; m, 3 = 55. *Artillery*: 1st Ind. Heavy, Col. John A. Keith; 1st Me., Lieut. John E. Morton; 6th Mass., Lieut. John F. Phelps; 12th Mass. (section), Lieut. Ed-

win M. Chamberlin; 18th N. Y., Capt. Albert G. Mack; A, 1st U. S., Capt. Edmund C. Bainbridge; G, 5th U. S., Lieut. Jacob B. Rawles. Artillery loss: k, 10; w, 49; m, 10=69. *Unattached*: 1st La. Eng's, Corps d'Afrique, Col. Justin Hodge; 1st La. Native Guards, Lieut.-Col. Chamney J. Bassett; 3d La. Native Guards, Col. John A. Nelson, Capt. Charles W. Blake; 1st La. Cav., Maj. Harai Robinson; 2d R. I. Cav., Lieut.-Col. Augustus W. Corliss. *Unattached* loss: k, 57; w, 171; m, 43=271.

SECOND DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Thomas W. Sherman (w), Brig.-Gen. George L. Andrews, Brig.-Gen. Frank S. Nickerson, Brig.-Gen. William Dwight. Staff loss: w, 2.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Neal Dow (w and c), Col. David S. Cowles (k), Col. Thomas S. Clark: 26th Conn., Lieut.-Col. Joseph Selden; 6th Mich., Col. Thomas S. Clark, Lieut.-Col. Edward Bacon; 15th N. H., Col. John W. Kingman; 128th N. Y., Col. David S. Cowles, Capt. Francis S. Keese, Lieut.-Col. James Smith; 162d N. Y., Col. Lewis Benedict, Lieut.-Col. Justin W. Blanchard. Brigade loss: k, 81; w, 498; m, 12=591. *Third Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Frank S. Nickerson: 14th Me., Col. Thomas W. Porter; 24th Me., Col. George M. Atwood; 28th Me., Col. Ephraim W. Woodman; 165th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Abel Smith, Jr. (m w), Maj. Gouverneur Carr (w), Capt. Felix Agnus; 175th N. Y., Col. Michael K. Bryan (k), Maj. John Gray; 177th N. Y., Col. Ira W. Ainsworth. Brigade loss: k, 34; w, 199; m, 5=238. *Artillery*: 21st N. Y., Capt. James Barnes; 1st Vt., Capt. George T. Hebard. Artillery loss: k, 1; w, 6=7.

THIRD DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Halbert E. Paine (w), Col. Hawkes Fearing, Jr. Staff loss: w, 1.

First Brigade, Col. Timothy Ingraham, Col. Samuel P. Ferris: 28th Conn., Col. Samuel P. Ferris, Lieut.-Col. Wheelock T. Batcheller, Maj. William B. Wescome; 4th Mass., Col. Henry Walker; 16th N. H., Col. James Pike; 110th N. Y., Col. Clinton H. Sage. Brigade loss: k, 20; w, 127; m, 20=167. *Second Brigade*, Col. Hawkes Fearing, Jr., Maj. John H. Allcot, Col. Lewis M. Peck: 8th N. H., Lieut.-Col. Oliver W. Lull (k), Capt. William M. Barrett; 133d N. Y., Col. Leonard D. H. Currie (w), Capt. James K. Fuller; Maj. John H. Allcot; 173d N. Y., Maj. A. Power Galloway (m w), Capt. George W. Rogers; 4th Wis., Col. Sidney A. Bean (m w), Capt. Webster P. Moore. Brigade loss: k, 115; w, 483; m, 86=684. *Third Brigade*, Col. Oliver P. Gooding; 31st Mass. (7 co's), Lieut.-Col. W. S. B. Hopkins; 38th Mass., Lieut.-Col. William L. Rodman (k), Maj. James P. Richardson; 53d Mass., Col. John W. Kimball; 156th N. Y., Col. Jacob Sharpe. Brigade loss: k, 48; w, 265; m, 8=321. *Artillery*, Capt.

Richard C. Duryea: 4th Mass., Lieut. Frederick W. Reinhard; F, 1st U. S., Capt. Richard C. Duryea; 2d Vt., Capt. Pythagoras E. Holcomb. Artillery loss: k, 1; w, 4; m, 2=7.

FOURTH DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Cuvier Grover.

First Brigade, Col. Richard E. Holcomb (k), Col. Joseph S. Morgan: 1st La., Lieut.-Col. William O. Fiske; 22d Me., Col. Simon G. Jerrard; 90th N. Y., Col. Joseph S. Morgan; Maj. Nelson Shaurman; 91st N. Y., Col. Jacob Van Zandt; 131st N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Nicholas W. Day. Brigade loss: k, 84; w, 359; m, 27=470. *Second Brigade*, Col. William K. Kimball: 24th Conn., Col. Samuel M. Mansfield; 12th Me., Lieut.-Col. Edward Hsley; 52d Mass., Col. Halbert S. Greenleaf. Brigade loss: k, 32; w, 125; m, 3=160. *Third Brigade*, Col. Henry W. Birge: 13th Conn., Capt. Apollos Comstock; 25th Conn., Lieut.-Col. Mason C. Weld; 26th Me., Col. Nathaniel H. Hubbard; 159th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Charles A. Burt. Brigade loss: k, 34; w, 128; m, 10=172. *Artillery*, Capt. Henry W. Clossou: 2d Mass., Capt. Ormand F. Nims; L, 1st U. S., Capt. Henry W. Clossou; C, 2d U. S., Lieut. Theodore Bradley. Artillery loss: w, 5; m, 3=8.

CAVALRY, Col. Benjamin H. Grierson.

6th Ill., Col. Reuben Loomis; 7th Ill., Col. Edward Prince, 1st La., Maj. Harai Robinson; 3d Mass., Col. Thomas E. Chickering; 14th N. Y., ——. Cavalry loss: k, 10; w, 37; m, 47=94.

CORPS D'AFRIQUE: 6th Inf., —; 7th Inf., —; 8th Inf., —; 9th Inf., —; 10th Inf., —. Corps d'Afrique loss: k, 15; w, 12; m, 4=31.

Total Union loss: killed, 708; wounded, 3336; captured or missing, 319=4363.

General Banks, in his official report, says that on May 27th, when he first assaulted the enemy's works, his effective force had been reduced to less than 13,000, and that at the time of the surrender "the besieging force was reduced to less than 10,000 men." But the returns of Banks's command for May 31st ("Official Records," Vol. XXVI, Pt. I, pp. 526-528) show not less than 30,000 officers and men of all arms "present for duty" at Port Hudson, besides the Corps d'Afrique, which is not reported on any of the returns for that month. According to the return for June 30th ("Official Records," Vol. XXVI, Pt. I, p. 611), the "present for duty" (including the Corps d'Afrique) aggregated 23,962, but Colonel Irwin, who (as assistant adjutant-general) made all these figures, informs us that those for May 31st and June 30th were totals of former months carried forward, whereas the actual strength was as given by him on page 595.—EDITORS.

THE CONFEDERATE ARMY.

Major-General Frank Gardner.

Line Commanders: Brig.-Gen. W. N. R. Beall, Col. W. R. Miles, and Col. I. G. W. Steedman.

Garrison Troops: 1st Ala., Col. I. G. W. Steedman, Lieut.-Col. M. B. Locke, Maj. Samuel L. Knox; 49th Ala., Maj. T. A. Street; Maury (Tenn.) Artillery (attached to 12th La. Heavy Art'y Battalion); 1st Ark. Battalion, Lieut.-Col. B. Jones; 10th Ark., Lieut.-Col. M. B. Locke, Lieut.-Col. E. L. Vaughan, Maj. C. M. Cargile; 11th and 17th Ark. (detachment); 12th Ark., Col. T. J. Reid, Jr.; 14th Ark., Lieut.-Col. Pleasant Fowler; 15th Ark., Col. Ben. W. Johnson; 16th Ark., Col. David Provance; 18th Ark., Lieut.-Col. W. N. Parish; 23d Ark., Col. O. P. Lyles; 4th La. (detachment), Capt. Charles T. Whitman; 9th La. Battalion (infantry), Capt. R. B. Chinn; 9th La. Battalion (Partisan Rangers), Lieut.-Col. J. H. Wingfield, Maj. James De Baum; 12th La. Heavy Art'y Battalion, Lieut.-Col. P. F. De Gournay; 30th La. (detachment), Capt. T. K. Porter; La. Legion, Col. W. R. Miles, Lieut.-Col. Frederick B. Brand; La. Battery Capt. R. M. Boone (w), Capt. S. M. Thomas; La. Battery (Watson), Lieut. E. A. Toledano; 1st Miss., Lieut.-Col. A. S. Hamilton, Maj. Thomas H. Johnston; 39th Miss., Col. W. B. Shelby; Claiborne (Miss.) Light Infantry, Capt. A. J. Lewis; 1st Miss. Light Artillery (Abbey's,

Bradford's, and Herod's batteries); Miss. Battery (English's), Lieut. P. J. Noland; Miss. Battery (Seven Stars Art'y), Lieut. F. G. W. Coleman; B and G, 1st Tenn. Heavy Art'y (attached to 12th La. Heavy Art'y Battalion), Lieut. Oswald Tilghman and Capt. James A. Fisher; Tenn. Battalion (composed of details from 41st, 42d, 48th, 49th, 53d, and 55th Tenn. regiments), Capt. S. A. White-side.

Cavalry and Mounted Infantry (operating outside of the post), Col. John L. Logan: 11th and 17th Ark. (consolidated), —; 9th Tenn. Battalion, —; Cochran's Battalion, —; Garland's Battalion, —; Hughes's Battalion, —; Stockdale's Battalion, —; Robert's Battery (section), —.

According to an incomplete report ("Official Records," Vol. XXVI, Pt. I, p. 144), the loss of the garrison of Port Hudson during the siege was 176 killed, and 447 wounded=623. General Banks reports ("Official Records," Vol. XXVI, Pt. I, p. 55), "that with the post there fell into our hands over 5500 prisoners." There appears to be no statement of the strength of the garrison at any time during the investment. The effective strength of Logan's command, June 25th, was 1296. See "Official Records," Vol. XXVI, Pt. II, p. 82.

BRAGG'S ADVANCE AND RETREAT.†

BY DAVID URQUHART, COLONEL, C. S. A.; MEMBER OF GENERAL BRAGG'S STAFF.


GENERAL BRAGG'S Kentucky campaign has drawn on him more criticism than any other part of his career as a military commander. During that memorable march I rode at his side from day to day, and it was his habit to confide to me his hopes and fears.

About the end of June, 1862, General Bragg was visited by many prominent citizens of Kentucky, who had abandoned their homes, and who assured him that Kentuckians were thoroughly loyal to the South, and that as soon as they were given an opportunity it would be proven. Fired with this idea, he planned his offensive campaign. On the 21st of July, 1862, the movement of the Army of Mississippi from Tupelo was ordered. The infantry moved by rail, the artillery and cavalry across the country. Headquarters were established at Chattanooga on the 29th. On the 30th Major-General Kirby Smith visited General Bragg at that point, and it was arranged that Smith should move at once against the Federal forces under General George W. Morgan in Cumberland Gap. In this interview General Bragg was very certain that he would begin his forward move in ten or fifteen days at latest, and if Kirby Smith was successful in his operation against Morgan he would be on his offensive against Buell. Kirby Smith took the field on the 13th of August, 1862. On the 28th, after some inevitable delays, Bragg crossed the Tennessee, his right wing, under Polk, 13,537 strong; the left wing, under Hardee, 13,763 strong,—total effective, 27,320 rank and file.

General Bragg by this time was deeply impressed with the magnitude of his undertaking. He had lost faith somewhat in the stories that had been told him of Kentucky's desire to join the South, but he proposed to give the people a chance of so doing by the presence of Southern troops. At the same time he was resolved to do nothing to imperil the safety of his army, whose loss, he felt, would be a crushing blow to the Confederacy. He reached Carthage on the 9th of September. On the 12th he was at Glasgow, Kentucky, where he issued a proclamation to Kentuckians. About that time also the corps of Polk and Hardee were ordered to unite. Buell was now moving on Bowling Green from the south. On the 16th our army surrounded and invested Munfordville, and General Wilder, with its garrison of four thousand men, was forced to capitulate. General Kirby Smith, having found Morgan's position impregnable, detached a part of his forces to invest it, and, advancing on Lexington, defeated the Federal forces encountered at Richmond, Ky. He was relying on an early junction with General Bragg.

On the 17th of September Generals Polk and Hardee were called to a council at Munfordville. With the map and the cavalry dispatches outspread before him, General Bragg placed General Buell and his army in our rear, with Munfordville on the direct line of his march to Louisville, the

† See also articles by General Wheeler and General Buell, pp. 1 and 32.



GENERAL BRAXTON BRAGG, C. S. A. FROM A WAR-TIME PHOTOGRAPH.

assumed objective point of his movement, General Bragg then explaining his plan, which was discussed and approved by his lieutenants. Our advance was then resumed, leaving General Buell to pursue his march unmolested. This action was subsequently severely criticised by military men, and at the time it was greatly deplored by many officers of his command. At 1 o'clock on the morning of the 18th of September, indeed, Bragg was on the point of rescinding the order to continue the march, and of directing instead an immediate offensive movement against Buell. The importance of recovering Nashville induced the proposed change of operation. But, upon further consideration, he reverted to his previous plans, saying to me with emphasis, "This campaign must be won by marching, not by fighting." He used similar language at subsequent stages of the campaign before the battle of Perryville. At the moment he evinced no regret at having allowed Buell to pass on our left flank.

The success of the column under Kirby Smith in its combat at Richmond, Ky., elated him. He was worried by the delays that retarded his

junction with that officer, and was greatly relieved when all the Confederate forces in Kentucky were united at Lexington.

Here a brilliant entertainment was given to the two generals by our old comrade, General William Preston, in his delightful Kentucky home. But it was here, also, that General Bragg fully realized that the reported desire of Kentucky to cast her lot with the South had passed away, if indeed such a disposition had ever existed; for not only was Kentucky unprepared to enter the Confederacy, but her people looked with dread at the prospect of their State being made a battle-field. Under these circumstances he remarked to me again and again, "The people here have too many fat cattle and are too well off to fight." He was now aware that he had embarked in a campaign that was to produce no favorable result, and that he had erred in departing from his original plan of taking the offensive in the outset against Buell by an operation on that general's communications. He was determined, however, not to expose his army to disaster, nor to take any chances. The information we were receiving indicated that Buell was being heavily reënforced.

It was now the eve of the battle of Perryville, and Kirby Smith, at Salvisa, twenty miles to the north-east, was calling for reënforcements, as he was confident that the feint was against Perryville, and that the main attack would surely fall on him. Thus urged, General Bragg, against his own judgment, yielded, and detached two of his best divisions (Withers's and Cheatham's) to Smith's aid. The former division could not be recalled in time, and the latter arrived the morning of the battle. Having placed General Polk in command of the troops, Bragg had gone to Frankfort, the capital of the State of Kentucky, to witness the inauguration of the secessionist governor, Hawes. The inaugural was being read when the booming of cannon, shortly followed by dispatches from our cavalry outposts, announced the near presence of the enemy. As the hall was chiefly filled by the military, who hurried away to their respective commands, the governor was obliged to cut short his inaugural address.

The field of Perryville was an open and beautiful rolling country, and the battle presented a grand panorama. There was desperate fighting on both sides. I saw a Federal battery, with the Union flag planted near its guns, repulse six successive Confederate charges before retiring, saving all but one gun, and eliciting praise for their bravery from their desperate foes.

About dark, Polk, convinced that some Confederate troops were firing into each other, cantered up to the colonel of the regiment that was firing, and asked him angrily what he meant by shooting his own friends. The colonel, in a tone of surprise, said: "I don't think there can be any mistake about it. I am sure they are the enemy." "Enemy! Why, I have just left them myself. Cease firing, sir. What is your name?" rejoined the Confederate general. "I am Colonel — of the — Indiana. And pray, sir, who are you?" Thus made aware that he was with a Federal regiment and that his only escape was to brazen it out, his dark blouse and the increasing obscurity happily befriending him, the Confederate general shook his fist in the Federal colonel's face and promptly said: "I will show you who I am, sir. Cease firing at once!" Then, cantering down the line again, he shouted authoritatively to

the men, "Cease firing!" Then, reaching the cover of a small copse, he spurred his horse and was soon back with his own corps, which he immediately ordered to open fire.

The battle of Perryville, a hard-fought fight against many odds, was merely a favorable incident which decided nothing. Our army, however, was elated and did not dream of a retreat, as we had held the field and bivouacked on it. But the commanding general, full of care, summoned his lieutenant-generals to a council in which both advised retreat.

The next day General Smith's army was called to Harrodsburg, where a junction of the two forces was effected, and where a position was selected to receive Buell's attack;—this, however, not being made, Bragg was enabled to take measures for an immediate retrograde. Forrest was at once dispatched by forced marches to take position at Murfreesboro', and prepare it for occupancy by the retreating Confederates.


The conduct of the retreat was intrusted to Polk. Our army fell back first to Camp Dick Robinson, whence the retreat began in earnest, a brigade of cavalry leading. All the supplies which it was impossible to carry from this depot were burned; the rest were hauled away in wagons, including provisions, merchandise of all kinds, and captured muskets, while captured cannon were drawn by oxen. Refugees, with their families, slaves, and a great deal of household stuff; omnibuses, stages, and almost every other description of vehicle were to be seen in this heterogeneous caravan. Thousands of beef cattle, sheep, and hogs were driven along under the charge of Texans as reckless as the affrighted cattle they were driving.

General Smith's army and Polk's and Hardee's corps followed the trains. The Federal army promptly took up the pursuit and made an effort by a flank movement to intercept our long unwieldy trains. General Wheeler with his cavalry brought up the rear—fighting by day and obstructing the roads at night. Before the pursuit was abandoned at Rock Castle, that officer was engaged over twenty-six times. His vigilance was so well known by the infantry that they never feared a surprise. Hard marching, stony roads, and deep fords lay before us until we had crossed Cumberland Gap. But at last almost all that had been taken out of Kentucky was safely conveyed to Morristown, Tenn.

About the 31st of October, 1862, General Bragg, having made a short visit to Richmond, there obtained the sanction of the Confederate Government for a movement into middle Tennessee. Returning to Knoxville, General Bragg made preparations with the utmost rapidity for the advance to Murfreesboro', where General Breckinridge was already posted, and General Forrest was operating with a strong, active cavalry force. Our headquarters were advanced to Tullahoma on the 14th of November, and on the 26th to Murfreesboro'. Notwithstanding long marches and fighting, the condition of the troops was very good; and had they been well clad, the Confederate army would have presented a fine appearance.

On November 24th, 1862, the commands of Lieutenant-General Pemberton at Vicksburg, and that of General Bragg in Tennessee, were placed under

General Joseph E. Johnston, and his official headquarters were established at Chattanooga. Immediately thereafter General Johnston visited Murfreesboro', where he passed some days devoted to a thorough inspection of the army. Our forces numbered somewhat over 40,000 men. General Johnston's visit was followed during the second week in December by that of President Davis and his aide, General Custis Lee. The President asked Bragg if he did not think he could spare a division of his army to reënforce Pember-



BUILDINGS AT MURFREESBORO'. FROM PHOTOGRAPHS.

1. General Rosecrans's Headquarters. 2. Christian Church, used as a post chapel by the Union army. 3. Soule Female College, used as a hospital. 4. Headquarters of General Bragg; afterward of Generals Thomas and Garfield. 5. Union University, used as a hospital.

ton. Bragg assented and dispatched a division of 8000 men under Stevenson. This step was contrary to the decided opinion previously expressed to Mr. Davis by General Johnston. [See p. 473.]

So well satisfied was General Bragg at having extricated his army from its perilous position in Kentucky, that he was not affected by the attacks upon him by the press for the failure of the campaign. He was cheerful, and would frequently join the staff about the camp-fire, and relate with zest incidents of his services under General Taylor in Mexico.† On the 26th General

† He told how on one occasion, when he was asleep, the men of his battery had placed under his cot a shell, which exploded, tearing everything to

pieces, but without harming him. He told us also that at the battle of Buena Vista General Taylor did not use the words so frequently quoted, "A

Wheeler, commanding the cavalry outposts, † sent dispatches in quick succession to headquarters reporting a general advance of Rosecrans's army. Soon all was bustle and activity. General Hardee's corps at Triune was ordered to Murfreesboro'. Camps were at once broken up and everything was made ready for active service. On the 27th of December our army was moving.

On Sunday, December 28th, Polk and Hardee met at General Bragg's headquarters to learn the situation and his plans. Rosecrans was advancing from Nashville with his whole army. Wheeler with his cavalry was so disposed at the moment as to protect the flanks, and, when pressed, to fall back toward the main army. Hardee's corps, consisting of the divisions of Breckinridge and Cleburne, with Jackson's brigade as a reserve, constituted our right wing, with its right resting on the Lebanon Pike and its left on the Nashville road. Polk's corps, composed of Withers's and Cheatham's divisions, was to take post with its right touching Hardee on the Nashville road, and its left resting on the Salem Pike; McCown's division was to form the reserve and to occupy our center. Such was the position of the Confederate army on the 29th of December.

On Tuesday, December 30th, Rosecrans was in our front, a mile and a half away. At 12 o'clock artillery on both sides was engaged. At 3 o'clock the Federal infantry advanced and attacked our lines, but were repulsed by the Louisiana and Alabama brigade, under Colonel Gibson, commanding

little more grape, Captain Bragg," but had ridden up to him and exclaimed, "Captain, give them hell!" He also often related anecdotes of Buell, Thomas, and Sherman. Thomas had been in his old battery and he never could praise him too much. While at Murfreesboro' flags of truce were the order of the day, and almost always some kind message from old army friends was sent thereby to General Hardee, usually accompanied by a bottle of brandy.—D. U.

† Wheeler had shortly before relieved our dashing cavalryman, John H. Morgan, who, since the return from Kentucky, had commanded a brigade picketing our front. As early as the 1st of December Morgan had been ordered by Bragg to operate on Rosecrans's lines of communication in rear of Nashville, and to prevent him from foraging north of the Cumberland. Learning that the Union force at Hartsville, at the crossing of the Cumberland, was isolated [see map, p. 635], Morgan resolved to capture it, and while two brigades of Cheatham's division, with Wheeler's cavalry, made a demonstration before Nashville, he set out on the 6th from Baird's Mills, with four regiments and one battalion of cavalry under Colonel Basil W. Duke, and two regiments of infantry and Cobb's battery from Hanson's brigade, under Colonel T. H. Hunt. The Union force at Hartsville consisted of Colonel A. B. Moore's brigade under Dumont's division and numbered about two thousand men. At Castalian Springs, nine miles distant, there were two brigades numbering 5000, and at Gallatin, other forces, all belonging to Thomas's command. Morgan crossed the Cumberland on

the night of the 6th, and disposed his forces so as to cut off the retreat from Hartsville on the roads to Lebanon, Gallatin, and Castalian Springs, and, closing in, attacked the troops who were drawn up to receive him. Morgan won a complete victory after a stubborn fight of an hour and a half, and promptly retired with his prisoners and some wagons, animals, and stores. While he was retiring, the advance of a brigade of reinforcements under Colonel John M. Harlan, coming up from Castalian Springs, reached Hartsville and attacked the Confederate rear-guard.


The Union loss was: k, 58; w, 204; m, 1834,—total, 2096. The Confederate loss was 139 in all. Colonel Moore was taken prisoner and his assistant adjutant-general, Captain W. G. Gholson, was killed.—EDITORS.

I have been present in my life at many marriages, religious and civil, but only once did I witness one purely military, and never one with which I was so much impressed as that of John H. Morgan. A few days before the battle of Stone's River his marriage ceremony was performed at the house of the bride. General Bragg and his staff, with a few of Morgan's comrades, were gathered as witnesses in the front parlor. General Polk, Bishop of Louisiana, performed the ceremony and gave the blessing. That evening Morgan and his command left Murfreesboro' on a raid toward Kentucky. Social recreation at Murfreesboro' at this time was at its zenith; Christmas was approaching. The young officers of our army were all bent on fun and gayety. Invitations were out for a ball on the day after Christmas.—D. U.

in the absence of General Daniel Adams. But night soon interposed, quiet prevailed, and the two armies bivouacked opposite to each other. General Bragg was on the field the entire day, but returned to his headquarters that evening at Murfreesboro'. He called his corps commanders together and informed them that his advices convinced him that Rosecrans, under cover of the day's attack, had been massing his troops for a move on our left flank. It was then agreed that Hardee should at once move to the extreme left Cleburne's division of his corps and the reserve (McCown), and that, next morning,

Hardee should take command in that quarter and begin the fight.


At daylight on the 31st (Wednesday), Hardee, with Cleburne's and McCown's divisions, attacked McCook's corps of the Federal army. For a



THE NASHVILLE PIKE OUT OF MURFREESBORO', LOOKING NORTH-WEST TOWARD THE RISE OF GROUND WHICH WAS THE SITE OF FORTRESS ROSECRANS, CONSTRUCTED AFTER THE WITHDRAWAL OF BRAGG. FROM A PHOTOGRAPHE TAKEN IN 1884.

while the enemy were disorganized, many of the men being still engaged in cooking their breakfasts, but they very soon got under arms and in position, and resisted the attack with desperation. At this juncture Polk advanced with Withers's and Cheatham's divisions, and after hard fighting McCook's corps was driven back between three and four miles. Our attack had pivoted the Federals on their center, bending back their line, as one half-shuts a knife-blade. At 12 o'clock we had a large part of the field, with many prisoners, cannon, guns, ammunition, wagons, and the dead and wounded of both armies.

Between 2 and 3 o'clock, however, Rosecrans massed artillery on the favorable rising ground to which his line had been forced back. On this ground cedar-trees were so thick that his movements had not been perceived. Our line again advanced. Stewart's, Chalmers's, Donelson's, and Maney's brigades, supported by Slocumb's, Cobb's, and Byrne's batteries, were hurled against the Federal line, but could not carry it. Reënforced by Gibson's and Jackson's brigades, another charge was ordered, but the position was not carried and many were killed and wounded on our side.



VIEW OF MURFREESBORO' FROM THE VICINITY OF FORTRESS ROSECRANS. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN IN 1884.

A bitter cold night was now on us. We were masters of the field. The sheen of a bright moon revealed the sad carnage of the day, and the horrors of war became vividly distinct. That night General Bragg again made his headquarters at Murfreesboro', whence he gave orders for the care of the wounded. All the churches and public buildings were turned into hospitals. He announced to Richmond by telegraph: "God has granted us a happy New Year."


We had indeed routed the Federal right wing, but the bloody work was not over. During January 1st Rosecrans's army was intrenching itself, but General Bragg was of the opinion that their quiet meant a retreat.

During the morning of the 2d (Friday) quiet prevailed, except some shelling on our right. At about noon General Bragg determined to dislodge the force on his right. Orders were given to that end, and our best troops were carefully selected. Hanson's, Preston's, Gibson's, and Hunt's brigades, with Cobb's and Wright's batteries, were placed under Major-General Breckinridge. A gun fired by one of our batteries at 4 o'clock was the signal for the attack. After a fierce fight we carried the hill. The orders were to take its crest, and there remain intrenched. General Breckinridge endeavored to execute this order, but the commanders of the brigades engaged could not restrain the ardor of their men, who pushed on beyond support. The Federal batteries that had been massed on the other side of the stream now opened on them and drove the Confederates back with terrible slaughter, fully 2000 of our men being killed and wounded in this attack. At 10 o'clock P. M. the news of this disastrous charge, led by the *élite* of the Confederate army, cast a gloom over all.

Saturday, January 3d, the two armies faced each other, with little fighting on either side.

The miscarriage of the 2d determined General Bragg to begin to fall back on Tullahoma; but all day of the 3d our forces maintained their line of battle taken up early that morning. That night the evacuation of Murfreesboro' was effected.

* General Rosecrans entered Murfreesboro' on Sunday, the 4th of January, 1863. Meantime his adversary was in full retreat on Tullahoma, thirty-six



BRIGADIER-GENERAL JAMES E. RAINS, C. S. A., KILLED AT STONE'S RIVER. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

miles distant. By this time General Bragg's corps commanders, as well as their subordinates down to the regimental rank and file, scarcely concealed their want of confidence in him as the commander of the army. On the 11th of January he invited from his corps, division, and brigade commanders an expression of their opinion on that point, and their replies, while affirming their admiration for his personal courage, devotion to duty, and ability as



BRIGADIER-GENERAL R. W. HANSON, C. S. A., KILLED AT STONE'S RIVER. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

an organizer, frankly confessed that his army had lost confidence to such an extent in his capacity for chief command as wholly to impair his further usefulness. On the 4th of February General Polk went so far indeed as to write direct to President Davis with regard to the dissatisfaction felt, and the necessity for the immediate substitution of another commander. ¶

To vindicate himself, General Bragg at once made an official report of the battle of the 31st of December, especially in relation to the miscarriage of the effort to break the enemy's center. \

The feeling outside as well as inside of his army, however, waxed so strong against Bragg that President Davis ordered General Johnston, then near

Vicksburg, to go to Tennessee, with authority, if he thought it wise, to relieve Bragg from command. Johnston's arrival was hailed with joy, for our army specially wanted him as their commander. But after spending more than a week looking into its condition, he decided that he would not relieve Bragg, and thereupon returned toward Vicksburg with his staff. This result quieted the bad feeling somewhat, but did not restore harmony between the corps

¶ Colonel Brent once showed me an order from General Bragg to place General Polk under arrest. Knowing what feeling against General Bragg such a step would produce, I was deeply pained and hastened to the latter's tent, where I besought, as a personal favor to myself, that the order should not be executed at present. After a short conversation General Bragg authorized me to direct Colonel Brent to withhold the arrest. The next morning, however, General Bragg, sent for me, and expressed his appreciation of what I had said, and said that he realized the feeling it would excite against himself, but that he felt that the urgent exactions of discipline made General Polk's arrest absolutely requisite. The arrest was therefore made, but it was not sustained by the Richmond authorities. It is hardly necessary to say that the incident deepened General Bragg's unpopularity with his army, while the feeling between his two corps commanders and himself grew from "bad to worse." On the eve of the

battle of Chickamauga his relations with General Longstreet were no better than with the other two.—D. U.

\ In his report General Bragg says, in part :

"To meet our successful advance and retrieve his losses in the front of his left, the enemy early transferred a portion of his reserve from his left to that flank, and by 2 o'clock had succeeded in concentrating such a force on Lieutenant-General Hardee's front as to check his further progress. Our two lines had, by this time, become almost blended, so weak were they by losses, exhaustion, and extension to cover the enemy's whole front. As early as 10 A. M. Major-General Breckinridge was called on for one brigade, and soon after for a second, to reinforce or act as a reserve to General Hardee. His reply to the first call represented the enemy crossing Stone's River in heavy force in his immediate front; and on receiving the second order he informed me they had already crossed in heavy force and were advancing on him in two lines. He was immediately ordered not to wait attack but to advance and meet them. About this same time a report reached me that a heavy force of the enemy's infantry was advancing on the Lebanon Road about five miles in

commanders and their commanding general. Seldom did either of them visit headquarters except officially. On the other hand, Bragg was on good terms with the division and brigade commanders, namely, Wheeler, Cleburne, and Withers, Patton Anderson, J. C. Brown, J. K. Jackson, Bate, and Walthall.

The certainty he felt that General Rosecrans would retire from his front had led him to suffer the 1st to pass without advancing his right to cover the rising ground, thus giving ample leisure to Rosecrans to intrench and to restore order to his army after the fight of the 31st, when all the advantages of battle had remained with us. But on Friday, the 2d of January, he was convinced that Rosecrans was not going to retreat and that fighting must soon be resumed. After riding over the ground early on the morning of the 2d, at 11 o'clock he had adopted the following plan: To seize and carry by a vigorous assault that rising ground now occupied by the Federal forces, allowing only one hour to intervene between the time of the attack and dark, so that night should stop the fighting and give us opportunity to fortify at once. It was for that reason the hour of 4 P. M. was selected for the operation. The failure of Friday to secure the heights on our right necessitated an entire change of our lines, and Saturday his determination was to fall back to Tullahoma and await General Rosecrans's advance. No such move, however, having been made, our army went into winter quarters, undisturbed.

While the army was at Murfreesboro', no firing of guns being allowed, the country remained full of rabbits, some of which during the battle, alarmed by the din, rushed swiftly past one of our regiments, which at the time was advancing under a heavy fire of musketry. One of our soldiers was heard by a staff-officer to yell out, "Go it, cotton-tail; I'd run too if I hadn't a reputation."

At Tupelo an order had been issued forbidding the men firing their muskets when in camp. One of the volunteers shooting at a chicken killed a man; he was tried and shot, not, as unjustly stated, for disobedience of orders, but for killing the man. During one of General Bragg's rides near Tullahoma, he happened to meet a countryman dressed in his "butternut" garb, one of those rough, independent citizens of the mountain district of Tennessee, who, after intelligently giving all the information asked of him about the roads we were looking for, was also asked by the general if he did not "belong to Bragg's army." "Bragg's army?" was the reply. "He's got none; he shot half of them in Kentucky, and the other got killed up at Murfreesboro'." The general laughed and rode on.

Breckinridge's front. Brigadier-General Pegram, who had been sent to that road to cover the flank of the infantry with the cavalry brigade (save two regiments, detached with Wheeler and Wharton), was ordered forward immediately to develop such movement. The orders for the two brigades from Breckinridge were countermanded, whilst dispositions were made at his request to reënforce him. Before they could be carried out the movements ordered disclosed the facts that no force had crossed Stone's River; that the only enemy in our immediate front there were a small body of sharpshooters, and that there was no advance on the Lebanon Road.

"These unfortunate misapprehensions on that part of

the field (which, with proper precaution, could not have existed) withheld from active operations three fine brigades until the enemy had succeeded in checking our progress, had reëstablished his lines, and had collected many of his broken battalions."

The orders referred to by General Bragg as having been sent to General Breckinridge were in part written by me, and the receipts for their delivery were given to and retained by me for some time. General Bragg cordially said to me afterward that my preservation of those receipts had saved his reputation.—D. U.

THE OPPOSING FORCES AT STONE'S RIVER, TENN.

The composition, losses, and strength of each army as here stated give the gist of all the data obtainable in the Official Records. K stands for killed; w for wounded; m w for mortally wounded; m for captured or missing; c for captured.

THE UNION ARMY.

ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND (Fourteenth Army Corps), Maj.-Gen. William S. Rosecrans.

Provost-Guard: 10th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Joseph W. Burke. *Escort*: Anderson Troop Pa. Cav., Lieut. Thomas S. Maple. Staff and escort loss: k, 4; w, 5=9.

RIGHT WING, Maj.-Gen. Alexander McD. McCook.
FIRST (LATE NINTH) DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Jefferson C. Davis.

Escort: Cavalry Co. B, 36th Ill., Capt. Samuel B. Sherer; G, 2d Ky. Cav., Capt. Miller R. McEnloche (k), Lieut. Harvey S. Park. *Escort* loss: k, 1; w, 4; m, 6=11.

First (late Thirtieth) Brigade, Col. P. Sidney Post: 59th Ill., Capt. Hendrick E. Paine; 74th Ill., Col. Jason Marsh; 75th Ill., Lieut.-Col. John E. Bennett; 22d Ind., Col. Michael Gooding. *Brigade* loss: k, 25; w, 144; m, 155=324. *Second (late Thirty-first) Brigade*, Col. William P. Carlin: 21st Ill., Col. J. W. S. Alexander (w), Lieut.-Col. Warren E. McMackin; 38th Ill., Lieut.-Col. Daniel H. Gilmer; 101st Ohio, Col. Leander Stem (m w and e), Lieut.-Col. Moses F. Wooster (m w and e), Maj. Isaac M. Kirby, Capt. Bedan B. McDonald; 15th Wis., Col. Hans C. Heg. *Brigade* loss: k, 129; w, 498; m, 194=821. *Third (late Thirty-second) Brigade*, Col. William E. Woodruff: 25th Ill., Col. Thomas D. Williams (k), Capt. Wesford Taggart; 35th Ill., Lieut.-Col. William P. Chandler; 81st Ind., Lieut.-Col. John Timberlake. *Brigade* loss: k, 32; w, 179; m, 47=258. *Artillery*: 2d Minn. (2d Brigade), Capt. William A. Hotchkiss; 5th Wis. (1st Brigade), Capt. Osear F. Pinney (m w), Lieut. Charles B. Humphrey; 8th Wis. (3d Brigade), Capt. Stephen J. Carpenter (k), Sergt. Ohadiah German, Lieut. Henry E. Stiles. *Artillery* loss embraced in brigades to which attached.

SECOND DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Richard W. Johnson.

First (late Sixth) Brigade, Brig.-Gen. August Willieh (e), Col. William Wallace, Col. William H. Gibson: 89th Ill., Lieut.-Col. Charles T. Hotchkiss; 32d Ind., Lieut.-Col. Frank Erdelmeyer; 39th Ind., Lieut.-Col. Fielder A. Jones; 15th Ohio, Col. William Wallace, Capt. A. R. Z. Dawson, Col. William Wallace; 49th Ohio, Col. William H. Gibson, Lieut.-Col. Levi Drake (k), Capt. Samuel F. Gray. *Brigade* loss: k, 90; w, 373; m, 701=1164. *Second (late Fifth) Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Edward N. Kirk (w), Col. Joseph B. Dodge: 34th Ill., Lieut.-Col. Hiram W. Bristol, Maj. Alexander P. Dysart; 79th Ill., Col. Sheridan P. Read (k), Maj. Allen Buckner; 29th Ind., Lieut.-Col. David M. Dunn (e), Maj. Joseph P. Collins; 30th Ind. Col. Joseph B. Dodge, Lieut.-Col. Orrin D. Hurd; 77th Pa., Lieut.-Col. Peter B. Housum (k), Capt. Thomas E. Rose. *Brigade* loss: k, 99; w, 384; m, 376=859. *Third (late Fourth) Brigade*, Col. Philemon P. Baldwin; 6th Ind., Lieut.-Col. Hagerman Tripp; 5th Ky., Lieut.-Col. William W. Berry (w); 1st Ohio, Maj. Joab A. Stafford; 93d Ohio, Col. Charles Anderson (w). *Brigade* loss: k, 59; w, 244; m, 209=512. *Artillery*: 5th Ind. (3d Brigade), Capt. Peter Simonson; A, 1st Ohio (1st Brigade), Lieut. Edmund B. Belding; E, 1st Ohio (2d Brigade), Capt. Warren P. Edgarton (e). *Artillery* loss embraced in the brigades to which attached. *Cavalry*: G, H, I, and K, 3d Ind., Maj. Robert Klein. *Loss*: k, 4; w, 6; m, 15=25.

THIRD (LATE ELEVENTH) DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Philip H. Sheridan.

Escort: L, 2d Ky. Cav., Lieut. Joseph T. Forman.

First (late Thirty-seventh) Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Joshua W. Sill (k), Col. Nicholas Grensel: 36th Ill., Col. Nicholas Grensel, Maj. Silas Miller (w and e), Capt. Porter C. Olson; 88th Ill., Col. Francis T. Sherman; 21st Mich., Lieut.-Col. William B. McCreery; 24th Wis., Maj. Elisha C. Hibbard. *Brigade* loss: k, 104; w, 365; m,

200=669. *Second (late Thirty-fifth) Brigade*, Col. Frederick Schaefer (k), Lieut.-Col. Bernard Laiboldt: 44th Ill., Capt. Wallace W. Barrett (w); 73d Ill., Maj. William A. Presson (w); 2d Mo. Lieut.-Col. Bernard Laiboldt, Maj. Francis Ehler; 15th Mo., Lieut.-Col. John Weher. *Brigade* loss: k, 71; w, 281; m, 46=398. *Third Brigade*, Col. George W. Roberts (k), Col. Luther P. Bradley: 22d Ill., Lieut.-Col. Francis Swanwick (w and e), Capt. Samuel Johnson; 27th Ill., Col. Fazilo A. Harrington (k), Maj. William A. Schmitt; 42d Ill., Lieut.-Col. Nathan H. Walworth; 51st Ill., Col. Luther P. Bradley, Capt. Henry F. Westcott. *Brigade* loss: k, 62; w, 343; m, 161=566. *Artillery*: Capt. Henry Heseock; C, 1st Ill. (3d Brigade), Capt. Charles Houghtaling; 4th Ind. (1st Brigade), Capt. Asahel K. Bush; G, 1st Mo. (2d Brigade), Capt. Henry Heseock. *Artillery* loss embraced in brigades to which attached.

CENTER, Maj.-Gen. George H. Thomas. Staff and escort loss: k, 1; w, 1=2.

Provost-Guard: 9th Mich., Col. John G. Parkhurst.

FIRST (LATE THIRD) DIVISION, Maj.-Gen. Lovell H. Rousseau. Staff and escort loss: w, 2.

First (late Ninth) Brigade, Col. Benjamin F. Seribner: 38th Ind., Lieut.-Col. Daniel F. Griffin; 2d Ohio, Lieut.-Col. John Kell (k), Maj. Anson G. McCook; 33d Ohio, Capt. Ephraim J. Ellis; 94th Ohio, Col. Joseph W. Frizell (w), Lieut.-Col. Stephen A. Bassford; 10th Wis., Col. Alfred R. Chapin. *Brigade* loss: k, 33; w, 189; m, 57=279. *Second (late Seventeenth) Brigade*, Col. John Beatty: 42d Ind., Lieut.-Col. James M. Shanklin (e); 88th Ind., Col. George Humphrey (w), Lieut.-Col. Cyrus E. Briant; 15th Ky., Col. James B. Forman (k), Lieut.-Col. Joseph R. Snider; 3d Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Orris A. Lawson. *Brigade* loss: k, 53; w, 240; m, 96=389. *Third (late Twenty-eighth) Brigade*, Col. John C. Starkweather: 24th Ill., Col. Geza Mihalotzy; 79th Pa., Col. Henry A. Hambright; 1st Wis., Lieut.-Col. George B. Bingham; 21st Wis., Lieut.-Col. Harrison C. Hobart. *Brigade* loss: k, 2; w, 31; m, 113=146. *Fourth Brigade*, Lieut.-Col. Oliver L. Shepherd; 1st Battalion, 15th U. S., Maj. John H. King (w), Capt. Jesse Fulmer; 1st Battalion, 16th U. S., and B, 2d Battalion, Maj. Adam J. Slemmer (w), Capt. R. E. A. Crofton; 1st Battalion, and A and D, 3d Battalion, 18th U. S., Maj. James N. Caldwell; 2d Battalion, and B, C, E, and F, 3d Battalion, 18th U. S., Maj. Frederick Townsend; 1st Battalion, 19th U. S., Maj. Stephen D. Carpenter (k), Capt. James B. Mulligan. *Brigade* loss: k, 94; w, 497; m, 50=641. *Artillery*, Capt. Cyrus O. Loomis; A, Ky. (3d Brigade), Capt. David C. Stone; A, 1st Mich. (2d Brigade), Lieut. George W. Van Pelt; H, 5th U. S. (4th Brigade), Lieut. Francis L. Guenther. *Artillery* loss embraced in brigades to which attached. *Cavalry*: 2d Ky. (6 co's), Maj. Thomas P. Nicholas. *Loss*: w, 3.

SECOND (LATE EIGHTH) DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. James S. Negley.

First (late Twenty-fifth) Brigade, † Brig.-Gen. James G. Spears: 1st Tenn., Col. Robert K. Byrd; 2d Tenn., Lieut.-Col. James M. Melton; 6th Tenn., Col. Joseph A. Cooper. *Brigade* loss: k, 5; w, 28=33. *Second (late Twenty-ninth) Brigade*, Col. Timothy R. Stanley: 19th Ill., Col. Joseph R. Scott (w), Lieut.-Col. Alexander W. Raffin; 11th Mich., Col. William L. Stoughton; 18th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Josiah Given; 69th Ohio, Col. William B. Cassilly (w), Maj. Eli J. Hickey, Capt. David Putnam, Capt. Joseph H. Brigham, Lieut.-Col. George F. Elliott. *Brigade* loss: k, 76; w, 336; m, 101=513. *Third*

† The 14th Mich., 85th Ill., and two sections 10th Wis. Battery temporarily attached Jan. 2d and 3d.

(late Seventh) Brigade, Col. John F. Miller; 37th Ind., Col. James S. Hull (w); Lieut.-Col. William D. Ward; 21st Ohio, Lieut.-Col. James M. Neibling; 74th Ohio, Col. Granville Moody (w); 78th Pa., Col. William Sirwell. Brigade loss: k, 80; w, 471; m, 97 = 648. *Artillery*: B, Ky., Lieut. Alban A. Ellsworth; G, 1st Ohio, Lieut. Alexander Marshall; M, 1st Ohio (2d Brigade), Capt. Frederick Schultz. Artillery loss embraced in brigades to which attached.

THIRD (LATE FIRST) DIVISION.

First Brigade, $\frac{1}{2}$ Col. Moses B. Walker; 82d Ind., Col. Morton C. Hunter; 17th Ohio, Col. John M. Connell; 31st Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Frederick W. Lister; 38th Ohio, Col. Edward H. Phelps. Brigade loss: w, 22. *Artillery*: D, 1st Mich., Capt. Josiah W. Church.

LEFT WING.—Maj.-Gen. Thomas L. Crittenden. Staff loss: w, 1.

FIRST (LATE SIXTH) DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Thomas J. Wood (w), Brig.-Gen. Milo S. Hascall. Staff loss: w, 1.

First (late Fifteenth) Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Milo S. Hascall, Col. George P. Buell; 100th Ill., Col. Frederick A. Bartleson; 58th Ind., Col. George P. Buell, Lieut.-Col. James T. Embree; 3d Ky., Col. Samuel McKee (k), Maj. Daniel R. Collier; 26th Ohio, Capt. William H. Squires. Brigade loss: k, 50; w, 316; m, 34 = 400. *Second (late Twenty-first) Brigade*, Col. George D. Wagner; 15th Ind., Lieut.-Col. Gustavus A. Wood; 40th Ind., Col. John W. Blake, Lieut.-Col. Elias Neff (w), Maj. Henry Leaming; 57th Ind., Col. Cyrus C. Hines (w), Lieut.-Col. George W. Lennard (w), Capt. John S. McGraw; 97th Ohio, Col. John Q. Lane. Brigade loss: k, 57; w, 291; m, 32 = 380. *Third (late Twentieth) Brigade*, Col. Charles G. Harker; 51st Ind., Col. Abel D. Streight; 73d Ind., Col. Gilbert Hathaway; 13th Mich., Col. Michael Shoemaker; 64th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Alexander McIlvain; 65th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Alexander Cassil (w), Maj. Horatio N. Whitbeck (w). Brigade loss: k, 108; w, 330; m, 101 = 539. *Artillery*, Maj. Seymour Race; 8th Ind. (First Brigade), Lieut. George Estep; 10th Ind. (Second Brigade), Capt. Jerome B. Cox; 6th Ohio (Third Brigade), Capt. Cullen Bradley. Artillery loss embraced in brigades to which attached.

SECOND (LATE FOURTH) DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. John M. Palmer. Staff loss: w, 1.

First (late Twenty-second) Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Charles Cruft; 31st Ind., Col. John Osborn; 1st Ky., Col. David A. Enyart; 2d Ky., Col. Thomas D. Sedgewick; 90th Ohio, Col. Isaac N. Ross. Brigade loss: k, 44; w, 227; m, 126 = 397. *Second (late Nineteenth) Brigade*, Col. William B. Hazen; 110th Ill., Col. Thomas S. Casey; 9th Ind., Col. William H. Blake; 6th Ky., Col. Walter C. Whitaker; 41st Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Aquila Wiley. Brigade loss: k, 45; w, 335; m, 29 = 409. *Third (late Tenth) Brigade*, Col. William Grose; 84th Ill., Col. Lonis H. Waters; 36th Ind., Maj. Isaac Kinley (w), Capt. Pyrrhus Woodward; 23d Ky., Maj. Thomas H. Hamrick; 6th Ohio, Col. Nicholas L. Anderson (w); 24th Ohio, Col. Frederick C. Jones (k), Maj. Henry Terry (k), Capt. Enoch Weller

(k), Capt. A. T. M. Cockerill. Brigade loss: k, 107; w, 478; m, 74 = 659. *Artillery*, Capt. Wm. E. Standart; B, 1st Ohio, Capt. Wm. E. Standart; F, 1st Ohio, Capt. D. T. Cockerill (w), Lieut. Norval Osburn; H and M, 4th U. S., Lieut. C. C. Parsons. Artillery loss: k, 9; w, 40; m, 11 = 60.

THIRD (LATE FIFTH) DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Horatio P. Van

Cleve (w), Col. Samuel Beatty. Staff loss: w, 1.

First (late Eleventh) Brigade, Col. Samuel Beatty; Col. Benjamin C. Grider; 79th Ind., Col. Frederick Kneller; 9th Ky., Col. Benjamin C. Grider, Lieut.-Col. George H. Cram; 11th Ky., Maj. Erasmus L. Motley; 19th Ohio, Maj. Charles F. Manderson. Brigade loss: k, 67; w, 371; m, 83 = 521. *Second (late Fourteenth) Brigade*, Col. James P. Fyffe; 44th Ind., Col. William C. Williams (e), Lieut.-Col. Simeon C. Aldrich; 86th Ind., Lieut.-Col. George F. Dick; 13th Ohio, Col. Joseph G. Hawkins (k), Maj. Dwight Jarvis, Jr.; 59th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. William Howard. Brigade loss: k, 78; w, 239; m, 240 = 557. *Third (late Twenty-third) Brigade*, Col. Samuel W. Price; 35th Ind., Col. Bernard F. Mullen; 8th Ky., Lieut.-Col. Reuben May, Maj. Green B. Broadus; 21st Ky., Lieut.-Col. James C. Evans; 51st Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Richard W. McClain; 99th Ohio, Col. Peter T. Swaine (w), Lieut.-Col. John E. Cummins. Brigade loss: k, 79; w, 361; m, 143 = 583. *Artillery*, Capt. George R. Swallow; 7th Ind., Capt. George R. Swallow; B, Pa., Lieut. Alanson J. Stevens; 3d Wis., Lieut. Cortland Livingston. Artillery loss: k, 6; w, 19 = 25.

CAVALRY, Brig.-Gen. David S. Stanley.

CAVALRY DIVISION, Col. John Kennett.

First Brigade, Col. Robert H. G. Minty; M, 2d Ind., Capt. J. A. S. Mitchell; 3d Ky., Col. Eli H. Murray; 4th Mich., Lieut.-Col. William H. Dickinson; 7th Pa., Maj. John E. Wynkoop. Brigade loss: k, 5; w, 24; m, 77 = 106. *Second Brigade*, Col. Lewis Zahn; 1st Ohio, Col. Minor Milliken (k), Maj. James Langhlin; 3d Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Douglas A. Murray; 4th Ohio, Maj. John L. Pugh. Brigade loss: k, 18; w, 44; m, 59 = 121. *Artillery*: D, 1st Ohio (section), Lieut. Nathaniel M. Newell. Loss: k, 1.

RESERVE CAVALRY: $\frac{1}{2}$ 15th Pa., Maj. Adolph G. Rosengarten (k), Maj. Frank B. Ward (m w), Capt. Alfred Vezin; 1st Middle (5th) Tenn., Col. William B. Stokes; 2d Tenn., Col. Daniel M. Ray. Reserve cavalry loss: k, 12; w, 25; m, 67 = 104.

UNATTACHED: 3d Tenn., Col. William C. Pickens; 4th U. S., Capt. Elmer Otis. Loss: k, 3; w, 10; m, 12 = 25.

MISCELLANEOUS.—PIONEER BRIGADE, Capt. James St. C. Morton; 1st Battalion, Capt. Lyman Bridges (w); 2d Battalion, Capt. Calvin Hood; 3d Battalion, Capt. Robert Clements; Stokes's Ill. Battery, Capt. James H. Stokes. Brigade loss: k, 15; w, 33 = 48.

ENGINEERS AND MECHANICS: 1st Mich., Col. William P. Innes. Loss: k, 2; w, 9; m, 5 = 16.

Total loss of Union army (in the campaign): killed, 1730; wounded, 7802; captured or missing, 3717 = 13,249. Effective force December 31st, 1862, 43,400. (See "Official Records," Vol. XX., Pt. I., p. 201.)

$\frac{1}{2}$ This brigade and Chureh's battery were the only troops of this division engaged in the battle.
 $\frac{1}{2}$ Under the immediate command of General Stanley, chief of cavalry.

THE CONFEDERATE ARMY.

ARMY OF TENNESSEE.—General Braxton Bragg.

POLK'S CORPS, Lieut.-Gen. Leonidas Polk.

FIRST DIVISION, Maj.-Gen. B. F. Cheatham.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Daniel S. Donelson; 8th Tenn., Col. W. L. Moore (k), Lieut.-Col. J. H. Anderson; 16th Tenn., Col. John H. Savage; 38th Tenn., Col. John C. Carter; 51st Tenn., Col. John Chester; 84th Tenn., Col. S. S. Stanton; Tenn. Battery, Capt. W. W. Carnes. Brigade loss: k, 108; w, 575; m, 17 = 700. *Second Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Alexander P. Stewart; 4th and 5th Tenn., Col. Oscar F. Strahl; 19th Tenn., Col. Francis M. Walker; 24th Tenn., Col. H. L. W. Bratton (m w), Maj. S. E. Shannon; 31st and 33d Tenn., Col. E. E. Tansil; Miss. Battery, Capt. T. J. Stanford. Bri-

gade loss: k, 63; w, 334; m, 2 = 399. *Third Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. George Maney; 1st and 27th Tenn., Col. H. R. Feld; 4th Tenn. (Prov. army), Col. J. A. McMurry; 6th and 9th Tenn., Col. C. S. Hurt; Tenn. Sharpshooters, Capt. Frank Maney; Miss. Battery (Smith's), Lieut. William B. Turner. Brigade loss: k, 22; w, 163; m, 8 = 193. *Fourth Brigade*, Col. A. J. Vaughan, Jr.; 12th Tenn., Maj. J. N. Wyatt; 13th Tenn., Lieut.-Col. W. E. Morgan (m w), Capt. R. F. Lanier; 29th Tenn., Maj. J. B. Johnson; 47th Tenn., Capt. W. M. Watkins; 154th Tenn., Lieut.-Col. M. Magevney, Jr.; 9th Tex., Col. W. H. Young; Tenn. Sharpshooters (Allin's), Lieut. J. R. J. Creighton (w), Lieut. T. F. Patison; Tenn. Battery

Capt. W. L. Scott. Brigade loss: k, 105; w, 564; m, 38=707.

SECOND DIVISION, Maj.-Gen. Jones M. Withers.

First Brigade, Col. J. Q. Loomis (w), Col. J. G. Coltart: 19th Ala., —; 22d Ala., —; 25th Ala., —; 26th Ala., —; 39th Ala., —; 17th Ala. Battalion Sharpshooters, Capt. B. C. Yancey; 1st La. (Regulars), Lieut.-Col. F. H. Farrar, Jr. (m w); Fla. Battery, Capt. Felix H. Robertson. Brigade loss: k, 53; w, 533; m, 5=591. *Second Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. James R. Chalmers (w), Col. T. W. White: 7th Miss., —; 9th Miss., Col. T. W. White; 10th Miss., —; 41st Miss., —; 9th Miss. Battalion Sharpshooters, Capt. O. F. West; Blythe's Miss., —; Ala. Battery (Garrity's), —. Brigade loss: k, 67; w, 445; m, 36=548. *Third Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. J. Patton Anderson: 45th Ala., Col. James G. Gilchrist; 24th Miss., Lieut.-Col. R. P. McKelvaine; 27th Miss., Col. Thomas M. Jones, Lieut.-Col. James L. Autry (k), Capt. E. R. Neilson (w); 29th Miss., Col. W. F. Brantly (w), Lieut.-Col. J. B. Morgan; 30th Miss., Lieut.-Col. J. I. Seales; 39th N. C., Capt. A. W. Bell; Mo. Battery, Capt. O. W. Barret. Brigade loss: k, 130; w, 620; m, 13=763. *Fourth Brigade*, Col. A. M. Mandault: 24th Ala., —; 28th Ala., —; 34th Ala., —; 10th and 19th S. C., Col. A. J. Lythgoe (k); Ala. Battery, Capt. D. D. Waters. Brigade loss: k, 73; w, 428; m, 16=517.

HARDEE'S CORPS, Lieut.-Gen. William J. Hardee.

FIRST DIVISION, Maj.-Gen. John C. Breckinridge.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Daniel W. Adams (w), Col. Randall L. Gibson: 32d Ala., Lieut.-Col. Henry Manry (w), Col. Alexander McKinstry; 13th and 20th La., Col. Randall L. Gibson, Maj. Charles Guillet; 16th and 25th La., Col. S. W. Fisk (k), Maj. F. C. Zacharie; 14th La. Battalion, Maj. J. E. Austin; 5th Battery Washington (La.) Art'y, Lieut. W. C. D. Vanght. Brigade loss: k, 112; w, 445; m, 146=703. *Second Brigade*, Col. J. B. Palmer, Brig.-Gen. Gideon J. Pillow: 18th Tenn., Lieut.-Col. W. R. Butler, Col. J. B. Palmer (w); 26th Tenn., Col. John M. Lillard; 28th Tenn., Col. P. D. Cunningham (k); 45th Tenn., Col. A. Searcy; Ga. Battery (Moses's), Lieut. R. W. Anderson. Brigade loss: k, 49; w, 324; m, 52=425. *Third Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. William Preston: 1st and 3d Fla., Col. William Miller (w); 4th Fla., Col. William L. Bowen; 60th N. C., Col. J. A. McDowell; 20th Tenn., Col. T. B. Smith (w), Lieut.-Col. F. M. Lavender, Maj. F. Claybrooke; Tenn. Battery, Capt. E. E. Wright (k), Lieut. J. W. Phillips. Brigade loss: k, 58; w, 384; m, 97=539. *Fourth Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. R. W. Hanson (k), Col. R. P. Trabue: 41st Ala., Col. H. Talbird, Lieut.-Col. M. L. Stansel (w); 2d Ky., Maj. James W. Hewitt (w), Capt. James W. Moss; 4th Ky., Col. R. P. Trabue, Capt. T. W. Thompson; 6th Ky. Col. Joseph H. Lewis; 9th Ky., Col. T. H. Hunt; Ky. Battery, Capt. Robert Cobb. Brigade loss: k, 47; w, 273; m, 81=401. *Jackson's Brigade* (temporarily attached), Brig.-Gen. John K. Jackson: 5th Ga., Col. W. T. Black (k), Maj. C. P. Daniel; 2d Ga. Battalion Sharpshooters, Maj. J. J. Cox; 5th Miss., Lieut.-Col. W. L. Sykes (w); 8th Miss., Col. J. C. Wilkinson (w and e), Lieut.-Col. A. McNeill; Ga. Battery (Pritchard's), —; Ala. Battery (Lumsden's), Lieut. H. H. Cribbs. Brigade loss: k, 41; w, 262=303. *Unattached*: Ky. Battery, Capt. E. P. Byrue.

SECOND DIVISION, Maj.-Gen. P. R. Cleburne. Staff loss: w, 2.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. L. E. Polk: 1st Ark., Col. John W. Colquitt; 13th Ark., —; 15th Ark., —; 5th Confederate, Col. J. A. Smith; 2d Tenn., Col. W. D. Robison; 5th Tenn., Col. B. J. Hill; Ark. Battery (Helena Art'y), Lieut. T. J. Key. Brigade loss: k, 30; w, 298; m, 19=347. *Second Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. St. John

R. Liddell: 2d Ark., Col. D. C. Govan; 5th Ark., Lieut.-Col. John E. Murray; 6th and 7th Ark., Col. S. G. Smith (w), Lieut.-Col. F. J. Cameron (w), Maj. W. F. Douglass; 8th Ark., Col. John H. Kelly (w), Lieut.-Col. G. F. Baucum; Miss. Battery (Swett's), Lieut. H. Shannon. Brigade loss: k, 86; w, 503; m, 18=607. *Third Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Bnshrod R. Johnson: 17th Tenn., Col. A. S. Marks (w), Lieut.-Col. W. W. Floyd; 23d Tenn., Lieut.-Col. R. H. Keeble; 25 Tenn., Col. J. M. Hughes (w), Lieut.-Col. Samuel Davis; 37th Tenn., Col. Moses White (w), Maj. J. T. McReynolds (k), Capt. C. G. Jarnagin; 44th Tenn., Col. John S. Fulton; Miss. Battery (Jefferson Art'y), Capt. Put. Darden. Brigade loss: k, 61; w, 488; m, 57=606. *Fourth Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. S. A. M. Wood: 16th Ala., Col. W. B. Wood (w); 33d Ala., Col. Sammel Adams; 3d Confederate, Maj. J. F. Cameron; 45th Miss., Lieut.-Col. R. Charlton; 15th Miss. Battalion Sharpshooters, Capt. A. T. Hawkins; Ala. Battery, Capt. Henry C. Semple. Brigade loss: k, 52; w, 339; m, 113=504.

MCCOWN'S DIVISION (of Kirby Smith's corps, serving with Hardee), Maj.-Gen. J. P. McCown.

First Brigade (serving as infantry), Brig.-Gen. M. D. Ector: 10th Tex. Cav., Col. M. F. Loeke; 11th Tex. Cav., Col. J. C. Burks (m w), Lieut.-Col. J. M. Bounds; 14th Tex. Cav., Col. J. L. Camp; 15th Tex. Cav., Col. J. A. Andrews; Tex. Battery, Capt. J. P. Douglas. Brigade loss: k, 28; w, 276; m, 48=352. *Second Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. James E. Raines (k), Col. R. B. Vance: 3d Ga. Battalion, Lieut.-Col. M. A. Stovall; 9th Ga. Battalion, Maj. Joseph T. Smith; 29th N. C., Col. R. B. Vance; 11th Tenn., Col. G. W. Gordon (w), Lieut.-Col. William Thedford; Ala. Battery (Eufaula Light Art'y), Lieut. W. A. McDuffie. Brigade loss: k, 20; w, 161; m, 18=199. *Third Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Evander McNair, Col. R. W. Harper; 1st Ark. Mt'd Rifles (dismounted), Col. R. W. Harper, Maj. L. M. Ramsanr (w); 2d Ark. Mt'd Rifles (dismounted), Lieut.-Col. J. A. Williamson; 4th Ark., Col. E. C. Bunn; 30th Ark., Maj. J. J. Franklin (w and e), Capt. W. A. Cotter; 4th Ark. Battalion, Maj. J. A. Ross; Ark. Battery, Capt. J. T. Humphreys. Brigade loss: k, 42; w, 330; m, 52=424.

CAVALRY, Brig.-Gen. Joseph Wheeler.

Wheeler's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Joseph Wheeler: 1st Ala., Col. W. W. Allen (w); 3d Ala., Maj. F. Y. Gaines, Capt. T. H. Mandlin; 51st Ala., Col. John T. Morgan; 8th Confederate, Col. W. B. Wade; 1st Tenn., Col. James E. Carter; Tenn. Battalion, Maj. DeWitt C. Douglass; Tenn. Battalion, Maj. D. W. Holman; Ark. Battery, Capt. J. H. Wiggins. Brigade loss: k, 22; w, 61; m, 84=167. *Buford's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Abraham Buford: 3d Ky., Col. J. R. Butler; 5th Ky., Col. D. H. Smith; 6th Ky., Col. J. W. Grigsby. Brigade loss: k, 1; w, 11; m, 6=18. *Pegram's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. John Pegram: 1st Ga., —; 1st La., —. Brigade loss, not reported. *Wharton's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. John A. Wharton: 14th Ala. Battalion, Lieut.-Col. James C. Malone; 1st Confederate, Col. John T. Cox; 3d Confederate, Lieut.-Col. William M. Estes; 2d Ga., Lieut.-Col. J. E. Dnnlop, Maj. F. M. Ison; 3d Ga. (detachment), Maj. R. Thompson; 2d Tenn., Col. H. M. Ashby; 4th Tenn., Col. Baxter Smith; Tenn. Battalion, Maj. John R. Davis; 8th Tex., Col. Thomas Harrison; Murray's Tenn., Maj. W. S. Bledsoe; Escort Co., Capt. Paul F. Anderson; McCown's Escort Co., Capt. L. T. Hardy; Tenn. Battery, Capt. B. F. White, Jr. Brigade loss: k, 20; w, 131; m, 113=264.

The total Confederate loss (minus Pegram's cavalry brigade, not reported) was 1294 killed, 7945 wounded, and 1027 captured or missing=10,266. The number present for duty on December 31st, 1862, was 37,712. (See "Official Records," Vol. XX., Pt. I., p. 674.)

THE BATTLE OF STONE'S RIVER.

BY G. C. KNIFFIN, LIEUT.-COLONEL, U. S. V., OF GENERAL CRITTENDEN'S STAFF.

ON the 26th of December, 1862, General W. S. Rosecrans, who on the 20th of October had succeeded General Buell in the command of the Army of the Cumberland, set out from Nashville with that army with the purpose of attacking the Confederate forces under General Braxton Bragg, then concentrated in the neighborhood of Murfreesboro', on Stone's River, Tenn.

The three corps into which the army was organized moved by the following routes: General Crittenden by the Murfreesboro' turnpike, arriving within two miles of Murfreesboro' on the night of the 29th; General Thomas's corps by the Franklin and Wilkinson turnpikes, thence by cross-roads to the Murfreesboro' pike, arriving a few hours later; and General McCook's corps, marching by the Nolensville pike to Triune, and bivouacking at Overall's Creek on the same night. The forward movement had not been accomplished without some sharp fighting. The advance of Crittenden had a spirited action at La Vergne, and again at the Stewart's Creek bridge. McCook fought at Nolensville, and the cavalry, under General Stanley, found the march a continuous skirmish; but the Confederate advance pickets had fallen back upon the main line, where they rejoined their divisions.

The armies were about equally matched. Bragg's effective strength on December 10th was 39,304 infantry, 10,070 cavalry, and 1758 artillery,—total, 51,132; while on December 15th General Rosecrans's returns showed a present for duty of 51,822 infantry and artillery, and 4849 cavalry,—total, 56,671. In each army these figures were diminished by the usual details for hospital and transportation service, train guards, and other purposes, so that Rosecrans reported his force actually engaged, December 31st, at 43,400, while Bragg placed his own force at 37,712.†

Rosecrans's left wing, under Crittenden, bivouacked on the night of the 29th within seven hundred yards of the Confederate lines in front of Murfreesboro'. Crittenden's orders had been to go into Murfreesboro', and he was inclined to obey them. Riding forward, he found the two advance divisions arranged in line of battle, and, against the remonstrance of General Wood, ordered a forward movement. Palmer united with Wood, however, in a protest on the ground that an advance at night over unknown ground, in the face of a force of unknown strength, was too hazardous to be undertaken.

General Crittenden finally suspended the execution of the order one hour, and soon after it was countermanded by General Rosecrans, who

† One reason for the unreliability of official returns for historical purposes is that the absence of tri-monthly and monthly returns of numerous organizations frequently require the use of the returns "last on file," which may be three months

old, thus leaving out of the account, as rendered by the brigade, division, or corps adjutant, the numerous casualties that have tended to diminish the actual strength of those organizations since last reported.—G. C. K.

came up to Crittenden's headquarters at the toll-house on the Nashville turnpike.

Crittenden's line of battle was the base of a triangle of which Stone's River on his left and the line of a dense cedar thicket on his right formed the other sides. General Wood's division occupied the left, with his flank resting on the river, General Palmer's the right, while General Van Cleve was in reserve near a ford of Stone's River. Of Thomas's two divisions, Negley formed on the right of Palmer, with his right on the Wilkinson pike, while Rousseau was in reserve. †

The soldiers lay down on the wet ground without fires, under a drenching rain. The slumbers of the commanding general were disturbed at half-past 3 on the morning of the 30th by a call from General McCook, who had just come up and who was instructed to rest the left of his corps upon Negley's right. Of his divisions, Sheridan therefore, preceded by Stanley's cavalry, moved on the Wilkinson turnpike, closely followed by R. W. Johnson and Davis. Skirmishing into position, the line was formed by resting the left of Sheridan's division on the Wilkinson pike, Davis taking position on his right and Johnson in reserve.

The general course of the Nashville and Murfreesboro' turnpike, and of the railroad where they crossed the line of battle, is south-east. On the left of the turnpike, and opposite the toll-gate house, was a grove of trees of about four acres in extent, crowning a slight elevation known as the "Round




† An important cavalry raid by General Wheeler around the Union army had engaged two of Thomas's brigades, Starkweather's and Walker's. During the night of the 29th General Wheeler, who had moved from the left to the right of Murfreesboro', advancing by the Lebanon and Jefferson pikes, gained the rear of Rosecrans's army and attacked Starkweather's brigade of Rousseau's division, at Jefferson, at daylight on the 30th. The head of his brigade train, consisting of sixty-four wagons, had just arrived in camp, and was driving into park, when Wheeler dashed down upon it with three thousand cavalry. But he had encountered an antagonist as vigilant as himself. Wheeler's men, dismounted, advanced gallantly to the charge, when they were as gallantly met. After two hours' contest twenty wagons in the rear of the train were taken and destroyed, but the assault upon the brigade was handsomely repulsed. The Confederates fell back, followed by Starkweather for more than a mile, when he returned to camp. The Union loss in killed, wounded, and missing was 122.

From Jefferson Wheeler proceeded toward La Vergne, picking up stragglers and a small forage train, arriving at La Vergne about noon of the same day, where he captured the immense supply trains of McCook's corps, moving slowly forward under insufficient guard.

Seven hundred prisoners and nearly a million dollars' worth of property was the penalty paid by the Government for not heeding the requests of the commanding general for more cavalry. The

work of paroling prisoners, burning wagons, exchanging arms and horses, and driving off mules commenced at once and occupied the remainder of the day and night. Early on the morning of the 31st Colonel M. B. Walker's Union brigade (of Fry's division, Thomas's corps), on its night march from Nolensville to Stewartsboro', arrived within two and a half miles of La Vergne, and advanced at once to the scene of devastation. The turnpike, as far as the eye could reach, was filled with burning wagons. The country was overspread with disarmed men, broken-down horses and mules. The streets were covered with empty valises and trunks, knapsacks, broken guns, and all the indescribable debris of a captured and rifled army train. A few shells, judiciously administered, sufficed to set Wheeler's stragglers scampering after the main body, now far on its way toward Rock Spring. Walker recaptured eight hundred men and all the train animals, and saved some of the stores. A train there, and another at Nolensville, shared the fate of that at La Vergne, and three hundred paroled prisoners were left to carry the tidings back to Nashville. At 2 o'clock on the morning of the 31st Wheeler came up bright and smiling upon the left flank of the Confederate army in front of Murfreesboro', having made the entire circuit of Rosecrans's army in forty-eight hours, leaving miles of road strewn with burning wagons and army supplies, remounting a portion of his cavalry, and bringing back to camp a sufficient number of minie-rifles and accouterments to arm a brigade.—G. C. K.

Forest," in which Wagner's brigade was posted. The line of battle trending irregularly southward, facing east and accommodating itself to the character of the ground, was much nearer the Confederate line in front of McCook than on the left, where the flanks of the contending armies were separated by Stone's River. At 4 o'clock General McCook reported the alignment of the right wing, together with the fact that two divisions of Polk's corps and two of Hardee's were in his front, extending far to his right out the Salem pike. General Rosecrans objected to the direction of McCook's line, and said it should face strongly south, and that Johnson's division, in column of regiments at half distance, should be held in reserve in rear of Davis's right at close musket-range; but he left the arrangement of his right



wing with the corps commander, who had been over the ground.↓ The right wing, generally occupying a wooded ridge with open ground in front, was further protected from surprise by an outlook over a narrow cultivated

1. MONUMENT TO THE DEAD OF THE REGULAR BRIGADE, STONE'S RIVER CEMETERY.
2. CANNON INSCRIBED WITH THE NUMBER BURIED IN STONE'S RIVER CEMETERY.
3. STONE'S RIVER CEMETERY (SEE MAP, P. 616)—THE NASHVILLE RAILROAD IN THE FOREGROUND. FROM PHOTOGRAPHS MADE IN 1884.


↓ During the afternoon, General McCook being informed that his line was greatly overlapped by the enemy, Johnson's division was moved up on Davis's right. Kirk's brigade on the left was formed on the right of Post, but was advanced slightly to obtain position in the front edge of a woodland, commanding the ground in front. Willich's line was refused to the right and rear

of Kirk's, and Baldwin was in reserve. The left wing maintained substantially the same position it had assumed the previous night. The pioneer brigade, under Captain Morton, was posted on Stone's River, in rear of Wood, to prepare fords. Rousseau came up with Scribner's, Beatty's and the Regular brigade, and took position in rear of Negley.—G. C. K.

valley, widening from left to right from 200 to 500 yards, beyond which, in a dense cedar thicket, the enemy's lines were dimly visible. Confidence in the strength and staying qualities of his troops, and reluctance to yield a favorable position without a struggle, together with the fact that the retirement of his line must be executed in the night, induced General McCook to make the fatal mistake of leaving his position unchanged.

The plan of battle was as follows: General McCook was to occupy the most advantageous position, refusing his right as much as was practicable and

necessary to secure it; to receive the attack of the enemy, or, if that did not come, to attack sufficiently to hold all the forces in his front. General Thomas and General Palmer were to



VIEW ON THE NASHVILLE PIKE
AT THE UNION CEMETERY,
LOOKING SOUTH-EAST TOWARD
MURFREESBORO'.

FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN
IN 1884.

open with skirmishing and engage the enemy's center and left as far as the river. Crittenden was to cross Van Cleve's division at the lower ford (covered and supported by Mor-




MONUMENT TO THE DEAD OF HAZEN'S BRIGADE, ON THE POSITION HELD BY
HIS BRIGADE IN THE ANGLE BETWEEN THE PIKE AND THE RAILROAD.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN IN 1884.

ton's Pioneers, 1700 strong) and to advance on Breckinridge. Wood's division was to cross by brigades at the upper ford, and, moving on Van Cleve's right, was to carry everything before it to Murfreesboro'. This move was intended to dislodge Breckinridge, and to gain the high ground east of Stone's River, so that Wood's batteries could enfilade the heavy body of troops massed in front of Negley and Palmer. The center and left, using Negley's right as a pivot, were to swing round through Murfreesboro' and take the force confronting McCook in rear, driving it into the country toward Salem. The successful execution of General Rosecrans's design depended not more upon the spirit and gallantry of the assaulting column than upon the courage and obstinacy with which the position held by the right wing should be maintained. Having explained this fact to General McCook, the commanding general asked him if, with a full knowledge of the ground,

he could, if attacked, hold his position three hours,—again alluding to his dissatisfaction with the direction which his line had assumed, but, as before, leaving that to the corps commander,—to which McCook replied, “I think I can.”

Swift witnesses had borne to the ears of General Bragg the movements of General Rosecrans. He had in his army about the same proportion of raw troops to veterans as General Rosecrans, and the armies were equally well



BRIGADIER-GENERAL EDWARD N. KIRK, KILLED AT STONE'S RIVER. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.


armed. By a singular coincidence Bragg had formed a plan identical with that of his antagonist. If both could have been carried out simultaneously the spectacle would have been presented of two large armies turning upon an axis from left to right. Lieutenant-General Hardee was put in command of the Confederate left wing, consisting of McCown's and Cleburne's divisions, and received orders to attack at daylight. Hardee's attack was to be taken up by Polk with the divisions of Cheatham and Withers, in succession to the right flank, the move to be made by a constant wheel to the right, on Polk's right flank as a pivot. The

object of General Bragg was by an early and impetuous attack to force the Union army back upon Stone's River, and, if practicable, by the aid of the cavalry, cut it off from its base of operations and supplies by the Nashville pike.

As has been shown, the Union and Confederate lines were much nearer together on the Union right than on the left. In point of fact the distance to be marched by Van Cleve to strike Breckinridge on Bragg's right, crossing Stone's River by the lower ford, was a mile and a half. To carry out the order of General Bragg to charge upon Rosecrans's right, the Confederate left wing, doubled, with McCown in the first line and Cleburne in support, had only to follow at double-quick the advance of the skirmish line a few hundred paces, to find themselves in close conflict with McCook.

The Confederate movement began at daybreak. General Hardee moved his two divisions with the precision that characterized that able commander. McCown, deflecting to the west, as he advanced to the attack, left an opening between his right and Withers's left, into which Cleburne's division fell, and together the two divisions charged upon R. W. Johnson and Davis, while yet the men of those divisions were preparing breakfast. There was no surprise. The first movement in their front was observed by the Union skirmish line, but that first movement was a rush as of a tornado. The skirmishers fell back steadily, fighting, upon the main line, but the main line was overborne


by the fury of the assault. Far to the right, overlapping R. W. Johnson, the Confederate line came sweeping on like the resistless tide, driving artillerists from their guns and infantry from their encampments. Slowly the extreme right fell back, at first contesting every inch of ground. In Kirk's brigade 500 men were killed or wounded in a few minutes. Willich lost nearly as many. Goodspeed's battery, on Willich's right, lost three guns. The swing of Bragg's left flank toward the right brought McCown's brigades upon the right of Davis's division. Leaving the detachments in R. W. Johnson's division to the attention of two of his brigades and Wheeler's cavalry, McCown turned McNair to the right, where Cleburne was already heavily engaged. Driving Davis's skirmishers before him, Cleburne advanced with difficulty in line of battle, bearing to the right over rough ground cut up with numerous fences and thickets, and came upon the main line at a distance of three-fourths of a mile from his place of bivouac. It was not yet daylight when he began his march, and he struck the Union line at 6 o'clock. General Davis now changed the front of Colonel Post's brigade nearly perpendicular to the rear. Pinney's battery was moved to the right, and the 59th Illinois assigned to its support. One-fourth of a mile to the right of Post, Baldwin's brigade, with Simonson's battery on its right, took position behind a fence on the margin of a wood. Carlin's, Woodruff's, and Sill's brigades were on the main battle line. Against this force, about seven thousand strong without works of any kind, Hardee hurled the seven brigades commanded by Manigault, Loomis, Polk, Bushrod Johnson, Wood, Liddell, and McNair—10,000 men. The engagement which followed (being the second distinct stage of the battle on the right) was one of the fiercest of the day. Baldwin was the first to give way. After half an hour's spirited resistance, finding the left of McCown's division, in pursuit of the remnants of Willich's and Kirk's brigades, advancing far beyond his right, Baldwin withdrew to the edge of the woods in rear of the front line, and tried to make a stand, but was driven back. The salient angle formed by the junction of Post's brigade with Carlin's, which at this time formed the right of the extreme Union line of battle, was in the meantime fiercely assailed. In front of Post, the Confederates under McCown, in command of McNair's brigade of his own division, and Liddell of Cleburne's division, received a decided repulse; and Cleburne was for a time equally unsuccessful in pushing back the main Union line.



BRIGADIER-GENERAL JOSHUA W. SILL, KILLED AT STONE'S RIVER. FROM A STEEL ENGRAVING.

Three successive assaults were made upon this position. In the second, Vaughan's and Maney's brigades of Cheatham's division relieved Loomis's and Manigault's. In the third attack Post's brigade was enveloped by Hardee's left, which, sweeping toward his rear, made withdrawal a necessity. Sill had been killed in the first assault. Schaefer's Union brigade was brought for-

ward to the support of the front line. The dying order from General Sill to charge was gallantly obeyed, and Loomis was driven back to his first position. Manigault advanced at about 8 o'clock and attacked directly in



GENERAL ROSECRANS'S
HEADQUARTERS AT
STONE'S RIVER.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH
TAKEN IN 1884.

his front, but, meeting with the same reception, was compelled to retire. A second attack resulted like the first. Maney's brigade now came up and advanced in line with Manigault's



BRIDGE OVER OVERALL'S CREEK. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN IN 1884.

supported by Vaughan's. Turner's Confederate battery took position near the brick-kiln [see map, p. 616], and opened fire, under cover of which Manigault made an unsuccessful dash upon Houghtaling's Union battery. Colonel Roberts was killed, and Colonel Bradley, of the 51st Illinois, succeeded to the command of the brigade. Having completed the formation of his line, Hardee gave the order for a general advance, and that portion of the right wing, which up to this time had resisted every assault made upon it, retreated in perfect order toward the left and rear, with empty cartridge-boxes, but with courage undaunted. Schaefer's brigade, being entirely out of ammunition, obeyed Sheridan's order to fix bayonets and await the charge. Roberts's brigade, having a few cartridges left, fell back, resisting the enemy. With the country to the right and rear overrun by McCown's infantry and

Wheeler's cavalry in pursuit of R. W. Johnson's routed division, one-half of which were either killed, wounded, or captured, and with a strong, determined enemy pressing them upon front and flank, Davis and Sheridan now found themselves menaced by another powerful auxiliary to defeat. Their ammunition was nearly exhausted, and there was none nearer than the Nashville-Murfreesboro' pike in the rear of Crittenden. On the other hand, McCown, in his report, refers to the necessity of replenishing his ammunition at this juncture, Liddell's brigade having exhausted forty rounds per man.

Carlin's brigade retired and re-formed on the Murfreesboro' pike. Woodruff held out some time longer, but finally followed Carlin toward the left, taking all the artillery with him, with the exception of one gun from Pinney's battery. Captain Pinney, dangerously wounded, was left upon the field. The withdrawal of the artillery was a matter of greater difficulty. Nearly all the horses having been killed, the attempt was made to withdraw the pieces by the use of prolonges. Lieutenant Taliaferro, commanding a section of Hescok's battery, was killed, and his sergeant brought off his two guns by hand. The ground, however, was too rough, and the road to safety too long, and in consequence the six guns of Houghtaling's battery were abandoned. Dragging the remaining pieces of artillery with them, Sheridan's division at 11 o'clock emerged from the cedars on Palmer's right, passing Rousseau on his way to the front. Cheatham's Confederates advanced in line of battle over the ground vacated by the Union right wing, and came up with Stewart's brigade hotly engaged with Negley, while Cleburne and McCown, sweeping toward the Nashville pike, driving hundreds of fugitives before them, encountered a new line improvised by Rosecrans to meet the emergency.

Thus far the plan of battle formed by Bragg had been carried out in strict conformity with its requirements. It now remained for Withers and Cheatham to drive the Union center back on the Union left. The retirement of Sheridan's division precipitated the entire command of Cheatham and a portion of Withers's upon Negley's two brigades and two brigades of Rousseau, on the left of the Wilkinson pike, taking them in front, left flank, and rear. The roar of artillery and the sharp rattle of musketry had aroused these brigades early, and they had stood in line, for hours, in momentary expectation of an attack upon their front. This, it is possible, would have been repulsed; but when it came in such a questionable shape, preceded by a cloud of retreating troops, but one course appeared to present itself to the commander, and that was to fall back. Nevertheless, he faced Colonel T. R. Stanley's brigade to the right, and ordered Colonel John F. Miller to hold his position to the last extremity. Miller arranged his brigade in convex order, with Schultz's battery on his right and Ellsworth's battery on his left. Simultaneously with Cheatham's advance upon his right, Stewart's and Anderson's brigades attacked Miller in front. Miller's lines were barely formed when a heavy musketry and artillery fire opened upon his men, who met the charge with a well-directed fire. On his right was Stanley, and the rapid discharge of Schultz's and Ellsworth's guns told with terrible precision upon the ranks of the advancing Confederates who soon halted, but did not abate their




GENERAL SAMUEL BEATTY'S BRIGADE (VAN CLEVE'S DIVISION) ADVANCING TO SUSTAIN THE UNION RIGHT NEAR THE NASHVILLE PIKE (SEE MAP, P. 616). FROM A LITHOGRAPH.

fire. The 29th and 30th Mississippi, of Anderson's brigade, made a dash upon Schultz's battery, but were hurled back behind the friendly cover of a stone wall, where Stewart passed them in his charge upon Miller. A bayonet charge was met by the 21st Ohio, and repulsed with great gallantry. The fighting at this point was terrific. All along the front the dead and wounded lay in heaps, and over their bodies came the assaulting host, seemingly strong and brave as when the first charge was made in the morning. But the inevitable result of a successful flank movement, by which the ammunition trains had been captured, came to Negley's strong fighting brigades as it had come to those of Sheridan and Davis. Ammunition was nearly exhausted, and it could only be replenished in rear of Crittenden, whose lines still stood intact. Negley ordered Stanley to retire, which he did in perfect order; and Miller's brigade, after holding its position until the ammunition on the persons of the killed and wounded was all used, slowly fell back to re-form in Palmer's rear.

Rosecrans, having arranged his plan of battle, had risen early to superintend its execution. Crittenden, whose headquarters were a few paces distant, mounted at 6 A. M., and with his staff rode to an eminence, where Rosecrans, surrounded by his staff-officers, was listening to the opening guns on the right. The plan of Bragg was instantly divined, but no apprehension of danger was felt. Suddenly the woods on the right in the rear of Negley appeared to be alive with men wandering aimlessly in the direction of the rear. The roar of artillery grew more distinct, mingled with the con-

tinuous volleys of musketry. The rear of a line of battle always presents the pitiable spectacle of a horde of skulkers, men who, when tried in the fierce flame of battle, find, often to their own disgust, that they are lacking in the element of courage. But the spectacle of whole regiments of soldiers flying in panic to the rear was a sight never seen by the Army of the Cumberland except on that occasion. Captain Otis, from his position on the extreme right, dispatched a messenger, who arrived breathless, to inform General Rosecrans that the right wing was in rapid retreat. The astounding intelligence was confirmed a moment later by a staff-officer from McCook, calling for reënforcements. "Tell General McCook," said Rosecrans, "to contest every inch of ground. If he holds them we will swing into Murfreesboro' and cut them off." Then Rousseau with his reserves was sent into the fight, and Van Cleve, who, in the execution of the initial movement on the left, had crossed Stone's River at 6 A. M. at the lower ford, and was marching in close column up the hill beyond the river (preparatory to forming a line of battle for a movement to the right, where Wood was to join him in an assault upon Breckinridge), was arrested by an order to return and take position on the turnpike facing toward the woods on the right. A few moments later this gallant division came dashing across the fields, with water dripping from their clothing, to take a hand in the fray. Harker's brigade was withdrawn from the left and sent in on Rousseau's right, and Morton's Pioneers, relieved at the ford by Price's brigade, were posted on Harker's right. The remaining brigades of Van Cleve's division (Beatty's and Fyffe's) formed on the extreme right, and thus an improvised line half a mile in extent presented a new and unexpected front to the approaching enemy. It was a trying position to these men to stand in line while the panic-stricken soldiers of McCook's beaten regiments, flying in terror through the woods, rushed past them. The Union lines could not fire, for their comrades were between them and the enemy. Rosecrans seemed ubiquitous. All these dispositions had been made under his personal supervision. While riding rapidly to the front, Colonel Garesché, his chief-of-staff, was killed at his side by a cannon-ball. Finding Sheridan coming out of the cedars into which Rousseau had just entered, Rosecrans directed Sheridan to the ammunition train, with orders to fill his cartridge-boxes and march to the support of Hazen's brigade, now hotly engaged on the edge of the Round Forest. The left was now exposed to attack by Breckinridge, and riding rapidly to the ford, Rosecrans inquired who commanded the brigade. "I do, sir," said Colonel Price. "Will you hold this ford?" "I will try, sir." "Will you hold this ford?" "I will die right here." "Will you hold this ford?" for the third time thundered the general. "Yes, sir," said the colonel. "That will do"; and away galloped Rosecrans to Palmer, who was contending against long odds for the possession of the Round Forest.

At half-past 10 o'clock Rousseau's reserve division, shorn of one brigade, under command of Major-General Lovell H. Rousseau, was ordered into action on the right of General Negley. The two brigades commanded by Colonels John Beatty and B. F. Scribner, known as the 17th and 9th of the



SCENE OF THE FIGHTING OF PALMER'S AND ROUSSEAU'S DIVISIONS. FROM A LITHOGRAPH.

In the distance between the railroad on the left and the pike in the center was the first position of Hazen, of Palmer's division. On the right are the cedars in

which Negley's division and the regulars of Rousseau's division were so roughly handled. In the foreground are seen the batteries of Loomis and Guenther.

old Army of the Ohio, were the same that only three months before had hurled back the strong fighting brigades of Hardee on the bloody slopes of Chaplin Hills or Perryville. The regular brigade, composed of five battalions of the 15th, 16th, 18th, and 19th United States Infantry, commanded by Colonel Oliver L. Shepherd, under perfect discipline, was placed on the extreme right. The line was formed in a dense cedar brake, through which Cleburne's and McCown's victorious columns were advancing, sweeping everything before them. On the left the roar of battle in Negley's front showed that all was not lost, and to his right Colonel John Beatty's brigade was formed. Scribner was held in reserve. The shock of battle fell heaviest upon the regulars; over one-third of the command fell either killed or wounded. Major Slemmer, of Fort Pickens fame, was wounded early. Steadily, as if on drill, the trained battalions fired by file, mowing down the advancing Confederate lines. Guenther's battery could not long check the fury of the charge that bore down upon the flanks and was fast enveloping the entire command.

Lieutenant-Colonel Kell, the commander of the 2d Ohio, was killed; Colonel Forman, the boy Colonel of the 15th Kentucky, and Major Carpenter, of the 19th Infantry, fell mortally wounded. There was no resource but to retreat upon support. At this moment Negley's division, with empty cartridge-boxes, fell back, and Rousseau, finding his flanks exposed, after a heroic fight of over two hours, fell back slowly and stubbornly to the open field, where his flanks could be more secure. Captain Morton, with the Pioneers and the Chicago Board of Trade battery, pushed into the cedars, and disappeared from view on their way to the front simultaneously with Harker. The general course of the tide of the stragglers toward the rear struck the Nashville turnpike at the point where Van Cleve stood impatiently awaiting the order to advance. All along the line men were falling, struck by the bullets of the enemy, who soon appeared at the edge of the woods on

Morton's flank. At the order to charge, given by General Rosecrans in person, Van Cleve's division sprang forward, reserving their fire for close quarters. It was the crisis in the battle. If this line should be broken all would be lost. Steadily the line moved forward, sending a shower of bullets to the front.

The brigades of Stanley and Miller having fallen back, as previously described, and the entire strength of Cheatham and three brigades of Withers and Cleburne having come upon Rousseau, the latter had fallen back into the open field, where he found Van Cleve. Loomis's and Guenther's batteries, double-shotted with canister, were posted on a ridge, and as the Confederate line advanced, opened upon it with terrific force. Men fell all along the line, but it moved straight ahead. The field was covered with dead and wounded men. The deep bass of the artillery was mingled with the higher notes of the minie-rifles, while in the brief pauses could be distinguished the quickly spoken orders of commanding officers and the groans of the wounded. It was the full orchestra of battle. But there is a limit to human endurance. The Confederate brigades, now melted to three-fourths their original numbers, wavered and fell back; again and again they re-formed in the woods and advanced to the charge, only to meet with a bloody repulse. All along the line from Harker's right to Wood's left, the space gradually narrowed between the contending hosts. The weak had gone to the rear; there was no room now for any but brave men, and no time given for new dispositions; every man who had a stomach for fighting was engaged on the front line. From a right angle the Confederate left had been pressed back by Van Cleve and Harker and the Pioneers to an angle of 45 degrees. This advance brought Van Cleve within view of Rousseau, who at once requested him to form on his right.

General Harker, entering the woods on the left of Van Cleve, passed to his right, and now closed up on his flank. The enemy had fallen back, stubbornly fighting, and made a stand on the left of Cheatham. Brave old Van Cleve, his white hair streaming in the wind, the blood flowing from a wound in his foot, rode gallantly along the line to where Harker was stiffly holding his position, with his right "in the air." Bidding him hold fast to every inch of ground, he rode on to Swallow's battery, which was working with great rapidity. He then passed to the left, where General Samuel Beatty's brigade were firing with their minie-rifles at a line of men which seemed to be always on the point of advancing.

The advance of Bragg's left wing had brought it into a position at right angles with the original line. The entire strength of the center, and most of the left, was concentrated upon the angle formed by Rousseau and the right of Palmer's division. Chalmers's Confederate brigade, which up to 10 o'clock had lain concealed in the rifle-pits on the right of Withers's line, arose at the order, and, under a terrific fire, dashed forward across the open field upon Palmer's front. Finding that the time had come for a decisive blow, General Bragg now directed General Breckinridge to send two brigades to the left to reënforce Polk. General Pegram, who, with his cavalry, was posted on the Lebanon

pike in advance of Breckinridge's right, had observed Van Cleve's movement, and notified General Breckinridge that a heavy column of infantry and artillery had crossed Stone's River and was advancing along the river bank upon the position occupied by Hanson's brigade. Interpreting this as the initial movement in a plan which was intended to strike his division, Breckinridge declined to obey Bragg's order, which in his report he terms a "suggestion." At ten minutes after ten he replied, "The enemy is undoubtedly advancing upon me." Soon after he wrote Bragg, "The Lebanon road is unprotected, and I have no troops to fill out my line to it." At half-past eleven, upon Bragg ordering him to move forward and attack the Union left, Breckinridge replied, "I am obeying your order, but my left is now engaged with the enemy, and if I advance my whole line farther forward, and still retain communication with my left, it will take me clear away from the Lebanon road, and expose my right and that road to a heavy force of the enemy advancing from Black's." The withdrawal of Van Cleve appears to have passed unnoticed by Breckinridge, and was undiscovered until too late to accomplish any good by complying with Bragg's order. Thus, by simply thrusting forward the left flank of his army and at once withdrawing it, General Rosecrans had held four Confederate brigades inactive at a time when their presence in support of Chalmers might have administered the *coup de grace* to the center of the Union line.

The movement of Crittenden's left and center divisions upon Bragg's right wing having been arrested, Wood's division was in position to cross at the upper ford. Wagner's brigade was at the river bank. Hascall was in reserve some distance to the rear of the opening between Wagner's right and Hazen's left. The withdrawal of Negley from Palmer's right precipitated the attack of Donelson's and Chalmers's brigades against the right and Adams and Jackson against the left. Chalmers's attack was made with great fury. His men had been confined, without fires, in their rifle-pits for forty-eight hours, and when finally the order came at 10 o'clock to "up and at 'em," they came forward like a pack of hounds in full cry. Cruft recoiled from the attack in the open field between the Round Forest and the wood in which Negley was engaged, and, falling back, met the charge at the time that Negley moved to the rear. Now Cruft's right was in the air and exposed to attack by Donelson following Negley. Cruft repulsed Chalmers in his front, but Donelson's brigade, pouring to his rear, threatened to envelop him. Grose, from his position in reserve, faced to the right, and soon after to the rear, and bore back the charging columns, enabling Cruft to withdraw.

When Chalmers's assault first fell upon Palmer's right, Hazen faced his two right regiments, the 6th Kentucky and 9th Indiana, to the rear, where the impetus of Chalmers's assault upon Cruft had borne him, at the same time retiring the two left regiments, the 41st Ohio and 110th Illinois, some fifty yards to the left of the pike and engaged to the front, the 40th Indiana having fallen back. A burnt brick house [Cowan's] in the immediate front of the Round Forest afforded cover for the enemy, and in the steady, persistent effort to force back the front of Hazen's line the action became terrific. All

of Hascall's brigade, and two regiments of Wagner's, being engaged on the right of the 6th Kentucky, and Wagner's remaining regiments being in position at the ford some distance to the left, the assault on the left was borne by Hazen, whose brigade was thought by Polk to be the extreme left of the Union line. Upon this point, as on a pivot, the entire army oscillated from front to rear for hours. Hazen's horse fell shot square in the forehead. Word came that the ammunition of the 41st Ohio was nearly exhausted. "Fix bayonets and hold your ground!" was the order. To the 110th Illinois, who had no bayonets, and whose cartridges were expended, the order was given to club their muskets, but to hold the ground. The 9th Indiana now dashed across the line of fire, from a battery in front, to the left, to relieve the 41st Ohio. Cannon-balls tore through their ranks, but they were rapidly closed up, and the men took their place in the front line, the 41st retiring with thinned ranks, but in excellent order, to refill their empty cartridge-boxes. An ominous silence succeeded, soon followed by the charge of Donelson's fresh Confederate brigade and the remains of Chalmers's. The time had been occupied in the readjustment of Palmer's line. The 24th Ohio, commanded by Colonel Fred. Jones, and the 36th Indiana, shorn of half its strength in the previous assault, were sent to Hazen's support. Parsons's battery was posted on the left. The 3d Kentucky, led by McKee, dashed forward and took position on the right of the 9th Indiana across the turn-pike. The terrible slaughter in this regiment attests its courage.

While Hazen and Wagner were thus gallantly defending the left of the line from 9 o'clock in the morning until 2 in the afternoon, the fight raged not less furiously on their immediate right. Here a line was formed, composed of two brigades of Palmer's division and Hascall of Wood's, filled out by the remains of Sheridan's and Negley's divisions, who, after they had replenished their ammunition, formed behind the railroad embankment at right angles with Hazen's brigade, which alone retained its position upon the original line. Farther to the right was Rousseau, with Van Cleve, Harker, and Morton on his right. At this supreme moment the chances of victory were evenly balanced. The undaunted soldiers of the left and center had swept past the crowd of fugitives from the right wing, and now in strong array they stood like a rock-bound coast beating back the tide which threatened to engulf the rear.

Along this line rode Rosecrans; Thomas, calm, inflexible, from whose gaze skulkers shrank abashed; Crittenden, cheerful and full of hope, complimenting his men as he rode along the lines; Rousseau, whose impetuosity no disaster could quell; Palmer, with a stock of cool courage and presence of mind equal to any emergency; Wood, suffering from a wound in his heel, staid in the saddle, but had lost that jocularly which usually characterized him. "Good-bye, General, we'll all meet at the hatter's, as one coon said to another when the dogs were after them," he had said to Crittenden early in the action. "Are we doing it about right now, General?" asked Morton, as he glanced along the blazing line of muskets to where the Chicago battery [Stokes's] was hard at work. "All right, fire low," said Rosecrans as he dashed by. Colonel Grose, always in his place, had command of the Ammen

brigade, of Shiloh memory, which, with Hazen's and Cruft's brigades, had driven the right of Beauregard's victorious army off that field. After the formation of this line at noon it never receded; the right swung around until, at 2 o'clock, considerable of the lost ground had been retaken. The artillery, more than fifty guns, was massed in the open ground behind the angle in the line (twenty-eight Union guns had been captured), where they poured iron missiles continuously upon the Confederate line. They could not fire amiss. The fire from Cox's battery was directed upon Hanson's brigade across the river, whence Cobb, with his Napoleons, returned the compliment with zeal and precision. Schaefer's brigade, having received a new stock of cartridges, formed on Palmer's right, where later its commander received his death wound, the last of Sheridan's brigade commanders to fall during the day. At 4 o'clock it became evident to the Confederate commander that his only hope of success lay in a charge upon the Union left, which, by its overpowering weight, should carry everything before it. The movement of Cleburne to the left in support of McCown had deprived him of reserves; but Breckinridge had two brigades unemployed on the right, and these were peremptorily ordered across the river to the support of General Polk.


The charge of Adams and Jackson, and the subsequent attack of Preston's and Palmer's brigades, have been described. The error made by General Polk in making an attack with the two brigades that first arrived upon the field, instead of waiting the arrival of General Breckinridge with the remaining brigades, was so palpable as to render an excuse for failure necessary. This was easily found in the tardy execution of Bragg's order by Breckinridge, and resulted in sharp criticism of the latter. The Union 3d Kentucky, now nearly annihilated, was relieved by the 58th Indiana, Colonel George P. Buell. The 6th Ohio, Colonel Nicholas L. Anderson at its head, took position on the right of the 26th Ohio, with its right advanced so that its line of fire would sweep the front of the regiments on its left. The 97th Ohio and 100th Illinois came up and still further strengthened the position. They had not long to wait for the Confederate attack. These dispositions had hardly been made when a long line of infantry emerged from behind the hill. Adams's and Jackson's brigades were on the right, and Donelson's and Chalmers's, badly cut up but stout of heart, were on the left. On they came in splendid style, full six thousand strong. Estep's case-shot tore through their ranks, but the gaps closed up. Parsons sent volley after volley of grape-shot against them, and the 6th and the 26th Ohio, taking up the refrain, added the sharp rattle of minie-rifles to the unearthly din. Still the line pressed forward, firing as they came, until met by a simultaneous and destructive volley of musketry. They staggered, but quickly re-formed and, reënforced by Preston and the Confederate Palmer, advanced again to the charge. The battle had hushed on the extreme right, and the gallantry of this advance is indescribable. The right was even with the left of the Union line, and the left stretched far past the point of woods from which Negley had retired. It was such a charge as this that at Shiloh broke the strong lines of W. H. L. Wallace and Hurlbut, and enveloped Prentiss. The Confederates had no sooner moved into the open

field from the cover of the river bank than they were received with a blast from the artillery. Men plucked the cotton from the boles at their feet and stuffed it in their ears. Huge gaps were torn in the Confederate line at every discharge. The Confederate line staggered forward half the distance across the fields, when the Union infantry lines added minie-balls to the fury of the storm. Then the Confederates wavered and fell back, and the first day's fight was over.

New Year's was a day of fair weather. During the night Rosecrans retired his left to a more advantageous position, the extreme left resting on Stone's River at the lower ford, where Van Cleve had crossed on the previous morning, the line of battle extending to Stokes's battery, posted on a knoll on Rosecrans's right. Walker's and Starkweather's brigades having come up, the former bivouacked in close column in reserve in rear of McCook's left, and the latter, posted on Sheridan's left, next morning relieved Van Cleve's division, now commanded by Colonel Samuel Beatty, which crossed the river and took position on the margin of a woodland that covered a gentle slope extending from the river to an open field in its front.

Across this field the Lebanon road, running nearly at right angles with Beatty's line, was nearly in sight. In his front and right, an elevation still held by Hanson's brigade of Breckinridge's division was crowned by Cobb's battery of artillery. On the left and rear, Grose's brigade of Palmer's division occupied a knoll in support of Livingston's battery on the following day.

The Confederate line, formed by Polk and Breckinridge on the right and Hardee on the left, extended from the point on Stone's River where




POSITION OF STARKWEATHER'S AND SCRIBNER'S BRIGADES ON JANUARY 1, 2, AND 3. FROM A LITHOGRAPH.

Chalmers's brigade had bivouacked since the 25th, in a direction almost at right angles with its original line.

At dawn on the 1st of January the right flank of General Polk was advanced to occupy the ground vacated by the Union army on the west bank of the river. Neither commander deemed it advisable to attack, but each was watchful of every movement of the other. The picket lines on either side were thrust forward within sight of the main lines of the opposing force, on the alert to notify their commanders of any movement in their front. Weaker in numbers, but more compact, and decidedly stronger in morale, each awaited the order to advance and close in a final struggle.

General Bragg confidently expected to find the Union troops gone from his front on the morning of the 2d. His cavalry had reported the turnpike full of troops and wagons moving toward Nashville, but the force east of Stone's River soon attracted his attention. Reconnoissance by staff-officers revealed Beatty's line, enfilading Polk in his new position. It was evident that Polk must be withdrawn or Beatty dislodged. Bragg chose the latter alternative, and Breckinridge, against his earnest protest, was directed to concentrate his division and assault Beatty. Ten Napoleon guns were added to his command, and the cavalry was ordered to cover his right. The line was formed by placing Hanson's brigade of Kentuckians, who had thus far borne no part in the engagement, on the extreme left, supported by Adams's brigade, now commanded by Colonel Gibson. The Confederate Palmer's brigade, commanded by General Pillow, took the right of the line, with Preston in reserve. The artillery was ordered to follow the attack and go into position on the summit of the slope when Beatty should be driven from it. The total strength of the assaulting column was estimated by Bragg at six thousand men. His cavalry took no part in the action.

In the assault that followed a brief cannonade, Hanson's left was thrown forward close to the river bank, with orders to fire once, then charge with the bayonet. On the right of Beatty was Colonel S. W. Price's brigade, and the charge made by Hanson's 6th Kentucky was met by Price's 8th Kentucky regiment, followed by Hanson and Pillow in successive strokes from right to left of Beatty's line. Overborne by numerical strength, the Union brigades of Price and Fyffe were forced back upon Grider, in reserve, the right of whose brigade was rapidly being turned by Hanson, threatening to cut the division off from the river. Beatty ordered retreat, and assailants and assailed moved in a mass toward the river. The space between the river bank and the ridge occupied by Grose now presented a scene of the wildest confusion. The pursuit led the Confederate column to the right of Grose, and Lieutenant Livingston opened upon it with his artillery, but he was quickly ordered across the river. Crittenden, turning to his chief-of-artillery, said, "Mendenhall, you must cover my men with your guns." Never was there a more effective response to such a request; the batteries of Swallow, Parsons, Estep, Stokes, Stevens, Standart, Bradley, and Livingston dashed forward, wheeled into position, and opened fire. In all, fifty-eight pieces of artillery played upon the enemy. Not less than one hundred shots per minute were fired. As the mass of men



POSITION OF MENDENHALL'S FIFTY-EIGHT GUNS (AS SEEN FROM THE EAST BANK ABOVE THE FORD) WHICH REPELLED THE CHARGE OF BRECKINRIDGE, JANUARY 2, 1863. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN IN 1884.

swarmed down the slope they were mowed down by the score. Confederates were pinioned to the earth by falling branches. For a few minutes the brave fellows held their ground, hoping to advance, but the west bank bristled with bayonets.

Hanson was mortally wounded, and his brigade lost over 400 men; the loss in the division was 1410. There was no thought now of attacking Grose, but one general impulse to get out of the jaws of death. The Union infantry was soon ordered to charge. Colonel John F. Miller with his brigade and two regiments of Stanley's was the first to cross the river, on the extreme left. He was quickly followed on the right by Davis and Morton and by Hazen in the center. Beatty quickly re-formed his division and recrossed the river and joined in the pursuit. The artillery ceased firing, and the Union line with loud cheers dashed forward, firing volley after volley upon the fugitives, who rallied behind Robertson's battery and Anderson's brigade in the narrow skirt of timber from which they had emerged to the assault. The Union line advanced and took possession of the ground from which Beatty had been driven an hour before, and both armies bivouacked upon the battlefield. General Spears, with a brigade guarding a much-needed supply train, came up and took position on the right, relieving Rousseau on the following morning.

General Bragg had been promptly notified by General Joseph Wheeler of the arrival of this reënforcement to his antagonist, and says in his report:



ADVANCE OF COLONEL M. B. WALKER'S UNION BRIGADE, AT STONE'S RIVER, ON THE EVENING OF JANUARY 2, 1863. FROM A LITHOGRAPH.

Walker's position is in the cedars near the right of Rousseau's line (see map, page 616). In the right of the picture is seen the 4th Michigan Battery. The front line was composed of the 31st and 17th Ohio, and the second line of the 82d Indiana and 38th Ohio.

"Common prudence and the safety of my army, upon which even the safety of our cause depended, left no doubt on my mind as to the necessity of my withdrawal from so unequal a contest."

Bragg acknowledged a loss of over 10,000 men, over 9000 of whom were killed or wounded,—nearly 25 per cent. of the total force engaged. The loss in the Union army was, in killed, 1533; wounded, 7245 = 8778; and in prisoners, McCook, 2092; Thomas, 576; Crittenden, 821,—total, 3489. Apprehending the possible success of a flank movement against his left, General Bragg had caused all the tents and baggage to be loaded on wagons and sent to the rear. On the night of the 3d he began his retreat and continued it south of Elk River, whence he was ordered back to Tullahoma by General Johnston.

THE UNION LEFT AT STONE'S RIVER.

BY THOMAS L. CRITTENDEN, MAJOR-GENERAL, U. S. V.

THE battle of Stone's River, Tennessee, on the 31st of December, 1862, and the 2d of January, 1863, was one of the most fiercely contested and bloody conflicts of the war. The two armies that met in this conflict were made up of soldiers who, for the most part, had been disciplined by capable instructors and hardened by service in the field, both having made many long marches, and neither having been strangers to the perils of the battle-field. Moreover, these armies were ably commanded by graduates of the Military Academy at West Point—a military school, I think, not surpassed, if equaled, anywhere else. The duration of the battle, and the long list of the killed and wounded, show the stuff of which the two armies were composed. I do not think that two better

armies, as numerous and so nearly matched in strength, ever met in battle.

I had the good fortune to command the left wing of our army, and, thanks to the skill and bravery of the officers and men of my command, the enemy were not able to drive them from our first line of battle. On the 31st of December my extreme left was strongly posted, but my right was in an open field back from the stream. Still it was a fairly strong position by reason of the railroad and the railroad cut and the woods. Thomas's position in the center was not so strong as mine; of McCook's, on our right, I knew nothing; that it was less strong than ours, I presume from the fact that in spite of the most stubborn resistance McCook was driven back two miles or more, the whole right of the

army hinging on its center, while the left held its ground. Thomas, with Rousseau's division, including a brigade of regulars (Lieutenant-Colonel O. L. Shepherd's), undertook to support McCook, but they were all driven along. Every time the right was driven in I thought (and I now think) that nothing but a most extraordinary blunder on the part of a soldier of the experience of Bragg hindered him from breaking Rosecrans's army in two and leaving me standing with my troops looking at Murfreesboro'. It is a pretty well-established maxim in military tactics that you should always press your advantage. Bragg had the advantage; all that he had to do (it seems to me) was to pursue it, and leave me alone with my success. Instead of that, he attempted to drive the left; but he could not drive us; and meanwhile our right was reorganized. I did not know on the 31st when they would come right upon our rear. I was facing Murfreesboro'. My right division under Palmer changed its place somewhat, to conform to our movements on the right, but that line was maintained by stubborn fighting. Thomas was then not far back, and that helped me more. (McCook was too far away for any protection to my flank.) Rousseau's men were driven out of the woods, a regular dense thicket, and Shepherd's regulars suffered fearfully in there. They moved in by the head of column. There was no fighting of consequence on the 1st of January.

The last attack made by the enemy was upon my extreme left, on the 2d of January, and it was disastrous to them. Van Cleve's division, under Colonel Samuel Beatty, had crossed the river on the 1st, and Grose and Hazen had followed with their brigades on the 2d. The fight opened on Colonel Beatty's line and lasted about twenty minutes. Before this battle I had been inclined to underrate the importance of artillery in our war, but I never knew that arm to render such important service as at this point. The sound judgment, bravery, and skill of Major John Mendenhall, who was my chief-of-artillery, enabled me to open 58 guns almost simultaneously on Breckinridge's men and to turn a dashing charge into a sudden retreat and rout, in which the enemy lost 1700 or 1800 men in a few moments. I witnessed the effect of this cannonade upon the Confederate advance. Mendenhall's guns were about 100 yards back from the river. Van Cleve's division of my command was retiring down the opposite slope, before overwhelming numbers of the enemy, when the guns, the fire of which had been held till our men should no longer be exposed to it, opened upon the swarming enemy. The very forest seemed to fall before our fire, and not a Confederate reached the river. †

† General Breckinridge says in his report:

"It now appeared that the ground we had won was commanded by the enemy's batteries, within easy range, on better ground, upon the other side of the river. I do not know how many guns he had. He had enough to sweep the whole position from the front, the left, and the right, and to render it wholly untenable by our force present of artillery and infantry."

EDITORS.

‡ The enemy was repulsed and sent flying in confusion before the terrific fire of Mendenhall's guns.

Mendenhall did not receive adequate recognition in the reports of General Rosecrans. ‡

As to our general's plan of battle, I don't remember that I was ever advised of it. The battle was fought according to the plan of General Bragg. Indeed, our uniform experience was—at Perryville, at Stone's River, at Chickamauga—that whenever we went to attack Bragg we were attacked by him, and so our plan had to be extemporized. I knew Bragg. His reputation was that of a martinet. He was a severe disciplinarian, a good soldier, and a hard fighter.

During the fight I had the experience of eating a horse-steak, the only one I ever tasted; it was simply because although we had supplies there we couldn't get at them. I had to go to sleep without my wagon, and as I said something about being hungry, one of the men said: "General, I will get you a first-rate beefsteak." Next morning I found that the steak had been cut from a horse that had been killed. I didn't know this at the time I ate it.

On the night of the 31st a wagon-train arrived from Nashville escorted by a thousand men, and these men, I learned, were sent back. I won't say whom they were under, but I know I felt and thought it was unwise that a thousand men who hadn't been in the fight at all should be sent away. All the wagons in the world wouldn't have made me send back a thousand fresh men. They could have staid there and eaten horse for a while until they had won the fight.

I regard Rosecrans as of the first order of military mind. He was both brave and generous, impulsively so; in fact, in his impulsiveness lay a military defect, which was to issue too many orders while his men were fighting. When I met him on the field on the 31st I saw the stains of blood on his breast, and exclaimed: "Are you wounded, General?" "Oh, no," said he, "that is the blood of poor Garesché, who has just been killed." †

After the fight on the night of the 31st a number of general officers were assembled by Rosecrans's order, including McCook, Thomas, Stanley, and myself. There was some talk of falling back. I do not remember who started the subject, but I do remember that I expressed the opinion that my men would be very much discouraged to have to abandon the field after their good fight of the day, during which they had uniformly held their position. I spoke of the proposition as resembling the suggestion of General Wool to General Taylor at Buena Vista, when Taylor responded: "My wounded are behind me, and I will never pass them alive." Rosecrans called McCook to accompany him on a ride,

The pursuit was made by Negley's men and Morton's Pioneer Corps, with portions of my command under Cruft, Hazen, and Grose, and a part of General Jefferson C. Davis's command.—T. L. C.

‡ Lieutenant-Colonel Julius P. Garesché, assistant adjutant-general, U. S. A., and since November 13th chief-of-staff of the Army of the Cumberland, was killed on the afternoon of the 31st of December, by a shell which carried off his head after narrowly missing General Rosecrans.—EDITORS.



BRIGADIER-GENERAL JOHN H. MORGAN, C. S. A.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

directing us to remain until their return. McCook has since told me that the purpose of this ride was to find a position beyond Overall's Creek to which the army might retire. Upon approaching the creek Rosecrans, perceiving mounted men moving up and down with torches, said to McCook: "They have got entirely in our rear and are forming a line of battle by torchlight." They returned then to where we were, and Rosecrans told us to

go to our commands and prepare to fight or die. The explanation of the torches is that the men were making fires, and the torches were firing-brands being carried from one point to another by cavalymen. I had received an order from General Rosecrans not to allow the men to make fires; but upon looking out of my quarters I discovered that the fires were already made from one end of my line to the other. I sent Rosecrans word that as the men were cold and were not being disturbed by the enemy, and as it would take all night to put out the fires, we had better leave them. The men would have suffered very much if they had staid there all night without fire.

The battle was fought for the possession of middle Tennessee. We went down to drive the Confederates out of Murfreesboro', and we drove them out. They went off a few miles and camped again. And we, although we were the victors, virtually went into hospital for six months before we could march after them again. Whether we would take Murfreesboro' or go back to Nashville was doubtful until the last moment. As in most of our battles, very meager fruits resulted to either side from such partial victories as were for the most part won. Yet it was a triumph. It showed that in the long run the big purse and the big battalions—both on our side—must win; and it proved that there were no better soldiers than ours.

The results of the battle were not what we had hoped, and yet there was a general feeling of elation. One day, after we had gone into Murfreesboro', I accompanied General Rosecrans in a ride about our camp. We had come across some regiment or brigade that was being drilled, and they raised a shout, and as he rode along he took off his cap and said: "All right, boys, all right; Bragg's a good dog, but Hold Fast's a better." This well expressed my feeling as to the kind of victory we had won.

MORGAN'S OHIO RAID.


IN the summer of 1863, the Confederate army at Tullahoma having been weakened by detachments for the defense of Vicksburg, Bragg found himself exposed to the risk of an attack by Rosecrans from Murfreesboro' simultaneously with a movement by Burnside from the Ohio to drive Buckner out of Knoxville. Bragg therefore determined to fall back to Chattanooga. To cover the retreat he ordered Brigadier-General John H. Morgan with a picked force from his division of mounted infantry to ride into Kentucky, breaking up the railroad, attacking Rosecrans's detachments, and threatening Louisville. To gain more time, Morgan wanted to extend the raid by a wide sweep beyond the Ohio, but Bragg would not consent.

Morgan set out from Burkesville, on the 2d of July, with 2460 men and 4 guns, ostensibly to execute Bragg's orders, but really bent on carrying out his own plan. Although ten thousand Federal troops under Generals Hartsuff and Judah were watching the Cumberland at various points, Morgan skillfully effected the difficult crossing, overcame Judah's opposition, and rode north, followed by all the Federal detachments within reach.

On the 4th he attacked the 25th Michigan, Col. Orlando H. Moore, in a strong position guarding the bridge over Green River, and drew off with heavy loss. On the 5th he defeated and captured the garrison of Lebanon, and then marched, by Springfield and Bardstown, to Brandenburg, on the Ohio, where he arrived on the morning of the

† Brig.-Gen. B. W. Duke commanded the First Brigade, and Colonel Adam R. Johnson the Second.—EDITORS.

9th, and at once began crossing on two captured steamboats. The passage was disputed by a gun-boat, and by some home-guards with a field-piece on the Indiana shore, but by midnight the whole command was in Indiana. Twenty-four hours later General E. H. Hobson followed, leading the advance of Judah's forces in pursuit. But Indiana and Ohio were now in arms, and at every step their militia had to be eluded or overcome; to do either caused delay.



MAP OF MORGAN'S OHIO RAID.

Turning to the east, Morgan rode through Corydon, Salem, Vienna, Lexington, Paris, Vernon, Dupont, Sumansville, and Harrison, Ohio, detaching to burn bridges and confuse the pursuit, impressing fresh horses, his men pillaging freely. Under cover of a feint on Hamilton, Ohio, he marched by night unmolested through the suburbs of Cincinnati, and at last, after dark on the evening of July 18th, reached the bank of the Ohio, near Buffington Bar and Blennerhassett's Island, where from the first he had planned to escape. Morning found his pursuers closing in from all directions. Morgan, with about half his men, eluded the net.† All the rest were killed or captured.‡ After nearly reaching the West Virginia shore Morgan himself returned, and with the remnant made for Pennsylvania, hotly pursued, and finally surrendered on the 26th of July, near Beaver Creek, with 364 officers and men.‡

Later on Morgan commanded in south-western Virginia. After another disastrous raid into Kentucky, he was killed at Greenville, Tennessee, on the 4th of September, 1864.—EDITORS.

† Of these many were drowned, but about three hundred escaped across the river.

‡ About 120 were killed and wounded, and 700 captured.

‡ Morgan was confined in the State Penitentiary at Columbus, Ohio, until November 27th, when he made his escape by tunneling.

MANŒUVRING BRAGG OUT OF TENNESSEE.


BY GILBERT C. KNIFFIN, LIEUTENANT-COLONEL, U. S. V.

THE brief campaign which resulted in forcing the Confederate army to evacuate their works at Tullahoma and Shelbyville, Tenn., and retire behind the Tennessee River, began on the 23d of June, was prosecuted in the midst of drenching rains, and terminated July 4th, 1863. Both armies had occupied the time since the battle of Stone's River in recruiting their strength and in fortifying their respective positions. Murfreesboro' was Rosecrans's secondary base of supplies, while Tullahoma was Bragg's barrier against Rosecrans's farther advance toward Chattanooga, the stra-

tegic importance of which, as controlling Confederate railroad communication between the East and West, had rendered it the objective point of all the campaigns of the armies of the Ohio and the Cumberland.

As the contending armies stood facing each other on the 20th of June, 1863, General Bragg estimated the effective strength of his army at 30,449 infantry, 13,962 cavalry, and 2254 artillery. Polk and Hardee commanded his two corps of infantry, and Wheeler and Forrest the cavalry.

Deducting the garrisons of Nashville and points



MAP OF THE TULLAHOMA CAMPAIGN.

Corps, 12,575, to be used in emergency, Rosecrans had at the same date "present for duty, equipped," 40,746 infantry, 6806 cavalry, and 3065 artillery, for an offensive campaign. Having received full and accurate descriptions of the fortifications at Tullahoma, where a part of Polk's corps was intrenched behind formidable breastworks, protected by an abatis of fallen trees six hundred yards in width, and at Shelbyville, where Hardee had fortified his position with equal engineering skill, General Rosecrans determined to force the Confederate army out of its works, and if possible engage it in the open field. A glance at the map will show Shelbyville directly south of Murfreesboro', and Tullahoma, on the line of the Nashville and Chattanooga railroad, eighteen miles south-east. The high state of cultivation of the country west of Shelbyville, and the connection of the towns by broad turn-pike roads, would naturally suggest the route of march for the Union army; moreover, the region to the east of the railroad consisted of sterile uplands through which winding country roads offered continuous obstacles to the rapid advance of an army. Precisely for this reason Rosecrans chose the latter route for one of his corps, while the other two corps were directed against the center of the line at Tullahoma. Seeding his supply trains out on the Shelbyville road, the cavalry under Stanley was ordered to Eagleville, twenty miles west, and a little south of Murfreesboro', with orders to advance on Shelbyville on the 24th of June in bold array, and at night to fill the country to their rear with camp-fires extending from Hardee's left to the Shelbyville road and beyond, indicating the presence of a heavy infantry force in his sup-

north, and the Reserve

port. This ruse had the desired effect, and held Hardee at Shelbyville, while the real movement was against his right.

This advance was made by Hoover's Gap, in front of Tullahoma, and to this end Colonel J. T. Wilder, in command of his splendid brigade of mounted infantry, was ordered to "trot through the gap," pushing the Confederate pickets before him, while Thomas was directed to follow as closely in his rear as possible. Wilder obeyed his orders literally, paying no attention to the frequent stands made by the retiring pickets, but, driving them back upon their reserves,—who in turn fell back upon Stewart's division, posted on the Garrison Fork,—he pushed on to Elk River in rear of Tullahoma. General Stewart sent Bushrod Johnson's brigade forward, and a brisk fight ensued. The head of Thomas's column was six miles in the rear, but Wilder's plucky regiments used their Spencer rifles to such good purpose as to hold their ground until Reynolds's division secured possession of the bridge, when Stewart, finding that the movement was really an advance in force, that the Gap he was posted to guard was lost, and that a heavy infantry column was crossing the bridge, fell back upon the main line.

Thomas was followed closely by McCook with the Twentieth Corps, Granger with the Reserve Corps holding the ground in front of Murfreesboro'. Meantime, Crittenden with the Twenty-first Corps, who had seventeen miles to march, over a road that seemingly had no bottom, was toiling through the mud between Woodbury and Mauchester on his way to his position before Bragg's right flank and rear. Colonel John F. Miller with his brigade of Negley's division attacked Liberty Gap, and fell in a fierce fight there, badly wounded; but the

! A range of hills dividing the waters of Duck River from the head-waters of Stone's River, about eleven miles from Murfreesboro' and running nearly east and west, is pierced by several gaps. Hoover's Gap, nearly north from Wartrace, Liberty, and Guy's Gaps, and

the Railroad Gap were all guarded by heavy pickets. Cleburne's division was stationed at Wartrace, and Stewart's division held possession of Hoover's Gap and the bridge over the Garrison fork of Duck River five or six miles north of Tullahoma.—EDITORS.

Gap was held by the brigade until relieved by the Twentieth Corps, which then passed Thomas and took the lead on the Manchester road, both corps camping within two miles of Tullahoma. In front of Stanley, Guy's Gap, held by a battery supported by cavalry, was charged, driving the Confederates toward Shelbyville, near which town they made a stand; but Colonel Minty attacked them on the left with the 4th Regular Cavalry of his brigade, sabering the gunners and pursuing the remainder through the town.


Bragg had ordered Hardee to the support of Polk's threatened left flank, leaving Shelbyville with its elaborately planned fortifications to fall before a cavalry charge after a brief struggle by the rear-guard.

The unforeseen inclemency of the weather retarded Crittenden's advance to such an extent that, notwithstanding the continued exertions of both officers and men, he was four days in marching seventeen miles. Horses and mules, floundering in the mud, were unhitched, and artillery and ammunition wagons dragged through deep morasses by the infantry. In some places mules perished in the mud, unable to extricate themselves. But

for the heavy rains Crittenden would have joined McCook and Thomas two days earlier, and the campaign might have had a different ending. When he came up, line of battle was formed fronting the works at Tullahoma, to mask a flank movement through the woods to Elk River Bridge, four miles in rear of Bragg's position. Between the lines the treacherous soil was filled with quicksand, which only needed the soaking of the week's rain to render it impassable. To advance against the Confederate works over this ground, through a dense abatis of tangled tree-tops, in the face of a storm of grape-shot and minie-balls, would have been to doom one-half the army to destruction. Finding, when too late, that the advance against Hardee was only a feint to cover the real movement upon his left and rear, and alive to the paramount importance of protecting Chattanooga, General Bragg again faced his army southward, and crossed the Tennessee River at Bridgeport, the mouth of Battle Creek, and at Kelley's Ferry. The advance of the column against Elk River Bridge arrived in time to witness the crossing of the rear of Bragg's army, and on the afternoon of the 3d of July Sheridan's division occupied Tullahoma. ¶

¶ The Union loss aggregated 84 killed, 473 wounded, and 13 captured or missing = 570. The Confederate loss is only partially reported. In Liddell's, Bushrod John-

son's, and Bate's brigades the casualties amounted to 50 killed, 228 wounded, and 23 missing = 291. The loss in other commands is not indicated.—EDITORS.



THE OLD JOHN ROSS HOUSE AT ROSSVILLE—MISSIONARY RIDGE ON THE RIGHT. (SEE MAP, P. 648.)
FROM A WAR-TIME PHOTOGRAPH.



CONFEDERATE LINE OF BATTLE IN THE
CHICKAMAUGA WOODS.

CHICKAMAUGA—THE GREAT BATTLE OF THE WEST.†

BY DANIEL H. HILL, LIEUTENANT-GENERAL, C. S. A.

ON the 13th of July, 1863, while in charge of the defenses of Richmond and Petersburg and the Department of North Carolina, I received an unexpected order to go West. I was seated in a yard of a house in the suburbs of Richmond (the house belonging to Mr. Poe, a relative of the poet), when President Davis, dressed in a plain suit of gray and attended by a small escort in brilliant uniform, galloped up and said: "Rosecrans is about to advance upon Bragg; I have found it necessary to detail Hardee to defend Mississippi and Alabama. His corps is without a commander. I wish you to command it." "I cannot do that," I replied, "as General Stewart ranks me." "I can cure that," answered Mr. Davis, "by making you a lieutenant-general. Your papers will be ready to-morrow. When can you start?" "In twenty-four hours," was the reply. Mr. Davis gave his views on the subject, some directions in regard to matters at Chattanooga, and then left in seemingly good spirits. ‡

‡ At the beginning of the Civil War I was asked the question, "Who of the Federal officers are most to be feared?" I replied: "Sherman, Rosecrans, and McClellan. Sherman has genius and daring, and is full of resources. Rosecrans has fine practical sense, and is of a tough, tenacious fiber. McClellan is a man of talents, and his delight has always been in the study of military history and the art and science of war." Grant was not once thought of. The light of subsequent events thrown upon the careers of these three great soldiers has not changed my estimate of them; but I acquiesce in the verdict which has given greater renown to some of their comrades. It was my lot to form a more intimate acquaintance with the three illustrious officers who I fore-

saw would play an important part in the war. I fought against McClellan from Yorktown to Sharpsburg (Antietam), I encountered Rosecrans at Chickamauga, and I surrendered to Sherman at Greensboro', N. C.—each of the three commanding an army.—D. H. H.

† His cheerfulness was a mystery to me. Within a fortnight the Pennsylvania campaign had proved abortive. Vicksburg and Port Hudson had fallen, and Federal gun-boats were now plying up and down the Mississippi, cutting our communications between the east and west. The Confederacy was cut in two, and the South could readily be beaten in detail by the concentration of Federal forces, first on one side of the Mississippi and then on the other. The end of our glorious dream could not

The condition of our railroads even in 1863 was wretched, so bad that my staff and myself concluded to leave our horses in Virginia and resupply ourselves in Atlanta. On the 19th of July I reported to General Bragg at Chattanooga. I had not seen him since I had been the junior lieutenant in his battery of artillery at Corpus Christi, Texas, in 1845. The other two lieutenants were George H. Thomas and John F. Reynolds. We four had been in the same mess there. Reynolds had been killed at Gettysburg twelve days before my new assignment. Thomas, the strongest and most pronounced Southerner of the four, was now Rosecrans's lieutenant. It was a strange casting of lots that three messmates of Corpus Christi should meet under such changed circumstances at Chickamanga.

My interview with General Bragg at Chattanooga was not satisfactory. He was silent and reserved and seemed gloomy and despondent. He had grown prematurely old since I saw him last, and showed much nervousness. His relations with his next in command (General Polk) and with some others of his subordinates were known not to be pleasant. His many retreats, too, had alienated the rank and file from him, or at least had taken away that enthusiasm which soldiers feel for the successful general, and which makes them obey his orders without question, and thus wins for him other successes. The one thing that a soldier never fails to understand is victory, and the commander who leads him to victory will be adored by him whether that victory has been won by skill or by blundering, by the masterly handling of a few troops against great odds, or by the awkward use of overwhelming numbers. Long before Stonewall Jackson had risen to the height of his great fame, he had won the implicit confidence of his troops in all his movements. "Where are you going?" one inquired of the "foot cavalry" as they were making the usual stealthy march to the enemy's rear. "We don't know, but old Jack does," was the laughing answer. This trust was the fruit of past victories, and it led to other and greater achievements.

I was assigned to Hardee's old corps, consisting of Cleburne's and Stewart's divisions, and made my headquarters at Tynes's Station, a few miles east of Chattanooga on the Knoxville railroad. The Federals soon made their appearance at Bridgeport, Alabama, and I made arrangements to guard the crossings of the Tennessee north of Chattanooga.† On Fast Day,

be far off. But I was as cheerful at that interview as was Mr. Davis himself. The bitterness of death had passed with me before our great reverses on the 4th of July. The Federals had been stunned by the defeat at Chancellorsville, and probably would not have made a forward movement for months. A corps could have been sent to General Joe Johnston, Grant could have been crushed, and Vicksburg, "the heart of the Confederacy," could have been saved. The drums that beat for the advance into Pennsylvania seemed to many of us to be beating the funeral march of the dead Confederacy. Our thirty days of mourning were over before the defeat of Lee and Pemberton. Duty, however, was to be done faithfully and unflinchingly to the last. The calmness of our Confeder-

ate President may not have been the calmness of despair, but it may have risen from the belief, then very prevalent, that England and France would recognize the Confederacy at its last extremity, when the Northern and Southern belligerents were both exhausted. Should the North triumph, France could not hope to retain her hold upon Mexico. Besides, the English aristocracy, as is well known, were in full sympathy with the South.—D. H. H.

† A regiment was placed at Sivley's Ford, another at Blythe's Ferry, farther north, and S. A. M. Wood's brigade was quartered at Harrison, in supporting distance of either point. The railroad upon which Rosecrans depended for his supplies ran south of Chattanooga, and had he crossed the



MAP OF THE CHICKAMAUGA CAMPAIGN.

August 21st, while religious services were being held in town, the enemy appeared on the opposite side of the river and began throwing shells into the houses. ¶ Rev. B. M. Palmer, D. D., of New Orleans, was in the act of prayer when a shell came hissing near the church. He went on calmly with his petition to the Great Being “who rules in the armies of heaven and among the inhabitants of earth,” but at its close, the preacher, opening his eyes, noticed a perceptible diminution of his congregation. Some women and children were killed and wounded by the shelling. Our pickets and scouts had given no notice of the approach of the enemy. On Sunday, August 30th, we learned through a citizen that McCook’s corps had crossed at Caperton’s Ferry, some thirty-five miles below Chattanooga, the movement having begun on the 29th. Thomas’s corps was also crossing at or near the same point.

The want of information at General Bragg’s headquarters was in striking contrast with the minute knowledge General Lee always had of every operation in his front, and I was most painfully impressed with the feeling that it was to be a hap-hazard campaign on our part. \ Rosecrans had effected the crossing of the river (Thomas’s corps) and had occupied Will’s Valley, between Sand and Lookout mountains, without opposition, and had established his

river above the town he would have been separated many miles from his base and his depot. But he probably contemplated throwing a column across the Tennessee to the north of the town to cut off Buckner at Knoxville from a junction with Bragg, and inclose him between that column and the forces of Burnside which were pressing toward Knoxville.—D. H. H.

Buckner’s division was promptly withdrawn south of the Hiwassee.—EDITORS.

¶ Colonel J. T. Wilder, who led the reconnoissance, says: “The enemy opened fire upon the com-

mand from their batteries, which was replied to by Captain Lilly’s 18th Indiana battery.”—EDITORS.

\ My sympathies had all been with Bragg. I knew of the carping criticisms of his subordinates and the cold looks of his soldiers, and knew that these were the natural results of reverses, whether the blame lay with the commander or otherwise. I had felt, too, that this lack of confidence or lack of enthusiasm, whichever it might be, was ominous of evil for the impending battle. But ignorance of the enemy’s movements seemed a still worse portent of calamity.—D. H. H.

headquarters at Trenton. Lookont Mountain now interposed to screen all the enemy's movements from our observation. ☆

On the 7th of September Rosecrans sent McCook to cross Lookont Mountain at Winston's Gap, forty-six miles south of Chattanooga, and to occupy Alpine, east of the mountains. Thomas was ordered to cross the mountain at Stevens's and Cooper's gaps, some twenty-five miles from Chattanooga, and to occupy McLemore's Cove on the east, a narrow valley between Lookont and Pigeon mountains. Pigeon Mountain is parallel to the former, not so high and rugged, and does not extend so far north, ending eight miles south of Chattanooga. Crittenden was left in Will's Valley to watch Chattanooga.

General Bragg had had some inclosed works constructed at Chattanooga, and the place could have been held by a division against greatly superior forces. By holding Chattanooga in that way, Crittenden's corps would have been neutralized, and a union between Rosecrans and Burnside would have been impossible. Moreover, the town was the objective point of the campaign, and to lose it was virtually to lose all east Tennessee south of Knoxville. If Bragg knew at the time of the prospective help coming to him from the Army of Northern Virginia, it was of still more importance to hold the town, that he might be the more readily in communication with Longstreet on his arrival. Under similar circumstances General Lee detached Early's division to hold the heights of Fredericksburg, and neutralized Sedgwick's corps, while he marched to attack Hooker at Chancellorsville. Bragg, however, may have felt too weak to spare even one division from his command. Whatever may have been his motive, he completely abandoned the town by the 8th, and Crittenden took possession of it next day. My corps, † consisting of Breckinridge's and Cleburne's divisions, had led in the withdrawal, and was halted at Lafayette, twenty-two miles from, and almost south of, Chattanooga, and east of Pigeon Mountain, which separates it from McLemore's Cove, into which the columns of Thomas began to pour on the 9th. I placed Breckinridge in charge of the Reserve Artillery and the wagon-train at Lafayette, while Cleburne was sent to hold the three gaps in Pigeon Mountain, Catlett's on the north, Dug in the center, and Blue Bird on the south. Cleburne pitched his tent by the road leading to the center gap. Notwithstanding the occupation of Chattanooga, Rosecrans did not attempt to concentrate his forces there, but persisted in pushing two of his corps to our left and rear.

As the failure of Bragg to beat Rosecrans in detail has been the subject of much criticism, it may be well to look into the causes of the failure. So far as the commanding general was concerned, the trouble with him was: first, lack of knowledge of the situation; second, lack of personal supervision of the execution of his orders. No general ever won a permanent fame who was

☆ General Bragg had said petulantly a few days before the crossing into Will's Valley: "It is said to be easy to defend a mountainous country, but mountains hide your foe from you, while they are full of gaps through which he can pounce upon you at any time. A mountain is like the wall of a house full of rat-holes. The rat lies hidden at his hole, ready to

pop out when no one is watching. Who can tell what lies hidden behind that wall?" said he, pointing to the Cumberland range across the river.—D. H. H.

† Breckinridge's division of my corps had come up from Mississippi and was substituted for Stewart's, sent to Knoxville to join Buckner.

D. H. H.

wanting in these grand elements of success, knowledge of his own and his enemy's condition, and personal superintendence of operations on the field.‡

The failure to attack Negley's division in the cove on September 10th↓ was owing to Bragg's ignorance of the condition of the roads, the obstructions at Dug Gap, and the position of the enemy. He attributed the failure to make the attack on the same force on the 11th to the major-general [Hindman] who had it in charge,—whether justly or unjustly, I do not know.‡ All day of the 11th my signal corps and scouts at Blue Bird Gap reported the march of a heavy column to our left and up the cove. These reports were forwarded to the commanding general, but were not credited by him.

On the morning of the 13th I was notified that Polk was to attack Crittenden at Lee and Gordon's Mills, and the Reserve Artillery and baggage trains were specially intrusted to my corps. Breckinridge guarded the roads leading south from Lafayette, and Cleburne guarded the gaps in Pigeon Mountain. The attack was not made at Lee and Gordon's Mills, and this was the second of the lost opportunities. Bragg in his official report, speaking of this failure, quotes his first order to Polk to attack, dated 6 P. M. September 12th, Lafayette, Ga.:

"GENERAL: I inclose you a dispatch from General Pegram. This presents you a fine opportunity of striking Crittenden in detail, and I hope you will avail yourself of it at daylight to-morrow. This division crushed, and the others are yours. We can then turn again on the force in the cove. Wheeler's cavalry will move on Wilder so as to cover your right. I shall be delighted to hear of your success."

This order was twice repeated at short intervals, the last dispatch being:

"The enemy is approaching from the south—and it is highly important that your attack in the morning should be quick and decided. Let no time be lost."

The rest of the story is thus told by General Bragg:

"At 11 P. M. a dispatch was received from the general [Polk] stating that he had taken up a strong position for defense, and requesting that he should be heavily reënforced. He was


‡ Invidious critics have attributed many of Stonewall Jackson's successes to lucky blunders, or at best to happy inspirations at the moment of striking. Never was there a greater mistake. He studied carefully (shall I add prayerfully?) all his own and his adversary's movements. He knew the situation perfectly, the geography and the topography of the country, the character of the officers opposed to him, the number and material of his troops. He never joined battle without a thorough personal reconnoissance of the field. That duty he trusted to no engineer officer. When the time came for him to act, he was in the front to see that his orders were carried out, or were modified to suit the ever-shifting scenes of battle.—D. H. H.

↓ Thomas's corps, after crossing at Bridgeport, Shell Mound, and Caperton's Ferry, arrived, September 4th, near Trenton, in Will's Valley (east of Sand Mountain). On the 6th Negley's division, with Baird's supporting, reached Johnson's Crook, and on the 10th crossed Missionary Ridge into

McLemore's Cove. On the 11th Negley and Baird retired to Stevens's Gap after feeling the enemy in front of Dug Gap, in Pigeon Mountain. Meantime Davis's and Johnson's divisions of McCook's corps crossing the Tennessee at Caperton's Ferry passed over Sand Mountain and seized Winston's Gap, while Sheridan's division, moving via Trenton, was close at hand. On the 10th McCook's three divisions were at Alpine. Crittenden's corps by September 4th was across the Tennessee (at Bridgeport, Shell Mound, and Battle Creek). On the 9th Wood's division occupied Chattanooga, and Palmer and Van Cleve marched to Rossville. On the 10th Crittenden, leaving Wagner's brigade to occupy Chattanooga, pursued the enemy toward Dalton and Ringgold. Wood reached Lee and Gordon's Mills on the 11th, and Crittenden was now ordered to close up his whole force on Wood.—EDITORS.

‡ The Comte de Paris states that Bragg sent word to Hindman, at 11 A. M. September 11th, to retire if he deemed it not prudent to attack.—EDITORS.

promptly ordered not to defer his attack,—his force being already numerically superior to the enemy,—and was reminded that his success depended upon the promptness and rapidity of his movements. He was further informed that Buckner's corps would be moved within supporting distance the next morning. Early on the 13th I proceeded to the front, ahead of Buckner's command, to find that no advance had been made upon the enemy and that his forces [the enemy's] had formed a junction and recrossed the Chickamauga. Again disappointed, immediate measures were taken to place our trains and limited supplies in safe positions, when all our forces were concentrated along the Chickamauga threatening the enemy in front."



ALEXANDER'S BRIDGE
FROM THE CONFED-
ERATE SIDE OF THE
CHICKAMAUGA LOOK-
ING UP STREAM.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH
TAKEN IN 1884.

During the active operations of a campaign the post of the commander-in-chief should be in the center of his marching columns, that he may be able to give prompt and efficient aid to whichever wing may be threatened. But whenever a great battle is to be fought, the commander must be on the field to see that his orders are executed and to take advantage of the ever-changing phases of the conflict. Jackson leading a cavalry fight by night near Front Royal in the pursuit of Banks, Jackson at the head of the column following McClellan in the retreat from Richmond to Malvern Hill, presents a contrast to Bragg sending, from a distance of ten miles, four consecutive orders for an attack at daylight, which he was never to witness.

Surely in the annals of warfare there is no parallel to the coolness and nonchalance with which General Crittenden marched and counter-marched for a week with a delightful unconsciousness that he was in the presence of a force of superior strength. On the 11th we find him with two divisions (Van Cleve's and Palmer's) at Ringgold, twenty miles from Chattanooga, and with his third (Thomas J. Wood's), ten miles from Ringgold, at Lee and Gordon's Mills, where it remained alone and unsupported, until late in the day of the 12th. Crittenden was at the mills with his whole corps on the 13th and morning of the 14th, moving back to Missionary Ridge during the 14th all his divisions except Wood's, which remained all that day. Crittenden seemed to think that so long as the bridge there was held,

there was no danger of the rebels passing to his rear on the road toward Chattanooga, though there were other bridges and several good fords over the Chickamauga at other points. It was to the isolation of Wood that Bragg refers in his order dated Lafayette, 6 P. M., on the 12th. Captain Polk (in the Southern Historical Society papers) says:

“General Bragg, in his official report of the battle of Chickamauga, charges General Polk with the failure to crush Crittenden’s forces in their isolated position at Ringgold. It will be noted, however, that General Polk was ordered to take position at a particular spot,—Rock Spring,—thence, if not attacked, to advance by daylight of the 13th of September, and assume the offensive against the opposing forces, which were expected from the way of Ringgold. But Crittenden was at Gordon’s Mills behind the Chickamauga on the evening of the 12th. The order was simply impracticable.”

The concentration at Rock Spring, seven miles south-west from Ringgold and four and a half miles south-east from Lee and Gordon’s Mills, was apparently to interpose between Crittenden’s columns, and to strike in detail whichever should present itself. But General Crittenden, unaware, apparently, of his danger, crossed the Chickamauga at the mills, and united with Wood about nightfall on the 12th. General Polk discovered that there was a large force in front of him on the night of the 12th, and not a single division, and hence he thought only of a defensive attitude. It is probable that, from his long experience of Bragg’s ignorance of the situation, he was skeptical in regard to the accuracy of the general’s information on the present occasion. Bragg certainly did not know of the union of Crittenden’s forces in the afternoon and night of the 12th. But, even with that knowledge, he would have acted wisely in falling upon the combined forces on the 13th and 14th. [See letter from Captain Polk, p. 662.]

The truth is, General Bragg was bewildered by “the popping out of the rats from so many holes.” The wide dispersion of the Federal forces, and their confrontal of him at so many points, perplexed him, instead of being a source of congratulation that such grand opportunities were offered for crushing them one by one. He seems to have had no well-organized system of independent scouts, such as Lee had, and such as proved of inestimable service to the Germans in the Franco-Prussian war. For information in regard to the enemy, apparently he trusted alone to his very efficient cavalry. But the Federal cavalry moved with infantry supports, which could not be brushed aside by our cavalry. So General Bragg only learned that he was encircled by foes, without knowing who they were, what was their strength, and what were their plans. His enemy had a great advantage over him in this respect. The negroes knew the country well, and by dividing the numbers given by them by three, trustworthy information could be obtained. The waning fortunes of the Confederacy were developing a vast amount of “latent unionism” in the breasts of the original secessionists—those fiery zealots who in ’61 proclaimed that “one Southerner could whip three Yankees.” The negroes and the fire-eaters with “changed hearts” were now most excellent spies.

The 13th of September was a day of great anxiety to me at Lafayette, in charge of the Reserve Artillery and the wagons trains, with only two weak

divisions, less than nine thousand strong, to protect them. During the 11th and 12th my signal corps on Pigeon Mountain had been constantly reporting the march of a heavy column to our left and rear. These reports were communicated by me to the commanding general, and were discredited by him. At 8 A. M. on the 13th Lieutenant Baylor came to my camp with a note from General Wharton, of the cavalry, vouching for the lieutenant's entire trustworthiness. Lieutenant Baylor told me that McCook had encamped the night before at Alpine, twenty miles from Lafayette, toward which his march was directed. Our cavalry pickets had been driven in on the Alpine road the afternoon before, and had been replaced by infantry. Soon after the report by Lieutenant Baylor, a brisk fire opened upon the Alpine road, two miles from Lafayette. I said to my staff, as we galloped toward the firing, "It is to be South Mountain over again." This referred to the defense, on the 14th of September, 1862, of the passes of that mountain by my gallant division, reduced by fighting and marching to five thousand men. We learned, on reaching the Alpine road, that General Daniel Adams's skirmishers had been attacked by two regiments of cavalry, which were repulsed. General Adams said to me, "The boldness of the cavalry advance convinces me that an infantry column is not far off." Lucius Polk's brigade was brought down from Pigeon Mountain, and every disposition was made to celebrate appropriately the next day—the anniversary of South Mountain. But that was not to be. General McCook (Federal) had been ordered to Summerville, eleven miles south of Lafayette on the main road to Rome, Ga. But he had become cautious after hearing that Bragg was not making the hot and hasty retreat that Rosecrans had supposed. He therefore ordered his wagon-train back to the top of Lookout Mountain, and remained all day of the 13th at Alpine. His cavalry had taken some prisoners from General Adams, and he thus learned certainly that Bragg had been reënforced. At midnight on the 13th McCook received the order to hurry back to join Thomas [in McLemore's Cove]. Then began the race of life and death, the crossing back over Lookout Mountain, the rapid exhausting march north through Lookout Valley, and the junction at last at Stevens's Gap on the 17th. The contemporary accounts represent McCook's march as one of fatigue and suffering.

General Bragg returned to Lafayette on the afternoon of the 13th, and I communicated to him verbally that night the report of Lieutenant Baylor. He replied excitedly, "Lieutenant Baylor lies. There is not an infantry soldier of the enemy south of us." The next morning he called his four corps commanders, Polk, Buckner, W. H. T. Walker, and myself, together, and told us that McCook was at Alpine, Crittenden at Lee and Gordon's Mills, and Thomas in McLemore's Cove. McCook was at that very time making that famous march, estimated by Rosecrans at fifty-seven miles, to join Thomas at Stevens's Gap. But the Confederate commander did not know of this withdrawal, and possibly the fear of an attack in his rear by McCook kept him from falling upon Thomas and Crittenden in his front. The nightmare upon Bragg for the next three days was due, doubtless, to his uncertainty about the movements of his enemy, and to the certainty that there was not that



LEE AND GORDON'S MILLS ON THE CHICKAMAUGA. FROM A WAR-TIME PHOTOGRAPH.

mutual confidence between him and some of his subordinates that there ought to be between a chief and his officers to insure victory. Bragg's want of definite and precise information had led him more than once to issue "impossible" orders, and therefore those intrusted with their execution got in the way of disregarding them. Another more serious trouble with him was the disposition to find a scapegoat for every failure and disaster. This made his officers cautious about striking a blow when an opportunity presented itself, unless they were protected by a positive order. ¶

In reference to the long intervals between battles in the West, I once said to General Patton Anderson, "When two armies confront each other in the East, they get to work very soon; but here you look at one another for days and weeks at a time." He replied with a laugh, "Oh, we out here have to crow and peck straws awhile before we use our spurs." The crowing and pecking straws were now about over. On the 13th Rosecrans awoke from his delusion that Bragg was making a disorderly retreat, and issued his orders for the concentration of his army in McLemore's Cove. Granger's corps came up from Bridgeport, occupied Rossville on the 14th, and remained there until the battle of the 20th. Rossville is at the gap in Missionary Ridge through which runs the road from Chattanooga to Lafayette and Rome, Ga. General Rosecrans had felt it to be of vital importance to hold this gap at all hazards, in case of a disaster to his arms. On the 16th Rosecrans had his forces well in hand, extending from Lee and Gordon's Mills to

¶ General Lee sought for no vicarious victim to atone for his *one* disaster. "I alone am to blame; the order for attack was mine," said he, after the

repulse of the assault upon Cemetery Ridge at Gettysburg. Lee and Bragg were cast in different molds.—D. H. H.

Stevens's Gap, in a line running from east to south-west some eleven miles long. On the same day Bragg, with headquarters still at Lafayette, held the gaps in Pigeon Mountain, and the fords to Lee and Gordon's Mills. Each commander was in position, on the 17th, to turn the left flank of his adversary,—Bragg by crossing the Chickamauga at points north of Lee and Gordon's Mills; but by this he risked fighting with his back to the river,—a hazardous situation in case of defeat. He risked too, to some extent, his trains, which had yet to be moved toward Ringgold and Dalton. His gain, in case of a decided victory, would be the cutting off of Rosecrans from Chattanooga, and possibly the recapture of that place. Rosecrans could have flanked Bragg by crossing at the Mills and at the fords between that place and Catlett's. This would have cut off Bragg from Rome certainly, and from Dalton in case of his advance upon Chattanooga, or else would have compelled him to come out and fight upon ground selected by his antagonist. The risk to Rosecrans was an insecure line of retreat in case of defeat, and possibly the loss of Chattanooga. But he had Granger's corps to hold the fortifications of Chattanooga, and he held also the gaps in Lookout Mountain. Bragg showed superior boldness by taking the initiative. Rosecrans determined to act upon the defensive. He says that he knew on the 17th that Bragg would try to seize the Dry Valley and Rossville roads—the first on the west and the second on the east of Missionary Ridge. He thus divined the plan of his enemy twelve hours before Bragg's order was issued. Therefore Rosecrans, on the afternoon of the 17th, ordered McCook to take the place of Thomas at Pond Spring, Thomas to relieve the two divisions of Crittenden at Crawfish Springs, and Crittenden to take these divisions and extend them to the left of Wood at Lee and Gordon's, so as to protect the road to Chattanooga. McCook's corps reached its position at dark, Crittenden's near midnight. Thomas marched all night uninterruptedly, and the head of his column reached the Widow Glenn's (Rosecrans's headquarters) at daylight on the 19th.

On the 18th Bragg issued, from Lee's tan-yard, his order for battle:

"1. [Bushrod] Johnson's column (Hood's), on crossing at or near Reed's Bridge, will turn to the left by the most practicable route, and sweep up the Chickamauga toward Lee and Gordon's Mills.

"2. Walker, crossing at Alexander's Bridge, will unite in this move and push vigorously on the enemy's flank and rear in the same direction.

"3. Buckner, crossing at Tedford's Ford, will join in the movement to the left, and press the enemy up the stream from Polk's front at Lee and Gordon's.

"4. Polk will press his forces to the front of Lee and Gordon's Mills, and if met by too much resistance to cross will bear to the right and cross at Dalton's Ford or at Tedford's, as may be necessary, and join the attack wherever the enemy may be.

"5. Hill will cover our left flank from an advance of the enemy from the cove, and, by pressing the cavalry in his front, ascertain if the enemy is reinforcing at Lee and Gordon's Mills, in which event he will attack them in flank.

"6. Wheeler's cavalry will hold the gaps in Pigeon Mountain, and cover our rear and left, and bring up stragglers.

"7. All teams, etc., not with troops should go toward Ringgold and Dalton beyond Taylor's Ridge. All cooking should be done at the trains; rations when cooked will be forwarded to the troops.

"8. The above movement will be executed with the utmost promptness, vigor, and persistence."

BATTLE-FIELD OF CHICKAMAUGA.


- Union.

Confederate.
- Positions, Evening of Sept. 18th, 1863.

Direction of lines of battle, Sept. 19th.

First lines of battle, Sept. 20th.

Last lines of battle, Sept. 20th.
- Cavalry.



INDICATES POSITIONS OF UNION TROOPS AFTER THE BATTLE


This map is based upon the Official Reports, the official topographical map compiled by Edward Ruger under the direction of Colonel W. E. Merrill, Chief Engineer Department of the Cumberland, and the maps of Captain Walter J. Morris of General Leonidas Polk's staff. — Editors.

Had this order been issued on any of the four preceding days, it would have found Rosecrans wholly unprepared for it, with but a single infantry division (Wood's) guarding the crossings of the Chickamauga, and that at one point only, Lee and Gordon's—the fords north of it being watched by cavalry. Even if the order had been given twenty-four hours earlier, it must have been fatal to Rosecrans in the then huddled and confused grouping of his forces.

All that was effected on the 18th was the sending over of Walker's small corps of a little more than 5000 men near Alexander's Bridge, and Bushrod Johnson's division of 3600 men at Reed's Bridge, farther north. These troops drove off Wilder's mounted infantry from the crossings immediately south of them, so as to leave undisputed passage for Bragg's infantry, except in the neighborhood of Lee and Gordon's. On the night of the 18th Bragg's troops were substantially as follows: Hill's corps on the extreme left, with center at Glass's Mill; Polk's at Lee and Gordon's; Buckner's at Byram's Ford; Hood's at Tedford's Ford. ☆ During the night Cheatham's division of Polk's corps was detached, moved down the Chickamauga, and crossed at Hunt's Ford about 7 A. M. on the 19th. On that morning the Federal line of battle ran, in the main, parallel to the Chattanooga road from Lee and Gordon's to beyond Kelly's farm, and consisted of the divisions of Wood, Van Cleve, and Palmer of Crittenden's corps, and Baird's and Brannan's of Thomas's corps, in the order named from right to left. Negley and Reynolds, commanders under Thomas, had not come up at the opening of the battle of the 19th. The leading division (R. W. Johnson's) of McCook's corps reached Crawfish Springs at an early hour that day, and the divisions of Davis and Sheridan soon followed. It is about five miles from Crawfish Springs to Kelly's farm.

Soon after getting into position at Kelly's after his night march, General Thomas was told by Colonel Daniel McCook, commanding a brigade of the Reserve Corps, that there were no rebel troops west of the Chickamauga, except one brigade that had crossed at Reed's Bridge the afternoon before, and which could easily be captured, as he (McCook) had burned the bridge behind the rebels. Thomas ordered Brannan to take two brigades and make a reconnoissance on the road to Reed's Bridge, and place a third brigade on the road to Alexander's Bridge. This order took the initiative away from Bragg, and put it in the hands of Thomas with his two divisions in line to crush the small Confederate force west of the river, and then with *his* supports, as they came, beat, in detail, the *Confederate* supports, delayed, as they must be, by the crossings and the distances to march. Croxton's brigade, of Brannan's division, met Forrest's cavalry on the Reed's Bridge road, and drove it back on the infantry—two small brigades under Ector and Wilson. These advanced with the "rebel yell," pushed Croxton back, and ran over his battery, but were in turn beaten back by Brannan's and Baird's forces. Baird now began the readjustment of his lines, and during the confusion of the movement Liddell's (Confederate) division, two thousand strong, struck the brigades of Scribner and King, and drove them in disorder, capturing Loomis's battery, commanded by Lieutenant Van Pelt. Bush's Indiana battery was

☆ Hood's division, about 5000, was the only part of Longstreet's corps in the action of the 19th.—D. H. H.



CRAWFISH SPRINGS. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH
TAKEN IN 1884.

captured at the same time. The defeat had become a panic, and Baird's and Brannan's men were going pell-mell to the rear, when the victorious Liddell found himself in the presence of a long line of Federal troops

overlapping both flanks of his little force. These were the troops of Brannan's reorganized division on his right, and of the freshly arrived division of R. W. Johnson from McCook. Liddell extricated himself skillfully, losing heavily, however, and being compelled to abandon his captured guns. It was by Rosecrans's own order, at 10:15 A. M., that R. W. Johnson had been hurried forward five miles from Crawfish Springs, just in time to save the Federal left from a grave disaster. At 11 A. M. Bragg ordered Cheatham to the relief of Liddell, but he reached the ground after Johnson—too late to drive Brannan as well as Baird off the field. Cheatham's veteran division of seven thousand men advanced gallantly, driving the enemy before it, when it was in its turn hurled back by an attacking column which Thomas had organized after the defeat of Liddell and the arrival of two fresh divisions, viz., Palmer's of Crittenden's corps and Reynolds of his own corps.

Unfortunately for the Confederates, there was no general advance, as there might have been along the whole line—an advance that must have given a more decisive victory on the 19th than was gained on the 20th. It was desultory fighting from right to left, without concert, and at inopportune times. It was the sparring of the amateur boxer, and not the crushing blows of the

trained pugilist. From daylight on the 19th until after midday, there was a gap of two miles between Crittenden and Thomas, into which the Confederates could have poured, turning to right or left, and attacking in flank whichever commander was least prepared for the assault. As Cheatham was falling back, A. P. Stewart's division of Buckner's corps, 3400 strong, attacked Palmer's division of Crittenden's corps, which was flanking Cheatham, drove it back, and marching forward met Van Cleve's division of the same corps hastening to the assistance of Thomas, and hurled it back also. Hood, with his own division and Bushrod Johnson's, moved at 2:30 P. M., and gained for a time a most brilliant success, crushing the right center of the Federal army, capturing artillery, and seizing the Chattanooga road. The three Confederate divisions, after their first triumphs, had to encounter the four fresh divisions of Wood, Davis, Sheridan, and Negley, and were in turn driven back to the east of the road.

Stewart had recaptured the battery lost by Cheatham's division, twelve pieces of Federal artillery, over two hundred prisoners, and several hundred rifles. Hood and Bushrod Johnson had met with a similar success at first, but, of course, three divisions could not stand the combined attack of six.

On our extreme left a good deal of demonstrating had been done by the Federals on the 17th and 18th; infantry had been crossed over at Owen's Ford, and threats made at Glass's Mill. On the 19th I ordered an attack at the latter place. Slocumb's battery had a bloody artillery duel with one on the west of the river, and, under cover of the artillery fire, Helm's brigade of Breckinridge's division was crossed over, and attacked Negley's infantry and drove it off. Riding over the ground with Breckinridge, I counted eleven dead horses at the Federal battery, and a number of dead infantrymen that had not been removed. The clouds of dust rolling down the valley revealed the precipitate retirement of the foe, not on account of our pressure upon him, but on account of the urgency of the order to hurry to their left. This was the time to have relieved the strain upon our right by attacking the Federal right at Lee and Gordon's. My veteran corps, under its heroic division commanders, Breckinridge and Cleburne, would have flanked the enemy out of his fortifications at this point, and would by their brilliant onset have confounded Rosecrans in his purpose of massing upon his left; but Bragg had other plans. †

At 3 P. M. I received an order to report to the commander-in-chief at Bedford's Ford, to set Cleburne's division in motion to the same point, and to relieve Hindman at Gordon's with Breckinridge's division. Cleburne had six miles to march over a road much obstructed with wagons, artillery, and details of soldiers. He got into position on the extreme right after sundown. Thomas had, in the meanwhile, moved Brannan from his left to his right, and was retiring Baird and R. W. Johnson to a better position, when

†The great commander is he who makes his antagonist keep step with him. Thomas, like the grand soldier he was, by attacking first, made Bragg keep step with him. He who begins the attack

assumes that he is superior to his enemy, either in numbers or in courage, and therefore carries with him to the assault all the moral advantage of his assumed superiority.—D. H. H.

Cleburne, with Cheatham upon his left, moved upon them "in the gloaming" in magnificent style, capturing three pieces of artillery, a number of caissons, two stand of colors, and three hundred prisoners. The contest was obstinate, for a time, on our left, where log breastworks were encountered; and here that fine soldier, Brigadier-General Preston Smith, of Cheatham's division, lost his life. Discovering that our right extended beyond the enemy, I threw two batteries in advance of our fighting line and almost abreast of that of the enemy. These caused a hasty abandonment of the breastworks and a falling back of some half a mile. This ended the contest for the day.

General Rosecrans made a very natural mistake about our overwhelming numbers. But it *was* a big mistake. The South, from patriotic pride, still kept up its old military organizations, for how could it merge together divisions and brigades around which clustered such glorious memories? But the waste of war had reduced them to mere skeleton divisions and brigades. My corps at Chickamauga was but little more than one-third of the size of my division at Yorktown, and so it was through the whole Southern army. Captain W. M. Polk, from data furnished him by General Marcus J. Wright, has given an estimate of the numbers in the respective corps and divisions of the two armies; he concludes that the Federals had 45,855 and the Confederates 33,897 in the battle of the 19th.

I witnessed some of the heaviest fighting on the afternoon of the 19th, and never saw so little straggling from the field. I saw but one deserter from Hood's ranks, and not one from Cleburne's. The divisions of Hindman, Breckinridge, and Preston had not been put into the fight, and two brigades of McLaws's (Kershaw's and Humphreys's) were expected next day. Rosecrans had put in all but two of his brigades. The outlook seemed hopeful for the Confederates. Longstreet arrived at 11 P. M. on the 19th.‡

Soon after, General Bragg called together some of his officers and ventured upon that hazardous experiment, a change of organization in face of the enemy. He divided his army into two wings; he gave to Polk the right wing, consisting of the corps of Hill and Walker, and the division of Cheatham,—comprising in all 18,794 infantry and artillery, with 3500 cavalry under Forrest; to Longstreet he gave the left wing, consisting of the corps of Buckner and Hood, and the division of Hindman,—22,849 infantry and artillery, with 4000 cavalry under Wheeler. That night Bragg announced his purpose of adhering to his plan of the 19th for the 20th, viz., successive attacks from right to left, and he gave his wing commanders orders to begin at daylight. I left Cleburne, after his fight, at 11 P. M., and rode with Captains Coleman and Reid five miles to Tedford's Ford, where the orders for the

‡ While lying on the Rapidan in August, after that disastrous day at Gettysburg, Longstreet had suggested to General Lee the reënforcing of Bragg. The general went to Richmond, and after a time got the consent of the Confederate authorities to send Longstreet, without artillery or cavalry, with the much reduced divisions of McLaws and Hood. Lee followed Longstreet to his horse to see him off, and as he was mounting said, "General, you

must beat those people." (Lee always called the Federals "those people.") Longstreet said, "General, if you will give your orders that the enemy, when beaten, shall be destroyed, I will promise to give you victory, if I live; but I would not give the life of a single soldier of mine for a barren victory." Lee replied, "The order has been given and will be repeated."—D. H. H. [See p. 676 for strength of Longstreet's force.]

day announced that Bragg's headquarters would be, that I might get instructions for the next day. On the way I learned from some soldiers that Breckinridge was coming up from Lee and Gordon's. I sent Captain Reid to him to conduct him to Cleburne's right. General Polk, however, as wing commander, gave General Breckinridge permission to rest his weary men, and took him to his own headquarters. It was after 2 o'clock when General Breckinridge moved off under the guidance of Captain Reid, and his division did not get into position until after sunrise. Captain Coleman and myself reached the ford after midnight, only to learn that Bragg was not there. Some time after the unsuccessful search, my other staff-officers came up, and my chief-of-staff gave me a message from General Polk that my corps had been put under his command, and that he wished to see me at Alexander's Bridge. He said not a word to any of them about an attack at daylight, nor did he to General Breckinridge, who occupied the same room with him that night. I have by me written statements from General Breckinridge and the whole of my staff to that effect. General Polk had issued an order for an attack at daylight, and had sent a courier with a copy, but he had failed to find me. I saw the order for the first time nineteen years afterward in Captain Polk's letter to the Southern Historical Society. At 3 A. M. on the 20th I went to Alexander's Bridge, but not finding the courier who was to be posted there to conduct me to General Polk, I sent Lieutenant Morrison, aide-de-camp, to hunt him up and tell him I could be found on the line of battle, which I reached just after daylight, before Breckinridge had got into position. Neither of my division commanders had heard anything of the early attack, and cooked rations were being distributed to our men, many of whom had not eaten anything for twenty-four hours. At 7:25 an order was shown me from General Polk, directed to my major-generals, to begin the attack. I sent a note to him that I was adjusting my line, and that my men were getting their rations. Polk soon after came up, and assented to the delay. Still nothing was said of the daylight attack. Bragg rode up at 8 A. M. and inquired of me why I had not begun the attack at daylight. I told him that I was hearing then for the first time that such an order had been issued and had not known whether we were to be the assailants or the assailed. He said angrily, "I found Polk after sunrise sitting down reading a newspaper at Alexander's Bridge, two miles from the line of battle, where he ought to have been fighting."

However, the essential preparations for battle had not been made up to this hour and, in fact, could not be made without the presence of the commander-in-chief. The position of the enemy had not been reconnoitered, our line of battle had not been adjusted, and part of it was at right angles with the rest; there was no cavalry on our flanks, and no order had fixed the strength or position of the reserves. My corps had been aligned north and south, to be parallel to the position of the enemy. Cheatham's division was at right angles to my line, and when adjusted was found to be exactly behind Stewart's, and had therefore to be taken out after the battle was begun, and placed in reserve. Kershaw's brigade of Longstreet's corps was also out of place, and was put in reserve.



GENERAL THOMAS'S BIVOUAC AFTER THE FIRST DAY'S BATTLE.

Rosecrans in person made a careful alignment of his whole line in the morning, arranging it so as to cover the Rossville (Chattanooga) and the Dry Valley roads. It began four hundred yards east of the Rossville road, on a crest which was occupied from left to right by Baird's division (Thomas's corps), R. W. Johnson's division (McCook's), Palmer's division (Crittenden's), and Reynolds's division (Thomas's). These four divisions became isolated during the day, and the interest of the battle centers largely in them. They lay behind substantial breastworks of logs,↓ in a line running due south and bending back toward the road at each wing. "Next on the right of Reynolds," says a Federal newspaper account, "was Brannan's division of Thomas's corps, then Negley's of the same corps, its right making a crotchet to the rear. The line across the Chattanooga road toward Missionary Ridge was completed by Sheridan's and Davis's divisions of McCook's corps: Wood's and Van Cleve's divisions of Crittenden's corps were in reserve at a proper distance." The line from Reynolds extended in a south-westerly direction. Minty's cavalry covered the left and rear at Missionary Mills; Mitchell's and

↓ The ringing of axes in our front could be heard all night.—D. H. H.

These breastworks were described as follows by William F. G. Shanks, war correspondent of the "New York Herald":

"General Thomas had wisely taken the precaution to

make rude works about breast-high along his whole front, using rails and logs for the purpose. The logs and rails ran at right angles to each other, the logs keeping parallel to the proposed line of battle and lying upon the rails until the proper height was reached. The spaces between these logs were filled with rails, which served to add to their security and strength. The spade had not been used."

EDITORS.

Wilder's cavalry covered the extreme right. Rosecrans's headquarters were at Widow Glenn's house.

The Confederate line ran at the outset from north to south, Hill's corps on the right, next Stewart's division, Hood in reserve, then Bushrod Johnson's, then Hindman's on the extreme left, Preston's in reserve. After the fighting had actually begun, Walker's and Cheatham's divisions and Kershaw's brigade were taken out and put in reserve. Wheeler's cavalry covered our left, and Forrest had been sent, at my request, to our right. The Confederates were confronted with eight Federal divisions protected generally by breastworks. The battle can be described in a few words. The Confederate attack on the right was mainly unsuccessful because of the breastworks, but was so gallant and persistent that Thomas called loudly for reënforcements, which were promptly sent, weakening the Federal right, until finally a gap was left. This gap Longstreet entered. Discovering, with the true instinct of a soldier, that he could do more by turning to the right, he disregarded the order to wheel to the left and wheeled the other way, striking the corps of Crittenden and McCook in flank, driving them with their commanders and the commanding general off the field.† Thomas, however, still held his ground, and, though ordered to retreat, strongly refused to do so until nightfall, thus saving the Federals from a great disaster. Longstreet, then, was the organizer of victory on the Confederate side, and Thomas the savior of the army on the other side.

Longstreet did not advance until noon, nor did he attack the breastworks on the Federal left (Thomas's position) at all, though Federal writers at the time supposed that he did. Those assaults were made first by the divisions of Breckinridge and Cleburne of Hill's corps, and then by the brigades of Gist, Walthall, Govan, and others sent to their assistance. Stewart began his brilliant advance at 11 A. M., and before that time Thomas began his appeals for help.

Breckinridge moved at 9:30 A. M., and Cleburne fifteen minutes later, according to the order for attack. Forrest dismounted Armstrong's division of cavalry to keep abreast of Breckinridge, and held Pegram's division in reserve. Breckinridge's two right brigades, under Adams and Stovall, met but little opposition, but the left of Helm's brigade encountered the left of the breastworks, and was badly cut up. The heroic Helm was killed, and his command repulsed. His brigade, now under the command of that able officer, Colonel J. H. Lewis, was withdrawn. The simultaneous advance of Cleburne's troops would have greatly relieved Helm, as he was exposed to a flank as well as a direct fire. General Breckinridge suggested, and I cordially approved the suggestion, that he should wheel his two brigades to the left, and get in rear of the breastworks. These brigades had reached the Chattanooga road, and their skirmishers had pressed past Cloud's house, where

† General Bushrod Johnson was the first to enter the gap with his division and, with the coolness and judgment for which he was always distinguished, took in the situation at a glance and

began the flank movement to the right. General Longstreet adopted the plan of his lieutenant, and made his other troops conform to Bushrod Johnson's movement.—D. H. H.

there was a Federal field-hospital. The wheeling movement enabled Stovall to gain a point beyond the retired flank of the breastworks, and Breckinridge says in his report, "Adams had advanced still farther, being actually in rear of his intrenchments. A good supporting line to my division at this moment would probably have produced decisive results." Federal reinforcements had, however, come up. Adams was badly wounded and fell into the enemy's hands, and the two brigades were hurled back. Beatty's brigade

of Negley's division had been the first to come to Baird's assistance. General Thomas says:

"Beatty, meeting with greatly superior numbers, was compelled to fall back until relieved by the fire of several regiments of Palmer's reserve, which I had ordered to the support of the left, being placed in position by General Baird, and which, with the cooperation of Van Derveer's brigade [^] of Brannan's division, and a portion of Stanley's brigade of Negley's division, drove the enemy entirely from Baird's left and rear."



THE SINK-HOLE NEAR WIDOW GLENN'S HOUSE. FROM A RECENT PHOTOGRAPH.

This sink-hole contained the only water to be had in the central part of the battle-field. Colonel Wilder's brigade of mounted infantry at one time gained the pool after a hard contest and quenched their thirst. In the water were lying dead men and horses that had been wounded and had died while drinking.

Breckinridge's two thousand men. American troops cannot stand flank and rear attacks. While Breckinridge was thus alarming Thomas for his left, Cleburne was having a bloody fight with the forces behind the breastworks. From want of alignment before the battle, Deshler's brigade had to be taken out that it might not overlap Stewart. L. E. Polk's brigade soon encountered the enemy behind his logs, and after an obstinate contest was driven back. Wood's (Confederate) brigade on the left had almost reached Poe's house (the burning house) on the Chattanooga road, when he was subjected to a heavy enfilading and direct fire, and driven back with great loss. Cleburne withdrew his division four hundred yards behind the crest of a hill. The gallant young brigadier Deshler was killed while executing the movement, and his brigade then fell into the able hands of Colonel R. Q. Mills. The fierce fight on our right lasted until 10:30 A. M. It was an unequal contest of two small divisions against four full ones behind fortifications. Surely, there were never nobler leaders than Breckinridge and Cleburne, and surely never were nobler troops led on a more desperate "forlorn-hope"—against odds in

[^] General Adams was captured by Van Derveer's men.—D. H. H.

numbers and superiority in position and equipment. But their unsurpassed and unsurpassable valor was not thrown away. Before a single Confederate soldier had come to their relief, Rosecrans ordered up other troops to the aid of Thomas, in addition to those already mentioned. At 10:10 A. M. he ordered McCook to be ready at 10:30; Sheridan's division to support Thomas.

General McCook says that he executed the order and marched the men at double-quick. This weakening of his right by Rosecrans to support his left was destined soon to be his ruin. So determined had been the assaults of Breckinridge and Cleburne, that, though repulsed and badly punished, they were not pursued by the enemy, who did not venture outside of his works.


At 11 A. M. Stewart's division advanced under an immediate order from Bragg. His three brigades under Brown, Clayton, and Bate advanced with Wood of Cleburne's division, and, as General Stewart says, "pressed on past the corn-field in front of the burnt house, two or three hundred yards beyond the Chattanooga road, driving the enemy within his line of intrenchments. . . . Here they encountered a fresh artillery fire on front and flank, heavily supported by infantry, and had to retire."

This was the celebrated attack upon Reynolds and Brannan which led directly to the Federal disaster. In the meantime our right was preparing to renew the attack. I proposed to the wing commander, Polk, to make a second advance, provided fresh troops were sent forward, requesting that the gap in Breckinridge's left, made by the withdrawal of Helm, should be filled by another brigade. General J. K. Jackson's was sent for that purpose, but unfortunately took its position too far in rear to engage the attention of the enemy in front, and every advance on our right during the remainder of the day was met with flank and cross fire from that quarter. Gist's brigade and Liddell's division of Walker's corps reported to me. Gist immediately attacked with great vigor the log-works which had repulsed Helm so disastrously, and he in turn was driven back. Liddell might have made as great an impression by moving on the Chattanooga road as Breckinridge had done, but his strong brigade (Walthall's) was detached, and he advanced with Govan's alone, seized the road for the second time that day, and was moving behind the breastworks, when, a column of the enemy appearing on his flank and rear, he was compelled to retreat.

This was simultaneous with the advance of Stewart. The heavy pressure on Thomas caused Rosecrans to support him by sending the divisions of Negley and Van Cleve and Brannan's reserve brigade. In the course of these changes, an order to Wood, which Rosecrans claims was misinterpreted, led to a gap being left into which Longstreet stepped with the eight brigades (Bushrod Johnson's original brigade and McNair's, Gregg's, Kershaw's, Law's, Humphreys's, Benning's, and Robertson's) which he had arranged in three lines to constitute his grand column of attack. Davis's two brigades, one of Van Cleve's, and Sheridan's entire division were caught in front and flank and driven from the field. Disregarding the order of the day, Longstreet now gave the order to wheel to the right instead of the left, and thus take in reverse the strong position of the enemy. Five of McCook's brigades were speedily

driven off the field. He estimates their loss at forty per cent. Certainly that flank march was a bloody one. I have never seen the Federal dead lie so thickly on the ground, save in front of the sunken wall at Fredericksburg.

But that indomitable Virginia soldier, George H. Thomas, ☆ was there and was destined to save the Union army from total rout and ruin, by confronting with invincible pluck the forces of his friend and captain in the Mexican war. Thomas had ridden to his right to hurry up reënforcements, when he discovered a line advancing, which he thought at first was the expected succor from Sheridan, but he soon heard that it was a rebel column marching upon him. He chose a strong position on a spur of Missionary Ridge, running east



GENERAL W. H. LYTLE, COMMANDING THE
FIRST BRIGADE, SHERIDAN'S DIVISION,
KILLED SEPTEMBER 20, 1863.

and west, placed upon it Brannan's division with portions of two brigades of Negley's; Wood's division (Crittenden's) was placed on Brannan's left. These troops, with such as could be rallied from the two broken corps, were all he had to confront the forces of Longstreet, until Steedman's division of Granger's corps came to his relief about 3 p. m. Well and nobly did Thomas and his gallant troops hold their own against foes flushed with past victory and confident of future success. His new line was nearly at right angles with the line of log-works on the west side of the Rossville road, his right being an almost impregnable wall-like hill, his

left nearly an inclosed fortification. Our only hope of success was to get in his rear by moving far to our right, which overlapped the Federal left.

Bushrod Johnson's three brigades in Longstreet's center were the first to fill the gap left by Wood's withdrawal from the Federal right; but the other five brigades under Hindman and Kershaw moved promptly into line as soon as space could be found for them, wheeled to the right, and engaged in the murderous flank attack. On they rushed, shouting, yelling, running over batteries, capturing trains, taking prisoners, seizing the headquarters of the Federal commander, at the Widow Glenn's, until they found themselves facing the new Federal line on Snodgrass Hill. Hindman had advanced a little later than the center, and had met great and immediate success. The brigades of Deas and Manigault charged the breastworks at double-quick, rushed over them, drove Laiboldt's Federal brigade of Sheridan's division off the field down the Rossville road; then General Patton Anderson's brigade of Hindman, having come into line, attacked and beat back the forces of Davis, Sheridan, and Wilder † in their front, killed the hero and poet General Lytle,

☆ Bragg had great respect and affection for the first lieutenant of his battery. The tones of tenderness with which he spoke of "Old Tom" are still remembered by me.—D. H. H.

† James Burns, 39th Indiana Mounted Infantry, writes to the editors from Harper, Kansas:

"Wilder's brigade, with Colonel T. J. Harrison's 39th Indiana Mounted Infantry regiment, which was ordered to report to Colonel Wilder about 9 o'clock A. M. of the 20th of September, was stationed on a hill about one-third of a mile in the rear of the line of battle,—the 39th on the left of the brigade. A few minutes after 11 o'clock A. M. the brigade was ordered to advance

took 1100 prisoners, 27 pieces of artillery, commissary and ordnance trains, etc. Finding no more resistance on his front and left, Hindman wheeled to the right to assist the forces of the center. The divisions of Stewart, Hood, Bushrod Johnson, and Hindman came together in front of the new stronghold of the Federals. [See map, p. 648.]

It was now 2:30 p. m. Longstreet, with his staff, was lunching on sweet-potatoes. A message came just then that the commanding general wished to see him. He found Bragg in rear of his lines, told him of the steady and satisfactory progress of the battle, that sixty pieces of artillery had been reported captured (though probably the number was over-estimated), that many prisoners and stores had been taken, and that all was going well. He then asked for additional troops to hold the ground gained, while he pursued the two broken corps down the Dry Valley road and cut off the retreat of Thomas. Bragg replied that there was no more fight in the troops of Polk's wing, that he could give Longstreet no reinforcements, and that his headquarters would be at Reed's Bridge. He seems not to have known that Cheatham's division and part of Liddell's had not been in action that day.†

Some of the severest fighting had yet to be done after 3 p. m. It probably never happened before for a great battle to be fought to its bloody conclusion with the commanders of each side away from the field of conflict. But the Federals were in the hands of the indomitable Thomas, and the Confederates were under their two heroic wing commanders Longstreet and Polk. In the lull of the strife I went with a staff-officer to examine the ground on our left. One of Helm's wounded men had been overlooked, and was lying alone in the woods, his head partly supported by a tree. He was shockingly injured.‡

across the valley where the ammunition train was stationed, and up the hill to the support of Captain Lilly's battery, and to hold the hill at all hazards until the train was got out of the way. My company, 'A,' 39th Indiana, was in advance, and on reaching the brow of the hill Major Evans gave the commands, '39th Indiana on left into line'; 'Fire at will.' At a distance of less than fifty yards six solid lines of gray were coming with their hats down, their bayonets at a charge, and the old familiar rebel yell. Our first volley did not check their advance, but as volley after volley from our Spence rifles followed, with scarce a second's intermission, and regiment after regiment came on left into line on our right, and poured the same steady, deadly fire into their fast-thinning ranks, they broke and fled.

"Colonel Wilder and Colonel Harrison rode along our lines, directing that if they charged us again, no shot must be fired until the word of command was given. In a few moments those lines of gray once more emerged from the sheltering timber on the opposite side of the field, and steadily, as if on parade, they advanced to the charge till the line had reached to the point at which they broke before, when the command 'Fire' was given, and again they broke and fled in wild confusion. Three times more did those brave men advance at a charge, and each time were they hurled back. A lieutenant of the 17th Indiana went down with a few men under cover of the fire of the brigade, and brought in the flag of an Alabama regiment. We then received orders to move off, remount and guard the ammunition train to Chattanooga, which we did successfully."

† General Longstreet wrote to me in July, 1884:

"It is my opinion that Bragg thought at 3 p. m. that the battle was lost, though he did not say so positively.

I asked him at that time to reinforce me with a few troops that had not been so severely engaged as mine, and to allow me to go down the Dry Valley road, so as to interpose behind Thomas and cut off his retreat to Chattanooga, at the same time pursuing the troops that I had beaten back from my front. His reply, as well as I can remember, was that he had no troops except my own that had any fight left in them, and that I should remain in the position in which I then was. After telling me this, he left me, saying, 'General, if anything happens, communicate with me at Reed's Bridge.' In reading Bragg's report, I was struck with his remark that the morning after the battle 'he found the ever-vigilant General Liddell feeling his way to find the enemy.' Inasmuch as every one in his army was supposed to know on the night of the battle that we had won a complete victory, it seemed to me quite ludicrous that an officer should be commended for his vigilance the next morning in looking for the enemy in his immediate presence. I know that I was then laying a plan by which we might overhaul the enemy at Chattanooga or between that point and Nashville. It did not occur to me on the night of the 20th to send Bragg word of our complete success. I thought that the loud huzzas that spread over the field just at dark were a sufficient assurance and notice to any one within five miles of us. . . . Rosecrans speaks particularly of his apprehension that I would move down the Dry Valley road."

D. H. H.

‡ He belonged to Von Zinken's regiment, of New Orleans, composed of French, Germans, and Irish. I said to him: "My poor fellow, you are badly hurt. What regiment do you belong to?" He replied: "The Fifth Confederate, and a dommed

Hindman and Bushrod Johnson organized a column of attack upon the front and rear of the stronghold of Thomas. It consisted of the brigades of Deas, Manigault, Gregg, Patton Anderson, and McNair. Three of the brigades, Johnson says, had each but five hundred men, and the other two were not strong. Deas was on the north side of the gorge through which the Crawfish road crosses, Manigault across the gorge and south, on the crest parallel to the Snodgrass Hill, where Thomas was. The other three brigades extended



GENERAL J. M. BRANNAN.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN IN MAY, 1865.

along the crest with their faces north, while the first two faced east. Kershaw, with his own and Humphreys's brigade, was on the right of Anderson and was to coöperate in the movement. It began at 3:30 P. M. A terrific contest ensued. The bayonet was used, and men were killed and wounded with clubbed muskets. A little after 4, the enemy was reënforced, and advanced, but was repulsed by Anderson and Kershaw.

General Bushrod Johnson claims that his men were surely, if slowly, gaining ground at all points, which must have made untenable the stronghold of Thomas. Relief was,

however, to come to our men, so hotly engaged on the left, by the advance of the right. At 3 P. M. Forrest reported to me that a strong column was approaching from Rossville, which he was delaying all he could. From prisoners we soon learned that it was Granger's corps. We were apprehensive that a flank attack, by fresh troops, upon our exhausted and shattered ranks might prove fatal. Major-General Walker strongly advised falling back to the position of Cleburne, but to this I would not consent, believing that it would invite attack, as we were in full view. Cheatham's fine division was sent to my assistance by the wing commander. But Granger, who had gallantly marched without orders to the relief of Thomas, moved on "to the sound of the firing, attacked with vigor and broke

good regiment it is." The answer, though almost ludicrous, touched me as illustrating the *esprit de corps* of the soldier—his pride in and his affection for his command. Colonel Von Zinken told me afterward that one of his desperately wounded Irishmen cried out to his comrades, "Charge them, boys; they have cha-ase (cheese) in their haversacks." Poor Pat, he has fought courageously in every land in quarrels not his own.—D. H. H.

Major-General Walker claims that he proposed to me to make an advance movement with his whole corps, and complains that his command was disintegrated by sending it in by brigades.

General Walker did propose, as he says, to fall back and align upon Cleburne, when we saw Granger's corps approaching on our right, and I did refuse to permit this, believing that a withdrawal in full view of Granger would invite an attack upon our flank, and this might be fatal to troops more or less demoralized by the bloody repulse which they had sustained. The proposal to advance with his whole corps was never heard by me, and was, at best, impossible, as two of his five brigades had been detached, the one by Polk and the other by myself, to fill gaps in the line.—D. H. H.

oar line.”^λ Rosecrans thus describes the timely help afforded by Granger to the sorely beset Thomas :

“Arrived in sight, Granger discovered at once the peril and the point of danger—the gap—and quick as thought he directed his advance brigade upon the enemy. General Steedman, taking a regimental color, led the column. Swift was the charge and terrible the conflict, but the enemy was broken. A thousand of our brave men killed and wounded paid for its possession.”

Longstreet was determined to send Preston with his division of three brigades under Gracie, Trigg, and Kelly, aided by Robertson's brigade of Hood's division, to carry the heights—the main point of defense. His troops were of the best material and had been in reserve all day; but brave, fresh, and strong as they were, it was with them alternate advance and retreat, until success was assured by a renewal of the fight on the right. At 3:30 p. m. General Polk sent an order to me to assume command of the attacking forces on the right and renew the assault. Owing to a delay in the adjustment of our lines, the advance did not begin until 4 o'clock. The men sprang to their arms with the utmost alacrity, though they had not heard of Longstreet's success, and they showed by their cheerfulness that there was plenty of “fight in them.” Cleburne ran forward his batteries, some by hand, to within three hundred yards of the enemy's breastworks, pushed forward his infantry, and carried them. General J. K. Jackson, of Cheatham's division, had a bloody struggle with the fortifications in his front, but had entered them when Cheatham with two more of his brigades, Maney's and Wright's, came up. Breckinridge and Walker met with but little opposition until the Chattanooga road was passed, when their right was unable to overcome the forces covering the enemy's retreat. As we passed into the woods west of the road, it was reported to me that a line was advancing at right angles to ours. I rode to the left to ascertain whether they were foes or friends, and soon recognized General Buckner. The cheers that went up when the two wings met were such as I had never heard before, and shall never hear again.

Preston gained the heights a half hour later, capturing 1000 prisoners and 4500 stand of arms. But neither right nor left is entitled to the laurels of a complete triumph. It was the combined attack which, by weakening the enthusiasm of the brave warriors who had stood on the defense so long and so obstinately, won the day.

Thomas had received orders after Granger's arrival to retreat to Rossville, but, stout soldier as he was, he resolved to hold his ground until nightfall. An hour more of daylight would have insured his capture. Thomas had under him all the Federal army, except the six brigades which had been driven off by the left wing.☆

^λ According to the official returns the entire loss during the afternoon in Steedman's two brigades [including 613 captured or missing] was 1787. A Federal writer says that of the eight staff-officers of Brig.-Gen. Whitaker “three were killed, three wounded, and one killed or captured.”—D. H. H.

☆ In regard to the relative strength of the two

armies [see also p. 676], Colonel Archer Anderson says:

“From an examination of the original returns in the War Department, I reckon, in round numbers, the Federal infantry and artillery on the field at 59,000, and the Confederate infantry and artillery at 55,000. The Federal cavalry, about 10,000 strong, was outnumbered by the Confederates by 1000 men. Thus speak

Whatever blunders each of us in authority committed before the battles of the 19th and 20th, and during their progress, the great blunder of all was that of not pursuing the enemy on the 21st. The day was spent in burying the dead and gathering up captured stores. Forrest, with his usual promptness, was early in the saddle, and saw that the retreat was a rout. Disorganized masses of men were hurrying to the rear; batteries of artillery were inextricably mixed with trains of wagons; disorder and confusion pervaded the broken ranks struggling to get on. Forrest sent back word to Bragg that "every hour was worth a thousand men." But the commander-in-chief did not know of the victory until the morning of the 21st, and then he did not order a pursuit. Rosecrans spent the day and the night of the 21st in hurrying his trains out of town. A breathing-space was allowed him; the panic among his troops subsided, and Chattanooga—the objective point of the campaign—was held. There was no more splendid fighting in '61, when the flower of the Southern youth was in the field, than was displayed in those bloody days of September, '63. But it seems to me that the *élan* of the Southern soldier was never seen after Chickamauga—that brilliant dash which had distinguished him was gone forever. He was too intelligent not to know that the cutting in two of Georgia meant death to all his hopes. He knew that Longstreet's absence was imperiling Lee's safety, and that what had to be done must be done quickly. The delay in striking was exasperating to him; the failure to strike after the success was crushing to all his longings for an independent South. He fought stoutly to the last, but, after Chickamauga, with the sullenness of despair and without the enthusiasm of hope. That "barren victory" sealed the fate of the Southern Confederacy.

the returns. Perhaps a deduction of 5000 men from the reported strength of each army would more nearly represent the actual strength of the combatants. But in any case it is, I think, certain that Rosecrans was stronger in infantry and artillery than Bragg by at least 4000 men."

The Federal estimate of their loss, in captured

or missing, is below the mark by 1000, if the Confederate claim of the capture of 6500 prisoners is correct. The Confederates also claim to have taken 51 pieces of artillery, 15,000 stand of arms, and a large amount of ordnance stores, camp-equipage, etc.—D. H. H.

GENERAL POLK AT CHICKAMAUGA.

BY HIS SON, CAPTAIN W. M. POLK, OF HIS STAFF.

THE reason given by General Polk for the delay in attack on the morning of September 20th, 1863, was that General Hill's corps was not ready for the assault. General Polk sent General Hill an order at midnight to attack at daylight, but General Hill could not be found (either on his line of battle or at Tedford's Ford, where his headquarters were reported to be). Upon learning this fact General Polk issued an order, dated 5:30 A. M., direct to Hill's division commanders to attack as soon as they could get into position. This second order was delivered in the presence of General Hill by Captain Wheless soon after sunrise, about 6:15. To this General Hill replied that his men were getting rations and that he would not be ready to move for an hour or more. General Polk reported this reply to General Bragg, in a note dated 7 A. M.,

and stated that the attack would be made as soon as General Hill was ready. This, of course, conflicts with the time given by General Hill for the reception of the second order, viz., 7:25 A. M. These facts are derived from the official statements of General Polk, Captain Wheless, and of John H. Fisher, on file in the War Records office.

As to the whereabouts of General Polk, on the morning of the 20th: General Polk left his camp at Alexander's Bridge, 1200 yards in rear of his line, between daylight and sunrise, and, as is shown by the statement of General Cheatham ("Official Records"), was on the line of battle at sunrise, where he remained and where he first met General Bragg (Captain Wheless, "Official Records"). These facts I state from my personal knowledge.

General Bragg's statement that General Polk

was away from his line of battle at this time was not derived from his own knowledge, but from a statement of one of his staff-officers, as is shown in the following extract from an unpublished private letter from General Bragg, dated Mobile, February 8th, 1873 :

"The staff-officer sent to General Polk (Major Lee, A. I. G.) to urge his compliance with the orders of the previous night, reported to me that he found him at a farmhouse, three miles from the line of his troops, about one hour after sunrise, sitting on the gallery reading a newspaper, and waiting as he (the general) said, for his breakfast."

The facts of the records above quoted are sufficient answer to this absurd statement. But I can add further that I saw Major Lee when he delivered General Bragg's message to General Polk, at his (Polk's) camp in the woods, at Alexander's Bridge, 1200 yards from his line, before sunrise. General Polk was then preparing to mount his horse.

I will also add of my own knowledge that General

Polk had ridden from one end of his line to the other, and had met General Hill and each of the division commanders before General Bragg came upon his line of battle. They met on the line about 7 : 45 A. M.

As to the failure to attack on the 13th, the object of Polk's movement was to intercept Crittenden before he should cross to the west side of the Chickamauga and unite with other portions of Rosecrans's army. Polk was told that he would find Crittenden east of the creek about Pea Vino Church on the Graysville road, and was directed to attack him there at daylight of the 13th. He moved as ordered and found no enemy, Crittenden having crossed to the west of the creek the evening before. General Bragg in his report neglects to take this fact into account, and thus leaves the impression that Crittenden's escape was due to Polk's tardiness in moving rather than to his own tardiness in ordering the movement. It should have been ordered for the morning of the 12th.

THE CRISIS AT CHICKAMAUGA.†

BY GATES P. THRUSTON, BREVET BRIGADIER-GENERAL, U. S. V.

THE furious initial attack on the Federal left, on the morning of the 20th, although repulsed, unfortunately led to changes in Rosecrans's army materially affecting the results of the general conflict. Thomas, discovering his position turned and his front assaulted, hurried messengers to Rosecrans for assistance. Two aides, in rapid succession, called for reinforcements. All was still on the Federal right. The fight was raging with grand fury on the left.

Rosecrans felt that his apprehensions of the morning were to be realized. The Confederates were doubtless massing on his left. They had reached the much-coveted Chattanooga road. McCook was at once notified that Thomas was heavily pressed, that the left must be held at all hazards, and that he must be ready to reinforce Thomas at a moment's warning. Five minutes later came the order to hurry Sheridan's two brigades to the left. Negley's troops, replaced by Wood, had started. Van Cleve, with two brigades, was also sent to aid Thomas. McCook was now left with one of Sheridan's brigades and two of Jefferson C. Davis's, all depleted by Saturday's losses. They were unable to form a connected front, but joined Wood on their left. Captain Kellogg, of Thomas's staff, hurrying along the line with orders, unfortunately reported to Rosecrans that he had noticed "Brannan was out of line, and Reynolds's right exposed."

Turning to an aide (Major Frank Bond), Rosecrans directed him to order Wood "to close up on Reynolds as fast as possible and support him." In fact, Reynolds was *not* needing help, and Brannan was in position on his right, but slightly in rear. Wood, whose left connected with Brannan's right, passed to the rear of Brannan to reach Rey-

nolds's position; thus a wide gap was left in the Union line. McCook had already called up Wilder to strengthen his front, and sent for the main cavalry to protect the right. The right had unexpectedly become, as it were, the *rear* of the army.

Unhappily for the National army, Bragg was *not* now massing his forces on our left. He had just been defeated and repulsed there. Bragg's main plan had failed; but in the quiet forest, within almost a stone's-throw of our right, and in the still overclouding mist, were Longstreet and Buckner, with the left wing of the Confederate army massed in battle array, impatiently awaiting the signal for attack.

Longstreet's troops were placed in column of brigades at half distance,—a masterpiece of tactics. Hood, a soldier full of energy and dash, was to lead the column, his own division being massed five brigades deep, with the brigades of Kershaw and Humphreys as additional supports.

The order to advance came at last. The deep Confederate lines suddenly appeared. The woods in our front seemed alive. On they came like an angry flood. They struck McCook's three remaining brigades, the remnants of the Federal right. Under the daring personal exertions of McCook and Davis, they made a gallant but vain resistance. The massed lines of the enemy swarmed around their flanks. Pouring through the opening made by Wood's withdrawal, they struck his last brigade as it was leaving the line. It was slammed back like a door, and shattered. Brannan, on Wood's left, was struck in front and flank. His right was flung back; his left stood fast. Sheridan, hastening to the left with two brigades, was called back, and rushed to the rescue. His little force stayed the storm for a time. Wave after wave of Con-

† Condensed from the "Southern Bivouac" for December, 1886.—EDITORS.

federates came on; resistance only increased the multitude. Brannan's artillery, attacked in flank, rushed to the rear for clearer ground, and, with the Confederates at their heels, suddenly plunged into Van Cleve marching to the aid of Thomas. Disorder ensued; effective resistance was lost. The Reserve Artillery of the center, well posted in rear, unable to manœuvre in the undergrowth, hedged around by infantry a half hour before, was now without immediate support. The sudden rush of Longstreet's compact column through the forest had foiled all plans. The astonished artillerists were swept from their guns. General Negley, with one of his brigades isolated in rear, shared the general fate of the right.

When Longstreet struck the right, Rosecrans was near McCook and Crittenden. Seeing our line swept back, he hurried to Sheridan's force for aid. With staff and escort he recklessly strove to stem the tide. They attempted to pass to the left through a storm of canister and musketry, but were driven back.

All became confusion. No order could be heard above the tempest of battle. With a wild yell the Confederates swept on far to their left. They seemed everywhere victorious. Rosecrans was borne back in the retreat. Fugitives, wounded, caissons, escort, ambulances, thronged the narrow pathways. He concluded that our whole line had given way, that the day was lost, that the next stand must be made at Chattanooga. McCook and Crittenden, caught in the same tide of retreat, seeing only rout everywhere, shared the opinion of Rosecrans, and reported to him for instructions and coöperation.

Briefly, this is the story of the disaster on our right at Chickamauga: We were overwhelmed by numbers; we were beaten in detail. Thirty minutes earlier Longstreet would have met well-organized resistance. Thirty minutes later our marching divisions could have formed beyond his column of attack.

But Longstreet had now swept away all organized opposition in his front. Four divisions only of the Union army remained in their original position—Johnsou, of McCook's corps; Palmer, of Crittenden's, and Baird and Reynolds, of Thomas's. Three had been cut off and swept away. Longstreet's force separated them. He says he urged Bragg to send Wheeler's cavalry in pursuit. Strange to report, no pursuit was ordered.

An incident of the battle perhaps contributed to the delay. When Sheridan and others were sent to the left, the writer hastened down toward Crawfish Springs, instructed by McCook to order the cavalry to the left to fill the gaps made by the withdrawal of infantry. I was but fairly on the run when Longstreet struck our right. The storm of battle was sweeping over the ground I had just left. Hastily giving the orders and returning, I found the 39th Indiana regiment coming from a cross-road,—a full, fresh regiment, armed with Spencer's repeating-rifles, the only mounted force in our army corps. Calling upon Colonel T. J. Harrison, its commander, to hurry to the left, we led the regiment at a gallop to the Widow Glenn's.

The sound of battle had lulled. No Union force was in sight. A Confederate line near by was advancing against the position. Harrison, dismounting his men, dashed at the enemy in a most effective charge. Wilder, coming up on our right, also attacked. Wilder had two regiments armed with the same repeating-rifles. They did splendid work. Longstreet told Wilder after the war that the steady and continued racket of these guns led him to think an army corps had attacked his left flank. Bragg, cautious by nature, hesitated. By the time he was ready to turn Longstreet's force against Thomas, valuable time had elapsed.

Brannan, partly knocked out of line, had gathered his division on a hill at right angles to his former position, and a half mile in rear of Reynolds. General Wood came up with Harker's brigade and part of George P. Buell's, and posted them near Brannan's left. Some of Van Cleve's troops joined them, and fragments of Negley's.

General Thomas, ignorant of these movements and of the disaster to the right of the Union army, had again been attacked by Breckinridge and Forrest. They were again in Baird's rear with increased force. Thomas's reserve brigades, Willich, Grose, and Van Derveer, hurried to meet the attack. After a fierce struggle the Confederates were beaten back. Thomas, expecting the promised assistance of Sheridan, had sent Captain Kellogg to guide him to the left. Kellogg, hurrying back, reported that he had been fired on by a line of Confederates advancing in the woods in rear of Reynolds, who held the center of our general line.

The men in gray were coming on the right instead of Sheridan! Wood and Harker hoped the force advancing in the woods on their new front was a friendly one. The National flag was waved; a storm of bullets was the response. It was Stewart and Bate coming with their Tennesseeans. They had finally forced their way across the ragged edge of the Federal right, and were following Hood. Fortunately Thomas had just repulsed Breckinridge's attack on his left, and Stauley, Beatty, and Van Derveer had double-quickened across the "horseshoe" to our new right. They did not come a moment too soon. The improvised line of Federals thus hastily formed on "Battery Hill" now successfully withstood the assault of the enemy. The Union line held the crest. Longstreet was stayed at last. Gathering new forces, he soon sent a flanking column around our right. We could not extend our line to meet this attack. They had reached the summit, and were coming around still farther on through a protected ravine. For a time the fate of the Union army hung in the balance. All seemed lost, when unexpected help came from Gordon Granger and the right was saved.

When Longstreet first struck our right I was hurrying toward Crawfish Springs, as stated above, to order the cavalry to the left. I brought back with me Harrison's regiment, which, with Wilder's brigade, gallantly charged the Confederates in flank. Harrison captured some two hundred prisoners and turned again upon the enemy. Finding no Federal infantry in sight, I passed to the northward, taking with me Harrison's disarmed prison-

ers, partly under charge of my small escort, to prevent their recapture. We had a lively double-quick race, pushing our prisoners at the point of sword and carbine to get them to a place of safety. Only the predominance of the gray uniforms prevented the Confederates, three hundred yards away, from riddling our little party in the chase. We soon reached our retreating forces. Placing the prisoners in safe custody, I turned and rode over the Ridge toward the front, no enemy appearing.

Riding on, I struck the Dry Valley road, running along the east slope of the Ridge. Near by, on the left, I found Sheridan and Davis, with the remnants of their five brigades. General Phil was furious. Like the great Washington on several occasions, he was *searing* mad, and no wonder. The devoted Lytle and the truest and bravest had fallen in vain resistance around him. His splendid fighting qualities and his fine soldiers had not had half a chance. He had lost faith. Hearing the sound of battle on our left, I offered to ascertain the situation with Thomas on the left, and report as soon as possible. I hurried off at a racing gallop, directly through the open woodland, with my few faithful soldiers of the 2d Kentucky cavalry (of the Headquarters escort), toward the increasing sound of musketry. As we neared the firing we came suddenly upon a line of gray much too close to be agreeable. Fortunately it was intent on other game in its front, and we escaped with only a few whizzing compliments. We were too far to the right. We had struck the wrong side, and were behind the Confederates. Circling to the left we were soon among the soldiers in blue in rear of the Union lines.

Galloping through the wounded as best we could, I checked my horse before the form of an officer borne in the arms of his comrades to find that it was an old home friend, Colonel Durbin Ward, a moment before severely wounded.

I soon reached General Thomas. He was intently watching the conflict near the crest, a few steps in rear of the battle-line. General Wood and other officers were near. I reported briefly the situation on the right. Thanking me, he requested me to try to bring up Sheridan's and Davis's troops to aid his right. In his official report he states that I came with General Garfield. We probably reached him about the same time, but General Garfield had come out from Rossville, by

the Lafayette road, and I had crossed almost directly from the extreme right. We gave him the first tidings from the troops cut off. Hurrying back on my mission, full of hope that the day was not lost, we soon reached the identical spot on the Dry Valley road where we had left Sheridan and Davis. Strange to say, no Confederate cavalry or infantry appeared, and there seemed still no pursuit. Forrest, Wheeler, Wharton, Roddey,—half the cavalry of the Confederacy,—were with Bragg, yet no cavalry apparently came through the gap of a mile or more to pursue or follow our retreating forces on the right. At our recent fight at Murfreesboro', Wheeler's whole force had been smashing around in our rear. It had been about as uncomfortable for nervous recruits there as on the battle-front.

Unfortunately Sheridan's and Davis's force had drifted down the road toward Rossville. Hastening after them, we found they had already entered the narrow road or defile at McFarland's Gap. I tried to halt the rear of the column, but without success. The miseries of a mounted officer trying to pass marching infantry on a narrow roadway can be well imagined. Time was precious. I rode furiously through the thicket, alongside, and appealed to officers. "See Jeff, Colonel?" they said. "See Phil?" Some old trudge in the ranks called out, "We'll talk to you, my son, when we get to the Ohio River!"

A long half-hour was lost in scrambling along this wretched defile before I reached the head of the column. There I found Generals Sheridan, Davis, and Negley. We were about half-way between the field and Rossville. We held a hasty conference. Davis ordered a "right-about" at once, and marched briskly to the front; Lieutenant-Colonel William M. Ward followed with the 10th Ohio. Sheridan was still without faith. He may have thought there was danger at Rossville, or that his troops had not regained their fighting spirit. He insisted on going to Rossville. Darkness would catch him before he could reach the field from that direction. Negley was vacillating: he finally went to Rossville.

We soon reached the battle-field with Davis's and Ward's troops, but the night was then near. They did not get into action, but it was a cheerful sight to see at least some of the troops cut off in the morning in line again on the right of General Thomas, ready for an emergency.

'REENFORCING THOMAS AT CHICKAMAUGA.

BY J. S. FULLERTON, BREVET BRIGADIER-GENERAL, U. S. V.; AT CHICKAMAUGA CHIEF-OF-STAFF
TO GENERAL GORDON GRANGER.

ON the 19th day of September, 1863, the Reserve Corps of the Army of the Cumberland, General Gordon Granger in command, was distributed over a long stretch of country, its rear at Murfreesboro' and its van on the battle-field of Chickamauga. These troops had been posted to cover the rear and left flank of the army. During September 19th, the first day of the battle, they

were engaged in some skirmishing and stood at arms expecting an attack. On the evening of the 19th every indication pointed to a renewal of the battle early the next day. The night was cold for that time of the year. Tell-tale fires were prohibited. The men slept on their arms. All was quiet save in the field-hospitals in the rear. A bright moon lighted up the fields and woods.



THE SNODGRASS FARM-HOUSE. FROM A RECENT PHOTOGRAPH.

General Thomas's headquarters on the second day were in the field this side of the house. The hills called the "Horse-shoe," made famous by the defense of Brannan and Steedman, lie on the opposite side of the house. See map, p. 648.—EDITORS.

Along the greater part of a front of eight miles the ground was strewn with the intermingled dead of friend and foe. The morning of Sunday, the 20th, opened with a cloudless sky, but a fog had come up from the warm water of the Chickamauga and hung over the battle-field until 9 o'clock. A silence of desertion was in the front. This quiet continued till nearly 10 o'clock; then, as the peaceful tones of the church-bells, rolling over the land from the east, reached the meridian of Chickamauga, they were made dissonant by the murderous roar of the artillery of Bishop Polk, who was opening the battle on Thomas's front. Granger, who had been ordered at all hazards to hold fast where he was, listened and grew impatient. Shortly before 10 o'clock, calling my attention to a great column of dust moving from our front toward the point from which came the sound of battle, he said, "They are concentrating over there. That is where we ought to be." The corps flag marked his headquarters in an open field near the Ringgold road. He walked up and down in front of his flag, nervously pulling his beard. Once stopping, he said, "Why the— does Rosecrans keep me here? There is nothing in front of us now. There is the battle"—pointing in the direction of Thomas. Every moment the sounds of battle grew louder, while the many columns of dust rolling together here mingled with the smoke that hung over the scene.

At 11 o'clock, with Granger, I climbed a high hay-rick near by. We sat there for ten minutes listening and watching. Then Granger jumped up, thrust his glass into its case, and exclaimed with an oath:

"I am going to Thomas, orders or no orders!"

"And if you go," I replied, "it may bring disaster to the army and you to a court-martial."

"There's nothing in our front now but ragtag, bobtail cavalry," he replied. "Don't you see Bragg is piling his whole army on Thomas? I am going to his assistance."

We quickly climbed down the rick, and, going to Steedman, Granger ordered him to move his command "over there," pointing toward the place from which came the sounds of battle. Colonel Daniel McCook was directed to hold fast at McAfee Church, where his brigade covered the Ringgold road. Before half-past 11 o'clock Steedman's command was in motion. Granger, with his staff and escort, rode in advance. Steedman, after accompanying them a short distance, rode back to the head of his column.

Thomas was nearly four miles away. The day had now grown very warm, yet the troops marched rapidly over the narrow road, which was covered ankle-deep with dust that rose in suffocating clouds. Completely enveloped in it, the moving column swept along like a desert sandstorm. Two miles from the point of starting, and three-quarters of a mile to the left of the road, the enemy's skirmishers and a section of artillery opened fire on us from an open wood. This force had worked round Thomas's left, and was then partly in his rear. Granger halted to feel them. Soon becoming convinced that it was only a large party of observation, he again started his column and pushed rapidly forward. I was then sent to bring up Colonel McCook's brigade, and put it in

position to watch the movements of the enemy, to keep open the Lafayette road, and to cover the open fields between that point and the position held by Thomas. This brigade remained there the rest of the day. Our skirmishers had not gone far when they came upon Thomas's field-hospital, at Cloud's house, then swarming with the enemy. They came from the same body of Forrest's cavalry that had fired on us from the wood. They were quickly driven out, and our men were warmly welcomed with cheers from dying and wounded men.

A little farther on we were met by a staff-officer sent by General Thomas to discover whether we were friends or enemies; he did not know whence friends could be coming, and the enemy appeared to be approaching from all directions. All of this shattered Army of the Cumberland left on the field was with Thomas; but not more than one-fourth of the men of the army who went into battle at the opening were there. Thomas's loss in killed and wounded during the two days had been dreadful. As his men dropped out his line was contracted to half its length. Now its flanks were bent back, conforming to ridges shaped like a horse-shoe.

On the part of Thomas and his men there was no thought but that of fighting. He was a soldier who had never retreated, who had never been defeated. He stood immovable, the "Rock of Chickamauga." Never had soldiers greater love for a commander. He imbued them with his spirit, and their confidence in him was sublime.

To the right of Thomas's line was a gorge, then a high ridge, nearly at right angles thereto, running east and west. Confederates under Kershaw (McLaws's division of Hood's corps) were passing through the gorge, together with Bushrod Johnson's division, which Longstreet was strengthening with Hindman's division; divisions were forming on this ridge for an assault; to their left the guns of a battery were being unlimbered for an enfilading fire. There was not a man to send against the force on the ridge, none to oppose this impending assault. The enemy saw the approaching colors of the Reserve Corps and hesitated.

At 1 o'clock Granger shook hands with Thomas. Something was said about forming to fight to the right and rear.

"Those men must be driven back," said Granger, pointing to the gorge and ridge. "Can you do it?" asked Thomas.

"Yes. My men are fresh, and they are just the fellows for that work. They are raw troops, and they don't know any better than to charge up there."

Granger quickly sent Aleshire's battery of 3-inch rifle guns which he brought up to Thomas's left to assist in repelling another assault about to be made on the Kelly farm front. Whitaker's and Mitchell's brigades under Steedman were wheeled into position and projected against the enemy in the gorge and on the ridge. With ringing cheers they advanced in two lines by double-quick—over open fields, through weeds waist-high, through a little valley, then up the ridge. The enemy opened on them first with artillery, then with a murderous musketry fire. When well up the ridge the men, almost exhausted, were halted

for breath. They lay on the ground two or three minutes, then came the command, "Forward!" Brave, bluff old Steedman, with a regimental flag in his hand, led the way. On went the lines, firing as they ran and bravely receiving a deadly and continuous fire from the enemy on the summit. The Confederates began to break and in another minute were flying down the southern slope of the ridge. In twenty minutes from the beginning of the charge the ridge had been carried.


Granger's hat had been torn by a fragment of shell; Steedman had been wounded; Whitaker had been wounded, and four of his five staff-officers killed or mortally wounded. Of Steedman's two brigades, numbering 3500, twenty per cent. had been killed and wounded in that twenty minutes; and the end was not yet.

The enemy massed a force to retake the ridge. They came before our men had rested; twice they assaulted and were driven back. During one assault, as the first line came within range of our muskets, it halted, apparently hesitating, when we saw a colonel seize a flag, wave it over his head, and rush forward. The whole line instantly caught his enthusiasm, and with a wild cheer followed, only to be hurled back again. Our men ran down the ridge in pursuit. In the midst of a group of Confederate dead and wounded they found the brave colonel dead, the flag he carried spread over him where he fell.

Soon after 5 o'clock Thomas rode to the left of his line, leaving Granger the ranking officer at the center. The ammunition of both Thomas's and Granger's commands was now about exhausted. When Granger had come up he had given ammunition to Brannan and Wood, and that had exhausted his supply. The cartridge-boxes of both our own and the enemy's dead within reach had been emptied by our men. When it was not yet 6 o'clock, and Thomas was still on the left of his line, Brannan rushed up to Granger, saying, "The enemy are forming for another assault; we have not another round of ammunition—what shall we do?" "Fix bayonets and go for them," was the reply. Along the whole line ran the order, "Fix bayonets." On came the enemy—our men were lying down. "Forward," was sounded. In one instant they were on their feet. Forward they went to meet the charge. The enemy fled. So impetuous was this counter-charge that one regiment, with empty muskets and empty cartridge-boxes, broke through the enemy's line, which, closing in their rear, carried them off as in the undertow.

One more feeble assault was made by the enemy; then the day closed, and the battle of Chickamauga was over. Of the 3700 men of the Reserve Corps who went into the battle that afternoon, 1175 were killed and wounded; 613 were missing, many of whom were of the regiment that broke through the lines. Our total loss was 1788, nearly 50 per cent.

Gordon Granger was rough in manner, but he had a tender heart. He was inclined to insubordination, especially when he knew his superior to be wrong. Otherwise he was a splendid soldier. Rosecrans named him well when he wrote of him, "Granger, great in battle."



HOUSE OF MR. J. M. LEE, CRAWFISH SPRINGS, ROSECRANS'S HEADQUARTERS BEFORE THE BATTLE, AND SITE OF THE UNION FIELD-HOSPITAL FOR THE RIGHT WING. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN IN 1884.

NOTES ON THE CHICKAMAUGA CAMPAIGN.

BY EMERSON OPDYCKE, BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL. U. S. V.

CHATTANOOGA was the indispensable key to all the objects committed to the Army of the Cumberland, and General Halleck planned two widely separated movements toward their accomplishment. General Burnside, starting from the Ohio River with one column, was to cross the mountains of eastern Kentucky. To overcome the great advantage of the enemy's position and works, and secure at one blow a decisive victory, General Rosecrans conceived a series of brilliant movements from Murfreesboro' where his four corps were concentrated. On the 23d of June he began the formidable operations which sent the enemy out of middle Tennessee and left our army at the western base of the Cumberland mountains.

General Rosecrans halted there till the 16th of August, and between him and Halleck the question of delay was renewed with spirit. Rosecrans justly urged that, before crossing the Tennessee River, his right and rear ought to be protected by the part of our army made idle by the surrender of Vicksburg, because the enemy's superiority in cavalry forced him constantly to weaken his line of battle, to protect the long line over which supplies were brought to him. This sound view, however, did not prevail, and if General Bragg had perceived the advantage to him of Halleck's error, I am sure that the peremptory order by which Rosecrans was sent across the Tennessee River and into the mountains between Bridgeport and Chattanooga would have proved disastrous.

If Bragg had stubbornly defended his several

positions, he certainly could have retained Chattanooga and assumed the offensive, for reinforcements soon made his army larger than ours. It would have been rash for Rosecrans to move his force on the theory that the enemy would not defend at least some of the formidable positions that now separated the two armies. He had to assume that his adversary's conduct would be stubbornly defensive.

On the 16th of August he put his army in motion, crossed the Cumberland mountains, and caused his main columns to appear at several points on the river, the extremes fifty miles apart. These movements so deceived Bragg that he was comparatively harmless where we really wished to cross; and by the 4th of September the army, followed by its artillery, wagons, and beeves, safely reached the south bank of the Tennessee River. Then, throwing as much energy into his movements as though he had approved them, Rosecrans promptly marched upon Chattanooga.

With but slight opposition his columns wound through the defiles of Raccoon Mountain and came to the western base of the Lookout range. On its highest point the enemy's signal-flags were seen announcing to Bragg in Chattanooga the presence of our army. There are only three routes by which armies can cross the range, respectively 2 miles, 26 miles, and 42 miles south of Chattanooga. Unless Bragg should defend these passes, he could remain in the town only to surrender, because the two more distant routes would give us

ready access to his line of supplies and enable us to close all avenues of retreat.

Time had now become of pressing importance to him, because heavy reinforcements were advancing to his aid: two divisions from Mississippi, one from Knoxville, and a renowned corps under Longstreet from the army of General Lee. He was in a few days to feel the mistake of allowing us so easily to come to the last barrier of Chattanooga. Fortunately for our army, the Confederate general, while easily defending the pass nearest the town, gave no attention to the other two. Thomas was directed to the 26 and McCook to the 42 mile pass, while Crittenden made demonstrations near Chattanooga. These admirable movements endangered Bragg's communications and forced him to choose between immediate retreat and ultimate surrender. He retreated; and on the 9th of September Crittenden entered Chattanooga. These operations drew Buckner from Knoxville to the aid of Bragg, and Burnside marched into Knoxville.

It is surprising that the events of the last sixty days did not suggest to General Halleck concentrations that must have ended the war in 1863. By the 4th of July Meade had seriously defeated and permanently weakened Lee at Gettysburg, and Grant, by giving us Vicksburg and 30,000 prisoners, had ended all important operations near the Mississippi River. In the main, this left Grant's army of 75,000 men free to be sent in whatever directions lay the best chance of decisive work. Is it not, therefore, clear, that Rosecrans should have been heavily reinforced and made able to crush Bragg at Chickamauga? He then could have marched irresistibly through east Tennessee, to the aid of Meade against Lee, whose army could not have existed a single day if it had held its ground, before such a concentration of forces. The order thus to reinforce the Army of the Cumberland could have been as easily made and executed before as after Chickamauga. I am convinced that it would have saved us the slaughter and the expense of 1864. But Halleck only ordered Burnside to reinforce Rosecrans. Burnside, though without an opposing force of importance, failed utterly to obey the orders of Halleck, as well as the plain suggestions of the situation.

Up to the 9th of September—the day Rosecrans entered Chattanooga—his plans and movements, aside from the delay in beginning operations, had been brilliant and faultless. He had not achieved the highest success—the destruction of his adversary, but he had forced from the enemy strategic advantages from which immense results were afterward gained by his successors. But the moment he entered Chattanooga he should have concentrated his army there long enough to accumulate supplies, ascertain the position and intentions of his adversary, and whether or not Burnside would reinforce him. He was now 337 miles from the Ohio River, 150 from Nashville, and his prudence, not his impetuosity, should have increased. Halleck, himself deceived, misled Rosecrans, who judged that his present work was to pursue an alarmed adversary, and, accordingly,

on the 10th of September, ordered Crittenden's corps to seek the enemy in the direction of Ringgold,—thus still farther separating his army.

General Wood's division, to which I belonged, happened to be the rear of Crittenden's column, and in the evening a simple negro informed Wood of the position of Bragg's army. Instead of an alarmed retreat, the enemy's movement had been a leisurely march of thirty miles south to Lafayette. The divergent movements which had placed Thomas near to and west of Lafayette, McCook sixteen miles farther south, and was now placing Crittenden farther north than McCook was south of the Confederate army, made it convenient for Bragg to overwhelm in succession our separated corps before any two of them could be united. Wood hurried the momentous information to Rosecrans at Chattanooga; and, notwithstanding the incredulity with which it was received, Harker's brigade of Wood's division was ordered to counter-march at daybreak to the Lafayette road, and to make a reconnaissance in the direction indicated by the negro. Soon meeting an opposing force that was feeling its way toward Chattanooga, Harker slowly forced it back across the Chickamunga River, at Lee and Gordon's Mills, only eighteen miles from Lafayette. Crittenden was now ordered to the mills, Thomas to Lafayette, and McCook to Snmmerville, twenty-five miles south of Lafayette; for Rosecrans did not yet believe that the enemy's entire army was there, preparing to assume the offensive. Most happily, Bragg, although correctly informed of the isolation of our corps, took no decisive advantage of our helplessness.

McCook found that the enemy's cavalry, when driven, always retreated in the direction of Lafayette; and in advancing toward that place Thomas met a resistance that convinced him that he was in the presence of the Confederate army, while Crittenden's reconnaissance south from the mills sustained the opinion of Thomas.

On the 12th, however, Rosecrans also became at last convinced that the enemy had faced about at Lafayette, and orders were issued to attack them at that place.

By the 15th he learned that the enemy was receiving heavy reinforcements. Doctor Hale, chief-of-scouts for General Thomas, found large numbers of prisoners whom Grant had paroled at Vicksburg. They spoke freely of the fact that they had been ordered on duty, although not yet exchanged, and all were confident that the concentration then going on would result in our annihilation. Stunned by the disasters to their cause at Gettysburg and Vicksburg, the Confederate chiefs were secretly hurrying reinforcements to Bragg, hoping to neutralize the effects of those disasters by overwhelming Rosecrans. These well-planned movements were not, until too late, even suspected by Halleck, who sent us the report that Bragg was reinforcing Lee!

As already indicated, if Rosecrans had opened his campaign when the other two great armies were carrying forward the Gettysburg and Vicksburg campaigns, his operations could not now have been disturbed by these reinforcements.

If he should be defeated when so far from his base, and with such obstacles to the rear, the destruction of his army would be probable; while if he should have the good fortune to defeat his adversary, it would not be possible, without surplus supplies at Chattanooga, to pursue far enough to gather the fruits of a victory. With so much to lose and so little to gain, it is clear that the battle of Chickamauga ought not to have been fought.

It has been said that this battle was necessary to secure us Chattanooga. But the error of that assertion may be seen in the fact that Rosecrans, before the battle, still had time to assume impregnable positions around that town. Three days were enough for this, and it was seven days before Bragg seriously interfered with the freedom of our movements. Moreover, Chattanooga, won at the cost of Chickamauga, became a peril instead of a gain. But, deciding not to fall back, Rosecrans slowly concentrated his corps on the north bank of the Chickamauga River, at Lee and Gordon's Mills, twelve miles south of Chattanooga. Bragg decided to move down the valley up which he had retired because, first, of all the routes open to him that one was least obstructed; and, secondly, because it would continue his army near the railway of his supplies, which was also bringing him Longstreet.

Rosecrans did not get his corps united and well in position, before the enemy, on the 19th, began the battle of Chickamauga.

The country in which the next two days' operations took place lies between the river and Missionary Ridge, and was covered by woods of varying density, broken here and there by cleared fields. The Chickamauga River, winding slowly through the forest of the region, flows into the Tennessee eight miles above Chattanooga. Bragg's aim was to turn our left and gain the road into Chattanooga, now indispensable to the existence of our army. Thomas commanded our left; and as Bragg sent division after division against that wing, Rosecrans sent successive divisions to Thomas. The fighting was close and stubborn; batteries were taken and retaken till the day closed, without material advantage to either side. It was clear, however, that we were outnumbered; for, while we had put nearly every regiment into the action, the enemy, meeting us with equal numbers in line of battle, still had heavy reserves.

In the night both commanders prepared for the decisive conflict which all felt must come on the 20th. Still covering the Chattanooga road, Rosecrans placed his army in a somewhat better position, both flanks well refused. From left to right his divisions were: Baird's, R. W. Johnson's, Palmer's, Reynolds's, Brannan's, Negley's, Davis's, Sheridan's; Wood's and Van Cleve's were in reserve; and three brigades of Granger's corps were near Rossville, four miles away. Thomas commanded six divisions at the left, McCook two at the right, and Crittenden the two in reserve. Thomas covered his front with a slight barricade of rails and old logs found in the woods, and so greatly aided his men.

Early in the morning Thomas discovered, and reported to Rosecrans, that another division was

needed to maintain our extreme left against the enemy's longer line. Rosecrans, therefore, brought Wood from reserve to relieve Negley, and ordered Negley at once to report his division to Thomas; and Thomas was informed that Negley would immediately join him at the left. But Negley, disappearing from the line, drifted away from the field to Rossville. Two of his brigades reached the left, but so far apart, and so ill-timed, as to be of little value. It is important to remember Negley's conduct, because from it came the misapprehensions that were soon to result in disaster to our right wing.

The Confederate plan was to turn and envelop our left, and then to advance upon our divisions in succession, and involve the whole in one common ruin. Their right wing was commanded by Polk, and their left by Longstreet.

Polk was ordered to begin the battle at day-break, but the first shots were not heard before 8:30; and, in an hour, the action at the left became furious. Polk's right division began to envelop our left and to appear upon our rear; but Thomas hurried some reserves against it and drove it away in disorder. Having been able, in the absence of Negley's division, to find the way to our left and rear, the enemy would naturally reappear there with decisive numbers. Thomas, therefore, knowing nothing of Negley's conduct, and wishing to add only a division to his left, sent again and again for the promised reinforcements. The attack soon extended heavily to Johnson, Palmer, and Reynolds; and, by 10:30, lightly to Brannan. Naturally supposing that Negley had already reached Thomas, Rosecrans inferred, from the requests of Thomas and from other indications, that Bragg was moving his left wing to the extreme right of the Confederate line of battle. The conflict had been raging against Thomas for two hours, while Wood, Davis, and Sheridan were untouched; and, not suspecting that Longstreet (a reconnaissance of ten minutes would have developed it) was already formed for attack and about to advance in full force against our right wing, Rosecrans, in the short space of fifteen minutes, — 10:30 to 10:45, — ordered to his left Van Cleve, from the reserve, and Sheridan, from the extreme right; and, by the blunder of an aide in wording an order, sent Wood out of line to "close up on Reynolds and support him as soon as possible," while McCook was to move Davis by the left flank into the position vacated by Wood. These disconnected and fatal movements of Van Cleve, Wood, Sheridan, and Davis were in progress when Longstreet attacked them with six divisions of the Confederate left wing. Disaster was the immediate and inevitable result.

Sheridan's routed division moved back to Rossville. Heroism could not save Davis; his division was overwhelmed, and scattered in fragments that were afterward collected behind Missionary Ridge. Wood's movement uncovered Brannan's right, and, in temporary confusion, that division hurried away to a new position. This exposed Reynolds's right, made it necessary for him to change front to the rear at right angles on his left; but *there* he held firmly to Palmer's right. The rush of disordered troops

and artillery, disintegrating Van Cleve's division, destroyed its further usefulness in this battle.

Rosecrans, seeing this appalling demolition of his right wing, and finding that the enemy had interposed between him and Thomas, hastened around to Rossville. Finding there men of Negley's division, which he had supposed to be with Thomas, Rosecrans thought the day lost, and deemed it his duty to hasten to Chattanooga, there to prepare for the reception and disposition of what *seemed to him* his disordered and defeated army. Rosecrans and Garfield, his chief-of-staff, separated at Rossville—Rosecrans riding to Chattanooga and Garfield to Thomas at the front. Rosecrans says that he sent Garfield to the front; while Garfield has many times said that he himself insisted upon going—that the sound of the battle proved that Thomas was still holding the enemy in check. McCook and Crittenden soon joined Rosecrans at Chattanooga; but Thomas remained on the field. Brannan brought his division to a good position, but so far to the right of Reynolds that the space of a division lay open between them. While Wood was moving toward this gap, Longstreet, advancing to complete the work, came within musket-range.

The moment was critical, because if Wood should be unable to occupy and hold the gap, Longstreet would pass through, permanently cut off Brannan, again turn, and then overwhelm Reynolds, and attack the rear of Palmer, Johnson, and Baird, who were still confronted by Polk. Wood coolly changed front under fire, so as to face south instead of east, and caused one of his brigades to charge with fixed bayonets. The audacity of the charge probably made the enemy believe that there was force enough near to sustain it, for they soon bolted, and then fled out of range just before our bayonets reached their ranks. The needed moments were snatched from the enemy, and Wood brought his division into the gap between Reynolds and Brannan.

Except some fragments from the broken divisions, our line was now composed of Baird's, Johnson's, Palmer's, Reynolds's, Wood's, and Brannan's divisions, naming them from left to right. In front stood the whole army of the enemy, eager to fall upon us with the energy that comes from great success and greater hopes. But close behind our line rode a general whose judgment never erred, whose calm, invincible will never bent; and around him thirty thousand soldiers resolved to exhaust the last round of ammunition, and then to hold their ground with their bayonets. Soldiers thus inspired and commanded, are more easily killed than defeated.

For five long hours the shocks and carnage were as close and deadly as men could make them. Thomas often came within speaking distance of his men, and wherever the energy of the attack most endangered our line, he strengthened it with cannon and regiments drawn from points in less peril; and when the soldiers asked for more ammunition Thomas said: "Use your bayonets." At about 3:30 in the afternoon I saw General Thomas looking in the direction of Chattanooga,

watching with anxious interest a column of dust rising in the air. Our suspense was relieved when Granger and Steedman emerged from the dust, and Garfield dashed up to Thomas.

To prevent a turning movement on the road from Ringgold, through Rossville to Chattanooga, Granger, with three brigades, had been stationed on the Ringgold road; and, by a sound, soldierly judgment, leaving one brigade to do the work assigned to the three, brought two brigades to the field. Thomas himself was then only a little way down the rear slope of the low ridge on which Wood's division was fighting, with every man in the line, and with no reserves. We were hard pressed, and many muskets became so hot that loading was difficult; but Thomas sent up two cannon with the words: "The position must be held." The reply was: "Tell General Thomas that we will hold the position or go to heaven from it."

At about 4 o'clock Longstreet drew back and asked for reinforcements, but was answered that the right wing was already so shattered that it could not aid him. He then brought forward his reserves and re-formed his lines; and, extending beyond our right, advanced in a final attack.

Thomas ordered Granger's reinforcements to the right of Brannan, where the enemy had already begun to appear. The conflict there, and on the divisions of Brannan and Wood, was soon at its fiercest. Our short-range ammunition from the cannon cut great gaps through the enemy's column, and the steady volleys of musketry, aided by our bayonets, did their remorseless work for about thirty minutes; and then the Confederate left wing, shattered, bleeding, defeated, withdrew from sight. The battle was ended—Thomas had saved the army.

The sun had not yet gone down, and there was time enough to renew the action, but Bragg, if we may trust his official report, had lost two-fifths of his infantry; his army was incapable of making another effort. What now would have been the consequences if General Rosecrans had come upon the field with ammunition and the few thousand soldiers collected near Rossville?

On the 21st Bragg was too prudent to attack, and on the 22d our army was placed in positions around Chattanooga.

Of our men under fire, we had lost more than one-third, and a number of batteries in the woods fell to the enemy by the disaster on the morning of the 20th. About 30,000 men—both sides—were killed and wounded in this battle.

On the 23d and 24th the Confederates came slowly into position on Missionary Ridge and Lookout Mountain, connecting the two by a line of earth-works across Chattanooga Valley; and, by sending a force into Lookout Valley, they commanded our 26-mile wagon route to Bridgeport for supplies. This forced us to an almost impassable mountain route of sixty miles to the same point. Knowing that it would be impossible long to sustain an army by this route, Bragg waited the process of starvation with some probability of success.

THE OPPOSING FORCES AT CHICKAMAUGA, GA.

September 19th-20th, 1863.

For much of the information contained in this list and in similar lists to follow, the editors are indebted (in advance of the publication of the "Official Records") to Brigadier-General Richard C. Drumm, Adjutant-General of the Army. K stands for killed; w for wounded; m w for mortally wounded; m for captured or missing; c for captured.

THE UNION ARMY.

ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND—Major-General William S. Rosecrans.

General Headquarters: 1st Battalion Ohio Sharpshooters, Capt. Gershoum M. Barber; 10th Ohio Infantry, Lieut.-Col. William M. Ward; 15th Pa. Cav., Col. William J. Palmer. Loss: w, 2; m, 4=6.

FOURTEENTH ARMY CORPS, Maj.-Gen. George H. Thomas. Staff loss: m, 1.

Escort: L, 1st Ohio Cav., Capt. John D. Barker. **FIRST DIVISION,** Brig.-Gen. Absalom Baird.

First Brigade, Col. Benjamin F. Scribner: 38th Ind., Lieut.-Col. Daniel F. Griffin; 2d Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Obadiah C. Maxwell (w), Maj. William T. Beatty (w and c), Capt. James Warnock; 33d Ohio, Col. Oscar F. Moore; 94th Ohio, Maj. Rue P. Hutchins; 10th Wis., Lieut.-Col. John H. Ely (m w and c), Capt. Jacob W. Roby. Brigade loss: k, 55; w, 254; m, 423=732. *Second Brigade,* Brig.-Gen. John C. Starkweather: 24th Ill., Col. Geza Mihalotzy (w), Capt. August Mauff; 79th Pa., Col. Henry A. Hambricht; 1st Wis., Lieut.-Col. George B. Bingham; 21st Wis., Lieut.-Col. Harrison C. Hobart (w), Capt. Charles H. Walker. Brigade loss: k, 65; w, 285; m, 256=606. *Third Brigade,* Brig.-Gen. John H. King: 1st Battalion 15th U. S., Capt. Albert B. Dod; 1st Battalion 16th U. S., Maj. Sidney Coolidge (k), Capt. Robert E. A. Crofton; 1st Battalion 18th U. S., Capt. George W. Smith; 2d Battalion 18th U. S., Capt. Henry Haymond; 1st Battalion 19th U. S., Maj. Samuel K. Dawson (w), Capt. Edmund L. Smith. Brigade loss: k, 61; w, 255; m, 523=839. *Artillery:* 4th Ind. (Second Brigade), Lieut. David Flansburg (w and c), Lieut. Henry J. Willits; A, 1st Mich. (First Brigade), Lieut. George W. Van Pelt (k), Lieut. Almerick W. Wilber; H, 5th U. S. (Third Brigade), Lieut. Howard M. Burnham (k), Lieut. Joshua A. Fessenden (w). Artillery loss included in that of brigades.

SECOND DIVISION, Maj.-Gen. James S. Negley.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. John Beatty: 104th Ill., Lieut.-Col. Douglas Hapeman; 42d Ind., Lieut.-Col. William T. B. McIntire; 88th Ind., Col. George Humphrey; 15th Ky., Col. Mariou C. Taylor. Brigade loss: k, 17; w, 189; m, 104=310. *Second Brigade,* Col. Timothy R. Stanley (w), Col. William L. Stoughton: 19th Ill., Lieut.-Col. Alexander W. Raffin; 11th Mich., Col. William L. Stoughton, Lieut.-Col. Melvin Mudge (w); 18th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Charles H. Grosvenor. Brigade loss: k, 20; w, 146; m, 49=215. *Third Brigade,* Col. William Sirwell: 37th Ind., Lieut.-Col. William D. Ward; 21st Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Dwella M. Stoughton (m w), Maj. Arnold McMahan (w), Capt. Charles H. Vantine; 74th Ohio, Capt. Joseph Fisher; 78th Pa., Lieut.-Col. Archibald Blakeley. Brigade loss: k, 29; w, 95; m, 142=266. *Artillery:* Bridges's Ill. Battery (First Brigade), Capt. Lyman Bridges; G, 1st Ohio (Third Brigade), Capt. Alexander Marshall; M, 1st Ohio (Second Brigade), Capt. Frederick Schultz. Artillery loss included in brigades to which attached.

THIRD DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. John M. Brannan. Staff loss: w, 1.

First Brigade, Col. John M. Connell: 82d Ind., Col. Morton C. Hunter; 17th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Durbin Ward (w); 31st Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Frederick W. Lister. Brigade loss: k, 49; w, 323; m, 70=442. *Second Brigade,* Col. John T. Croxton (w), Col. William H. Hays: 10th Ind., Col. William B. Carroll (m w), Lieut.-Col. Marsh B. Taylor; 74th Ind., Col. Charles W. Chapman, Lieut.-Col. Myron Baker; 4th Ky., Lieut.-Col. P. Burgess Hunt (w), Maj. Robert M. Kelly; 10th Ky., Col. William H. Hays, Maj. Gabriel C. Wharton; 14th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Henry D. Kingsbury. Brigade loss: k, 131; w, 728; m, 79=938. *Third Brigade,* Col. Ferdinand Van Derveer: 87th

Ind., Col. Newell Gleason; 2d Minn., Col. James George; 9th Ohio, Col. Gustave Kammerling; 35th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Henry V. N. Boynton. Brigade loss: k, 144; w, 594; m, 102=840. *Artillery:* D, 1st Mich. (First Brigade), Capt. Josiah W. Church; C, 1st Ohio (Second Brigade), Lieut. Marco B. Gary; I, 4th U. S. (Third Brigade), Lieut. Frank G. Smith. Artillery loss included in brigades to which attached.

FOURTH DIVISION, Maj.-Gen. Joseph J. Reynolds. Staff loss: w, 1; m, 1=2.

First Brigade, Col. John T. Wilder: 92d Ill., Col. Smith D. Atkins; 98th Ill., Col. John J. Funkhouser (w), Lieut.-Col. Edward Kitchell; 128th Ill., Col. James Monroe; 17th Ind., Maj. William T. Jones; 72d Ind., Col. Abram O. Miller. Brigade loss: k, 13; w, 94; m, 18=125. *Second Brigade,* Col. Edward A. King (k), Col. Milton S. Robinson: 68th Ind., Capt. Harvey J. Espy (w); 75th Ind., Col. Milton S. Robinson, Lieut.-Col. William O'Brien; 101st Ind., Lieut.-Col. Thomas Doan; 105th Ohio, Maj. George T. Perkins (w). Brigade loss: k, 50; w, 363; m, 71=484. *Third Brigade,* Brig.-Gen. John B. Turchin: 18th Ky., Lieut.-Col. H. Kavanaugh Milward (w), Capt. John B. Heltemes; 11th Ohio, Col. Philander P. Lane; 36th Ohio, Col. William G. Jones (k), Lieut.-Col. Hiram F. Duvall; 92d Ohio, Col. Benjamin D. Fearing (w), Lieut.-Col. Douglas Putman, Jr. (w). Brigade loss: k, 30; w, 227; m, 86=343. *Artillery:* 18th Ind. (First Brigade), Capt. Eli Lilly; 19th Ind. (Second Brigade), Capt. Samuel J. Harris (w), Lieut. Robert G. Lackey; 21st Ind. (Third Brigade), Capt. William W. Andrew. Artillery loss included in brigades to which attached.

TWENTIETH ARMY CORPS, Maj.-Gen. Alexander McD. McCook.

Protest-Guard: H, 81st Ind., Capt. Will'm J. Richards. *Escort:* I, 2d Ky. Cav., Lieut. George W. L. Batman. **FIRST DIVISION,** Brig.-Gen. Jefferson C. Davis.

Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. William P. Carlin: 21st Ill., Col. John W. S. Alexander (k), Capt. Chester K. Knight; 38th Ill., Lieut.-Col. Daniel H. Gilmer (k), Capt. Willis G. Whitehurst; 81st Ind., Capt. Nevil B. Boone, Maj. James E. Calloway; 101st Ohio, Lieut.-Col. John Messer (w), Maj. Bedau B. McDonald (w), Capt. Leonard D. Smith; 2d Minn. Batt'y, Lieut. Albert Woodbury (m w), Lieut. Richard L. Dawley. Brigade loss: k, 54; w, 299; m, 298=651. *Third Brigade,* Col. Haus C. Heg (k), Col. John A. Martin: 25th Ill., Maj. Samuel D. Wall (w), Capt. Wesford Taggart; 35th Ill., Lieut.-Col. William P. Chandler; 8th Kans., Col. John A. Martin, Lieut.-Col. James L. Abernethy; 15th Wis., Lieut.-Col. Ole C. Johnson (c); 8th Wis. Batt'y, Lieut. John D. McLean. Brigade loss: k, 70; w, 519; m, 107=696.

SECOND DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Richard W. Johnson. Staff loss: k, 1; m, 2=3.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. August Willich: 89th Ill., Lieut.-Col. Duncan J. Hall (k), Maj. William D. Williams; 32d Ind., Lieut.-Col. Frank Erdelmeyer; 39th Ind., Col. Thomas J. Harrison; 15th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Frank Askew; 49th Ohio, Maj. Samuel F. Gray (w). Capt. Luther M. Strong; A, 1st Ohio Art'y. Capt. Wilbur F. Goodspeed. Brigade loss: k, 63; w, 355; m, 117=535. *Second Brigade,* Col. Joseph B. Dodge: 79th Ill., Col. Allen Buckner; 29th Ind., Lieut.-Col. David M. Dunn; 30th Ind., Lieut.-Col. Orrin D. Hurd; 77th Pa., Col. Thomas E. Rose (c), Capt. Joseph J. Lawson; 20th Ohio Battery, Capt. Edward Grosskopf. Brigade loss: k, 27; w, 200; m, 309=536. *Third Brigade,* Col. Philemon P. Baldwin (k), Col. William W. Berry: 6th Ind., Lieut.-Col.

† Detached and serving as mounted infantry.

‡ Captain William A. Hotchkiss, chief of division artillery.

Hagerman Tripp (w), Maj. Calvin D. Caupbell; 5th Ky., Col. William W. Berry, Capt. John M. Huston; 1st Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Bassett Langdon; 93d Ohio, Col. Hiram Strong (m w), Lieut.-Col. Wm. H. Martin; 5th Ind. Bat'y, Capt. Peter Simonson. Brigade loss: k, 57; w, 385; m, 126 = 568.

THIRD DIVISION, Maj.-Gen. Philip H. Sheridan.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. William H. Lytle (k), Col. Silas Miller; 36th Ill., Col. Silas Miller, Lieut.-Col. Porter C. Olson; 88th Ill., Lieut.-Col. Alexander S. Chadbourn; 21st Mich., Col. William B. McCreery (w and e), Maj. Seymour Chase; 24th Wis., Lieut.-Col. Theodore S. West (w and e), Maj. Carl von Banmbach; 11th Ind. Battery, Capt. Arnold Sutermeister. Brigade loss: k, 55; w, 321; m, 84 = 460.

Second Brigade, Col. Bernard Laiboldt; 44th Ill., Col. Wallace W. Barrett (w); 73d Ill., Col. James F. Jaquess; 2d Mo., Lieut.-Col. Arnold Beck; 15th Mo., Col. Joseph Conrad; G (Capt. H. Heseock, chief of division artillery), 1st Mo. Art'y, Lieut. Gustavus Schueler. Brigade loss: k, 38; w, 243; m, 108 = 389.

Third Brigade, Col. Luther P. Bradley (w), Col. Nathan H. Walworth; 22d Ill., Lieut.-Col. Francis Swanwick; 27th Ill., Col. Jonathan R. Miles; 42d Ill., Col. Nathan H. Walworth, Lieut.-Col. John A. Hottentstine; 51st Ill., Lieut.-Col. Samuel B. Raymond; C, 1st Ill. Art'y, Capt. Mark H. Prescott. Brigade loss: k, 58; w, 374; m, 64 = 496.

TWENTY-FIRST ARMY CORPS, Maj.-Gen. Thomas L. Crittenden.

Escort: K, 15th Ill. Cav., Capt. S. B. Sherer. Loss: w, 3.

FIRST DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Thos. J. Wood. Staff loss: w, 1.

First Brigade, Col. George P. Bnell; 100th Ill., Col. Frederick A. Bartleson (w and e), Maj. Charles M. Hammond; 58th Ind., Lieut.-Col. James T. Embree; 13th Mich., Col. Joshua B. Culver (w), Maj. Willard G. Eaton; 26th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. William H. Young. Brigade loss: k, 79; w, 443; m, 129 = 651.

Third Brigade, Col. Charles G. Harker; 3d Ky., Col. Henry C. Dunlap; 64th Ohio, Col. Alexander McIlvain; 65th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Horatio N. Whitbeck (w), Maj. Samuel C. Brown (m w), Capt. Thomas Powell; 125th Ohio, Col. Emerson Opdycke. Brigade loss: k, 51; w, 283; m, 58 = 392.

Artillery: 8th Ind. (First Brigade), Capt. George Estep (w); 6th Ohio (Third Brigade), Capt. Cullen Bradley. Artillery loss: k, 2; w, 17; m, 7 = 26.

SECOND DIVISION, Maj.-Gen. John M. Palmer. Staff loss: k, 1; w, 2; m, 3 = 6.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Charles Cruft; 31st Ind., Col. John T. Smith; 1st Ky. (5 co's), Lieut.-Col. Alva R. Hadlock; 2d Ky., Col. Thomas D. Sedgewick; 90th Ohio, Col. Charles H. Rippey. Brigade loss: k, 24; w, 213; m, 53 = 290.

Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. William B. Hazen; 9th Ind., Col. Isaac C. B. Suman; 6th Ky., Col. George T. Shackelford (w), Lieut.-Col. Richard Rockingham (k), Maj. Richard T. Whitaker; 41st Ohio, Col. Aquila Wiley; 124th Ohio, Col. Oliver H. Payne (w), Maj. James B. Hampson. Brigade loss: k, 46; w, 378; m, 76 = 500.

Third Brigade, Col. William Grose; 84th Ill., Col. Louis H. Waters; 36th Ind., Lieut.-Col. Oliver H. P. Carey (w), Maj. Gilbert Trusler; 23d Ky., Lieut.-Col. James C. Foy; 6th Ohio, Col. Nicholas L. Anderson (w), Maj. Samuel C. Erwin; 24th Ohio, Col. David J. Higgins. Brigade loss: k, 53; w, 399; m, 65 = 517.

Artillery, Capt. William E. Standart; B, 1st Ohio (First Brigade), Lieut. Norman A. Baldwin; F, 1st Ohio (Second Brigade), Lieut. Giles J. Cokerill; H, 4th U. S. (Third Brigade), Lieut. Harry C. Cushing; M, 4th U. S. (Third Brigade), Lieut. Francis D. L. Russell. Artillery loss: k, 10; w, 39; m, 6 = 55.

THIRD DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. H. P. VanCleve. Staff loss: m, 1.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Samuel Beatty; 79th Ind., Col. Frederick Knefler; 9th Ky., Col. George H. Cram; 17th Ky., Col. Alexander M. Stout; 19th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Henry G. Stratton. Brigade loss: k, 16; w, 254; m, 61 = 331.

Second Brigade, Col. George F. Dick; 44th Ind.,

Lieut.-Col. Simcon C. Aldrich; 86th Ind., Maj. Jacob C. Dick; 13th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Elhannon M. Mast (k), Capt. Horatio G. Cosgrove; 59th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Granville A. Frambes. Brigade loss: k, 16; w, 180; m, 83 = 279.

Third Brigade, Col. Sidney M. Barnes; 35th Ind., Maj. John P. Duffey; 8th Ky., Lieut.-Col. James D. Mayhew (e), Maj. John S. Clark; 51st Ohio, Col. Richard W. McClain (e), Lieut.-Col. Charles H. Wood; 99th Ohio, Col. Peter T. Swaine. Brigade loss: k, 20; w, 135; m, 144 = 299.

Artillery: 17th Ind., Capt. George R. Swallow; 26th Pa., Capt. Alanson J. Stevens (k), Lieut. Samuel M. McDowell; 3d Wis., Lieut. Cortland Livingston. Artillery loss: k, 4; w, 35; m, 13 = 52.

RESERVE CORPS, Maj.-Gen. Gordon Granger. Staff loss: k, 1.

FIRST DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. James B. Steedman.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Walter C. Whitaker; 96th Ill., Col. Thomas E. Champion; 115th Ill., Col. Jesse H. Moore; 84th Ind., Col. Nelson Trusler; 22d Mich., Col. Heber Le Favour (e), Lieut.-Col. William Sanborn (w), Capt. Alonzo M. Keeler (e); 40th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. William Jones; 89th Ohio, Col. Caleb H. Carlton (e), Capt. Isaac C. Nelson; 18th Ohio Battery, Capt. Charles C. Aleshire. Brigade loss: k, 154; w, 654; m, 518 = 1326.

Second Brigade, Col. John G. Mitchell; 78th Ill., Lieut.-Col. Carter Van Vleck (w), Lieut. Geo. Green; 98th Ohio, Capt. Moses J. Urquhart (w), Capt. Armstrong J. Thomas; 113th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Darins B. Warner; 121st Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Henry B. Banning; M, 1st Ill. Art'y, Lieut. Thos. Burton. Brigade loss: k, 58; w, 308; m, 95 = 461.

SECOND DIVISION.

Second Brigade, Col. Daniel McCook; 85th Ill., Col. Caleb J. Dilworth; 86th Ill., Lieut.-Col. D. W. Magee; 125th Ill., Col. Oscar F. Harmon; 52d Ohio, Maj. J. T. Holmes; 69th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. J. H. Brigham; I, 2d Ill. Art'y, Capt. C. M. Barnett. Brigade loss: k, 2; w, 14; m, 18 = 34.

CAVALRY CORPS, Brig.-Gen. Robert B. Mitchell.

FIRST DIVISION, Col. Edward M. McCook.

First Brigade, Col. Archibald P. Campbell; 2d Mich., Maj. Leonidas S. Seranton; 9th Pa., Lieut.-Col. Roswell M. Russell; 1st Tenn., Lieut.-Col. James P. Brownlow. Brigade loss: k, 2; w, 6; m, 7 = 15.

Second Brigade, Col. Daniel M. Ray; 2d Ind., Maj. Joseph B. Presdee; 4th Ind., Lieut.-Col. John T. Deweese; 2d Tenn., Lieut.-Col. William R. Cook; 1st Wis., Col. Osear H. La Grange; D, 1st Ohio Art'y (section), Lieut. Nathaniel M. Newell. Brigade loss: k, 2; w, 10; m, 11 = 23.

Third Brigade, Col. Lonis D. Watkins; 4th Ky., Col. Wickliffe Cooper; 5th Ky., Lieut.-Col. William T. Hoblitzell; 6th Ky., Maj. Louis A. Gratz. Brigade loss: k, 2; w, 8; m, 236 = 246.

SECOND DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. George Crook.

First Brigade, Col. Robert H. G. Minty; 3d Ind. (detachment), Lieut.-Col. Robert Klein; 4th Mich., Maj. Horace Gray; 7th Pa., Lieut.-Col. James J. Seibert; 4th U. S., Capt. James B. McIntyre. Brigade loss: k, 7; w, 33; m, 8 = 48.

Second Brigade, Col. Eli Long; 2d Ky., Col. Thomas P. Nicholas; 1st Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Valentine Cnpp (m w), Maj. Thomas J. Patten; 3d Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Charles B. Seidel; 4th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Oliver P. Robie. Brigade loss: k, 19; w, 79; m, 38 = 136.

Artillery: Chicago Board of Trade Battery, Capt. James H. Stokes.

Total Union loss: killed 1656, wounded 9749, captured or missing 4774 = 16,179.

Effective strength (partly from official reports and partly estimated):

Fourteenth Army Corps (estimated).....	20,000
Twentieth Army Corps (estimated).....	11,000
Twenty-first Army Corps (report).....	12,052
Reserve Corps (report).....	3,913
Cavalry Corps (estimated).....	10,000

Total 56,965

THE CONFEDERATE ARMY.

ARMY OF TENNESSEE—General Braxton Bragg.

RIGHT WING, Lieut.-Gen. Leonidas Polk.

CHEATHAM'S DIVISION [Polk's Corps], Maj.-Gen. B. F. Cheatham.

Escort: G, 2d Ga. Cav., Capt. T. M. Merritt.

Jackson's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. John K. Jackson; 1st Ga. (Confed.) and 2d Ga. Battalion, Maj. J. C. Gordon; 5th Ga., Col. C. P. Daniel; 2d Ga. Battalion Sharpshooters, Maj. R. H. Whiteley; 5th Miss., Lieut.-Col. W.

L. Sykes (k), Maj. J. B. Herring; 8th Miss., Col. J. C. Wilkinson. Brigade loss: k, 55; w, 430; m, 5=490. *Maney's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. George Maney: 1st and 27th Tenn., Col. H. R. Feild; 4th Tenn. (Prov. Army), Col. J. A. McMurry (k), Lieut.-Col. R. N. Lewis (w), Maj. O. A. Bradshaw (w), Capt. J. Bostick; 6th and 9th Tenn., Col. George C. Porter; 24th Tenn. Battalion Sharpshooters, Maj. Frank Maney. Brigade loss: k, 54; w, 317; m, 15=386. *Smith's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Preston Smith (k), Col. A. J. Vaughan, Jr.; 11th Tenn., Col. G. W. Gordon; 12th and 47th Tenn., Col. W. M. Watkins; 13th and 154th Tenn., Col. A. J. Vaughan, Jr., Lieut.-Col. R. W. Pitman; 29th Tenn., Col. Horace Riee; Dawson's Battalion ☆ Sharpshooters, Maj. J. W. Dawson (w), Maj. William Green. Brigade loss: k, 42; w, 284; m, 36=362. *Wright's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Marcus J. Wright: 8th Tenn., Col. John H. Anderson; 16th Tenn., Col. D. M. Donnell; 28th Tenn., Col. S. S. Stanton; 38th Tenn. and Murray's (Tenn.) Battalion, Col. J. C. Carter; 51st and 52d Tenn., Lieut.-Col. John G. Hall. Brigade loss: k, 44; w, 400; m, 43=487. *Strahl's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. O. F. Strahl; 4th and 5th Tenn., Col. J. J. Lamb; 19th Tenn., Col. F. M. Walker; 24th Tenn., Col. J. A. Wilson; 31st Tenn., Col. E. E. Tansil; 33d Tenn., ———. Brigade loss: k, 19; w, 203; m, 28=250. *Artillery*, Maj. Melanethou Smith: Tenn. Battery, Capt. W. W. Carnes; Ga. Battery, Capt. John Scogin; Tenn. Battery (Scott's), Lieut. J. H. Marsh (w), Lieut. A. T. Watson; Miss. Battery (Smith's), Lieut. W. B. Turner; Miss. Bat'y, Capt. T. J. Stauford. *HILL'S CORPS*, Lieut.-Gen. Daniel H. Hill.

CLUBKNE'S DIVISION, Maj.-Gen. P. R. Cleburne.

Wood's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. S. A. M. Wood: 16th Ala., Maj. J. H. McGaughy (k), Capt. F. A. Ashford; 33d Ala., Col. Samuel Adams; 45th Ala., Col. E. B. Breedlove; 18th Ala. Battalion, Maj. J. H. Gibson (k), Col. Samuel Adams; 32d and 45th Miss., Col. M. P. Lowrey; Sharpshooters, Maj. A. T. Hawkins (k), Capt. Daniel Coleman. Brigade loss: k, 96; w, 680=776. *Polk's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Lucius E. Polk; 1st Ark., Col. J. W. Colquitt; 3d and 5th Confederate, Col. J. A. Smith; 2d Tenn., Col. W. B. Robertson; 35th Tenn., Col. B. J. Hill; 48th Tenn., Col. G. H. Nixon. Brigade loss: k, 58; w, 541; m, 6=605. *Deshler's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. James Deshler (k), Col. R. Q. Mills; 19th and 24th Ark., Lieut.-Col. A. S. Hutchinson; 6th, 10th, and 15th Tex., Col. R. Q. Mills, Lieut.-Col. T. Scott Anderson; 17th, 18th, 24th, and 25th Tex., Col. F. C. Wilkes (w), Lieut.-Col. John T. Coit, Maj. W. A. Taylor. Brigade loss: k, 52; w, 366=418. *Artillery*, Maj. T. R. Hotchkiss (w), Capt. Henry C. Semple: Ark. Battery (Calvert's), Lieut. Thomas J. Key; Tex. Battery, Capt. J. P. Douglas; Ala. Battery, Capt. Henry C. Semple, Lieut. R. W. Goldthwaite.

BRECKINRIDGE'S DIVISION, Maj.-Gen. J. C. Breckinridge.

Helm's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Benjamin H. Helm (k), Col. J. H. Lewis; 41st Ala. Col. M. L. Stansel; 2d Ky., Col. J. W. Hewitt (k), Lieut.-Col. J. W. Moss; 4th Ky., Col. Joseph P. Nuckols, Jr. (w), Maj. T. W. Thompson; 6th Ky., Col. J. H. Lewis, Lieut.-Col. M. H. Cofer; 9th Ky., Col. J. W. Caldwell (w), Lieut.-Col. J. C. Wickliffe. Brigade loss: k, 63; w, 408=471. *Adams's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Daniel W. Adams (w and e), Col. R. L. Gibson: 32d Ala., Maj. J. C. Kimbrell; 13th and 20th La., Col. R. L. Gibson, Col. Leon von Zinken, Capt. E. M. Dubroca; 16th and 25th La., Col. D. Gober; 19th La., Lieut.-Col. R. W. Turner (w), Maj. L. Butler (k), Capt. H. A. Kennedy; 14th La. Battalion, Maj. J. E. Austin. Brigade loss: k, w and m=429. *Stovall's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. M. A. Stovall: 1st and 3d Fla., Col. W. S. Dilworth; 4th Fla., Col. W. L. L. Bowen; 47th Ga., Capt. William S. Phillips (w), Capt. Joseph S. Cone; 60th N. C., Lieut.-Col. J. M. Ray (w), Capt. J. T. Weaver. Brigade loss: k, 37; w, 232; m, 46=315. *Artillery*, Maj. R. E. Graves (k); Ky. Battery, Capt. Robert Cobb; Tenn. Battery, Capt. John W. Mebane; La. Battery, Capt. C. H. Slocumb.

RESERVE CORPS, Maj.-Gen. W. H. T. Walker.

WALKER'S DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. S. R. Gist.

Gist's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. S. R. Gist, Col. P. H. Col-

quitt (k), Lieut.-Col. L. Napier; 46th Ga., Col. P. H. Colquitt, Maj. A. M. Speer; 8th Ga. Battalion, Lieut.-Col. L. Napier; 24th S. C., Col. C. H. Stevens (w), Lieut.-Col. Ellison Capers (w). Brigade loss: k, 49; w, 251; m, 36=336. *Ector's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. M. D. Ector: Stoue's Ala. Battalion, ———; Pound's Miss. Battalion, ———; 29th N. C., ———; 9th Texas, ———; 10th, 14th, and 32d Tex. Cav. (dismounted), ———. Brigade loss: k, 59; w, 239; m, 138=436. *Wilson's Brigade*, Col. C. C. Wilson: 25th Ga., Lieut.-Col. A. J. Williams (k); 29th Ga., Lieut. G. R. McRae; 30th Ga., Lieut.-Col. James S. Boynton; 1st Ga. Battalion Sharpshooters, ———; 4th La. Battalion, ———. Brigade loss: k, 99; w, 426; m, 80=605. *Artillery*: Martiu's Battery, ———.

LIDDELL'S DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. St. John R. Liddell.

Liddell's Brigade, Col. Daniel C. Govan: 2d and 15th Ark., Lieut.-Col. R. T. Harvey; 5th and 13th Ark., Col. L. Featherston (k), Lieut.-Col. John E. Murray; 6th and 7th Ark., Col. D. A. Gillespie (w), Lieut.-Col. Peter Snyder; 8th Ark. and 1st La., Lieut.-Col. George F. Baueum (w), Maj. A. Watkins. Brigade loss: k, 73; w, 502; m, 283=858. *Walthall's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. E. C. Walthall: 24th Miss., Lieut.-Col. R. P. McKelvine (w), Maj. W. C. Staples (w), Capt. B. F. Toomer, Capt. J. D. Smith (w); 27th Miss., Col. James A. Campbell; 29th Miss., Col. William F. Brantly; 30th Miss., Col. Junius I. Seales (e), Lieut.-Col. Hugh A. Reynolds (k), Maj. J. M. Johnson (w); 34th Miss., Maj. W. G. Pegram (w), Capt. H. J. Bowen, Lieut.-Col. H. A. Reynolds (k). Brigade loss: k, 61; w, 531; m, 196=788. *Artillery*, Capt. Charles Sweet; Ala. Battery, Capt. W. H. Fowler (w); Miss. Battery (Warren Light Art'y), Lieut. H. Shannon. Artillery loss included in loss of brigades.

LEFT WING, Lieut.-Gen. James Longstreet.

HINDMAN'S DIVISION [Polk's Corps], Maj.-Gen. T. C. Hindman (w), Brig.-Gen. J. Patton Anderson. Staff loss: w, 1.

Anderson's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. J. Patton Anderson, Col. J. H. Sharp: 7th Miss., Col. W. H. Bishop; 9th Miss., Maj. T. H. Lynam; 10th Miss., Lieut.-Col. James Barr; 41st Miss., Col. W. F. Tucker; 44th Miss., Col. J. H. Sharp, Lieut.-Col. R. G. Kelsey; 9th Miss. Batt. Sharpshooters, Maj. W. C. Richards; Ala. Battery, Capt. J. Garrity. Brigade loss: k, 80; w, 464; m, 24=568. *Deas's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Z. C. Deas: 19th Ala., Col. Samuel K. McSpadden; 22d Ala., Lieut.-Col. John Weedon (k), Capt. H. T. Toulmin; 25th Ala., Col. George D. Johnston; 39th Ala., Col. W. Clark; 50th Ala., Col. J. G. Coltart; 17th Ala. Batt. Sharpshooters, Capt. Jas. F. Nabers; Robertson's Battery, Lieut. S. H. Dent. Brigade loss: k, 123; w, 578; m, 28=729. *Manigault's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. A. M. Manigault: 24th Ala., Col. N. N. Davis; 28th Ala., Col. John C. Reid; 34th Ala., Maj. John N. Slaughter; 10th and 19th S. C., Col. James F. Pressley; Ala. Battery (Waters's), Lieut. Charles W. Watkins. Brigade loss: k, 66; w, 426; m, 47=539.

BUCKNER'S CORPS, Maj.-Gen. Simon B. Buckner.

STEWART'S DIVISION, Maj.-Gen. Alexander P. Stewart. Staff loss: w, 1; m, 1=2.

Johnson's Brigade (attached to Johnson's Provisional Division), Brig.-Gen. Bushrod R. Johnson, Col. J. S. Fulton: 17th Tenn., Lieut.-Col. Watt W. Floyd; 23d Tenn., Col. R. H. Keeble; 25th Tenn., Lieut.-Col. R. B. Snowden; 44th Tenn., Lieut.-Col. J. L. McEwen, Jr. (w), Maj. G. M. Crawford; Ga. Battery, Lieut. W. S. Everett. Brigade loss: k, 28; w, 271; m, 74=373. *Brown's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. John C. Brown (w), Col. Edmund C. Cook: 18th Tenn., Col. J. B. Palmer (w), Lieut.-Col. W. R. Butler (w), Capt. Gideon H. Lowe; 26th Tenn., Col. J. M. Lillard (k), Maj. R. M. Saffell; 32d Tenn., Col. Edmund C. Cook, Capt. C. G. Tucker; 45th Tenn., Col. A. Searey; 23d Tenn. Batt., Maj. T. W. Newman (w), Capt. W. P. Simpson. Brigade loss: k, 50; w, 426; m, 4=480. *Bate's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. William B. Bate: 58th Ala., Col. Bushrod Jones; 37th Ga., Col. A. F. Rudler (w), Lieut.-Col. Joseph T. Smith; 4th Ga. Battalion Sharpshooters, Maj. T. D. Caswell (w), Capt.

☆ Composed of two companies from the 11th Tenn., two from the 12th and 47th Tenn. (consolidated), and one from the 154th Senior Tenn.

B. M. Turner (w), Lieut. Joel Towers; 15th and 37th Tenn., Col. R. C. Tyler (w), Lieut.-Col. R. D. Frayser (w), Capt. R. M. Tankesley; 20th Tenn., Col. T. B. Smith (w), Maj. W. M. Shy. Brigade loss: k, 63; w, 530; m, 11 = 604. *Clayton's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. H. D. Clayton (w); 18th Ala., Col. J. T. Moltzclaw (w), Lieut.-Col. R. F. Inge (m w), Maj. P. F. Humley; 36th Ala., Col. L. T. Woodruff; 38th Ala., Lieut.-Col. A. R. Lankford. Brigade loss: k, 86; w, 518; m, 15 = 619. *Artillery*, Maj. J. W. Eldridge; 1st Ark. Battery, Capt. J. T. Humphreys; Ga. Battery (Dawson's), Lieut. R. W. Anderson; Eufaula Art'y, Capt. McD. Oliver. Artillery loss: k, 4; w, 23 = 27. PRESTON'S DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. William Preston.

Gracie's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Archibald Gracie, Jr.; 43d Ala., Col. Y. M. Moody; 1st Ala. Battalion, ↓ Lieut.-Col. J. H. Holt (w), Capt. G. W. Huguley; 2d Ala. Battalion, ↓ Lieut.-Col. Bolling Hall, Jr. (w), Capt. W. D. Walden (w); 3d Ala. Battalion, ↓ Maj. Joseph W. A. Sanford; 4th Ala., ↓ Maj. J. D. McLennan; 63d Tenn., Lieut.-Col. A. Fulkerson (w), Maj. John A. Aiken. Brigade loss: k, 90; w, 576; m, 2 = 668. *Trigg's Brigade*, Col. Robert C. Trigg; 1st Fla. Cav. (dismounted), Col. G. T. Maxwell; 6th Fla., Col. J. J. Finley; 7th Fla., Col. R. Bullock; 54th Va., Lieut.-Col. John J. Wade. Brigade loss: k, 46; w, 231; m, 4 = 281. *Kelly's Brigade*, Col. J. H. Kelly; 65th Ga., Col. R. H. Moore; 5th Ky., Col. H. Hawkins; 68th N. C., Col. John B. Palmer (w); 63d Va., Maj. J. M. French. Brigade loss: k, 66; w, 241; m, 3 = 310. *Artillery*, Brig.-Gen. A. Leyden; Ga. Battery, Capt. A. M. Wolihin; Ga. Battery, Capt. T. M. Peoples; Va. Battery, Capt. W. C. Jeffress; Ga. Battery (York's). Artillery loss: w, 6.

RESERVE ARTILLERY, Maj. S. C. Williams: Baxter's (Tenn.) Battery; Darden's (Miss.) Battery; Kolb's (Ala.) Battery; McCant's (Fla.) Battery. Artillery loss: k, 2; w, 2 = 4.

JOHNSON'S DIVISION, ↓ Brig.-Gen. Bushrod R. Johnson. *Gregg's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. John Gregg (w), Col. C. A. Sugg; 3d Tenn., Col. C. H. Walker; 10th Tenn., Col. William Grace; 30th Tenn., —; 41st Tenn., Lieut.-Col. James D. Tillman (w); 50th Tenn., Col. C. A. Sugg, Lieut.-Col. T. W. Beaumont (k), Maj. C. W. Robertson (w), Col. C. H. Walker; 1st Tenn. Battalion, Maj. S. H. Colms (w), Maj. C. W. Robertson; 7th Texas, Col. H. B. Granbury (w), Maj. K. M. Vanzandt; Mo. Battery (Bledsoe's), Lieut. R. L. Wood. Brigade loss: k, 109; w, 474; m, 18 = 601. *McNair's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. E. McNair (w), Col. D. Coleman; 1st Ark. Mounted Rifles, Col. Robert W. Harper (m w); 2d Ark. Mounted Rifles, Col. James A. Williamson; 25th Ark., Lieut.-Col. Eli Hufstader (w); 4th and 31st Ark. and 4th Ark. Battalion, Maj. J. A. Ross; 33th N. C., Col. D. Coleman; S. C. Battery, Capt. J. F. Chilpeper. Brigade loss: k, 51; w, 336; m, 64 = 451.

LONGSTREET'S CORPS, ↓ Maj.-Gen. John B. Hood (w). Staff loss: w, 1.

McLAWS'S DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Joseph B. Kershaw, Maj.-Gen. Lafayette McLaws.

Kershaw's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Joseph B. Kershaw; 2d S. C., Lieut.-Col. F. Gaillard; 3d S. C., Col. James D. Nance; 7th S. C., Lieut.-Col. Elbert Bland (k), Maj. John S. Hard (k), Capt. E. J. Goggans; 8th S. C., Col. John W. Henagan; 15th S. C., Lieut.-Col. Joseph F. Gist; 3d S. C. Battalion, Capt. J. M. Townsend (k). Brigade loss: k, 68; w, 419; m, 1 = 488. *Wofford's Brigade*, ☆ Brig.-Gen. W. T. Wofford; 16th Ga., —; 18th Ga., —; 24th Ga., —; 3d Ga. Battalion Sharpshooters, —; Cobb's (Ga.) Legion, —; Phillips's (Ga.) Legion, —. *Humphreys's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Benjamin G. Humphreys; 13th Miss., —; 17th Miss., —; 18th Miss., —; 21st Miss., —. Brigade loss: k, 20; w, 132 = 152. *Bryan's Brigade*, ☆ Brig.-Gen. George Bryan; 10th Ga., —; 50th Ga., —; 51st Ga., —; 53d Ga., —.

HOOD'S DIVISION, Maj.-Gen. John B. Hood, Brig.-Gen. E. Melver Law.

Jenkins's Brigade, ↓ Brig.-Gen. Micah Jenkins; 1st S. C., —; 2d S. C. Rifles, —; 5th S. C., —; 6th S. C., —; Hampton Legion, —; Palmetto (S. C.) Sharpshooters, —. *Law's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. E. Melver Law, Col. James L. Sheffield; 4th Ala., —; 15th Ala., Col. W. C. Oates; 44th Ala., —; 47th Ala., —; 48th Ala., —. Brigade loss: k, 61; w, 329 = 390. *Robertson's Brigade*, ↓ Brig.-Gen. J. B. Robertson, Col. Van H. Manning; 3d Ark., Col. Van H. Manning; 1st Texas, Capt. R. J. Harding; 4th Texas, Col. John P. Bane (w), Capt. R. H. Bassett (w); 5th Texas, J. C. Rogers (w), Capt. J. S. Cleveland (w), Capt. T. T. Clay. Brigade loss: k, 78; w, 457; m, 35 = 570. *Anderson's Brigade*, ↓ Brig.-Gen. George T. Anderson; 7th Ga., —; 8th Ga., —; 9th Ga., —; 11th Ga., —; 59th Ga., —. *Benning's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Henry L. Benning; 2d Ga., Lieut.-Col. William S. Shepherd (w), Maj. W. W. Charlton; 15th Ga., Col. D. M. Du Bose (w), Maj. P. J. Shannon; 17th Ga., Lieut.-Col. Charles W. Matthews (m w); 20th Ga., Col. J. D. Waddell. Brigade loss: k, 46; w, 436; m, 6 = 488.

CORPS ARTILLERY, ↓ Col. E. Porter Alexander; S. C. Battery (Fieklings); Va. Battery (Jordan's); La. Battery (Moody's); Va. Battery (Parker's); Va. Battery (Taylor's); Va. Battery (Woolfolk's).

RESERVE ARTILLERY, ARMY OF TENNESSEE, Maj. Felix H. Robertson: Barret's (Mo.) Battery; Le Garden's (La.) Battery; Havis's (Ala.) Battery; Lumsden's (Ala.) Battery; Massenburg's (Ga.) Battery. Artillery loss: k, 2; w, 6 = 8.

CAVALRY, Maj.-Gen. Joseph Wheeler.

WHARTON'S DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. John A. Wharton.

First Brigade, Col. C. C. Crews; 7th Ala., —; 2d Ga., —; 3d Ga., —; 4th Ga., Col. Isaac W. Avery. *Second Brigade*, Col. Thomas Harrison; 3d Confederate, Col. W. N. Estes; 1st Ky., Lieut.-Col. J. W. Griffith; 4th Tenn., Col. Paul F. Anderson; 8th Texas, —; 11th Texas, —; Ga. Battery (White's).

MARTIN'S DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. William T. Martin.

First Brigade, Col. J. T. Morgan; 1st Ala., —; 3d Ala., Lieut.-Col. T. H. Mauldin; 51st Ala., —; 8th Confederate, —. *Second Brigade*, Col. A. A. Russell; 4th Ala., —; 1st Confederate, Col. W. B. Wade; Ark. Battery (Wiggins's). *Roddey's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. P. D. Roddey; 4th Ala., ↓ Lieut.-Col. William A. Johnson; 5th Ala., —; 53d Ala., —; Tenn. Reg't (Forrest's); Ga. Battery (Newell's). Loss of Wheeler's cavalry (estimated), 375 killed, wounded, and missing.

FORREST'S CORPS, Brig.-Gen. N. B. Forrest. ARMSTRONG'S DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Frank C. Armstrong.

Armstrong's Brigade, Col. J. T. Wheeler; 3d Ark., —; 1st Tenn., —; 18th Tenn. Battalion, Maj. Charles McDonald. *Forrest's Brigade*, Col. G. G. Dibrell; 4th Tenn., Col. W. S. McLemore; 8th Tenn., Capt. Hamilton McGinnis; 9th Tenn., Col. J. B. Bifle; 10th Tenn., Col. N. N. Cox; 11th Tenn., Col. D. W. Holman; Shaw's Battalion, Maj. J. Shaw; Tenn. Battery, Capt. A. L. Higgins; Tenn. Battery, Capt. John W. Morton.

PEGRAM'S DIVISION (composition of division uncertain). Brig.-Gen. John Pegram.

Davidson's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. H. B. Davidson; 1st Ga., —; 6th Ga., Col. John R. Hart; 6th N. C., —; Rucker's Legion, —; Tenn. Battery (Huwald's). *Scott's Brigade*, Col. J. S. Scott; 10th Confederate, Col. C. T. Goode; Detachment of Morgan's command, Lieut.-Col. R. M. Martin; 1st La., —; 2d Tenn., —; 5th Tenn., —; 12th Tenn. Battalion, —; 16th Tenn. Battalion, Capt. J. Q. Arnold (w); La. Battery (section), —. Brigade loss: k, 10; w, 39 = 49.

Total Confederate loss: killed, 2389; wounded, 13,412; captured or missing, 2003 = 17,804.

↓ Hilliard's Legion.

↓ Provisional, embracing Johnson's and, part of the time, Robertson's brigades, as well as Gregg's and McNair's. Sept. 19, attached to Longstreet's corps under Hood.

☆ Organization taken from return of Lee's army for Aug. 31, 1863. Pickett's division was left in Virginia.

☆ Longstreet's report indicates that these brigades did not arrive in time to take part in the battle.

↓ Did not arrive in time to take part in the battle.

↑ Served part of time in Johnson's Provisional Division.

† Two regiments of the same designation. Lieut.-Col. Johnson commanded that in Roddey's brigade.

As to the strength of the Confederate army at Chickamauga, Major E. C. Dawes contributed to "The Century" magazine, for April, 1888, the following note:

"An examination of the original returns in the War Department, which I have personally made, shows the following result: General Bragg's return, 31st of August, 1863, shows under the heading 'present for duty,' officers and men, 48,998. This return does not include the divisions of General Breckinridge or General Preston, the brigades of Generals Gregg and McNair, or the reinforcement brought by General Longstreet. The strength of each is accurately given in

Confederate official returns. The total Confederate force available for battle at Chickamauga was as follows: General Bragg's army, 31st of August, 1863, for duty, 48,998; Longstreet's command (Hood's and McLaws's divisions), by return of Army of Northern Virginia, 31st of August, 1863, for duty, 11,716; Breckinridge's division, by his official report in 'Confederate Reports of Battles,' for duty, 3769; Preston's division, by his official report in 'Confederate Reports of Battles,' for duty, 4509; Brigades of Gregg and McNair, by General Bushrod Johnson's official report (So. Hist. Soc. Papers, Vol. XIII.), for duty, 2559,—total, 71,551."

THE LITTLE STEAMBOAT THAT OPENED THE "CRACKER LINE."

BY WILLIAM G. LE DUC, BREVET BRIGADIER-GENERAL AND ASSISTANT QUARTERMASTER, U. S. V.

IN answer to the urgent demand of Rosecrans for reinforcements, the Eleventh Corps (Howard's) and the Twelfth Corps (Slocum's) were sent from the east to his assistance under command of General Hooker. Marching orders were received on the 22d of September, and the movement was commenced from the east side of the Rappahannock on the 24th; at Alexandria the troops and artillery and officers' horses were put on cars, and on the 27th started for Nashville. On the 2d of October the advance reached Bridgeport, and on the 3d Hooker established headquarters at Stevenson, and Howard the headquarters of the Eleventh Corps at Bridgeport,¹ then the limit of railroad travel, eight miles east of Stevenson.

The short reach of 26 miles of railroad, or 28 miles of road that ran nearly alongside the railroad, was now all that was necessary for the security of the important position at Chattanooga. But Rosecrans must first secure possession of the route, and then rebuild the long truss-bridge across the Tennessee River, and the trestle, one-quarter of a mile long and 113 feet high, at Whiteside, or Running Water, which would take longer than his stock of provisions and forage would last.

To supply an army of 40,000 or 50,000 men, having several thousand animals, in Chattanooga, by wagons, over country roads 28 miles long, in winter, would be a most difficult, but not an impossible task. Rosecrans determined to build some small, flat-bottomed steamers, that could navigate the river from Bridgeport, and transport supplies to Kelley's Ferry or William's Island (either within easy reach from Chattanooga), which would enable him to supply his army with comfort until the railroad could be repaired. The enemy held Lookout Mountain, commanding both river and railroad above William's Island. This position was then deemed impregnable. The Confederates also had an outpost on Raccoon Mountain, commanding the river completely and also overlooking a road that skirted the river-bank on the north side for a

short distance, thus making the long detour over Waldron's Ridge necessary to communication between Stevenson, Bridgeport, and Chattanooga. The river, where it passes through the Raccoon Range, is very rapid and narrow; the place is known as the Suck, and in navigating up stream the aid of windlass and shore-lines is necessary. Kelley's Landing, below the Suck, is the debouchement of a low pass through Raccoon Mountain, from Lookout Valley, and is within eight or ten miles of Chattanooga.

At Bridgeport I found Captain Edwards, Assistant Quartermaster, from Detroit, preparing to build a steamboat to navigate the river, by mounting an engine, boiler, and stern-wheel on a flat-bottomed scow, to be used in carrying and towing up supplies until the completion of the railroad.


I quote from my Diary:

Oct. 5, 1863.—General Hooker was over yesterday . . . and examined the little scow. He appreciated the probable importance of the boat, and ordered me to take it in hand personally and see that work was crowded on it as fast as possible. . . . We also looked over the grade of the Jasper Branch Railroad, which is above high-water mark, and must be used if supplies are sent on the north side of the river. He directed me to send him a report in writing, and a copy for General Rosecrans, of my observations and suggestions, and to go ahead and do what I could without waiting for written orders. I turned my attention to the boat. Captain Edwards has employed a ship-builder from Lake Erie—Turner, an excellent mechanic, who has built lake vessels and steamers, but who is not so familiar with the construction of flat-bottomed, light-draught river steamers. He has a number of ship and other carpenters engaged, with some detailed men from our own troops, making an efficient force. Men who can be serviceable as rough carpenters are abundant; not so with calkers, who will soon be needed, I hope. The frame of the boat is set on blocks, and is

¹ General Grant says [see p. 689]: "Hooker had brought with him from the east a full supply of land transportation. His animals had not been subjected to hard work on bad roads without forage, but were in good condition."

This should have been the fact, but unfortunately was not. Hooker's command, when ordered west, had land transportation of the most efficient description, more than 6000 mules and horses, seasoned to army work in marches made through Virginia clay and quicksand,

from Fredericksburg to Gettysburg and back to the Rappahannock; but against protest they were ordered to be turned into the corrals at Alexandria and Washington. These choice and efficient trains, that could be relied on to do effective work day and night, were thus broken up, and the want of them was soon after most seriously felt on the Tennessee. Hooker's troops were supplied from the corral at Nashville with all sorts of animals, young and old, broken and unbroken. Many died on the road before reaching Bridgeport.—W. G. L.



THE "CHATTANOOGA" UNLOADING AT KELLEY'S LANDING, NOVEMBER, 1863. FROM A WAR-TIME PHOTOGRAPH.

only five or six feet above the present water of the river. This mountain stream must be subject to sudden floods, which may make trouble with the boat.

Oct. 16.— . . . I found Turner, the master mechanic, in trouble with the hull of the little boat. The planking was nearly all on, and he was getting ready to calk and pitch her bottom when I went to Stevenson. The water had risen so rapidly that it was within sixteen or eighteen inches of her bottom planks when I returned, and Turner was loading her decks with pig-iron that the rebels had left near the bridge-head. He thought he would thus keep the hull down on the blocking, and after the waters went down would then go on and finish.

"But," I said, "Turner, if the planking gets wet, you cannot calk and pitch until it dries." "That's true; and it would take two weeks, and may be four, to dry her after she was submerged, and who knows how high it may rise and when it will abate?" "Then, Turner, what's the use of weighing it down with pig-iron. Rosecrans's army depends on this little boat: he must have supplies before two weeks, or quit Chattanooga. Can't you cross-timber your blocks, and raise the hull faster than the water rises?" "No; I've thought of that, and believe it would be useless to try it. Captain Edwards and I concluded the only thing we could do was to weigh it down with pig-iron, and try to hold it, but if the water rises very high it will be swept away, pig-iron and all!" . . . I went rapidly over to Edwards's tent . . . and found him in his bunk, overcome by constant work, anxiety, and despair. . . . In answer to my question if nothing better could be done than weigh the hull down with pig-iron he said, "No; I've done all I can. I don't know what the

water wants to rise for here. It never rose this way where I was brought up, and they're expecting this boat to be done inside of two weeks, or they will have to fall back!" I turned from his tent, and stood perplexed, staring vacantly toward the pontoon-bridge. I saw a number of extra pontoons tied to the shore—flat-bottomed boats, 10 to 12 feet wide and 30 feet long, the sides 18 inches high. I counted them, and then started double-quick for the boat-yard, hallooing to Turner, "Throw off that iron, quick! Detail me three carpenters: one to bore with a two-and-a-half or three-inch anger, and two to make plugs to fill the holes. Send some laborers into all the camps to bring every bucket, and find some careful men who are not afraid to go under the boat and knock out blocks as fast as I bring them down a pontoon."

Turner, who had been standing silent and amazed at my excitement and rapid orders, exclaimed, with a sudden burst of conviction, "That's it! That's it! That'll do! Hurray! We'll save her yet. Come here with me under the boat, and help knock out a row of blocks." And he jumped into the water up to his arm-pits, leaving me to execute my own orders. The pontoons were dropped down the river, the holes were bored in the end allowing them partly to fill, and they were then pulled under the boat as fast as the blocks were out. The holes were then plugged, and the water was dipped until they began to lift up on the bottom of the hull, and when all were under that were necessary, then rapid work was resumed with the buckets, till by 2 o'clock in the morning she was safely riding on the top of the rising waters. They are now calking and pitching her as rapidly as possible, and fixing beams for wheel and en-

gines; as many men are at work as can get around on her to do anything.

Afternoon, 16th.—General Howard rode out with me to examine the bridge work on Jasper road, let out to some citizens living inside our lines. They are dull to comprehend, slow to execute, and need constant direction and supervision. Showed General Howard the unfinished railroad grade to Jasper, and my estimate of the time in which it can be made passable for cars if we can get the iron, and if not, of the time in which we can use it for wagons.

On October 19th, under General Rosecrans's orders to General Hooker, I was charged with the work on this road.

20th.—Commenced work on the Jasper branch.

22d.—General Grant and Quartermaster-General Meigs arrived on their way to the front with Hooker and staff. I accompanied them as far as Jasper. During the ride I gave Grant what information I had of the country, the streams, roads, the work being done and required to be done on the Jasper branch, also on the steamboat. He saw the impossibility of supplying by the dirt road, and approved the building of the Jasper branch, and extending it if practicable to Kelley's; also appreciated the importance of the little steamboat, which will be ready for launching to-morrow or Saturday. General Meigs . . . approved of the Jasper branch scheme and gave me a message ordering the iron forwarded at once.

23d.—Steamboat ready to launch to-morrow. Railroad work progressing.

24th.—Steamer launched safely.

26th.—Work on boat progressing favorably; as many men are at work on her as can be employed.

Extract from a letter dated Nov. 1st, 1863:

I had urged forward the construction of the little steamer day and night, and started her with only a skeleton of a pilot-house, without waiting for a boiler-deck, which was put on afterward as she was being loaded. Her cabin is now being covered with canvas. On the 29th she made her first trip, with two barges, 34,000 rations, to Rankin's Ferry, and returned. I loaded two more barges during the night, and started at 4 o'clock A. M. on the 30th for Kelley's Ferry, forty-five miles distant by river. The day was very stormy, with unfavorable head-winds. We made slow progress against the wind and the rapid current of this tortuous mountain stream. A hog-chain broke, and we floated down the stream while repairing it with help of block and tackle. I ordered the engineer to give only steam enough to overcome the current and keep crawling up, fearful of breaking some steam-pipe connection, or of starting a leak in the limber half-braced boat. Had another break, and again floated helplessly down while repairing; straightened up once more, and moved on again—barely moved up in some places where the current was unusually strong; and so we kept on, trembling and hoping, under the responsibility of landing safely this important cargo of rations. Night fell upon us—the darkest night possible—with a driving rain, in which, like a blind person, the little boat was feeling her way up an unknown river.

Captain Edwards brought, as captain, a man named Davis, from Detroit, who used to be a mate on a Lake Erie vessel; but, as he was ignorant of river boats or navigation, could not steer, and knew nothing of wheel-house bells or signals, I could not trust him on this important first trip. The only soldier I could find who claimed any knowledge of the business of a river pilot was a man named Williams, who had steered on a steam-ferry running between Cincinnati and Covington. Him I put into the wheel-house, and as I had once owned a fourth interest in a steamboat, and fooled away considerable money and time with her, I had learned enough of the wheel to know which way to turn it, and of the bell-pulls to signal Stop, Back, and Go ahead. I went with Williams into the wheel-house, and put Davis on the bows, to keep a lookout. As the night grew dark, and finally black, Davis declared he could see nothing, and came back wringing his hands and saying we would "surely be wrecked if we did not land and tie up."

"There's a light ahead now, Davis, on the north shore."

"Yes, and another on the south, I think."

"One or both must be rebels' camp-fires."

We tried to keep the middle of the river, which is less than musket-shot across in any part. After a long struggle against wind and tide we got abreast of the first camp-fire, and saw the sentry pacing back and forward before it, and hailed:

"Halloo! there. What troops are those?"

Back came the answer in unmistakable Southern patois: "Ninth Tennessee. Run your old tea-kettle ashore here, and give us some hot whisky."

The answer was not comforting. I knew of no Tennessee regiment in the Union service except one, or part of one, commanded by Colonel Stokes, and where that was I did not know. So we put the boat over to the other shore as fast as possible, and to gain time I called out:

"Who's in command?"

"Old Stokes, you bet."

"Never mind, Williams, keep her in the middle. We're all right.—How far to Kelley's Ferry?"

"Rite over thar whar you see that fire. They're sittin' up for ye, I reckon."

"Steady, Williams. Keep around the bend and steer for the light."

And in due time we tied the steamboat and barges safely to shore, with 40,000 rations and 39,000 pounds of forage, within five miles of General Hooker's men, who had half a breakfast ration left in haversacks; and within eight or ten miles of Chattanooga, where four cakes of hard bread and a quarter pound of pork made a three days' ration. In Chattanooga there were but four boxes of hard bread left in the commissary warehouses on the morning of the 30th [October]. About midnight I started an orderly to report to General Hooker the safe arrival of the rations. The orderly returned about sunrise, and reported that the news went through the camps faster than his horse, and the soldiers were jubilant, and cheering "The Cracker line open. Full rations, boys! Three cheers for the Cracker line," as if we had won another victory; and we had.

CHATTANOOGA.†

BY ULYSSES S. GRANT, GENERAL, U. S. A.

AFTER the fall of Vicksburg I urged strongly upon the Government the propriety of a movement against Mobile. General Rosecrans had been at Murfreesboro', Tennessee, with a large and well-equipped army from early in the year 1863, with Bragg confronting him with a force quite equal to his own at first, considering that it was on the defensive. But after the investment of Vicksburg, Bragg's army was largely depleted to strengthen Johnston, in Mississippi, who was being reënforced to raise the siege. I frequently wrote to General Halleck suggesting that Rosecrans should move against Bragg. By so doing he would either detain the latter's troops where they were, or lay Chattanooga open to capture. General Halleck strongly approved the suggestion, and finally wrote me that he had repeatedly ordered Rosecrans to advance, but that the latter had constantly failed to comply with the order,‡ and at last, after having held a council of war, replied, in effect, that it was a military maxim "not to fight two decisive battles at the same time." If true, the maxim was not applicable in this case. It would be bad to be defeated in two decisive battles fought the same day, but it would not be bad to win them. I, however, was fighting no battle, and the siege of Vicksburg had drawn from Rosecrans's front so many of the enemy that his chances of victory were much greater than they would be if he waited until the siege was over, when these troops could be returned. Rosecrans was ordered to move against the army that was detaching troops to raise the siege. Finally, on the 24th of June, he did move, but ten days afterward Vicksburg surrendered, and the troops sent from Bragg were free to return.‡ It was at this time that I recommended to the general-in-chief the movement against Mobile. I knew the peril the Army of the Cumberland was in, being depleted continually not only by ordinary casualties, but also by having to detach troops to hold its constantly extending line over which to draw supplies, while the enemy in front was as constantly being strengthened. Mobile was important to the enemy, and, in the absence of a threatening force, was guarded by little else than artillery. If threatened by land and from the

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‡ In an article in "The Century" magazine for May, 1887, General Rosecrans says:

"Since our forces in rear of Vicksburg would be endangered by General Joseph E. Johnston, if he should have enough troops, we must not drive Bragg out of middle Tennessee until it shall be too late for his command to reënforce Johnston's. Bragg's army is now, apparently, holding this army in check. It is the most important service he can render to his cause. The Confederate authorities know it. They will not order, nor will Bragg venture to send away any substantial detachments. The news that Vicksburg could not hold out over two or three weeks having reached us, we began our movements to dislodge Bragg from his intrenched camp on the 24th of June, 1863. It rained for seventeen

consecutive days. The roads were so bad that it required four days for Crittenden's troops to march seventeen miles. Yet, on the 4th of July, we had possession of both the enemy's intrenched camps, and by the 7th, Bragg's army was in full retreat over the Cumberland Mountains into Sequatchie valley, whence he proceeded to Chattanooga, leaving us in full possession of middle Tennessee and of the damaged Nashville and Chattanooga railway, with my headquarters at Winchester, fifty miles from our starting-point, Murfreesboro'. This movement was accomplished in fifteen days, and with a loss of only 586 killed and wounded."

EDITORS.

‡ Late in August the divisions of Breckinridge and W. H. T. Walker were transferred from Mississippi to Bragg's army, and the brigades of Gregg and McNair followed early in September. These troops were engaged at Chickamauga.—EDITORS.

water at the same time, the prize would fall easily, or troops would have to be sent to its defense. Those troops would necessarily come from Bragg.

My judgment was overruled, however, and the troops under my command were dissipated over other parts of the country where it was thought they could render the most service. Four thousand were sent to Banks, at New Orleans; five thousand to Schofield, to use against Price, in Arkansas; the Ninth Corps back to Kentucky; and finally, in August, the whole of the Thirteenth Corps to Banks. I also sent Ransom's brigade to Natchez, to occupy that point, and to relieve Banks from guarding any part of the river above what he had guarded before the fall of Port Hudson. Ransom captured a large amount of ammunition and about five thousand beef cattle that were crossing the river going east for the rebel armies. At this time the country was full of deserters from Pemberton's army, and it was reported that many had also left Johnston. These avowed they would never go back to fight against us again. Many whose homes were west of the river went there, and others went North to remain until they could return with security.

Soon it was discovered in Washington that Rosecrans was in trouble and required assistance. The emergency was now too immediate to allow us to give this assistance by making an attack in the rear of Bragg upon Mobile. It was, therefore, necessary to reënforce directly, and troops were sent from every available point. On the 13th of September Halleck telegraphed me to send all available forces to Memphis, and thence east along the Memphis and Charleston railroad to coöperate with Rosecrans. This instruction was repeated two days later, but I did not get even the first until the 23d of the month. As fast as transports could be provided all the troops except a portion of the Seventeenth Corps were forwarded under Sherman, whose services up to this time demonstrated his superior fitness for a separate command.† I also moved McPherson, with most of the troops still about Vicksburg, eastward, to compel the enemy to keep back a force to meet him. Meanwhile Rosecrans had very skillfully manœuvred Bragg south of the Tennessee River, and through and beyond Chattanooga. If he had stopped and intrenched, and made himself strong there, all would have been right, and the mistake of not moving earlier partially compensated. But he pushed on, with his forces very much scattered, until Bragg's troops from Mississippi began to join him.‡ Then Bragg took the initiative. Rosecrans had to fall back in turn, and was able to get his army together at Chickamauga, some miles south-east of Chattanooga, before the main battle was brought on. The

† In his "Personal Memoirs" (C. L. Webster & Co.) General Grant says:

"Soon after negotiations were opened with General Pemberton for the surrender of the city, I notified Sherman, whose troops extended from Haynes's Bluff on the left to the crossing of the Vicksburg and Jackson road over the Big Black on the right, and directed him to hold his command in readiness to advance and drive the enemy from the State as soon as Vicksburg surrendered. . . . Johnston heard of the surrender of Vicksburg almost as soon as it occurred, and immediately fell back on Jackson. On the 8th of July Sherman was within ten miles of Jackson, and on the 11th was


close up to the defenses of the city and shelling the town. The siege was kept up until the morning of the 17th, when it was found that the enemy had evacuated during the night. The weather was very hot, the roads dusty, and the water bad. Johnston destroyed the roads as he passed, and had so much the start that pursuit was useless; but Sherman sent one division, Steele's, to Brandon, fourteen miles east of Jackson. . . . Sherman was ordered back to Vicksburg, and his troops took much the same position they had occupied before — from the Big Black to Haynes's Bluff." EDITORS.

‡ Bragg was also reënforced by Longstreet, from the Army of Northern Virginia.—EDITORS.

battle was fought on the 19th and 20th of September, and Rosecrans was badly defeated, with a heavy loss in artillery, and some sixteen thousand men killed, wounded, and captured. The corps under Major-General George H. Thomas stood its ground, while Rosecrans, with Crittenden and McCook, returned to Chattanooga. Thomas returned also, but later, and with his troops in good order. Bragg followed and took possession of Missionary Ridge, overlooking Chattanooga. He also occupied Lookout Mountain, west of the town, which Rosecrans had abandoned, and with it his control of the river and river road as far back as Bridgeport. The National troops were now strongly intrenched in Chattanooga Valley, with the Tennessee River behind them, the enemy occupying commanding heights to the east and west, with a strong line across the valley, from mountain to mountain, and Chattanooga Creek for a large part of the way in front of their line.

On the 29th of September Halleck telegraphed me the above results, and directed all the forces that could be spared from my department to be sent to Rosecrans, suggesting that a good commander like Sherman or McPherson should go with the troops; also that I should go in person to Nashville to superintend the movement. Long before this dispatch was received Sherman was already on his way, and McPherson also was moving east with most of the garrison of Vicksburg. I at once sent a staff-officer to Cairo, to communicate, in my name, directly with the Government, and to forward me any and all important dispatches without the delays that had attended the transmission of previous ones. On the 3d of October a dispatch was received at Cairo ordering me to move with my staff and headquarters to that city, and report from there my arrival. This dispatch reached me on the 10th. I left Vicksburg the same day, reached Columbus *en route* for Cairo on the 16th, and reported my arrival at once. The reply to my telegram from Cairo, announcing my arrival at that point, came on the morning of the 17th, directing me to proceed immediately to the Galt House, Louisville, Kentucky, where I would meet an officer of the War Department with my instructions. I left Cairo within an hour after the receipt of this dispatch, going by rail by the way of Indianapolis, Indiana. Just as the train I was on was starting out of the depot at Indianapolis, a messenger came running up to stop it, saying the Secretary of War was coming into the station and wanted to see me. I had never met Mr. Stanton up to that time, though we had held frequent conversations over the wires, the year before, when I was in Tennessee. Occasionally, at night, he would order the wires between the War Department and my headquarters to be connected, and we would hold a conversation for an hour or two. On this occasion the secretary was accompanied by Governor Brough, of Ohio, whom I had never met, though he and my father had been old acquaintances. Mr. Stanton dismissed the special train that had brought him to Indianapolis and accompanied me to Louisville.

Up to this time no hint had been given me of what was wanted after I left Vicksburg, except the suggestion in one of Halleck's dispatches that I had better go to Nashville and superintend the operation of the troops sent to relieve Rosecrans. Soon after we had started, the secretary handed me two



THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND IN FRONT OF CHATTANOOGA. FROM A LITHOGRAPH.

The picture shows the intrenchments occupied by three divisions of Thomas's corps. In the foreground is seen Fort Grose, manned on the left of the picture by the 24th Ohio and on the right by the 36th Indiana,

guns of the First Ohio Battery being in the inclosures. Fort Negley is at the end of the line of works seen in the middle-ground, Lookout Mountain being in the distance.—EDITORS.

orders, saying that I might take my choice of them. The two were identical in all but one particular. Both created the Military Division of the Mississippi, giving me the command, composed of the Departments of the Ohio, the Cumberland, and the Tennessee, and all the territory from the Alleghanies to the Mississippi River, north of Banks's command in the south-west. One order left the department commanders as they were, while the other relieved Rosecrans and assigned Thomas to his place. I accepted the latter. We reached Louisville after night, and, if I remember rightly, in a cold, drizzling rain. The Secretary of War told me afterward that he caught a cold on that occasion from which he never expected to recover.

A day was spent in Louisville, the secretary giving me the military news at the capital, and talking about the disappointment at the results of some of the campaigns. By the evening of the day after our arrival all matters of discussion seemed exhausted, and I left the hotel to spend the evening away, both Mrs. Grant (who was with me) and myself having relations living in Louisville. In the course of the evening Mr. Stanton received a dispatch from Mr. C. A. Dana [an officer of the War Department], then in Chattanooga, informing him that unless prevented Rosecrans would retreat, and advising peremptory orders against his doing so. A retreat at that time would have been a terrible disaster. It would not only have been the loss of a most important strategic position to us, but it would have been attended with the loss of all the artillery still left with the Army of the Cumberland, and the annihilation of that army itself, either by capture or demoralization.

All supplies for Rosecrans had to be brought from Nashville. The railroad

between this base and the army was in possession of the Government up to Bridgeport, the point at which the road crosses to the south side of the Tennessee River; but Bragg, holding Lookout and Raccoon mountains west of Chattanooga, commanded the railroad, the river, and the shortest and best wagon roads both south and north of the Tennessee, between Chattanooga and Bridgeport. The distance between these two places is but twenty-six miles by rail; but owing to this position of Bragg all supplies for Rosecrans had to be hauled by a circuitous route, north of the river, and over a mountainous country, increasing the distance to over sixty miles. This country afforded but little food for his animals, nearly ten thousand of which had already starved, and none were left to draw a single piece of artillery or even the ambulances to convey the sick. The men had been on half rations of hard bread for a considerable time, with but few other supplies, except beef driven from Nashville across the country. The region along the road became so exhausted of food for the cattle that by the time they reached Chattanooga they were much in the condition of the few animals left alive there, "on the lift." Indeed, the beef was so poor that the soldiers were in the habit of saying, with a faint facetiousness, that they were living on half rations of hard bread and "beef dried on the hoof." Nothing could be transported but food, and the troops were without sufficient shoes or other clothing suitable for the advancing season. What they had was well worn. The fuel within the Federal lines was exhausted, even to the stumps of trees. There were no teams to draw it from the opposite bank, where it was abundant. The only means for supplying fuel, for some time before my arrival, had been to cut trees from the north bank of the river, at a considerable distance up the stream, form rafts of it, and float it down with the current, effecting a landing on the south side, within our lines, by the use of paddles or poles. It would then be carried on the shoulders of the men to their camps. If a retreat had occurred at this time it is not probable that any of the army would have reached the railroad as an organized body, if followed by the enemy.

On the receipt of Mr. Dana's dispatch Mr. Stanton sent for me. Finding that I was out, he became nervous and excited, inquiring of every person he met, including guests of the house, whether they knew where I was, and bidding them find me and send me to him at once. About 11 o'clock I returned to the hotel, and on my way, when near the house, every person met was a messenger from the secretary, apparently partaking of his impatience to see me. I hastened to the room of the secretary and found him pacing the floor rapidly, in a dressing-gown. Saying that the retreat must be prevented, he showed me the dispatch. I immediately wrote an order assuming command of the Military Division of the Mississippi, and telegraphed it to General Rosecrans. I then telegraphed to him the order from Washington assigning Thomas to the command of the Army of the Cumberland; and to Thomas that he must hold Chattanooga at all hazards, informing him at the same time that I would be at the front as soon as possible. A prompt reply was received from Thomas, saying, "We will hold the town till we starve." I appreciated the force of this dispatch later when I witnessed the condition of

affairs which prompted it. It looked, indeed, as if but two courses were open : one to starve, the other to surrender or be captured.

On the morning of the 20th of October I started by train with my staff, and proceeded as far as Nashville. At that time it was not prudent to travel beyond that point by night, so I remained in Nashville until the next morning. Here I met for the first time Andrew Johnson, Military Governor of Tennessee. He delivered a speech of welcome. His composure showed that it was by no means his maiden effort. It was long, and I was in torture while he was delivering it, fearing something would be expected from me in response. I was relieved, however, the people assembled having apparently heard enough. At all events they commenced a general hand-shaking, which, although trying where there is so much of it, was a great relief to me in this emergency.

From Nashville I telegraphed to Burnside, who was then at Knoxville, ☆ that important points in his department ought to be fortified, so that they could be held with the least number of men ; to Porter at Cairo, that Sherman's advance had passed Eastport, Miss. [see p. 691], and that rations were probably on their way from St. Louis by boat for supplying his army, and requesting him to send a gun-boat to convoy them ; and to Thomas, suggesting that large parties should be put at work on the wagon road then in use back to Bridgeport.

On the morning of the 21st we took the train for the front, reaching Stevenson, Alabama, after dark. Rosecrans was there on his way north. He came into my car, and we held a brief interview in which he described very clearly the situation at Chattanooga, and made some excellent suggestions as to what should be done. My only wonder was that he had not carried them out. We then proceeded to Bridgeport, where we stopped for the night. From here we took horses and made our way by Jasper and over Waldron's Ridge to Chattanooga. There had been much rain and the roads were almost impassable from mud knee-deep in places, and from washouts on the mountain-sides. I had been on crutches since the time of my fall in New Orleans, † and had to be carried over places where it was not safe to cross on horseback. The roads were strewn with the débris of broken wagons and the carcasses of thousands of starved mules and horses. At Jasper, some ten or twelve miles from Bridgeport, there was a halt. Howard had his headquarters there. From this point I telegraphed Burnside to make every effort to secure 500 rounds of ammunition for his artillery and small-arms. We stopped for the night at a little hamlet some ten or twelve miles farther on. The next day we reached Chattanooga, a little before dark. I went directly to Thomas's headquarters, and remained there a few days until I could establish my own.

During the evening most of the general officers called in to pay their respects and to talk about the condition of affairs. They pointed out on the maps the line marked with a red or blue pencil which Rosecrans had contemplated falling back upon. If any of them had approved the move, they

☆ General Burnside assumed command of the Department of the Ohio, succeeding General H. G. Wright, on the 25th of March, 1863.—EDITORS.

† In August General Grant went to New Orleans


to confer with Banks about coöperating in movements that had been ordered west of the Mississippi. During the visit his horse fell, severely injuring him.—EDITORS.

did not say so to me. I found General W. F. Smith occupying the position of chief engineer of the Army of the Cumberland. I had known Smith as a cadet at West Point, but had no recollection of having met him after my graduation, in 1843, up to this time. He explained the situation of the two armies and the topography of the country so plainly that I could see it without an inspection. I found that he had established a saw-mill on the banks of the river, by utilizing an old engine found in the neighborhood; and by rafting logs from the north side of the river above had got out the lumber and completed pontoons and roadway plank for a second bridge, one flying-bridge being there already. He was also rapidly getting out the materials for constructing the boats for a third bridge. In addition to this he had far under way a steamer for plying between Chattanooga and Bridgeport whenever he might get possession of the river. This boat consisted of a scow made of the plank sawed out at the mill, housed in, with a stern-wheel attached which was propelled by a second engine taken from some shop or factory.

I telegraphed to Washington this night, notifying Halleck of my arrival, and asking to have Sherman assigned to the command of the Army of the Tennessee, headquarters in the field. The request was at once complied with.

The next day, the 24th, I started out to make a personal inspection, taking Thomas and Smith with me, besides most of the members of my personal staff. We crossed to the north side of the river, and, moving to the north of detached spurs of hills, reached the Tennessee, at Brown's Ferry, some three miles below Lookout Mountain, unobserved by the enemy. Here we left our horses back from the river and approached the water on foot. There was a picket station of the enemy, on the opposite side, of about twenty men, in full view, and we were within easy range. They did not fire upon us nor seem to be disturbed by our presence. They must have seen that we were all commissioned officers. But, I suppose, they looked upon the garrison of Chattanooga as prisoners of war, feeding or starving themselves, and thought it would be inhuman to kill any of them except in self-defense. That night I issued orders for opening the route to Bridgeport—a "cracker line," as the soldiers appropriately termed it. [See p. 676.] They had been so long on short rations that my first thought was the establishment of a line over which food might reach them.

Chattanooga is on the south bank of the Tennessee, where that river runs nearly due west. It is at the northern end of a valley five or six miles in width through which runs Chattanooga Creek. To the east of the valley is Missionary Ridge, rising from five to eight hundred feet above the creek, and terminating somewhat abruptly a half-mile or more before reaching the Tennessee. On the west of the valley is Lookout Mountain, 2200 feet above tide-water. Just below the town, the Tennessee makes a turn to the south and runs to the base of Lookout Mountain, leaving no level ground between the mountain and river. The Memphis and Charleston railroad passes this point, where the mountain stands nearly perpendicular. East of Missionary Ridge flows the South Chickamauga River; west of Lookout Mountain is Lookout Creek; and west of that, the Raccoon Mountain. Lookout Mountain



REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION FROM "THE MILITARY HISTORY OF ULYSSES S. GRANT," BY GENERAL ADAM BADEAU. N. Y. : D. APPLETON & CO.

at its northern end rises almost perpendicularly for some distance, then breaks off in a gentle slope of cultivated fields to near the summit, where it ends in a palisade thirty or more feet in height. On the gently sloping ground, between the upper and lower palisades, there is a single farm-house, which is reached by a wagon road from the valley to the east.

The intrenched line of the enemy commenced on the north end of Missionary Ridge and extended along the crest for some distance south, thence across Chattanooga Valley to Lookout Mountain. Lookout Mountain was also fortified and held by the enemy, who also kept troops in Lookout Valley

and on Raccoon Mountain, with pickets extending down the river so as to command the road on the north bank and render it useless to us. In addition to this there was an intrenched line in Chattanooga Valley extending from the river east of the town to Lookout Mountain, to make the investment complete. Besides the fortifications on Missionary Ridge there was a line at the base of the hill, with occasional spurs of rifle-pits half-way up the front. The enemy's pickets extended out into the valley toward the town, so far that the pickets of the two armies could converse. At one point they were separated only by the narrow creek which gives its name to the valley and town, and from which both sides drew water. The Union lines were shorter than those of the enemy.

Thus the enemy, with a vastly superior force, was strongly fortified to the east, south, and west, and commanded the river below. Practically the Army of the Cumberland was besieged. The enemy, with his cavalry north of the river, had stopped the passing of a train loaded with ammunition and medical supplies. The Union army was short of both, not having ammunition enough for a day's fighting.

Long before my coming into this new field, General Halleck had ordered parts of the Eleventh and Twelfth corps, commanded respectively by Generals Howard and Slocum, Hooker in command of the whole, from the Army of the Potomac, to reinforce Rosecrans. It would have been folly to have sent them to Chattanooga to help eat up the few rations left there. They were consequently left on the railroad, where supplies could be brought them. Before my arrival Thomas ordered their concentration at Bridgeport.

General W. F. Smith had been so instrumental in preparing for the move which I was now about to make, and so clear in his judgment about the manner of making it, that I deemed it but just to him that he should have command of the troops detailed to execute the design, although he was then acting as a staff-officer, and was not in command of troops.

On the 24th of October, after my return to Chattanooga, the following details were made: General Hooker, who was now at Bridgeport, was ordered to cross to the south side of the Tennessee and march up by Whiteside's and Wauhatchie to Brown's Ferry. General Palmer, with a division of the Fourteenth Corps, Army of the Cumberland, was ordered to move down the river on the north side, by a back road, until opposite Whiteside's, then cross and hold the road in Hooker's rear after he had passed. Four thousand men were at the same time detailed to act under General Smith directly from Chattanooga. Eighteen hundred of them, under General Hazen, were to take sixty pontoon-boats and, under cover of night, float by the pickets of the enemy at the north base of Lookout, down to Brown's Ferry, then land on the south side and capture or drive away the pickets at that point. Smith was to march with the remainder of the detail, also under cover of night, by the north bank of the river, to Brown's Ferry, taking with him all the material for laying the bridge, as soon as the crossing was secured.

On the 26th Hooker crossed the river at Bridgeport and commenced his eastward march. At 3 o'clock on the morning of the 27th Hazen moved into



HAZEN'S MEN LANDING FROM PONTOON-BOATS AT BROWN'S FERRY [SEE MAP, P. 686].
FROM A WAR-TIME SKETCH.

the stream with his sixty pontoons and eighteen hundred brave and well-equipped men. Smith started enough in advance to be near the river when Hazen should arrive. There are a number of detached spurs of hills north of the river at Chattanooga, back of which is a good road parallel to the stream, sheltered from view from the top of Lookout. It was over this road Smith marched. At 5 o'clock Hazen landed at Brown's Ferry, surprised the picket-guard and captured most of it. By 7 o'clock the whole of Smith's force was ferried over and in possession of a height commanding the ferry. This was speedily fortified while a detail was laying the pontoon-bridge. By 10 o'clock the bridge was laid, and our extreme right, now in Lookout Valley, was fortified and connected with the rest of the army. The two bridges over the Tennessee River,—a flying one at Chattanooga and the new one at Brown's Ferry,—with the road north of the river, covered from both the fire and the view of the enemy, made the connection complete. Hooker found but slight obstacles in his way, and on the afternoon of the 28th emerged into Lookout Valley at Wauhatchie. Howard marched on to Brown's Ferry, while Geary, who commanded a division in the Twelfth Corps, stopped three miles south. The pickets of the enemy on the river below were cut off and soon came in and surrendered.


The river was now open to us from Lookout Valley to Bridgeport. Between Brown's Ferry and Kelley's Ferry the Tennessee runs through a narrow gorge in the mountains, which contracts the stream so much as to increase the current beyond the capacity of an ordinary steamer to stem. To get up these rapids, steamers must be cordelled, that is, pulled up by ropes from the shore. But there is no difficulty in navigating the stream from Bridgeport to Kelley's

Ferry. The latter point is only eight miles from Chattanooga, and connected with it by a good wagon road, which runs through a low pass in the Raccoon Mountain on the south side of the river to Brown's Ferry, thence on the north side to the river opposite Chattanooga. There were several steamers at Bridgeport, and abundance of forage, clothing, and provisions.

On the way to Chattanooga I had telegraphed back to Nashville for a good supply of vegetables and small rations, which the troops had been so long deprived of. Hooker had brought with him from the east a full supply of land transportation. His animals had not been subjected to hard work on bad roads without forage, but were in good condition. In five days from my arrival at Chattanooga the way was open to Bridgeport, and, with the aid of steamers and Hooker's teams, in a week the troops were receiving full rations. It is hard for any one not an eye-witness to realize the relief this brought. The men were soon reclothed and well fed; an abundance of ammunition was brought up, and a cheerfulness prevailed not before enjoyed in many weeks. Neither officers nor men looked upon themselves any longer as doomed. The weak and languid appearance of the troops, so visible before, disappeared at once. I do not know what the effect was on the other side, but assume it must have been correspondingly depressing. Mr. Davis had visited Bragg but a short time before, and must have perceived our condition to be about as Bragg described it in his subsequent report. "These dispositions," he said, "faithfully sustained, insured the enemy's speedy evacuation of Chattanooga, for want of food and forage. Possessed of the shortest route to his depot and the one by which reënforcements must reach him, we held him at our mercy, and his destruction was only a question of time." But the dispositions were not "faithfully sustained," and I doubt not that thousands of men engaged in trying to "sustain" them now rejoice that they were not.

There was no time during the rebellion when I did not think, and often say, that the South was more to be benefited by defeat than the North. The latter had the people, the institutions, and the territory to make a great and prosperous nation. The former was burdened with an institution abhorrent to all civilized peoples not brought up under it, and one which degraded labor, kept it in ignorance, and enervated the governing class. With the outside world at war with this institution, they could not have extended their territory. The labor of the country was not skilled, nor allowed to become so. The whites could not toil without becoming degraded, and those who did were denominated "poor white trash." The system of labor would have soon exhausted the soil and left the people poor. The non-slaveholders would have left the country, and the small slaveholder must have sold out to his more fortunate neighbors. Soon the slaves would have outnumbered the masters, and, not being in sympathy with them, would have risen in their might and exterminated them. The war was expensive to the South as well as to the North, both in blood and treasure; but it was worth all it cost.

The enemy was surprised by the movement which secured to us a line of supplies. He appreciated its importance, and hastened to try to recover the line from us. His strength on Lookout Mountain was not equal to Hooker's



PANORAMIC VIEW OF THE CHATTANOOGA REGION FROM POINT LOOKOUT, ON LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN. FROM A LITHOGRAPH.

command in the valley below. From Missionary Ridge he had to march twice the distance we had from Chattanooga, in order to reach Lookout Valley. But on the night of the 28th-29th [of October] an attack was made on Geary, at Wauhatchie, by Longstreet's corps. When the battle commenced, Hooker ordered Howard up from Brown's Ferry. He had three miles to march to reach Geary. On his way he was fired upon by rebel troops from a foot-hill to the left of the road, and from which the road was commanded. Howard turned to the left, and charged up the hill, and captured it before the enemy had time to intrench, taking many prisoners. Leaving sufficient men to hold this height, he pushed on to reinforce Geary. Before he got up, Geary had been engaged for about three hours against a vastly superior force. The night was so dark that the men could not distinguish one another except by the light of the flashes of their muskets. In the darkness and uproar Hooker's teamsters became frightened, and deserted their teams. The mules also became frightened, and, breaking loose from their fastenings, stampeded directly toward the enemy. The latter no doubt took this for a charge, and stampeded in turn. By 4 o'clock in the morning the battle had entirely ceased, and our "cracker line" was never afterward disturbed. ♣

♣ Major J. L. Coker, of Darlington, South Carolina, says of General Grant's description of this fighting in Lookout Valley:

"The engagement of Wauhatchie, or Lookout Valley, was of minor importance; but it is well to have errors corrected. General Geary's Federal division was not attacked by Longstreet's corps, but by Jenkins's South Carolina brigade, commanded by Colonel (afterward General) John Bratton. No other troops fired a shot at Geary's men that night. The battle lasted about one hour and a half, and was brought to a close on account of General Howard's advance threatening Bratton's rear, and not by a Confederate stampede caused by a 'mule-charge' in the dark. When the order to retire was received, the brigade was withdrawn in good order. The writer, acting assistant adjutant-general on Colonel Bratton's staff, was wounded and taken from the field at the close of the battle, and did not observe any disorder. General Howard was opposed by a small force, and made such progress that Jenkins's brigade was in danger of being cut off from the crossing over Lookout Creek. They were ordered out when they seemed to be getting the better of General Geary, who was surprised by the night attack, and no doubt thought himself 'greatly outnumbered,' and reported himself attacked by a corps instead of a brigade."

EDITORS.


In securing possession of Lookout Valley, Smith lost one man killed and four or five wounded. The enemy lost most of his pickets at the ferry by capture. In the night engagement of the 28th-29th Hooker lost 416 killed and wounded. I never knew the loss of the enemy, but our troops buried over 150 of his dead, and captured more than 100.

Having got the Army of the Cumberland in a comfortable position, I now began to look after the remainder of my new command. Burnside was in about as desperate a condition as the Army of the Cumberland had been, only he was not yet besieged. He was a hundred miles from the nearest possible base, Big South Fork of the Cumberland River, and much farther from any railroad we had possession of. The roads back were over mountains, and all supplies along the line had long since been exhausted. His animals, too, had been starved, and their carcasses lined the road from Cumberland Gap, and far back toward Lexington, Kentucky. East Tennessee still furnished supplies of beef, bread, and forage, but it did not supply ammunition, clothing, medical supplies, or small rations, such as coffee, sugar, salt, and rice.

Stopping to organize his new command, Sherman had started from Memphis for Corinth on the 11th of October. His instructions required him to repair the road in his rear in order to bring up supplies. The distance was about 330 miles through a hostile country. His entire command could not have maintained the road if it had been completed. The bridges had all been destroyed by the enemy and much other damage done; a hostile community lived along the road; guerrilla bands infested the country, and more or less of the cavalry of the enemy was still in the west. Often Sherman's work was destroyed as soon as completed, though he was only a short distance away.

The Memphis and Charleston road strikes the Tennessee River at Eastport, Mississippi. Knowing the difficulty Sherman would have to supply himself from Memphis, I had previously ordered supplies sent from St. Louis on small steamers, to be convoyed by the navy, to meet him at Eastport. These he got. I now ordered him to discontinue his work of repairing roads, and to move on with his whole force to Stevenson, Alabama, without delay. This order was borne to Sherman by a messenger who paddled down the Tennessee in a canoe, and floated over Muscle Shoals; it was delivered at Iuka on the 27th. In this Sherman was notified that the rebels were moving a force toward Cleveland, east Tennessee, and might be going to Nashville, in which event his troops were in the best position to beat them there. Sherman, with his characteristic promptness, abandoned the work he was engaged upon and pushed on at once. On the 1st of November he crossed the Tennessee at Eastport, and that day was in Florence, Alabama, with the head of column, while his troops were still crossing at Eastport, with Blair bringing up the rear.

Sherman's force made an additional army, with cavalry, artillery, and trains, all to be supplied by the single-track road from Nashville. All indications pointed also to the probable necessity of supplying Burnside's command, in east Tennessee, 25,000 more, by the same road. A



VIEW OF CHATTANOOGA AND MOCCASIN POINT FROM THE SIDE OF LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

single track could not do this. I therefore gave an order to Sherman to halt General G. M. Dodge's command of eight thousand men at Athens, and subsequently directed the latter to arrange his troops along the railroad from Decatur, north toward Nashville, and to rebuild that road. The road from Nashville to Decatur passes over a broken country, cut up with innumerable streams, many of them of considerable width, and with valleys far below the road-bed. All the bridges over these had been destroyed and the rails taken up and twisted by the enemy. All the locomotives and cars not carried off had been destroyed as effectually as they knew how to destroy them. All bridges and culverts had been destroyed between Nashville and Decatur, and thence to Stevenson, where the Memphis and Charleston and the Nashville and Chattanooga roads unite. The rebuilding of this road would give us two roads as far as Stevenson over which to supply the army. From Bridgeport, a short distance farther east, the river supplements the road.

General Dodge, besides being a most capable soldier, was an experienced railroad builder. He had no tools to work with except those of the pioneers—axes, picks, and spades. With these he was able to intrench his men and protect them against surprises by small parties of the enemy. As he had no base of supplies until the road could be completed back to Nashville, the first matter to consider, after protecting his men, was the getting in of food and forage from the surrounding country. He had his men and teams bring in all the grain they could find, or all they needed, and all the cattle

for beef, and such other food as could be found. Millers were detailed from the ranks to run the mills along the line of the army; when these were not near enough to the troops for protection, they were taken down and moved up to the line of the road. Blacksmith shops, with all the iron and steel found in them, were moved up in like manner. Blacksmiths were detailed and set to work making the tools necessary in railroad and bridge building. Axemen were put to work getting out timber for bridges, and cutting fuel for the locomotives when the road should be completed; car-builders were set to work repairing the locomotives and cars. Thus every branch of railroad-building, making tools to work with, and supplying the workingmen with food, was all going on at once, and without the aid of a mechanic or laborer except what the command itself furnished. But rails and cars the men could not make without material, and there was not enough rolling stock to keep the road we already had worked to its full capacity. There were no rails except those in use. To supply these deficiencies I ordered eight of the ten engineers General McPherson had at Vicksburg to be sent to Nashville, and all the cars he had, except ten. I also ordered the troops in west Tennessee to points on the river and on the Memphis and Charleston road, and ordered the cars, locomotives, and rails from all the railroads, except the Memphis and Charleston, to Nashville. The military manager of railroads, also, was directed to furnish more rolling stock, and, as far as he could, bridge material. General Dodge had the work assigned him finished within forty days after receiving his orders. The number of bridges to rebuild was 182, many of them over deep and wide chasms. The length of road repaired was 182 miles.

The enemy's troops, which it was thought were either moving against Burnside or were going to Nashville, went no farther than Cleveland. Their presence there, however, alarmed the authorities at Washington, and on account of our helpless condition at Chattanooga caused me much uneasiness. Dispatches were constantly coming, urging me to do something for Burnside's relief; calling attention to the importance of holding east Tennessee; saying the President was much concerned for the protection of the loyal people in that section, etc. We had not at Chattanooga animals to pull a single piece of artillery, much less a supply train. Reënforcements could not help Burnside, because he had neither supplies nor ammunition sufficient for them; hardly indeed bread and meat for the men he had. There was no relief possible for him, except by expelling the enemy from Missionary Ridge and about Chattanooga.

On the 4th of November Longstreet left our front with about 15,000 troops, besides Wheeler's cavalry, 5000 more, to go against Burnside.† The situation seemed desperate, and was more exasperating because nothing could be done until Sherman should get up. The authorities at Washington

† In the course of the preparation of this paper we asked General Grant, whether the detachment of Longstreet for the attack on Knoxville was not, in his opinion, a great mistake on the part of Bragg. He replied in the affirmative; and when

it was further presumed that Bragg doubtless thought his position impregnable, the Victor of Chattanooga answered, with a shrewd look that accented the humor of his words: "Well, it *was* impregnable."—EDITORS.



VIEW OF LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN FROM THE HILL TO THE NORTH, WHICH WAS GENERAL HOOKER'S POSITION DURING THE BATTLE ON THE MOUNTAIN, NOVEMBER 24, 1863. FROM A WAR-TIME PHOTOGRAPH.

The military road winding over the north slope of Lookout was built after Hooker captured the mountain.

were now more than ever anxious for the safety of Burnside's army, and plied me with dispatches faster than ever, urging that something should be done for his relief. On the 7th, before Longstreet could possibly have reached Knoxville, I ordered Gen. Thomas peremptorily to attack the enemy's right so as to force the return of the troops that had gone up the valley. I directed him to take mules, officers' horses, or animals wherever he could get them, to move the necessary artillery. But he persisted in the declaration that he could not move a single piece of artillery, and could not see how he could possibly comply with the order. Nothing was left to be done but to answer Washington dispatches as best I could, urge Sherman forward, although he was making every effort to get forward, and encourage Burnside to hold on, assuring him that in a short time he would be relieved. All of Burnside's dispatches showed the greatest confidence in his ability to hold his position as long as his ammunition should hold out. He even suggested the propriety of abandoning the territory he held south and west of Knoxville, so as to

draw the enemy farther from his base, and to make it more difficult for him to get back to Chattanooga when the battle should begin. Longstreet had a railroad as far as Loudon; but from there to Knoxville he had to rely on wagon trains. Burnside's suggestion, therefore, was a good one, and it was adopted. On the 14th I telegraphed him:

"Sherman's advance has reached Bridgeport. His whole force will be ready to move from there by Tuesday at furthest. If you can hold Longstreet in check until he gets up, or, by skirmishing and falling back, can avoid serious loss to yourself, and gain time, I will be able to force the enemy back from here, and place a force between Longstreet and Bragg that must inevitably make the former take to the mountain-passes by every available road, to get to his supplies. Sherman would have been here before this but for the high water in Elk River driving him some thirty miles up the river to cross.

Longstreet, for some reason or other, stopped at Loudon until the 13th. That being the terminus of his railroad communications, it is probable he was directed to remain there awaiting orders. ¶ He was in a position threatening Knoxville, and at the same time where he could be brought back speedily to Chattanooga. The day after Longstreet left Loudon, Sherman reached Bridgeport in person, and proceeded on to see me that evening, the 14th, and reached Chattanooga the next day.

My orders for the battle were all prepared in advance of Sherman's arrival, except the dates, which could not be fixed while troops to be engaged were so far away. The possession of Lookout Mountain was of no special advantage to us now. Hooker was instructed to send Howard's corps to the north side of the Tennessee, thence up behind the hills on the north side, and to go into camp opposite Chattanooga; with the remainder of the command Hooker was, at a time to be afterward appointed, to ascend the western slope between the upper and lower palisades, and so get into Chattanooga Valley.

The plan of battle was for Sherman to attack the enemy's right flank, form a line across it, extend our left over South Chickamauga River, so as to threaten or hold the railroad in Bragg's rear, and thus force him either to weaken his lines elsewhere or lose his connection with his base at Chickamauga Station. Hooker was to perform like service on our right. His problem was to get from Lookout Valley to Chattanooga Valley in the most expeditious way possible; cross the latter valley rapidly to Rossville, south of Bragg's line on Missionary Ridge, form line there across the ridge, facing north, with his right flank extended to Chickamauga Valley east of the ridge, thus threatening the enemy's rear on that flank and compelling him to reënforce this also. Thomas, with the Army of the Cumberland, occupied the center, and was to assault while the enemy was engaged with most of his forces on his two flanks.

To carry out this plan, Sherman was to cross the Tennessee at Brown's Ferry and move east of Chattanooga to a point opposite the north end of

¶ In his history, the Comte de Paris says Longstreet was delayed "by the necessity of collecting provisions and organizing his trains."—EDITORS.

¶ A bridge was thrown across the South Chickamauga Creek, at its mouth, and a brigade of cav-

alry was sent across it. That brigade caused the bridge across the Holston River to be burned by the enemy and thus cut off General Longstreet's forces from coming back to General Bragg.—EDITORS.

Missionary Ridge, and to place his command back of the foot-hills out of sight of the enemy on the ridge. There are two streams called Chickamauga emptying into the Tennessee River east of Chattanooga: North Chickamauga, taking its rise in Tennessee, flowing south and emptying into the river some seven or eight miles east; while the South Chickamauga, which takes its rise in Georgia, flows northward, and empties into the Tennessee some three or four miles above the town. There were now 116 pontoons in the North Chickamauga River, their presence there being unknown to the enemy.

At night a division was to be marched up to that point, and at 2 o'clock in the morning moved down with the current, thirty men in each boat. A few were to land east of the mouth of the South Chickamauga, capture the pickets there, and then lay a bridge connecting the two banks of the river. The rest were to land on the south side of the Tennessee, where Missionary Ridge would strike it if prolonged, and a sufficient number of men to man the boats were to push to the north side to ferry over the main body of Sherman's command, while those left on the south side intrenched themselves. ☆ Thomas was to move out from his lines facing the ridge, leaving enough of Palmer's corps to guard against an attack down the valley. Lookout Valley being of no present value to us, and being untenable by the enemy if we should secure Missionary Ridge, Hooker's orders were changed. His revised orders brought him to Chattanooga by the established route north of the Tennessee. He was then to move out to the right to Rossville. †

The next day after Sherman's arrival I took him, with Generals Thomas and Smith and other officers, to the north side of the river and showed them the ground over which Sherman had to march, and pointed out generally what he was expected to do. I, as well as the authorities in Washington, was still in a great state of anxiety for Burnside's safety. Burnside himself, I believe, was the only one who did not share in this anxiety. Nothing could be done for him, however, until Sherman's troops were up. As soon, therefore, as the inspection was over, Sherman started for Bridgeport to hasten

☆ This was not, however, the original plan to which Sherman assented, which was to march at once for the north end of the ridge.—EDITORS.

† Hooker's position in Lookout Valley was absolutely essential to us so long as Chattanooga was besieged. It was the key to our line for supplying the army. But it was not essential after the enemy was dispersed from our front, or even after the battle for this purpose was begun. Hooker's orders, therefore, were designed to get his force past Lookout Mountain and Chattanooga Valley, and up to Missionary Ridge. By crossing the north face of Lookout the troops would come into Chattanooga Valley in rear of the line held by the enemy across the valley, and would necessarily force its evacuation. Orders were accordingly given to Hooker to march by this route. But days before the battle began the advantages as well as disadvantages of this plan of action were all considered. The passage over the mountain was a difficult one to make in the face of an enemy. It might consume so much time as to lose us the use

of the troops engaged in it at other points where they were more wanted. After reaching Chattanooga Valley, the creek of the same name, quite a formidable stream to get an army over, had to be crossed.

I was perfectly willing that the enemy should keep Lookout Mountain until we got through with the troops on Missionary Ridge. By marching Hooker to the north side of the river, thence up the stream and recrossing at the town, he could be got in position at any named time; when in this new position he would have Chattanooga Creek behind him; and the attack on Missionary Ridge would unquestionably have caused the evacuation by the enemy of his line across the valley and on Lookout Mountain. Hooker's order was changed accordingly. As explained elsewhere, the original order had to be reverted to because of a flood in the river rendering the bridge at Brown's Ferry unsafe for the passage of troops at the exact juncture when it was wanted to bring all the troops together against Missionary Ridge.—U. S. G.

matters, rowing a boat himself, I believe, from Kelley's Ferry. Sherman had left Bridgeport the night of the 14th, reached Chattanooga the evening of the 15th, made the above-described inspection the morning of the 16th, and started back the same evening to hurry up his command, fully appreciating the importance of time.

His march was conducted with as much expedition as the roads and season would admit of. By the 20th he was himself at Brown's Ferry with head of column, but many of his troops were far behind, and one division, Ewing's, was at Trenton, sent that way to create the impression that Lookout was to be taken from the south. Sherman received his orders at the ferry, and was asked if he could not be ready for the assault the following morning. News had been received that the battle had been commenced at Knoxville. Burnside had been cut off from telegraphic communication. The President, the Secretary of War, and General Halleck were in an agony of suspense. My suspense was also great, but more endurable, because I was where I could soon do something to relieve the situation. It was impossible to get Sherman's troops up for the next day. I then asked him if they could not be got up to make the assault on the morning of the 22d, and ordered Thomas to move on that date. But the elements were against us. It rained all the 20th and 21st. The river rose so rapidly that it was difficult to keep the pontoons in place.

General Orlando B. Willcox, a division commander under Burnside, was at this time occupying a position farther up the valley than Knoxville,—about Maynardsville,—and was still in telegraphic communication with the North. A dispatch was received from him, saying that he was threatened from the east. The following was sent in reply:

"If you can communicate with General Burnside, say to him that our attack on Bragg will commence in the morning. If successful, such a move will be made as, I think, will relieve east Tennessee, if he can hold out. Longstreet passing through our lines to Kentucky need not cause alarm. He would find the country so bare that he would lose his transportation and artillery before reaching Kentucky, and would meet such a force before he got through that he could not return."

Meantime Sherman continued his crossing, without intermission, as fast as his troops could be got up. The crossing had to be effected in full view of the enemy on the top of Lookout Mountain. Once over, the troops soon disappeared behind the detached hills on the north side, and would not come to view again, either to watchmen on Lookout Mountain or Missionary Ridge, until they emerged between the hills to strike the bank of the river. But when Sherman's advance reached a point opposite the town of Chattanooga, Howard, who, it will be remembered, had been concealed behind the hills on the north side, took up his line of march to join the troops on the south side. His crossing was in full view both from Missionary Ridge and the top of Lookout, and the enemy, of course, supposed these troops to be Sherman's. This enabled Sherman to get to his assigned position without discovery.

On the 20th, when so much was occurring to discourage,—rains falling so heavily as to delay the passage of troops over the river at Brown's Ferry,

and threatening the entire breaking of the bridge; news coming of a battle raging at Knoxville; of Willeox being threatened by a force from the east,—a letter was received from Bragg which contained these words:


“As there may still be some non-combatants in Chattanooga, I deem it proper to notify you that prudence would dictate their early withdrawal.”

Of course I understood that this was a device intended to deceive; but I did not know what the intended deception was. On the 22d, however, a deserter came in who informed me that Bragg was leaving our front, and on that day Buckner's division was sent to reinforce Longstreet, at Knoxville, and another division started to follow, but was recalled. The object of Bragg's letter no doubt was in some way to detain me until Knoxville could be captured, and his troops there be returned to Chattanooga.

During the night of the 21st the rest of the pontoon-boats, completed, one hundred and sixteen in all, were carried up to and placed in North Chickamauga. The material for the roadway over these was deposited out of view of the enemy within a few hundred yards of the bank of the Tennessee where the north end of the bridge was to rest.

Hearing nothing from Burnside, and hearing much of the distress in Washington on his account, I could no longer defer operations for his relief. I determined therefore to do on the 23d, with the Army of the Cumberland, what had been intended to be done on the 24th.

The position occupied by the Army of the Cumberland had been made very strong for defense during the months it had been besieged. The line was about a mile from the town, and extended from Citico Creek, a small stream running near the base of Missionary Ridge and emptying into the Tennessee about two miles below the mouth of the South Chickamauga, on the left, to Chattanooga Creek on the right. All commanding points on the line were well fortified and well equipped with artillery. The important elevations within the line had all been carefully fortified and supplied with a proper armament. Among the elevations so fortified was one to the east of the town, named Fort Wood. It owed its importance chiefly to the fact that it lay between the town and Missionary Ridge, where most of the strength of the enemy was. Fort Wood had in it twenty-two pieces of artillery, most of which would reach the nearer points of the enemy's line. On the morning of the 23d Thomas, according to instructions, moved Granger's corps of two divisions, Sheridan and T. J. Wood commanding, to the foot of Fort Wood, and formed them into line as if going on parade—Sheridan on the right, Wood to the left, extending to or near Citico Creek. Palmer, commanding the Fourteenth Corps, held that part of our line facing south and south-west. He supported Sheridan with one division, Baird's, while his other division, under [R. W.] Johnson, remained in the trenches, under arms, ready to be moved to any point. Howard's corps was moved in rear of the center. The picket lines were within a few hundred yards of each other. At 2 o'clock in the afternoon all were ready to advance. By this time the clouds had lifted so that the enemy could see from his elevated



BRIDGING LOOKOUT CREEK PREPARATORY TO THE ASSAULT BY HOOKER. FROM A WAR-TIME SKETCH.

position all that was going on. The signal for advance was given by a booming of cannon from Fort Wood and other points on the line. The rebel pickets were soon driven back upon the main guards, which occupied minor and detached heights between the main ridge and our lines. These too were carried before halting, and before the enemy had time to reënforce their advance guards. But it was not without loss on both sides. This movement secured to us a line fully a mile in advance of the one we occupied in the morning, and one which the enemy had occupied up to this time. The fortifications were rapidly turned to face the other way. During the following night they were made strong. We lost in this preliminary action about eleven hundred killed and wounded, while the enemy probably lost quite as heavily, including the prisoners that were captured. With the exception of the firing of artillery, kept up from Missionary Ridge and Fort Wood until night closed in, this ended the fighting for the day.

The advantage was greatly on our side now, and if I could only have been assured that Burnside could hold out ten days longer I should have rested more easy. But we were doing the best we could for him and the cause.

By the night of the 23d Sherman's command was in a position to move, though one division (Osterhaus's) had not yet crossed the river at Brown's Ferry. The continuous rise in the Tennessee had rendered it impossible to keep the bridge at that point in condition for troops to cross; but I was determined to move that night, even without this division. Accordingly, orders were sent to Osterhaus to report to Hooker if he could not cross by 8 o'clock on the morning of the 24th. Because of the break in the bridge, Hooker's orders were again changed, but this time only back to those first given to him.

General W. F. Smith had been assigned to duty as chief engineer of the military division. To him was given the general direction of moving troops by the boats from North Chickamauga, laying the bridge after they reached



THE BATTLE OF LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN. FROM A PAINTING LENT BY CAPTAIN W. L. STORK.

This picture shows the Union troops fighting in the woods near the cliffs of Point Lookout.

Early in October, 1863, Jefferson Davis visited Lookout Mountain with General Bragg. As they approached the edge of the cliff, General Bragg, with a

wave of the hand, alluded to "the fine view"; whereupon Major Robert W. Wooley, who had little faith in the military outlook, exclaimed to a brother officer, but so that all could hear: "Yes, it's a fine view, but a — bad prospect."—EDITORS.

their position, and, generally, all the duties pertaining to his office of chief engineer. During the night General Morgan L. Smith's division was marched to the point where the pontoons were, and the brigade of Giles A. Smith was selected for the delicate duty of manning the boats and surprising the enemy's pickets on the south bank of the river. During this night, also, General J. M. Brannan, chief of artillery, moved forty pieces of artillery belonging to the Army of the Cumberland, and placed them on the north side

of the river so as to command the ground opposite, to aid in protecting the approach to the point where the south end of the bridge was to rest. He had to use Sherman's artillery horses for this purpose, Thomas having none.

At 2 o'clock in the morning, November 24th, Giles A. Smith pushed out from the North Chickamauga with his 116 boats, each loaded with 30 brave and well-armed men. The boats, with their precious freight, dropped down quietly with the current to avoid attracting the attention of any one who could convey information to the enemy, until arriving near the mouth of South Chickamauga. Here a few boats were landed, the troops debarked, and a rush was made upon the picket-guard known to be at that point. The guard was surprised, and twenty of their number captured. The remainder of the troops effected a landing at the point where the bridge was to start, with equally good results. The work of ferrying over Sherman's command from the north side of the Tennessee was at once commenced, using the pontoons for the purpose. A steamer was also brought up from the town to assist. The rest of M. L. Smith's division came first, then the division of John E. Smith. The troops as they landed were put to work intrenching their position. By daylight the two entire divisions were over, and well covered by the works they had built.

The work of laying the bridge on which to cross the artillery and cavalry was now begun. The ferrying over the infantry was continued with the steamer and the pontoons, taking the pontoons, however, as fast as they were wanted to put in their place in the bridge. By a little past noon the bridge was completed, as well as one over the South Chickamauga, connecting the troops left on that side with their comrades below, and all the infantry and artillery were on the south bank of the Tennessee.

Sherman at once formed his troops for assault on Missionary Ridge. By 1 o'clock he started, with M. L. Smith on his left, keeping nearly the course of Chickamauga River; J. E. Smith next, to the right and a little in the rear; then Ewing, still farther to the right, and also a little to the rear of J. E. Smith's command, in column ready to deploy to the right if an enemy should come from that direction. A good skirmish line preceded each of these columns. Soon the foot of the hill was reached; the skirmishers pushed directly up, followed closely by their supports. By half-past 3 Sherman was in possession of the height, without having sustained much loss. A brigade from each division was now brought up, and artillery was dragged to the top of the hill by hand. The enemy did not seem to have been aware of this movement until the top of the hill was gained. There had been a drizzling rain during the day, and the clouds were so low that Lookout Mountain and the top of Missionary Ridge were obscured from the view of persons in the valley. But now the enemy opened fire upon their assailants, and made several attempts with their skirmishers to drive them away, but without avail. Later in the day a more determined attack was made, but this, too, failed, and Sherman was left to fortify what he had gained.

Sherman's cavalry took up its line of march soon after the bridge was completed, and by half-past three the whole of it was over both bridges, and on its



THE FIGHT EAST OF THE PALISADES ON LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN. FROM A WAR-TIME SKETCH.

way to strike the enemy's communications at Chickamauga Station. All of Sherman's command was now south of the Tennessee. During the afternoon General Giles A. Smith was severely wounded and carried from the field.

Thomas having done on the 23d what was expected of him on the 24th, there was nothing for him to do this day, except to strengthen his position. Howard, however, effected a crossing of Citico Creek and a junction with Sherman, and was directed to report to him. With two or three regiments of his command, he moved in the morning along the banks of the Tennessee and reached the point where the bridge was being laid. He went out on the bridge as far as it was completed from the south end, and saw Sherman superintending the work from the north side, moving himself south as fast as an additional boat was put in and the roadway put upon it. Howard reported to his new chief across the chasm between them, which was now narrow and in a few minutes was closed.

While these operations were going on to the east of Chattanooga, Hooker was engaged on the west. He had three divisions: Osterhaus's, of the Fifteenth Corps, Army of the Tennessee; Geary's, Twelfth Corps, Army of the Potomac; and Cruft's, Fourteenth Corps, Army of the Cumberland. Geary was on the right at Wauhatchie, Cruft at the center, and Osterhaus near Brown's Ferry. These troops were all west of Lookout Creek. The enemy had the east bank of the creek strongly picketed and intrenched, and three brigades of troops in the rear to reënforce them if attacked. These brigades

occupied the summit of the mountain. General Carter L. Stevenson was in command of the whole. Why any troops except artillery, with a small infantry guard, were kept on the mountain-top, I do not see. A hundred men could have held the summit—which is a palisade for more than thirty feet down—against the assault of any number of men from the position Hooker occupied.

The side of Lookout Mountain confronting Hooker's command was rugged, heavily timbered, and full of chasms, making it difficult to advance with troops, even in the absence of an opposing force. Farther up the ground becomes more even and level, and was in cultivation. On the east side the slope is much more gradual, and a good wagon road, zigzagging up it, connects the town of Chattanooga with the summit.

Early in the morning of the 24th Hooker moved Geary's division, supported by a brigade of Cruft's, up Lookout Creek, to effect a crossing. The remainder of Cruft's division was to seize the bridge over the creek, near the crossing of the railroad. Osterhaus was to move up to the bridge and cross it. The bridge was seized by Grose's brigade after a slight skirmish with the picket guarding it. This attracted the enemy so that Geary's movement farther up was not observed. A heavy mist obscured him from the view of the troops on the top of the mountain. He crossed the creek almost unobserved, and captured the picket of over forty men on guard near by. He then commenced ascending the mountain directly in his front. By this time the enemy was seen coming down from their camp on the mountain slope, and filing into their rifle-pits to contest the crossing of the bridge. By 11 o'clock the bridge was complete. Osterhaus was up, and after some sharp skirmishing the enemy was driven away, with considerable loss in killed and captured.

While the operations at the bridge were progressing, Geary was pushing up the hill over great obstacles, resisted by the enemy directly in his front, and in face of the guns on top of the mountain. The enemy, seeing their left flank and rear menaced, gave way and were followed by Cruft and Osterhaus. Soon these were up abreast of Geary, and the whole command pushed up the hill, driving the enemy in advance. By noon Geary had gained the open ground on the north slope of the mountain with his right close up to the base of the upper palisade, but there were strong fortifications in his front. The rest of the command coming up, a line was formed from the base of the upper palisade to the mouth of Chattanooga Creek.

Thomas and I were on the top of Orchard Knob. Hooker's advance now made our line a continuous one. It was in full view extending from the Tennessee River, where Sherman had crossed, up Chickamauga River to the base of Missionary Ridge, over the top of the north end of the ridge, to Chattanooga Valley, then along parallel to the ridge a mile or more, across the valley to the mouth of Chattanooga Creek, thence up the slope of Lookout Mountain to the foot of the upper palisade. The day was hazy, so that Hooker's operations were not visible to us except at moments when the clouds would rise. But the sound of his artillery and musketry was heard

incessantly. The enemy on his front was partially fortified, but was soon driven out of his works. At 2 o'clock the clouds, which had so obscured the top of Lookout all day as to hide whatever was going on from the view of those below, settled down and made it so dark where Hooker was as to stop operations for the time. At 4 o'clock Hooker reported his position as impregnable. By a little after 5, direct communication was established, and a brigade of troops was sent from Chattanooga to reënforce him. These troops had to cross Chattanooga Creek, and met with some opposition, but soon overcame it, and by night the commander, General Carlin, reported to Hooker and was assigned to his left. I now telegraphed to Washington:

"The fight to-day progressed favorably. Sherman carried the end of Missionary Ridge, and his right is now at the tunnel, and his left at Chickamauga Creek. Troops from Lookout Valley carried the point of the mountain, and now hold the eastern slope and a point high up. Hooker reports two thousand prisoners taken, besides which a small number have fallen into our hands, from Missionary Ridge."

The next day the President replied:

"Your dispatches as to fighting on Monday and Tuesday are here. Well done. Many thanks to all. Remember Burnside."

Halleck also telegraphed:

"I congratulate you on the success thus far of your plans. I fear that Burnside is hard pushed, and that any further delay may prove fatal. I know you will do all in your power to relieve him."

The division of Jefferson C. Davis, Army of the Cumberland, had been sent to the North Chickamauga to guard the pontoons as they were deposited in the river, and to prevent all ingress or egress by citizens. On the night of the 24th his division, having crossed with Sherman, occupied our extreme left, from the upper bridge over the plain to the north base of Missionary Ridge. Firing continued to a late hour in the night, but it was not connected with an assault at any point.

At 12 o'clock at night, when all was quiet, I began to give orders for the next day, and sent a dispatch to Willcox to encourage Burnside. Sherman was directed to attack at daylight. Hooker was ordered to move at the same hour, and endeavor to intercept the enemy's retreat, if he still remained; if he had gone, then to move directly to Rossville and operate against the left and rear of the force on Missionary Ridge. Thomas was not to move until Hooker had reached Missionary Ridge. As I was with him on Orchard Knob, he would not move without further orders from me.

The morning of the 25th opened clear and bright, and the whole field was in full view from the top of Orchard Knob. It remained so all day. Bragg's headquarters were in full view, and officers—presumably staff-officers—could be seen coming and going constantly.

The point of ground which Sherman had carried on the 24th was almost disconnected from the main ridge occupied by the enemy. A low pass, over which there is a wagon road crossing the hill, and near which there is a railroad tunnel, intervenes between the two hills. The problem now was to get

to the latter. The enemy was fortified on the point, and back farther, where the ground was still higher, was a second fortification commanding the first. Sherman was out as soon as it was light enough to see, and by sunrise his command was in motion. Three brigades held the hill already gained. Morgan L. Smith moved along the east base of Missionary Ridge; Loomis along the west base, supported by two brigades of John E. Smith's division; and Corse with his brigade was between the two, moving directly toward the hill to be captured. The ridge is steep and heavily wooded on the east side, where M. L. Smith's troops were advancing, but cleared and with a more gentle slope on the west side. The troops advanced rapidly and carried the extreme end of the rebel works. Morgan L. Smith advanced to a point which cut the enemy off from the railroad bridge and the means of bringing up supplies by rail from Chickamauga Station, where the main depot was located. The enemy made brave and strenuous efforts to drive our troops from the position we had gained, but without success. The contest lasted for two hours. Corse, a brave and efficient commander, was badly wounded in this assault. Sherman now threatened both Bragg's flank and his stores, and made it necessary for him to weaken other points of his line to strengthen his right. From the position I occupied I could see column after column of Bragg's forces moving against Sherman; every Confederate gun that could be brought to bear upon the Union forces was concentrated upon him. J. E. Smith, with two brigades, charged up the west side of the ridge to the support of Corse's command, over open ground, and in the face of a heavy fire of both artillery and musketry, and reached the very parapet of the enemy. He lay here for a time, but the enemy coming with a heavy force upon his right flank, he was compelled to fall back, followed by the foe. A few hundred yards brought Smith's troops into a wood, where they were speedily re-formed, when they charged and drove the attacking party back to his intrenchments.

Seeing the advance, repulse, and second advance of J. E. Smith from the position I occupied, I directed Thomas to send a division to reënforce him. Baird's division was accordingly sent from the right of Orchard Knob. It had to march a considerable distance, directly under the eyes of the enemy, to reach its position. ☆ Bragg at once commenced massing in the same direction. This was what I wanted. But it had now got to be late in the afternoon, and I had expected before this to see Hooker crossing the ridge in the neighborhood of Rossville, and compelling Bragg to mass in that direction also.

The enemy had evacuated Lookout Mountain during the night, as I expected he would. In crossing the valley he burned the bridges over Chattanooga Creek, and did all he could to obstruct the roads behind him. Hooker was off bright and early, with no obstructions in his front but distance and the destruction above named. He was detained four hours in crossing Chatta-

☆ Concerning this movement General Baird writes as follows: "I was ordered to report to General Sherman to reënforce his command. I marched the distance, about two miles to the rear of his position, and sent an officer to report to

him, but I immediately received orders to return and form on the left of the line which was to assault Missionary Ridge. I reached there, and got my troops in position, just as the gun was fired directing the assault."—EDITORS.



BAIRD'S DIVISION FIGHTING FOR THE CREST OF MISSIONARY RIDGE. FROM THE CYCLORAMA.

nooga Creek, and thus was lost the immediate advantages I expected from his forces. His reaching Bragg's flank and extending across it was to be the signal for Thomas's assault of the ridge. But Sherman's condition was getting so critical that the assault for his relief could not be delayed any longer.

Sheridan's and Wood's divisions had been lying under arms from early in the morning, ready to move the instant the signal was given. I now directed Thomas to order the charge at once.† I watched eagerly to see the effect, and became impatient at last that there was no indication of any charge being made. The center of the line which was to make the charge was near where Thomas and I stood together, but concealed from our view by the intervening forest. Turning to Thomas to inquire what caused the delay, I was surprised to see General Thomas J. Wood, one of the division commanders who were to make the charge, standing talking to him. I spoke to General Wood, asking him why he had not charged, as ordered an hour before. He replied very promptly that this was the first he had heard of it, but that he had been ready all day to move at a moment's notice. I told him to make the charge at once. He was off in a moment, and in an incredibly short time loud cheering was heard, and he and Sheridan were driving the enemy's advance before them toward Missionary Ridge. The Confederates were strongly intrenched

† In this order authority was given for the troops to re-form after taking the first line of rifle-pits preparatory to carrying the ridge.— U. S. G.

on the crest of the ridge in front of us, and had a second line half-way down and another at the base. Our men drove the troops in front of the lower line of rifle-pits so rapidly, and followed them so closely, that rebel and Union troops went over the first line of works almost at the same time. Many rebels were captured and sent to the rear under the fire of their own friends higher up the hill. Those that were not captured retreated, and were pursued. The retreating hordes being between friends and pursuers, caused the enemy to fire high, to avoid killing their own men. In fact, on that occasion the Union soldier nearest the enemy was in the safest position. Without awaiting further orders or stopping to re-form, on our troops went to the second line of works; over that and on for the crest—thus effectually carrying out my orders of the 18th for the battle and of the 24th for this charge. I watched their progress with intense interest. The fire along the rebel line was terrific. Cannon and musket balls filled the air; but the damage done was in small proportion to the ammunition used.† The pursuit continued until the crest was reached, and soon our men were seen climbing over the Confederate barrier at different points in front of both Sheridan's and Wood's divisions. The retreat of the enemy along most of his line was precipitate, and the panic so great that Bragg and his officers lost all control over their men. Many were captured and thousands threw away their arms in their flight.

Sheridan pushed forward until he reached the Chickamauga River at a point above where the enemy had crossed. He met some resistance from troops occupying a second hill in rear of Missionary Ridge, probably to cover the retreat of the main body and of the artillery and trains. It was now getting dark, but Sheridan, without halting on that account, pushed his men forward up this second hill slowly and without attracting the attention of the men placed to defend it, while he detached to the right and left to surround the position. The enemy discovered the movement before these dispositions were complete, and beat a hasty retreat, leaving artillery, wagon trains, and many prisoners in our hands. To Sheridan's prompt movement the Army of the Cumberland and the nation are indebted for the bulk of the capture of prisoners, artillery, and small-arms that day. Except for his prompt pursuit, so much in this way would not have been accomplished.

While the advance up Missionary Ridge was going forward, General Thomas, with his staff, General Gordon Granger, commander of the corps, making the assault, and myself and staff, occupied Orchard Knob, from which the entire field could be observed. The moment the troops were seen going over the last line of rebel defenses I ordered Granger to join his command, and mounting my horse I rode to the front. General Thomas left about the same time. Sheridan, on the extreme right, was already in pur-

† Captain Benjamin F. Hegler, of Attica, Indiana, who was second in command of the 15th Indiana in the assault on Missionary Ridge, writes to the editors:

"General Grant says of the assault on Missionary Ridge that 'the fire along the rebel line was terrific. Cannon and musket balls filled the air; but the damage done was in small proportion to the ammunition used,'

The inference might be that the assault, though brilliant, was after all a rather harmless diversion. The 15th Indiana, of Sheridan's division, started up the ridge just to the left of Bragg's headquarters with 337 officers and men, and lost 202 killed and wounded, in just forty-five minutes, the time taken to advance from the line of works at the foot of the ridge and to carry the crest. This report I made officially to General Sheridan near Chickamauga Creek the morning after the battle."



THE CONFEDERATE LINE OPPOSED TO BAIRD'S DIVISION ON MISSIONARY RIDGE. FROM THE CYCLORAMA.

suit of the enemy east of the ridge. Wood, who commanded the division to the left of Sheridan, accompanied his men on horseback, but did not join Sheridan in the pursuit. To the left, in Baird's front, where Bragg's troops had massed against Sherman, the resistance was more stubborn, and the contest lasted longer. I ordered Granger to follow the enemy with Wood's division, but he was so much excited, and kept up such a roar of musketry, in the direction the enemy had taken, that by the time I could stop the firing the enemy had got well out of the way. The enemy confronting Sherman, now seeing everything to their left giving away, fled also. Sherman, however, was not aware of the extent of our success until after nightfall, when he received orders to pursue at daylight in the morning.

Hooker, as stated, was detained at Chattanooga Creek by the destruction of the bridges at that point. He got his troops over, with the exception of the artillery, by fording the stream, at a little after 3 o'clock. Leaving his artillery to follow when the bridges should be reconstructed, he pushed on with the remainder of his command. At Rossville he came upon the flank of a division of the enemy, which soon commenced a retreat along the ridge. This threw them on Palmer. They could make but little resistance in the position they were caught in, and as many of them as could do so escaped.

Many, however, were captured. Hooker's position during the night of the 25th was near Rossville, extending east of the ridge. Palmer was on his left, on the road to Graysville.

During the night I telegraphed to Willecox that Bragg had been defeated, and that immediate relief would be sent to Burnside if he could hold out; to Halleck I sent an announcement of our victory, and informed him that forces would be sent up the valley to relieve Burnside.

Before the battle of Chattanooga opened I had taken measures for the relief of Burnside the moment the way should be clear. Thomas was directed to have the little steamer that had been built at Chattanooga loaded to its capacity with rations and ammunition. Granger's corps was to move by the south bank of the Tennessee River to the mouth of the Holston, and up that to Knoxville, accompanied by the boat. In addition to the supplies transported by boat, the men were to carry forty rounds of ammunition in their cartridge-boxes, and four days' rations in haversacks.

In the battle of Chattanooga, troops from the Army of the Potomac, from the Army of the Tennessee, and from the Army of the Cumberland participated. In fact, the accidents growing out of the heavy rains and the sudden rise in the Tennessee River so mingled the troops that the organizations were not kept together, under their respective commanders, during the battle. Hooker, on the right, had Geary's division of the Twelfth Corps, Army of the Potomac; Osterhaus's division of the Fifteenth Corps, Army of the Tennessee; and Cruft's division of the Army of the Cumberland. Sherman had three divisions of his own army, Howard's corps from the Army of the Potomac, and Jeff. C. Davis's division of the Army of the Cumberland. There was no jealousy — hardly rivalry. Indeed I doubt whether officers or men took any note at the time of this intermingling of commands. All saw a defiant foe surrounding them, and took it for granted that every move was intended to dislodge him, and it made no difference where the troops came from so that the end was accomplished.

The victory at Chattanooga was won against great odds, considering the advantage the enemy had of position; and was accomplished more easily than was expected by reason of Bragg's making several grave mistakes: first, in sending away his ablest corps commander, with over 20,000 troops; second, in sending away a division of troops on the eve of battle; third, in placing so much of a force on the plain in front of his impregnable position.


It was known that Mr. Davis had visited Bragg on Missionary Ridge a short time before my reaching Chattanooga. It was reported and believed that he had come out to reconcile a serious difference between Bragg and Longstreet, and finding this difficult to do planned the campaign against Knoxville, to be conducted by the latter general. I had known both Bragg and Longstreet before the war, the latter very well. We had been three years at West Point together, and, after my graduation, for a time in the same regiment. Then we served together in the Mexican war. I had known Bragg in Mexico, and met him occasionally subsequently. I could well understand how there might be an irreconcilable difference between them.

Bragg was a remarkably intelligent and well-informed man, professionally and otherwise. He was also thoroughly upright. But he was possessed of an irascible temper, and was naturally disputatious. A man of the highest moral character and the most correct habits, yet in the old army he was in frequent trouble. As a subordinate he was always on the lookout to catch his commanding officer infringing upon his prerogatives; as a post commander he was equally vigilant to detect the slightest neglect, even of the most trivial order.

I heard in the old army an anecdote characteristic of General Bragg. On one occasion, when stationed at a post of several companies, commanded by a field-officer, he was himself commanding one of the companies and at the same time acting post quartermaster and commissary. He was a first lieutenant at the time, but his captain was detached on other duty. As commander of the company he made a requisition upon the quartermaster—himself—for something he wanted. As quartermaster he declined to fill the requisition, and indorsed on the back of it his reason for so doing. As company commander he responded to this, urging that his requisition called for nothing but what he was entitled to, and that it was the duty of the quartermaster to fill it. As quartermaster he still persisted that he was right. In this condition of affairs Bragg referred the whole matter to the commanding officer of the post. The latter, when he saw the nature of the matter referred, exclaimed: "My God, Mr. Bragg, you have quarreled with every officer in the army, and now you are quarreling with yourself."

Longstreet was an entirely different man. He was brave, honest, intelligent, a very capable soldier, subordinate to his superiors, just and kind to his subordinates, but jealous of his own rights, which he had the courage to maintain. He was never on the lookout to detect a slight, but saw one as soon as anybody when intentionally given.

It may be that Longstreet was not sent to Knoxville for the reason stated, but because Mr. Davis had an exalted opinion of his own



DEPARTURE OF THE FIRST HOSPITAL TRAIN FROM CHATTANOOGA, JANUARY, 1864, AND INTERIOR OF A HOSPITAL CAR. FROM A WAR-TIME SKETCH.

military genius, and thought he saw a chance of "killing two birds with one stone." On several occasions during the war he came to the relief of the Union army by means of his *superior military genius*.

I speak advisedly when I say Mr. Davis prided himself on his military capacity. He says so himself virtually, in his answer to the notice of his nomination to the Confederate Presidency. Some of his generals have said so in their writings since the downfall of the Confederacy. Whatever the cause or whoever is to blame, grave mistakes were made at Chattanooga, which enabled us, with the undaunted courage of the troops engaged, to gain a great victory, under the most trying circumstances presented during the war, much more easily than could otherwise have been attained. If Chattanooga had been captured, east Tennessee would have followed without a struggle. It would have been a victory to have got the army away from Chattanooga safely. It was manifold greater to defeat, and nearly destroy, the besieging army.

In this battle the Union army numbered in round figures about 60,000 men; we lost 752 killed, and 4713 wounded and 350 captured or missing. The rebel loss was much greater in the aggregate, as we captured, and sent North to be rationed there, over 6100 prisoners. Forty pieces of artillery, over seven thousand stand of small-arms, and many caissons, artillery wagons, and baggage wagons fell into our hands. The probabilities are that our loss in killed was the heavier, as we were the attacking party. The enemy reported his loss in killed at 361; but as he reported his missing at 4146, while we held over 6000 of them as prisoners, and there must have been hundreds, if not thousands, who deserted, but little reliance can be placed in this report. There was certainly great dissatisfaction with Bragg, ↓ on the part of the soldiers, for his harsh treatment of them, and a disposition to get away if they could. Then, too, Chattanooga following in the same half-year with Gettysburg in the East, and Vicksburg in the West, there was much the same feeling in the South at this time that there had been in the North the fall and winter before. If the same license had been allowed the people and the press in the South that was allowed in the North, Chattanooga would probably have been the last battle fought for the preservation of the Union.

Bragg's army now being in full retreat, the relief of Burnside's position at Knoxville was a matter for immediate consideration. Sherman marched with a portion of the Army of the Tennessee, and one corps of the Army of the Cumberland, toward Knoxville; but his approach caused Longstreet to abandon the siege long before these troops reached their destination. Knoxville was now relieved; the anxiety of the President was removed, and the loyal portion of the North rejoiced over the double victory: the raising of the siege of Knoxville and the victory at Chattanooga.

↓ General Bragg was succeeded by General Hardee December 2d, 1863, and the latter by General Polk December 23d. General Johnston assumed command December 27th. On February 24th, 1864, General Bragg, "under the direction of the President, was charged with the conduct of

military operations in the armies of the Confederacy." In November, 1864, he was placed in command of the Department of North Carolina. In February, 1865, he came under General J. E. Johnston's command again, and so remained till the surrender. General Bragg died Sept. 27th, 1876.—EDITORS.

SHERMAN'S ATTACK AT THE TUNNEL.

BY S. H. M. BYERS, CAPTAIN, U. S. V.

IT was the eve of the battle of Chattanooga. I had lately returned to the Army of the Tennessee, after a very short furlough, from my home in the West. How well I remember it—ten days of furlough out of four years of war! It was the only time in the whole four years that I slept in a bed. We had helped to capture Vicksburg after a hundred days' siege, and felt entitled to a rest. My regiment, the 5th Iowa, had already marched 2000 miles in two years. But Rosecrans was in straits, Sherman was called for, and we made the forced march of four hundred miles from Memphis to Chattanooga without a murmur.

Our camp was a concealed one in which no fires or lights were permitted—no noises allowed. In the darkness of the previous night, the command had left bright fires burning in a wood, and had secretly marched to this hidden position. Close beside it, the broad and rapid waters of the Tennessee rolled off into the darkness. On the opposite bank, numbers of rebel pickets kept guard, ignorant of our presence. Behind these pickets were the high hills known as Missionary Ridge, thoroughly intrenched and defended by a large rebel army, just fresh from victory. In a little creek close by lay secreted 116 pontoons. What were they there for? The silence, the secrecy, the mystery of the scene, convinced us that there was work ahead—and that we had to do it.

Before sundown two great soldiers had quietly been inspecting the little camp and the banks of the river. They were Grant and Sherman. Other officers, strangers to us, had come and looked at the pontoons in the creek, and a great wagon-load of boat-oars had been quietly placed beside them. We were at supper when the order came to row over the river and assault at midnight. I laid down my knife and fork, and stopped eating. A strange sensation came over me. Certainly I had been in dangerous places before. The regiment had a record for gallantry. The names of five battles were already inscribed upon its banners. Within two years from enlistment, half the men in the regiment had been killed, wounded, or disabled. We already had our third colonel. Numerous of our line officers had been promoted to higher posts. My own red sash had been given me under the guns of Vicksburg. Yes, we had seen fighting, but I had always been a believer in presentiments, and, somehow, something told me that I was doomed—that some calamity was in store for me.

The critical situation and the vast consequences dependent on success or failure were known to us all as we lay in the shadows that evening, waiting the order to move over the dark river and assault the heights of Missionary Ridge.

Midnight came—but we still lay quiet; 2 o'clock, and we heard some gentle splashing in the water near us, and the noise of muffled oars. Every man seized his rifle. "Quiet, boys—fall in quietly," said the captains. Spades were handed to many

of us—we did not ask what for, we knew too well. Quietly the pontoon-boats had been slipped out of the little creek to our left, and into the river, and quietly we stepped down the bank, two by two, into the rude craft. "Be prompt as you can, boys, there's room for thirty in a boat," said a tall man who stood on the bank near us, in the darkness. Few of us had ever before heard the voice of our beloved commander. Sherman's kind words, his personal presence, his attention to every detail of the dangerous adventure, waked confidence in every one. He was with us, and sharing the danger.

In a quarter of an hour a thousand of us were out in the middle of the river, afloat in the darkness. Would they fire on us from the opposite shore?—was our constant thought. Those were strange feelings, we soldiers had, out in the middle of the river that night. We were not aware that a boat-load of our comrades in blue had crossed farther up the stream, just at midnight, and had captured the rebel pickets on the bank without firing a shot. We met a boat in the water, full of men—the captured pickets being rowed over to our side of the river. It was a fine ruse that had been played on them. The boys, crossing above, had got in behind them, and then, calling out the "relief," deceived and captured all but one.

In half an hour we were up the opposite bank and creeping along through the thickets—a spade in one hand and a rifle in the other. What might happen any moment, we knew not. Where was the picket that had escaped? Why was not the whole rebel camp alarmed and upon us? Daylight came; but it found us two thousand strong, intrenched with rifle-pits a mile in length. What a sight for Bragg! Hand about, we worked and digged like beavers. An old Quaker came down to expostulate with us for ruining his farm by such digging. The scene was ludicrous, and the boys gave a derisive little cheer for "Broad-brim." The noise drew upon us the shells from a hidden battery, and cost us two wounded men. It very nearly cost our friend his life, as an exploding shell left a hole within a yard of him, twice as broad as his big hat.

Still we dug on at our rifle-pits. Other regiments were ferried across. By noon the pontoon-bridge was down behind us, and soon the whole army corps was over.

All the afternoon we manoeuvred and fought for position, chasing the enemy off one high hill-spur only to find him better intrenched behind another. These were the outlying hills between Missionary Ridge proper and the banks of the river. The real position was across fields and hollows, and farther up on the mountain. Sullenly and slowly the enemy gave way, preparing in his high position for the battle of the morrow.

That night my regiment stood picket in the wood at the front. All night long we could hear the rebel field-batteries taking position on Missionary Ridge. For a hundred hours we had scarcely slept.

The 25th of November dawned clear and beautiful, and with the sunrise came the bugle-sound for Corso's division at our center to advance on the enemy. All the morning the hills and woods in front of Missionary Ridge resounded with the crash of musketry. The battle raged for over an hour for the possession of a single hill-crest. Once the hail of bullets became so heavy that a temporary halt was made. The enemy had the advantage of position and numbers everywhere. So close were they, and so protected behind rifle-pits, logs, and bowlders, that they could throw stones on the assaulting column and do almost as much harm with them as with bullets. More regiments were sent in to Corse, and the hand-to-hand assault was renewed till Corse himself was borne wounded from the field. Still his men fought on, retreating not a foot. Around to our left, General J. E. Smith's division was gradually getting possession of that part of the enemy's line, and far off across Lookout Valley, Hooker's men, in possession of the heights, were driving in the left flank of the rebel army.

It was 2 o'clock when our division, my own regiment with it, was ordered to fix bayonets and join in the assault on the ridge. We had been concealed from the enemy all the forenoon by the edge of a wood; yet his constant shelling of this wood showed that he knew we were there. As the column came out upon the open ground, and in sight of the rebel batteries, their renewed and concentrated fire knocked the limbs from the trees about our heads. A awful cannonade had opened on us. In front of us was a rail-fence. Its splinters and fragments flew in every direction. "Jump the fence, boys," was the order, and never was a fence scaled more quickly. It was nearly half a mile to the rebel position, and we started on the charge, running across the open fields. I had heard the roaring of heavy battle before, but never such a shrieking of cannon-balls and bursting of shells as met us on that run. We could see the rebels working their guns, while in plain view other batteries galloped up, unlimbered, and let loose upon us. Behind us our own batteries were firing at the enemy over our heads, till the storm and roar became horrible. The line officers screamed at the top of their voices, trying to repeat the orders to the men. "Steady, steady. Bear to the right! Don't fire! Steady, steady," was yelled till every one of us was hoarse, and until the fearful thunder of the cannonade made all commands unheard and useless. In ten minutes the field was crossed, the foot of the ascent was reached, and now the Confederates poured into our faces the reserved fire of their awful musketry. It helped little that we returned it from our own rifles, hidden as the enemy were in rifle-pits, behind logs, and stumps, and trees. Still we charged, and climbed a fence in front of them, and charged again. The order was given to lie down and continue firing. Then some

one cried, "Look to the tunnel!" There, on the right, pouring through a tunnel in the mountain, and out of the railway cut, came the gray-coats by hundreds, flanking us completely. "Stop them!" cried our colonel to those of us at the right. "Push them back!" It was but the work of a few moments to rise to our feet and run to the mouth of the tunnel, firing as we ran. Too late! They were through by hundreds, and a fatal enfilading fire was cutting our line to pieces. No wonder the brigade temporarily faltered and gave way, when a whole army of the enemy seemed concentrated on a single point.

"Come out of that sword," shrieked a big Mississippian at me. "And give me that revolver," cried another. "And get up the hill quicker than hell," cried both of them. It was time; for our own batteries were now pouring a fearful fire on the very spot where we stood. The rocks and the earth flew about us, and everything seemed to smoke. Not only this, our brigade was rallying to charge again, and other brigades were climbing with them to the hill-top. Still more, Thomas was storming the center.

In a moment I reflected that I was a prisoner, and horrible pictures of Libby and Andersonville flashed through my mind—and with them the presentiment of evil I had had the night before the assault. I took a blanket from one of my dead comrades lying near me, and at the point of the bayonet I was hurried on up the mountain, the fire from our own guns constantly increasing. I passed numerous lines of the enemy standing or lying in the rifle-pits with which the whole mountain-side was honeycombed, both in front of Sherman and in front of Thomas. Once I glanced back and to the right. Glorious sight! The troops of Thomas were storming up the slopes of Missionary Ridge. In a hollow, back of the lines, I was mustered with others of my brigade who had been captured. Three of that night's messmates were among them. We were relieved of our watches, our money, our knives, even our pocket-combs, by a chivalrous young officer of the guard.†

"Why do your caissons hurry so to the rear?" I inquired of this gallant gentleman as I handed him my pocket-book. "For ammunition, of course," was his prompt reply. "And the cannon," I ventured further, noticing a dozen brass field-pieces being galloped off with; "do they bring ammunition too?" "Fall in," was the quick answer. "Guards, fall in; quick, quick!" In five minutes, prisoners and guards, infantry, artillery, and wagons were on the run pell-mell to the rear. Missionary Ridge had been taken.

Twenty-five miles they marched us down the railroad that night without stopping. Whizzing by us went trains loaded with wounded and dying soldiers. Far behind us we heard our own victorious cannon in pursuit.

only sixteen of the sixty of my regiment who were captured with me on that day were alive. Of the nine of my own company (B) who were taken, only one besides myself was left to tell the tale.—S. H. M. B.

†For seven months we officers lingered in Libby prison, and then for eight months more in Macon and Columbia. Most of the privates died in Andersonville. When I escaped at Columbia, fifteen months afterward,

COMMENTS ON GENERAL GRANT'S "CHATTANOOGA."

I. BY WILLIAM FARRAR SMITH, BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL, U. S. A.



UMBRELLA ROCK, POINT OF LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN.

ON the 3d of October, 1863, having reported to General Rosecrans at Chattanooga, I was assigned the duty of chief engineer of the Army of the Cumberland, and it devolved on me as a part of my duty, first, to lay out and construct the fortifications so as to enable a comparatively small force to hold the place, and, secondly, to look out for the communications by which the army was supplied. In the performance of that duty I was actively engaged in building boats and material for bridges, and was studying earnestly to find some way of restoring our short line of communications lost by the giving up of Lookout Mountain and Valley. I found a most excellent company of volunteers styled "Michigan Engineers and Mechanics," commanded by Captain Perrin V. Fox. Before my arrival they had set up a saw-mill, and were engaged in making boats and flooring, etc., for military bridges. In pursuance of the paramount necessity of finding some way of shortening our distance to the railroad at Bridgeport, on the 19th of October I started to make a personal examination of the north side of the Tennessee River below Chattanooga. The object was to find some point on the south side, the holding of which would secure to us the river from Bridgeport through the Raccoon Mountain, and the short road in the valley from there to Chattanooga. On returning unsuccessful in my search, to within about five miles of Chattanooga, I saw before me on a bluff, washed by the river, an earth-work in which was posted a field-battery commanding a road through a break in the hills on the opposite side, where had formerly been established a ferry, known as Brown's Ferry. The place struck me as worthy of examination, and learning from the commanding officer of the battery that there was a tacit agreement that the pickets should not fire on each other, I left my horse in the battery and went down to the water's edge. There I spent an hour, studying the character of the hills, the roadway through the gorge, and marking and estimating the distances to the fires of the picket reserves of the enemy. I then rode back to headquarters, to find that during my absence General Rosecrans had been relieved from duty there and General George H. Thomas put in command of the army.

The next morning, October 20th, General Thomas asked me what length of bridge material I had not in use, and directed me to throw another bridge across the river at Chattanooga. I asked

him not to give the order till he had heard my report of my examination of the day before and had looked into a plan I had to propose for opening the river to our steamboats, of which there were two then partly disabled, but which had not been repaired by me lest they should eventually serve the purpose of the enemy. After a discussion which I think was finished in two days, and by the 22d of October, he gave his approval to the plan, and I went to work at once, he giving the necessary orders for the coöperating movements from Bridgeport, which were a vital part of the operations. After that there was but one discussion between General Thomas and myself, which was as to the relative time at which Hooker's column was to move from Bridgeport. That took place after the arrival of General Grant at Chattanooga, all others having been concluded before General Grant made his appearance.

When Grant had been but about twelve hours in Chattanooga, and before he had even started on his trip to Brown's Ferry, Mr. Dana had sketched to the Secretary of War the substance of the whole movement.† That General Thomas had, after General Grant's arrival, to put before him the plan which he had determined upon, and that General Grant's approval was necessary, and that it was proper for him to go to Brown's Ferry at once to see the position before he gave his approval to it, cannot be gainsaid, but there is not the slightest reason for doubting that Thomas would have made the same move with the same men and with the same results, had General Grant been in Louisville, from which place he had telegraphed the order putting Thomas in command of the Army of the Cumberland. General Grant does not overstate the importance of this movement to the army. It gave at once to the army food and clothing, with forage for the animals which were yet alive, and last, but not least, ammunition, of which General Grant says the Union army had "not enough for a day's fighting." From being an army in a condition in which it could not retreat, it became an army which, so soon as it was reënforced by the troops with Sherman, assumed the offensive, and under the leadership of General Grant helped to win the battle of Missionary Ridge, inflicting a mortal blow upon the army under Bragg. General Thomas was a man who observed strictly the proprieties and courtesies of military life; and had the plan "for opening the route to Bridgeport," and the orders necessary for its execution, emanated from General Grant, Thomas would hardly have noticed the subject in the following words:

"To Brigadier-General W. F. Smith, chief engineer, should be accorded great praise for the ingenuity which conceived, and the ability which executed, the movement at Brown's Ferry. The preparations were all made in secrecy, as was also the boat expedition which passed under the overhanging cliffs of Lookout, so much so that when the bridge was thrown at Brown's

† Telegrams of Dana to Stanton, October 23d and 24th, 10 A. M.

Ferry, on the morning of the 27th, the surprise was as great to the army within Chattanooga as it was to the army besieging it from without." [From the report of the Committee on the Conduct of the War.]

With some hesitation I will give a copy of a letter from General Grant to the Secretary of War, which, though speaking of me in possibly much too high terms, is yet important in this connection from its date. It was written two weeks after the opening of the river, and two weeks before the battle of Missionary Ridge. It could hardly have been written from General Grant's previous knowledge of me, for he says he "had no recollection of having met me, after my [his] graduation, in 1843, up to this time,"—the night of his arrival at Chattanooga,—October 23d, 1863. It could not have been written because I had shown zeal in establishing a saw-mill, making a steamboat or any amount of bridge material, nor yet because I had commanded two brigades in a surprise attack at Brown's Ferry. No other movement than the successful opening of the river had been made from the time of General Grant's arrival to the date of this letter. Was it possible that it rose from any other reason than that General Grant, appreciating fully the great and prompt change in the condition of the army, arising from the opening of the river, had perhaps over-estimated the ability of the one who within his own knowledge had planned the movement? Circumstances afterward occurred to change the relations between General Grant and myself, to which it is not necessary to refer, and his opinion of me may and probably did afterward undergo a change, but at the time at which the letter was written there was some striking reason which produced it:

"HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISS.
"CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE, November 12th, 1863.

"HON. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

"SIR: I would respectfully recommend that Brigadier-General William F. Smith be placed first on the list for promotion to the rank of major-general. He is possessed of one of the clearest military heads in the army—is very practical and industrious—no man in the service is better qualified than he for our largest commands.

"I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

(Official)

"U. S. GRANT,

"Major-General.

"Signed, GEO. K. LEET, Assistant Adjutant-General."

Not only is it due to the truth of history that this evidence of General Grant's military appreciation of the movement on Brown's Ferry should appear, but it also establishes his generosity of character in giving credit where he felt it to be due.

At some future time I may have an opportunity of doing justice to the memory of General George H. Thomas, whose comparatively early death was so great a loss to the country. The civil war developed no higher character than his, viewed in all its aspects, either as soldier or civilian. There are no clouds on it to mar the brightness of his glory.

General Grant's narrative [see p. 679] is in text and inference so unjust to the memory of the late Major-General George H. Thomas that it is proper to make a statement of facts taken in the main from official papers.

In November, 1863, Mr. Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, was at Chattanooga. Under date of November 5th, 11 A. M., he telegraphed to Mr. Stanton:

"... Grant and Thomas considering plan proposed by W. F. Smith to advance our pickets on the left to Citico Creek, about a mile in front of the position they have occupied from the first, and to *threaten* the seizure of the north-west extremity of Missionary Ridge. This, taken in connection with our present demonstration in Lookout Valley, will compel them to concentrate and come back from Burnside to fight here."

It is perhaps well to explain here that at that time no plan for future operations had been discussed. On the supposition that Sherman's forces would be united with those of Thomas in front of Chattanooga, more space than we occupied was necessary for the proper encampments and probable developments for a battle. This made a move to the front at that time for the acquisition of more ground a proper one under all circumstances. It will be seen that in the plan proposed by me, as chief engineer, only a *threat to seize* the north-west end of Missionary Ridge was intended, and with the idea that such a feint might force the recall of Longstreet. I think I may safely state that I did not propose at that time, in view of the condition of the Army of the Cumberland, to suggest anything that would bring on a general battle unless under the guns of our forts at Chattanooga. The next telegram to Secretary Stanton referring to this move is dated November 7th at 10 A. M., and states:

"Before receiving this information [report of a rebel deserter] Grant had ordered Thomas to execute the movement on Citico Creek which I reported on the 5th as proposed by Smith. Thomas, who rather preferred an attempt on Lookout Mountain, desired to postpone the operation until Sherman should come up, but Grant has decided that for the sake of Burnside the attack must be made at once, and I presume the advance on Citico will take place to-morrow evening, and that on Missionary Ridge immediately afterward. If successful, this operation will divide Bragg's forces in Chattanooga valley from those in the valley of the Chickamauga, and will compel him either to retreat, leaving the railroad communication of Cheatham and Longstreet exposed, or else fight a battle with his diminished forces."

From General Grant's order of November 7th the following extract is made:

"... I deem the best movement to *attract* the enemy to be an attack on the north end of Missionary Ridge with all the force you can bring to bear against it, and, when that is *carried, to threaten*, and even attack if possible, the enemy's line of communication between Dalton and Cleveland. . . . The movement should not be made one moment later than to-morrow morning."

It will be seen from this order that the plan proposed by me had been entirely changed, for while I had proposed only to threaten the seizure of the north-west end of Missionary Ridge, General Grant proposed "to attack the enemy" by carrying the ridge, and then "to threaten, and even attack if possible," the lines of communication; *that is, to bring on a general engagement*. When it is remembered that eighteen days after this Sherman with six perfectly appointed divisions failed to carry this same point of Missionary Ridge, at a time when Thomas with four divisions

stood threatening Bragg's center, and Hooker with nearly three divisions was driving in Bragg's left flank (Bragg having no more strength than on the 7th), it will not be a matter of surprise that the order staggered Thomas. After the order had been issued I sought a conversation with General Grant for the purpose of inducing a modification, and began by asking General Grant what was the plan proposed by General Thomas for carrying out the order. To this General Grant replied, "*When I have sufficient confidence in a general to leave him in command of an army, I have enough confidence in him to leave his plans to himself.*" This answer seemed to cut off all discussion, and nothing more was said on the subject.

Shortly after that General Thomas sent for me, and under the impression that the order related to my plan, referred to in Mr. Dana's dispatch of November 5th, said, "If I attempt to carry out the order I have received, my army will be terribly beaten. You must go and get the order revoked." Without replying to this I asked General Thomas to go up the river with me, and we set out directly, going to a hill opposite the mouth of the South Chickamanga Creek, where we spent an hour or more. We looked carefully over the ground on which Thomas would have to operate, noted the extreme of Bragg's camp-fires on Missionary Ridge, and then, becoming convinced that Thomas with his force could not outflank Bragg's right without endangering our connection with Chattanooga, on our return I went directly to General Grant, and reported to him that after a careful reconnaissance of the ground I was of the decided opinion that no movement could be made in that direction until the arrival of Sherman's forces. That very evening the order for Thomas to move was countermanded, and no further effort to aid Burnside was attempted till the Army of the Tennessee had joined the army at Chattanooga. On the 8th of November, at 11 A. M., Mr. Dana sent to the Secretary of War the following dispatch:

"Reconnaissance of Citico Creek and head of Missionary Ridge made yesterday by Thomas, Smith, and Brannan from the heights opposite on the north of the Tennessee proved Smith's plan for attack impracticable. The creek and country are wrongly laid down on our maps, and no operation for the seizure of Missionary Ridge can be undertaken with the force which Thomas can now command for the purpose. That force cannot by any effort be made to exceed eighteen thousand men."

General Grant in his official report says:

"Directions were given for a movement against Missionary Ridge, with a view to carrying it, . . . of which I informed Burnside on the 7th of November by telegraph. After a thorough reconnaissance of the ground, however, it was deemed *utterly impracticable* to make the move until Sherman could get up, because of the inadequacy of our forces and the condition of the animals then at Chattanooga."

The writer of an article entitled "General Grant," in "The Century" for May, 1885, says of Chattanooga: "Few battles in any war have ever been fought so strictly according to the plan. This battle was fought as nearly according to the plan laid down in advance as any recorded in the schools."

Holding at the time the position of chief engineer of the Army of the Cumberland under General Thomas, and being at the same time chief engineer of the Military Division of the Mississippi under General Grant, it was absolutely necessary that I should know the plan to be able to direct the engineering operations. Let me compare the original plan as "laid down in advance" with a sketch of the battle as fought.

The original plan of the battle of Chattanooga was to turn Bragg's right flank on Missionary Ridge, thereby throwing his army away from its base and natural line of retreat. This, the first thing to be done, was confided to Sherman, and the plan was not adopted till after Sherman had carefully examined the situation and asserted that he could do the work assigned to him. Thomas was to hold the center and right of our front, to coöperate with Sherman, and attack when the proper time arrived.

The preliminary movements were simple. Sherman was to effect a lodgment on the left bank of the Tennessee River, just below the mouth of the South Chickamanga Creek. This was to be done by landing a brigade of troops from the boats, which were to be used in the bridge to be thrown at that point across the Tennessee for the crossing of Sherman's army. One division of Sherman's army was to march up the Lookout Valley, on the extreme right of our operations, and threaten a pass in Lookout Mountain, ostensibly to turn Bragg's left flank. The march was to be made in daylight, in sight of the enemy, and after dark the division was to retrace its steps, cross the Tennessee at Brown's Ferry, and join the main body of Sherman's force, which was to be massed during the night preceding the intended attack at the point where the bridge was to be laid. Hooker with his small force was to hold Lookout Valley and threaten Lookout Mountain at the point where it strikes the Tennessee. This general plan was filled in with all necessary details, embracing all the initial movements of the whole force under Grant. At the very outset began the changes in this plan. The division which made the threat against Bragg's left flank on returning found the bridge at Brown's Ferry impassable; and as it could not join Sherman, it was turned over to Hooker, who was ordered, with his command thus strengthened, to assault the works on his front on Lookout Mountain. This was a most decided change from the plan "laid down in advance."

On the evening of the first day the results could be summed up as follows: Sherman had crossed the Tennessee River at the point selected, but had not turned Bragg's right flank. Thomas had drawn out the Army of the Cumberland facing Missionary Ridge, had connected with Sherman, but had had no fighting other than skirmishing varied by some artillery practice. Hooker had carried Lookout Mountain after a fight which has been celebrated in song as "the battle above the clouds." This victory of Hooker's compelled Bragg to withdraw his troops from the Chattanooga Valley, and retreat or concentrate for a battle on

Missionary Ridge. On the morning of the second day Hooker was ordered by Thomas to march for and carry the Rossville Gap in Missionary Ridge, and as soon as that was done to send an aide or courier to him, in order that he might then make the assault of the "Ridge" with the Army of the Cumberland. Sherman with severe fighting continued his efforts to reach the crest of Missionary Ridge. As the day wore on, and no news came from Hooker, Thomas grew anxious, but could give no order to assault the works on his front till one at least of the enemy's flanks had been turned.

Finally, in the afternoon, General Grant sent orders directly to the division commanders of the Army of the Cumberland to move forward and carry the rifle-pits in their front at the base of Missionary Ridge. This was very easily done, and after capturing the rifle-pits the soldiers, seeing that they could not remain there under the fire from the crest of the ridge, and having no intention of giving up any ground won by them, demanded to be led up the hill to storm the works on the crest, which was successfully done, and Bragg's

headquarters were in their possession just before the sun went down on the second day of the battle. This assault was, of course, the crisis of the whole battle, and the successful carrying of Missionary Ridge was doubtless due in a measure to the position of Sherman and the threatening movement of Hooker.

The battle was then ended and nothing left but a retreat by one and a pursuit by the other opposing general. A condensed statement of the history of the original plan and the battle of Chattanooga as fought is this: The original plan contemplated the turning of Bragg's right flank, which *was not done*. The secondary plan of Thomas looked toward following up the success of Hooker at Lookout Mountain by turning the left flank of Bragg, and then an attack by Thomas along his entire front. The Rossville Gap was not carried in time to be of more than secondary importance in the battle.

The assault on the center before either flank was turned was never seriously contemplated, and was made without plan, without orders, and as above stated.

II. BY HENRY M. CIST, BREVET BRIGADIER-GENERAL, U. S. V.

GENERAL SMITH very clearly shows that the plan for the movement was originated some time prior to General Grant's arrival at Chattanooga, and that the only part of the plan Grant was concerned in was the approval he gave to it, on it being submitted to him by General Thomas and General Smith. The necessary orders for the execution of the plan and the approval of the movement, however, had been given even prior to the date at which General Thomas assumed command of the Army of the Cumberland, which was the 20th of October, 1863.

After the battle of Chickamauga and the return of the troops to Chattanooga, the first aim of General Rosecrans was to secure his command behind earth-works and fortifications on the front, sufficiently strong to enable the army successfully to resist any attack that might be made upon it in that quarter. This being accomplished, the next important demand was that of rations and supplies for the troops. In the execution of all of this General Rosecrans was ably seconded by the very efficient services of his chief engineer, General Smith; any plan of the latter, however, could only be carried into execution upon the approval of the commanding general.

The general plan for the fortifications, and also for the relief of the army with supplies, were those of the officer in command of the army. The preliminaries and details of these plans were, of course, intrusted to the chief executive officer of his staff in that branch of his service—his chief engineer. In the execution of his general plan, General Rosecrans, prior to the date of the order relieving him, had selected William's Island as a depot of supplies. He had also contracted for the rebuilding of the railroad bridge across the Tennessee and over Running Water, and had ordered the construction of four steamboats, for the use of

his army on the river. He had also directed that a sufficient number of pontoons should be built, by which he could throw a bridge across the Tennessee below the mouth of Lookout Creek, on which to march and take possession of Lookout Valley.

One of the last subjects of conference between Generals Rosecrans and Thomas after midnight of October 19th, 1863, and after Rosecrans's order relinquishing the command had been written and signed, grew out of the request of General Thomas to Rosecrans, "Now, General, I want you to be kind enough to describe the exact plan for the taking of Lookout Valley as you proposed it." General Rosecrans went over it again, explaining how it was his purpose to cross the river and where; how he intended to occupy Lookout Valley, and to secure the use of the road on the south side of the river—the plan as afterward matured and carried out.

When General Smith was assigned to duty the plan for the fortifications had been fully considered, and that for the relief of the troops in regard to rations was well under way. Under General Rosecrans's orders General Smith gave his attention to the details of both plans, and brought his skill to bear upon the best method to accomplish the desired results. When General Thomas assumed command of the Army of the Cumberland, General Smith was retained as chief engineer, and Thomas *continued* the preparations for the plan afterward so successfully carried out in the "Brown's Ferry movement," under the supervision of the chief engineer as to the details. As General Smith says, "Thomas would have made the same move with the same men, and with the same results, had General Grant been in Louisville."

General Smith says that General Thomas is entitled to the credit of the successful consummation

of these plans. Certainly he is as against the claim of General Grant. But as to Rosecrans, let us see what General Thomas himself says. In his report, dated November 7th, 1863, of "The Battle of Wauhatchie," he says:

"Preliminary steps had already been taken to execute this vitally important movement before the command of the department devolved on me. The bridge which it was necessary to throw across the river at Brown's Ferry to gain possession of the northern end of Lookout Valley and open communication with Bridgeport by road and river was nearly completed."

If all this had been accomplished by General Rosecrans, the plan must have been under his consideration with his approval for some weeks prior to his removal.

On November 4th, 1863, in the report of the

part taken by the troops under him of the movement that actually opened up the road to Brown's Ferry and Kelley's Ferry, General Smith says:

"On the 19th of October I was instructed by General Rosecrans to reconnoiter the river in the vicinity of William's Island with a view of making the island a cover for a steamboat landing and store-houses, etc."

I do not wish to appear as detracting from the honor that belongs to General Smith, who executed the plan, to General Thomas, who ordered the execution, to General Grant, who approved the plan, but I think the truth of history calls for a repetition of the statement as made by General Thomas that he took up the work where his predecessor in command left it, and that he carried out the plan of General Rosecrans in the final movement.

III. POSTSCRIPT BY GENERAL W. F. SMITH.

GENERAL ROSECRANS never said anything to me about a bridge into Lookout Valley, or a movement by Hooker's command from Bridgeport, although I was his chief engineer and troops under my command were making boats for bridges. Mr. Dana telegraphed to Mr. Stanton early in October that Rosecrans would throw a bridge from Moccasin Point into Lookout Valley. A bridge from Moccasin Point could not have been thrown, for the nose of Lookout Mountain was strongly held by the enemy, and if the bridge had been thrown it could not have been maintained, as it would have been under close fire of artillery.

Mr. Dana also telegraphed to Mr. Stanton that Rosecrans had ordered Hooker to concentrate his troops with a view to moving his force through the Raccoon Mountain into Lookout Valley. If that could have been done the operations at Brown's Ferry were useless, as it would have been only necessary to throw a bridge after the arrival of Hooker's troops in that Valley. With Bragg's force, the passes in the Raccoon Mountain could have been held so as to make it impossible for Hooker to get through them.

Shortly after my arrival at Chattanooga I told General Rosecrans that he could not supply his army over the mountain roads as soon as the fall rains began. He said I was mistaken, that he was getting double the number of rations that he used. I never said anything more on the subject. Seeing that we were daily falling behind, even after the troops had been put on half rations, I tried to hurry on the defenses, and was all the time trying to work out some plan for shortening the line of supplies. It seemed to me that, by holding the country between Bridgeport and the Raccoon Mountain and the nose of Raccoon Mountain where it struck the Tennessee River, we might use William's Island as a depot of supplies, the transportation from Bridgeport being by water. Determined to go and see if such a plan were practicable, I went to General Rosecrans on the evening of the 18th of October and said, "General, I wish to go down the river to-morrow to see if we cannot hold the river as far as William's Island, and use that for a depot." General Rosecrans said, "Go,

by all means, and I will go with you." We started at an early hour the next morning, but after crossing the river General Rosecrans stopped to go through the hospital and I pushed on and made the examination entirely alone. When I reached camp General Rosecrans had been relieved; he left that night, I think, and I did not say a word to him about what I had discovered and what I had to propose. It is impossible that Rosecrans could have developed any plan for opening the river to General Thomas which was satisfactory to Thomas, for any plan would have required a bridge to be thrown below Chattanooga, and General Thomas directed me, when I went to report to him the next day, to throw a bridge at the town. That would have left nothing for another bridge, and it took time to prepare boats and bridge materials.

General Rosecrans could not have informed his generals, with whom he was on confidential terms, of any such plan, for when Thomas explained my plan to them they opposed it strongly, and it took two or three interviews to get General Thomas to adopt the plan. Finally it was carried out exactly as I had suggested it. General Thomas was a very careful man about his statements and was very particular in his use of words. In his order he was careful to give me credit for planning as well as executing, and if he had had any such plan given to him by General Rosecrans he would certainly have not committed the injustice of giving me the credit for the plan.

General Cist's quotation from my report refers only to the William's Island project, which I gave up as soon as I saw the ground, and that may have been an idea of General Rosecrans, but he certainly had never taken any steps to find out if it were practicable, which I found it was not. I never heard of Brown's Ferry till I saw it. I did not report on it to Rosecrans, and I do not believe that Rosecrans had matured any scheme for shortening the line of communications. If he had, why did he not execute it; for at the time he was relieved the Army of the Cumberland could not have remained a week at Chattanooga, under the then existing lines for obtaining supplies.



MILITARY BRIDGE OVER THE TENNESSEE RIVER AT CHATTANOOGA, BUILT IN OCTOBER, 1863. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND AT CHATTANOOGA.

BY JOSEPH S. FULLERTON, BREVET BRIG.-GEN., U. S. V., ASSISTANT ADJ.-GEN., 4TH ARMY CORPS.

AFTER it became apparent that Bragg would not assault Rosecrans at Chattanooga, it was thought that he might cross the river above, threaten our lines of communication with the rear, and thus repeat, on the north side, the manoeuvre of Rosecrans. Longstreet advised such a movement, but Bragg preferred to adopt the plan of starving us out.

On September 24th a brigade that had held the point of Lookout Mountain was withdrawn. Bragg at once took possession, and sent Longstreet's corps over into Lookout Valley. He also extended his pickets down the south bank of the river, nearly to Bridgeport, our base of supplies. This cut us off from the river and the roads on its north and south banks, and left us but one open road to the rear. Over this, for a time, we might haul supplies; but we were in a state of semi-siege.

The trees within our lines were soon cut down for use in the fortifications, or for fuel. There had been but little rain since early in July. The earth was parched and blistered. Leaves had dried up on the trees, and all the grass had withered and turned gray. The moving of men and animals stirred up blinding clouds of dust which every breeze sent whirling through the camps. With the first week in October came the rains, and it was a question whether the deep and sticky mud was not more objectionable than the dust.

Our whole army was obliged to depend for every ration and every pound of forage on the mules that hauled the army wagons over the sixty miles of horrible road from Bridgeport. Some of the hills along this route were so steep that a heavy wagon was almost a load going up, and, now that the rains were falling, that part of it in the little valleys had become so soft and was so cut up that a lightly loaded wagon would sink up to the axles.

In the third week of the occupation of Chattanooga, no one, from commanding general down, any longer expected or even thought of an attack. Missionary Ridge, summit, side, and base, was furrowed with rifle-pits and studded with batteries. The little valley of Chattanooga was dammed up with earth-works; and Lookout Mountain, now a

mighty fortress, lifted to the low hanging clouds its threatening head crowned with siege-guns. The two lines of pickets were not more than three hundred yards apart; but, by common consent, there was no picket firing. On a still night, standing on the picket line, one could hear the old negro song "Dixie," adopted by the Confederates as their national music; while from our line came, in swelling response, "Hail Columbia" and "The Star-spangled Banner." With a glass Bragg's headquarters on Missionary Ridge, even the movement of his officers and orderlies, could be seen; while from the ridge or Lookout Mountain our whole camp was clearly in view. By daylight our troops could be counted, our reveille heard, our roll-call noted, our scanty meals of half rations seen—the last without envy. And we were not only heard and seen, but the enemy's signal-flag on Lookout talked, over our heads, with the signal-flag on Missionary Ridge.

The fall rains were beginning, and hauling was becoming each day more difficult. Ten thousand dead mules walled the sides of the road from Bridgeport to Chattanooga. In Chattanooga the men were on less than half rations. Guards stood at the troughs of artillery horses to keep the soldiers from taking the scant supply of corn allowed these starving animals. Many horses died of starvation, and most of those that survived grew too weak for use in pulling the lightest guns. Men followed the wagons as they came over the river, picking up the grains of corn and bits of crackers that fell to the ground. Yet there was no murmur of discontent.

Ever since Longstreet got into Lookout Valley, Rosecrans had been making preparation to drive him out. A small stern-wheel steamboat was built at Bridgeport; a captured ferry-boat, reconstructed, was made an available transport; and material for boats and pontoons, or either, with stringers and flooring for bridges, was prepared at Chattanooga as rapidly as possible, at an improvised saw-mill. But the plan finally adopted was conceived and worked out by General William F. Smith, Chief Engineer of the Army of the Cumber-

land. On the 20th of October, after having been fully matured, it was submitted, and was warmly approved by Thomas, who had then succeeded Rosecrans, and who at once gave orders to General Smith, General Hooker, and others to carry it into execution with all possible expedition. General Grant reached Chattanooga the evening of the 23d. General Smith's plan was explained to him, and he heartily approved it and directed its execution.

Everything necessary for the movement being in readiness, it was commenced with the greatest possible haste and secrecy on the night of the 26th. After midnight, fourteen hundred picked men from Hazen's and Turchin's brigades, under command of Brigadier-General Hazen, quietly marched to the river-bank at Chattanooga; the rest of the troops of these two brigades, with three batteries of artillery under Major John Mendenhall, crossed the river and marched over Moccasin Point to a place near Brown's Ferry, where, under cover of the woods, they awaited the arrival of General Hazen's force. The success of this expedition depended on surprising the enemy at Brown's Ferry. It was known that he had there 1000 infantry, 3 pieces of artillery, and a squadron of cavalry, while Longstreet's corps was not far off. At 3 o'clock in the morning, 52 pontoons, filled with Hazen's 1400 men, and under the direction of Colonel T. R. Stanley, 18th Ohio Infantry, noiselessly started down the river on the nine-mile course to Brown's Ferry. There was a full moon, but the light was dimmed by floating clouds and by a fog rising from the water. Oars were used till the first picket fire of the enemy was approached; then the boats were steered close to the right bank and allowed to float with the current. On top of Lookout a signal torch was seen flashing against the sky, but not a gun had yet been fired,—not an alarm given. Brown's Ferry was reached at break of dawn. Suddenly the oars were put into use, and before the enemy could make out the sounds the boats were rowed to the left bank. The pickets on guard greeted them with a volley of musketry, and then fell back on their reserves. The fourteen hundred men quickly and in perfect order occupied the crest of the hill and began to throw up light breastworks. But they had not proceeded far in this work when the enemy appeared and made a fruitless effort to drive them from the hill. In the meantime the boats were bringing over the river the rest of the two brigades that had marched to the north ferry landing. When the transfer had been accomplished, the boats were used in the construction of a pontoon-bridge, which was finished by 3 o'clock in the afternoon, and over which Mendenhall's artillery crossed.

At daylight on the morning of October 28th General Hooker crossed the river at Bridgeport with the Eleventh and Geary's division of the Twelfth Corps, and moved along the direct road to Brown's Ferry by the base of Raccoon Mountain. He brushed away the enemy's pickets and light bodies of skirmishers, and moved cautiously, as he knew Longstreet was in Lookout Valley and might at any moment appear to oppose his advance. At 5 o'clock in the afternoon the head of his column

reached a point about one mile from the ferry, up Lookout Valley; and here his command went into camp, excepting Geary's division, which was left three miles in the rear, in a position covering the ferry. A short distance from the ferry, up the little valley of Lookout, was Longstreet, with his troops. When Longstreet discovered Hooker's object, he did not even wait the light of day to repeat his old tactics. The night of the 28th was clear and the air crisp. The moon shone bright from before midnight till morning. Hooker's troops were sleeping soundly after their hard march of nearly twenty-five miles, when Longstreet's men came crowding down the valley. An hour past midnight a terrific onslaught was made on Geary's division. It was assaulted on three sides. Artillery in the valley and on Lookout opened a severe fire. Our men, who slept in line of battle, sprang to their feet at the first shot of a sentinel. The contest lasted for three hours, till Longstreet's line was broken and his men driven from the field. It was Longstreet's intention to crush Geary; then, with his whole force, to attack General Howard's Eleventh Corps, nearly three miles away. In order to hold Howard where he was, and to prevent him from lending assistance to Geary, he had sent a smaller column to move round his camp, and, almost in its rear, to occupy a steep hill nearly two hundred feet high. General Howard ordered Colonel Orland Smith, with his brigade, to carry the hill. In gallant response a magnificent charge was made up the steep side, and the enemy was driven from the barricades on top at the point of the bayonet. Longstreet, routed at every point, retreated up the valley, leaving it at daybreak. Four hundred and twenty of our men, and many more of the enemy, were killed and wounded. Hooker thus gained Lookout Valley; the siege of Chattanooga was raised; the "cracker line" was opened!

The credit of this result is chiefly due to General W. F. Smith, Chief Engineer of the Army of the Cumberland, who conceived the plan of operations, and under whose directions it was mostly carried out. The raising of the siege of Chattanooga, by opening up the river and the road on its south bank, was determined upon by the commanding officers of the Army of the Cumberland soon after the occupation, though the plan of operations was adopted later, but before General Grant came to Chattanooga.

On November 15th General Sherman reached Chattanooga in advance of his troops. General Grant's plan, in brief, now was to turn Bragg's right. He selected his old army—the Army of the Tennessee, under Sherman—to open the battle, to make the grand attack, and to carry Missionary Ridge as far as Tunnel Hill. The Army of the Cumberland was simply to get into position and cooperate.

No battle-field in our war, probably none in history, where large armies were engaged, was so spectacular or so well fitted for a display of soldierly courage and daring as the amphitheater of Chattanooga. Late on the night of November 22d a sentinel who had deserted from the enemy was

brought to General Sheridan, and informed him that Bragg's baggage was being reduced and that he was about to fall back. On account of these indications and reports, General Grant decided not to wait longer for General Sherman's troops to come up, but to find out whether Bragg was in fact withdrawing, and, if so, to attack him at once. Therefore, at 11 o'clock on the morning of the 23d, he directed General Thomas to "drive in the enemy's pickets," and feel his lines for the purpose of finding out whether he still held in force. Thus Grant was about to change his plans. He was compelled to depart from his original purpose, and was obliged to call on troops of the Army of the Cumberland to make the first offensive movement.

General Thomas ordered General Granger, commanding the Fourth Corps, to throw one division forward in the direction of Orchard Knob, with a second division in support, to discover if the enemy still remained near his old camp.

Orchard Knob is a rough, steep hill, one hundred feet high, covered with a growth of small timber, rising abruptly from the Chattanooga Valley, and lying about half-way between our outer pits and the breastworks of logs and stones. At its western base, and extending for a mile beyond, both north and south of the hill, were other rifle-pits, hid in part by a heavy belt of timber that extended about a quarter of a mile from the foot of the hill into the plain. Between this belt of timber and our lines were open fields, in which there was not a tree, fence, or other obstruction, save the bed of the East Tennessee Railroad. On the plain were hundreds of little mounds, thrown up by our own and the enemy's pickets, giving it the appearance of an overgrown prairie-dog village.

At noon General Grant, Assistant Secretary of War Dana, General Thomas, Generals Hooker, Granger, Howard, and other distinguished officers stood on the parapet of Fort Wood facing Orchard Knob, looking to see this initial movement,—the overture to the battle of Chattanooga. At half-past twelve, Wood's division, supported by Sheridan, marched out on the plain in front of the fort. It was an inspiring sight. Flags were flying; the quick, earnest steps of thousands beat equal time. The sharp commands of hundreds of company officers, the sound of the drums, the ringing notes of the bugle, companies wheeling and countermarching and regiments getting into line, the bright sun lighting up ten thousand polished bayonets till they glistened and flashed like a flying shower of electric sparks,—all looked like preparations for a peaceful pageant, rather than for the bloody work of death.

Groups of officers on Missionary Ridge looked down through their glasses, and the enemy's pickets, but a few hundred yards away, came out of their pits and stood idly looking on, unconcernedly viewing what they supposed to be preparations for a grand review. But at half-past one o'clock the advance was sounded. Instantly Wood's division, moving with the steadiness of a machine, started forward. Not a straggler or laggard was on the field, and, what was probably hardly ever before seen, drummers were marching with their companies, beating the charge. Now the enemy

realized, for the first time, that it was not a review. His pickets fell back to their reserves. The reserves were quickly driven back to the main line. Firing opened from the enemy's advanced rifle-pits, followed by a tremendous roll of musketry and roar of artillery. Men were seen on the ground, dotting the field over which the line of battle had passed. Ambulances came hurrying back with the first of the wounded. Columns of puffy smoke arose from the Orchard Knob woods. A cheer, faint to those on the parapet of Fort Wood, indicated that the boys in blue were carrying the breastworks on the Knob! A sharp, short struggle, and the hill was ours.

About 4 o'clock in the afternoon of November 23d, when it became certain that Osterhaus, cut off by the breaking of the pontoon-bridge at Brown's Ferry, would be attached to Hooker's command, General Thomas directed Hooker to make a demonstration against Lookout Mountain the next morning, and, if the demonstration showed it could be carried, to proceed to take it. Later in the day, orders to the same effect came to General Hooker from General Grant. The success at Orchard Knob, and the breaking of the bridge, caused this radical change to be made in Grant's plans. Yet he still held to the chief feature, which was to turn Bragg's right.

The morning of November 24th opened with a cold, drizzling rain. Thick clouds of mist were settling on Lookout Mountain. At daybreak Geary's division, and Whitaker's brigade of Cruft's division, marched up to Wauhatchie, the nearest point at which Lookout Creek, swelled by recent rains, could be forded, and at 8 o'clock they crossed. The heavy clouds of mist reaching down the mountain-side hid the movement from the enemy, who was expecting and was well prepared to resist a crossing at the Chattanooga road below. As soon as this movement was discovered, the enemy withdrew his troops from the summit of the mountain, changed front, and formed a new line to meet our advance, his left resting at the palisade, and his right at the heavy works in the valley, where the road crossed the creek. Having crossed at Wauhatchie, Whitaker's brigade, being in the advance, drove back the enemy's pickets, and quickly ascended the mountain till it reached the foot of the palisade. Here, firmly attaching its right, the brigade faced left in front, with its left joined to Geary's division. Geary now moved along the side of the mountain, and through the valley, thus covering the crossing of the rest of Hooker's command. In the meantime Grose's brigade was engaging the enemy at the lower road crossing, and Woods' brigade of Osterhaus's division was building a bridge rather more than half a mile farther up the creek. Geary, moving down the valley, reached this point at 11 o'clock, just after the bridge was finished, and as Osterhaus's division and Grose's brigade were crossing. Hooker's command, now united in the enemy's field, was ready to advance and sweep around the mountain. His line, hanging at the base of the palisades like a great pendulum, reached down the side of the mountain to the valley, where the force



GENERAL HOOKER AND STAFF ON THE HILL NORTH OF LOOKOUT CREEK, FROM WHICH HE DIRECTED THE BATTLE. FROM A WAR-TIME PHOTOGRAPH.

that had just crossed the creek was attached as its weight. Now, as, at the command of Hooker, it swung forward in its upward movement, the artillery of the Army of the Cumberland, on Moccasin Point, opened fire, throwing a stream of shot and shell into the enemy's rifle-pits at the foot of the mountain, and into the works thickly planted on the "White House" plateau. At the same time the guns planted by Hooker on the west side of the creek opened on the works which covered the enemy's right. Then followed a gallant assault by Osterhaus and Grose. After fighting for nearly two hours, step by step up the steep mountain-side, over and through deep gullies and ravines, over great rocks and fallen trees, the earth-works on the plateau were assaulted and carried, and the enemy was driven out and forced to fall back. He did so slowly and reluctantly, taking advantage of the rough ground to continue the fight. It was now 2 o'clock. A halt all along the line was ordered by General Hooker, as the clouds had grown so thick that further advance was impracticable, and as his ammunition was almost exhausted and more could not well be brought up the mountain. But all the

enemy's works had been taken. Hooker had carried the mountain on the east side, had opened communication with Chattanooga, and he commanded the enemy's line of defensive works in Chattanooga Valley. †

At 2 o'clock Hooker reported to General Thomas and informed him that he was out of ammunition. Thomas at once sent Carlin's brigade from the valley, each soldier taking with him all the small ammunition he could carry. At 5 o'clock Carlin was on the mountain, and Hooker's skirmishers were quickly supplied with the means of carrying on their work.

In the morning it had not been known in Chattanooga, in Sherman's army, or in Bragg's camp, that a battle was to be fought. Indeed, it was not definitely known even to General Grant; for Hooker was only ordered to make a demonstration, and, if this showed a good chance for success, then to make an attack. Soon after breakfast, Sherman's men at the other end of the line, intent on the north end of Missionary Ridge, and Thomas's men in the center, fretting to be let loose from their intrenchments, were startled by the sound of

† Colonel D. R. Hundley, of Greenbrier, Alabama, writing to the editors, May 27th, 1887, said: "The impression conveyed in the above is that Osterhaus and Grose were confronted by at least a reasonably large force in their fight up the mountain-side and at the earth-works. The fact is, the only force opposed to them on the side of the mountain were skirmishers from the weak brigade in charge of the earth-works, and the only force to confront them in the earth-works was the same weak brigade, but little over a thousand strong, commanded by General Walthall, of Mississippi. Nearly half of this

weak force was killed or captured, but the rest fought their way gallantly back to the Craven farm, where, for the first time, they received reinforcements. I personally know that no step backward was taken from that hour, and that the conflict raged furiously for some time on that ground before the Federals ceased firing. General Hooker had no occasion to 'order a halt all along the line'—the 'boys in gray' in his front, concealed in the mist and hid behind trees and rocks, had already most effectually halted the gallant 'boys in blue.'"

artillery and musketry firing in Lookout Valley. Surprise possessed the thousands who turned their anxious eyes toward the mountain. The hours slowly wore away; the roar of battle increased, as it came rolling around the point of the mountain, and the anxiety grew. A battle was being fought just before and above them. They could hear, but could not see how it was going. Finally, the wind, tossing about the clouds and mist, made a rift that for a few minutes opened a view of White House plateau. The enemy was seen to be in flight, and Hooker's men were in pursuit! Then went up a mighty cheer from the thirty thousand in the valley that was heard above the battle by their comrades on the mountain.

As the sun went down the clouds rolled away, and the night came on clear and cool. A grand sight was old Lookout that night. Not two miles apart were the parallel camp-fires of the two armies, extending from the summit of the mountain to its base, looking like streams of burning lava, while in between, the flashes from the skirmishers' muskets glowed like giant fire-flies.

The next morning there was silence in Hooker's front. Before daylight eight adventurous, active volunteers from the 8th Kentucky Infantry scaled the palisades and ran up the Stars and Stripes. The enemy had stolen away in the night.

Although General Grant had twice changed his original plan, first in the movement from the center, then in the reconnoissance and resulting attack on Lookout Mountain, he still adhered to his purpose of turning Bragg's right, and made no change in the instructions given to General Sherman, except as to the time of attack. Every necessary preparation for crossing Sherman's troops had been made secretly, under direction of General W. F. Smith; 116 pontoons had been placed in North Chickamauga Creek, and in ravines near its mouth, and many wagon-loads of "balks" (stringers) and chess (flooring) had been hid near by. Sherman had his troops well massed on the north side of the river. After dark, November 23d, Colonel James Barnett, the gallant and skillful Chief of Artillery, of the Army of the Cumberland under Rosecrans, to whom was assigned the duty of covering Sherman's crossing, and protecting the pontoon bridge, planted the guns of six six-gun batteries on the low foot-hills, and a battery of siege guns on the higher ground on the north side of the river. At midnight General Giles A. Smith's brigade entered the pontoons, floated out of North Chickamauga Creek, and was rowed to the south bank of the river. Landing quietly, he surprised and captured the enemy's pickets, and secured a firm foothold. The pontoons were sent across the river, and with these and the small steamboat brought up from Chattanooga General Morgan L. Smith's and General John E. Smith's divisions were ferried over the river. As soon as these troops had been landed, work was commenced on the pontoon-bridge, which was skillfully laid under the supervision of General W. F. Smith. The bridge was 1350 feet in length, and was completed by 11 o'clock in the morning, when General Ewing's division and Sherman's artillery

crossed. At 1 o'clock, just as Hooker was rounding the front of Lookout Mountain, the roar of his battle stirring the blood of the veterans of the Army of the Tennessee, General Sherman gave the command, "Forward!" At 3:30 General Sherman took the hill which was supposed to be the north end of the ridge, and soon afterward took another hill a little in advance, both separated by a deep depression from the heavily fortified Tunnel Hill, on which Bragg's right flank rested and which was Sherman's objective point.

None of the men of the Army of the Cumberland, who for nine weeks were buried in the trenches at Chattanooga, can ever forget the glorious night of the 24th of November. As the sun went down, the clouds rolled up the mountain, and the mist was blown out of the valley. Night came on clear, with the stars lighting up the heavens. But there followed a sight to cheer their hearts and thrill their souls. Away off to their right, and reaching skyward, Lookout Mountain was ablaze with the fires of Hooker's men, while off to their left, and reaching far above the valley, the north end of Missionary Ridge was aflame with the lights of Sherman's army. The great iron crescent that had, with threatening aspect, so long hung over them, was disappearing. The only thought that dampened their enthusiasm was that the enemy was being destroyed on the flanks, while they were tied down in the center, without a part in the victories. But late that night General Grant, thinking that General Sherman had carried Tunnel Hill, and acting in that belief, gave orders for the next day's battle. General Sherman was directed to attack the enemy at early dawn, Thomas to co-operate with him, and Hooker, to be ready to advance into Chattanooga Valley, to hold the road that zigzagged from the valley to the summit. Early the next morning, when General Grant learned that the ridge had not been carried as far as Tunnel Hill, and that Lookout Mountain had been evacuated by the enemy, he suspended his orders, except those to Sherman, and directed Hooker to come down from the mountain, to carry the pass at Rossville, and then operate on Bragg's left and rear. Bragg's army was now concentrated on Missionary Ridge, and in the valley at the east foot. Cheatham's and Stevenson's divisions had been withdrawn from Lookout Mountain on the night of the 24th, and, marching all night, were seen at dawn the next morning moving along the summit of Missionary Ridge, on the way to reënforce Bragg's right. For several hours after daylight the flowing of this steady stream of troops continued.

Early in the morning of the 25th General Grant and General Thomas established their headquarters on Orchard Knob, a point from which the best view of the movements of the whole army could be had. At sunrise General Sherman commenced his attack, but after repeated assaults and severe fighting, it appearing to be impossible for General Sherman to take the enemy's works, operations ceased early in the afternoon.

Meanwhile Hooker was detained three hours at Chattanooga Creek, while a bridge that the



THE CHARGE UP MISSIONARY RIDGE BY BAIRD'S, WOOD'S, SHERIDAN'S, AND JOHNSON'S DIVISIONS.
FROM THE ROUGH SKETCH FOR ONE SECTION OF THE CYCLORAMA OF THE BATTLE OF MISSIONARY RIDGE.

retreating enemy had burned was being rebuilt. As soon as he had taken Rossville, he moved against the south end of Missionary Ridge. The ridge was quickly carried, and, sweeping northward, Hooker soon came upon Stewart's division, posted on the summit, and behind the earth-works which the Army of the Cumberland had thrown up the day after Chickamauga. Cruft's division assaulted and carried the works, thus having the good fortune of retaking the works they themselves had constructed. It was by this time nearly sundown. Hooker reached the south end of the ridge too late in the day to relieve the pressure on Sherman, who was at the north end six miles off. Bragg's right had not been turned. Success had not followed Sherman's movement. The battle as planned had not been won.

Late on this memorable afternoon there was an accident—an accident like the charge at Bala-klava; though, unlike this theme for poetry, it called for greater daring, and was attended by complete success, and yielded most important results, for it led to the complete shattering of the enemy's army, and drove him from the field. On Orchard Knob, and opposite the center of Missionary Ridge, were four divisions of the Army of the Cumberland. On the left was Baird's division; then Wood's and Sheridan's divisions occupying

the lines which, two days before, they had taken in their magnificent advance; on the right was R. W. Johnson's division,—all under the personal command of Thomas. It was past 3 o'clock. General Sherman had ceased operations. General Hooker's advance had not yet been felt. The day was dying, and Bragg still held the ridge. If any movement to dislodge him was to be made that day it must be made at once. At half-past three o'clock an attack was ordered by General Grant. He had changed his plan of battle. At once orders were issued that at the firing, in rapid succession, of six guns on Orchard Knob, Thomas's whole line should instantaneously move forward, Sheridan's and Wood's divisions in the center, Sheridan to be supported on the right by Johnson, and Wood on the left by Baird. This demonstration was to be made to relieve the pressure on Sherman. The only order given was to move forward and take the rifle-pits at the foot of the ridge. In Sheridan's division the order was, "As soon as the signal is given, the whole line will advance, and you will take what is before you."

Between Orchard Knob and Missionary Ridge was a valley, partly covered with a small growth of timber. It was wooded in front of the right of Baird's and of the whole of Wood's division. In front of Sheridan's and Johnson's it had been

almost entirely cleared. At the foot of the ridge were heavy rifle-pits, which could be seen from Orchard Knob, and extending in front of them, for four and five hundred yards, the ground was covered with felled trees. There was a good plain for both direct and enfilading fire from the rifle-pits, and the approaches were commanded by the enemy's artillery. At this point the ridge is five or six hundred feet high. Its side, scored with gullies and showing but little timber, had a rough and bare appearance. Half-way up was another line of rifle-pits, and the summit was furrowed with additional lines and dotted over with epaulements, in which were placed fifty pieces of artillery. Directly in front of Orchard Knob, and on the summit of the ridge, in a small house, was Bragg's headquarters.

At twenty minutes before four the signal-guns were fired. Suddenly twenty thousand men rushed forward, moving in line of battle by brigades, with a double line of skirmishers in front, and closely followed by the reserves in mass. The big siege-guns in the Chattanooga forts roared above the light artillery and musketry in the valley. The enemy's rifle-pits were ablaze, and the whole ridge in our front had broken out like another *Ætna*. Not many minutes afterward our men were seen working through the felled trees and other obstructions. Though exposed to such a terrific fire, they neither fell back nor halted. By a bold and desperate push they broke through the works in several places and opened flank and reverse fires. The enemy was thrown into confusion, and took precipitate flight up the ridge. Many prisoners and a large number of small-arms were captured. The order of the commanding general had now been fully and most successfully carried out. But it did not go far enough to satisfy these brave men, who thought the time had come to finish the battle of Chickamauga. There was a halt of but a few minutes, to take breath and to re-form lines; then, with a sudden impulse, and without orders, all started up the ridge. Officers, catching their spirit, first followed, then led. There was no thought of supports or of protecting flanks, though the enemy's line could be seen, stretching on either side. †

As soon as this movement was seen from Orchard Knob, Grant quickly turned to Thomas, who stood by his side, and I heard him say angrily: "Thomas, who ordered those men up the ridge?" Thomas replied, in his usual slow, quiet manner: "I don't know; I did not." Then, addressing General Gordon Granger, he said, "Did you order them up, Granger?" "No," said Granger; "they started up without orders. When those fellows get started all hell can't stop them." General Grant said something to the effect that somebody would suffer if it did not turn out well, and then, turning, stoically watched the ridge. He gave no further orders.

As soon as Granger had replied to Thomas, he turned to me, his chief-of-staff, and said: "Ride

at once to Wood, and then to Sheridan, and ask them if they ordered their men up the ridge, and tell them, if they can take it, to push ahead." As I was mounting, Granger added: "It is hot over there, and you may not get through. I shall send Captain Avery to Sheridan, and other officers after both of you." As fast as my horse could carry me, I rode first to General Wood, and delivered the message. "I didn't order them up," said Wood; "they started up on their own account, and they are going up, too! Tell Granger, if we are supported, we will take and hold the ridge!" As soon as I reached General Wood, Captain Avery got to General Sheridan, and delivered his message. "I didn't order them up," said Sheridan; "but we are going to take the ridge!" He then asked Avery for his flask and waved it at a group of Confederate officers, standing just in front of Bragg's headquarters, with the salutation, "Here's at you!" At once two guns—the "Lady Breckinridge" and the "Lady Buckner"—in front of Bragg's headquarters were fired at Sheridan and the group of officers about him. One shell struck so near as to throw dirt over Sheridan and Avery. "Ah!" said the general, "that is ungenerous; I shall take those guns for that!" Before Sheridan received the message taken by Captain Avery, he had sent a staff-officer to Granger, to inquire whether "the order given to take the rifle-pits meant the rifle-pits at the base, or those on the top of the ridge." Granger told this officer that "the order given was to take those at the base." Conceiving this to be an order to fall back, the officer, on his way to Sheridan, gave it to General Wagner, commanding the Second Brigade of the division, which was then nearly half-way up the ridge. Wagner ordered his brigade back to the rifle-pits at the base, but it only remained there till Sheridan, seeing the mistake, ordered it forward. It again advanced under a terrific fire.

The men, fighting and climbing up the steep hill, sought the roads, ravines, and less rugged parts. The ground was so broken that it was impossible to keep a regular line of battle. At times their movements were in shape like the flight of migratory birds—sometimes in line, sometimes in mass, mostly in V-shaped groups, with the points toward the enemy. At these points regimental flags were flying, sometimes drooping as the bearers were shot, but never reaching the ground, for other brave hands were there to seize them. Sixty flags were advancing up the hill. Bragg was hurrying large bodies of men from his right to the center. They could be seen hastening along the ridge. Cheatham's division was being withdrawn from Sherman's front. Bragg and Hardee were at the center, urging their men to stand firm and drive back the advancing enemy, now so near the summit—indeed, so near that the guns, which could not be sufficiently depressed to reach them, became useless. Artillerymen were lighting the

† The Confederate line from right to left on the ridge was as follows: Hardee's corps on the right, Cleburne's division confronting Sherman; Stevenson and Cheatham came next, the latter joining on Breckinridge's corps, which occupied the slope of the ridge, with outposts in

trenches at the foot of the slope. Breckinridge's own division, under General Bate, was in the center, in front of Truman's house, Bragg's headquarters. [See map, p. 686.] Stewart's division, deployed, formed the left of the line.—EDITORS.

fuses of shells, and bowling them by hundreds down the hill. The critical moment arrived when the summit was just within reach. At six different points, and almost simultaneously, Sheridan's and Wood's divisions broke over the crest,—Sheridan's first, near Bragg's headquarters; and in a few minutes Sheridan was beside the guns that had been fired at him, and claiming them as captures of his division. Baird's division took the works on Wood's left almost immediately afterward; and then Johnson came up on Sheridan's right. The enemy's guns were turned upon those who still remained in the works, and soon all were in flight down the eastern slope. Baird got on the ridge just in time to change front and oppose a large body of the enemy moving down from Bragg's right to attack our left. After a sharp engagement, that lasted till dark, he drove the enemy back beyond a high point on the north, which he at once occupied. ¶

The sun had not yet gone down, Missionary Ridge was ours, and Bragg's army was broken and in flight! Dead and wounded comrades lay thickly strewn on the ground; but thicker yet were the dead and wounded men in gray. Then followed the wildest confusion, as the victors gave vent to their joy. Some madly shouted; some wept from very excess of joy; some grotesquely danced out their delight,—even our wounded forgot their pain, to join in the general hurrah. But Sheridan did not long stop to receive praise and congratulations. With two brigades he started down the Mission Mills road, and found, strongly posted on a second

hill, the enemy's rear. They made a stout resistance, but by a sudden flank movement he drove them from the heights and captured two guns and many prisoners. The day was succeeded by a clear moonlight night. At 7 o'clock General Granger sent word to General Thomas that by a bold dash at Chickamauga Crossing he might cut off a large number of the enemy now supposed to be leaving Sherman's front, and that he proposed to move in that direction. It was midnight before guides could be found, and then General Sheridan again put his tired and well-worn men in motion. He reached the creek just as the rear-guard of the enemy was crossing, and pressed it so closely that it burned the pontoon-bridge before all its troops were over. Here Sheridan captured several hundred prisoners, a large number of quartermasters' wagons, together with caissons, artillery, ammunition, and many small-arms.

In this battle Sheridan's and Wood's divisions—the two center assaulting divisions—took 31 pieces of artillery, several thousand small-arms, and 3800 prisoners. In that one hour of assault they lost 2337 men in killed and wounded,—over twenty per cent. of their whole force! On the northern end of the ridge General Sherman lost in his two days' fighting 1697 in killed and wounded. Of these, 1268 were in his own three divisions. During the night the last of Bragg's army was withdrawn from Missionary Ridge, and Chattanooga from that time remained in undisputed possession of the Union forces.

¶ Governor John A. Martin, of Kansas, colonel of the 8th Kansas Volunteers, of Willich's brigade, Wood's division, in a letter to General Fullerton, dated November 16th, 1886, describes the charge as follows:

"When the advance on Missionary Ridge was ordered, on November 25th, my regiment went out directly from Orchard Knob. General Willich, in communicating to me the orders received, distinctly stated that we were directed to take the line of Confederate works at the foot of the hill. We reached these works without serious difficulty, the losses being very small. Shortly after, we emerged from the woods into the open field, and were charging the Confederate works on the double-quick; the soldiers there threw down their arms, and, holding up their hands, in token of surrender, jumped to our side. I had ridden my horse to this line, and, on reaching it, halted my regiment behind the enemy's intrenchments. Dismounting, I ran forward to the little huts that were built by the Confederates, on the plateau just back of their line, with a view of ascertaining what the situation was. I had seen, as soon as I reached the first line of works, as did every soldier in the command, that it was impossible for the troops to remain there long. The line was within easy range of the musketry on the summit of the ridge, and was raked by the artillery fire on the projecting points of the ridge on either side. Reaching the foot of the ridge east of the plateau, I found the position there fairly well protected,—that is, not so easily reached, either by the musketry or artillery of the enemy,—and I at once ran back to near where my regiment had been halted. Just as I got there General Willich came up, and I said to him, 'We can't live here, and ought to go forward.' He gave me directions to move ahead, and I at once ordered my regiment forward. By that time, or about that time, it seemed to me that there was a simultaneous advance of many of the regiments in different parts of the line, and I got the impression that possibly orders had been communicated for an advance on the ridge, which I had not received; hence I hurried my regiment forward as rapidly as possible. When I reached the foot of the ridge again, with the regiment, my orderly came up with my horse, and I mounted it, as my adjutant did his. The advance to the ridge was as rapid as the nature of the ground would permit; and I think, from the position I occupied, I had a fair opportunity to see what was going on, not only immediately above me, but to

the right and left. I was impressed with the idea, I know, that a sharp rivalry had sprung up between several regiments, including my own, as to which should reach the summit first. Another idea, I remember distinctly, which impressed me, was that the different regiments had assumed the form of a triangle or wedge—the advance point in nearly every case being the regimental battle-flag. I have always believed that my own regiment made the first break in the enemy's lines on the summit of Missionary Ridge; but the difference between the break thus made by the 8th Kansas and the progress made by one or two regiments of Hazen's brigade on our right and the 25th Illinois of our own brigade, was exceedingly brief.

"But that the first break in the enemy's lines was made in front of our division, I have not the slightest doubt. After we passed through the Confederate works, and while the men were rushing with great enthusiasm after the fleeing Confederates, who were running down the hill on the other side, my attention was directed to the right, where, at the point of a knob, I saw other troops were still engaged in a fierce struggle with the Confederates, who were yet in force behind their works; and while thus, for a moment, watching the progress of the fight to the right, a Confederate battery on a point to the left of our position was swung round, and poured a fire directly down our line." Immediately I ordered my bugler to sound the recall, and began forming all the troops I could gather at that point, with a view of moving to the left to clear the enemy's works in that direction. I had assembled probably a hundred men, when suddenly the whole Confederate line, both to the right and left, gave way before the furious attack of our troops, and was soon in full retreat through the woods and down the roads to the rear.

"I have stated hastily some of my impressions of the battle, but the principal point, which, in my judgment, should always be made prominent, is the fact that Missionary Ridge was fought without orders from the commander-in-chief. I remember, too, and this only confirms what I have said, that shortly after the battle was over General Granger rode along our lines, and said, in a joking way, to the troops, 'I am going to have you all court-martialed! You were ordered to take the works at the foot of the hill, and you have taken those on top! You have disobeyed orders, all of you, and you know that you ought to be court-martialed!'"

EDITORS.

GENERAL BRAGG'S COMMENTS ON MISSIONARY RIDGE.

GENERAL BRAGG made a brief report on the Chattanooga campaign on November 30th, 1863, and on the 2d of December was relieved of command. Of the battle of Missionary Ridge, the report says:

"About 11 A. M. the enemy's forces were being moved in heavy masses from Lookout and beyond to our front, while those in front extended to our right. They formed their lines with great deliberation just beyond the range of our guns and in plain view of our position. Though greatly outnumbered, such was the strength of our position that no doubt was entertained of our ability to hold it, and every disposition was made for that purpose. During this time they [the enemy] had made several attempts on our extreme right, and had been handsomely repulsed with very heavy loss by Major-General Cleburne's command, under the immediate directions of Lieutenant-General Hardee. . . . About 8:30 P. M. the immense force in the front of our left and center advanced in three lines, preceded by heavy skirmishers. Our batteries opened with fine effect, and much confusion was produced before they reached musket-range. In a short time the roar of musketry became very heavy, and it was soon apparent the enemy had been repulsed in my immediate front. While riding along the crest congratulating the troops, intelligence reached me that our line was broken on my right, and the enemy had crowned the ridge. Assistance was promptly dispatched to that point under Brigadier-General Bate, who had so successfully maintained the ground in my front, and I proceeded to the rear of the broken line to rally our retiring troops and return them to the crest to drive the enemy back. General Bate found the disaster so great that his small force could not repair it. About this time I learned that our extreme left had also given way, and that my position was almost surrounded. Bate was immediately directed to form a second line in the rear, where, by the efforts of my staff, a nucleus of stragglers had been formed upon which to rally. Lieutenant-General Hardee, leaving Major-General Cleburne in command on the extreme right, moved toward the left when he heard the heavy firing in that direction. He reached the right of Anderson's division just in time to find it had nearly all fallen

back, commencing on its left, where the enemy had first crowned the ridge. By a prompt and judicious movement, he threw a portion of Cheatham's division directly across the ridge facing the enemy, who was now moving a strong force immediately on his left flank. By a decided stand here the enemy was entirely checked, and that portion of our force to the right remained intact. All to the left, however, except a portion of Bate's division, was entirely routed and in rapid flight. . . . A panic which I had never before witnessed seemed to have seized upon officers and men, and each seemed to be struggling for his personal safety, regardless of his duty or his character. In this distressing and alarming state of affairs General Bate was ordered to hold his position covering the road for the retreat of Breckinridge's command, and orders were immediately sent to Generals Hardee and Breckinridge to retire their forces upon the depot at Chickamauga. . . . No satisfactory excuse can possibly be given for the shameful conduct of our troops on the left in allowing their line to be penetrated. The position was one which ought to have been held by a line of skirmishers against any assaulting column, and wherever resistance was made the enemy fled in disorder after suffering heavy loss. Those who reached the ridge did so in a condition of exhaustion from the great physical exertion in climbing which rendered them powerless, and the slightest effort would have destroyed them. Having secured much of our artillery, they soon availed themselves of our panic, and turning our guns upon us enfiladed the lines, both right and left, rendering them entirely untenable. Had all parts of the line been maintained with equal gallantry and persistence, no enemy could ever have dislodged us, and but one possible reason presents itself to my mind in explanation of this bad conduct in veteran troops who never before failed in any duty assigned them, however difficult and hazardous: They had for two days confronted the enemy, marshaling his immense forces in plain view, and exhibiting to their sight such a superiority in numbers as may have intimidated weak-minded and untried soldiers. But our veterans had so often encountered similar hosts when the strength of position was against us, and with perfect success, that not a doubt crossed my mind."

OPPOSING FORCES IN THE CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN.

November 23d-27th, 1863.

For much of the information contained in this list and in similar lists to follow, the editors are indebted (in advance of the publication of the "Official Records") to Brigadier-General Richard C. Drmm, Adjutant-General of the Army. K stands for killed; w for wounded; m w for mortally wounded; m for captured or missing; e for captured.

THE UNION ARMY: Maj.-Gen. Ulysses S. Grant.

ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND.—Maj.-Gen. George H. Thomas.

General Headquarters: 1st Ohio Sharpshooters, Capt. G. M. Barber; 10th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. W. M. Ward.

FOURTH ARMY CORPS, Maj.-Gen. Gordon Granger.

FIRST DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Charles Cruft.

Escort: E, 92d Ill., Capt. Matthew Van Buskirk.

Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Walter C. Whitaker: 96th Ill., Col. Thomas E. Champion, Maj. George Hicks; 35th Ind., Col. Bernard F. Mullen; 8th Ky., Col. Sidney M. Barnes; 40th Ohio, Col. Jacob E. Taylor; 51st Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Charles H. Wood; 99th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. John E. Cummins. Brigade loss: k, 17; w, 63; m, 2 = 82. *Third Brigade,* Col. William Grose: 59th Ill., Maj. Clayton Hale; 75th Ill., Col. John E. Bennett; 84th Ill., Col. Louis H. Waters; 9th Ind., Col. Isaac C. B. Swan; 36th Ind., Maj. Gilbert Trusler; 24th Ohio, Capt. George M. Bacon. Brigade loss: k, 4; w, 60 = 64.

SECOND DIVISION, Maj.-Gen. Philip H. Sheridan.

First Brigade, Col. Francis T. Sherman: 36th Ill., Col. Silas Miller, Lieut.-Col. Porter C. Olson; 44th Ill., Col. Wallace W. Barrett; 73d Ill., Col. James F. Jaques;

74th Ill., Col. Jason Marsh; 88th Ill., Lieut.-Col. George W. Chandler; 22d Ind., Col. Michael Gooding; 2d Mo., Col. Bernard Laiholdt, Lieut.-Col. Arnold Beck; 15th Mo., Col. Joseph Conrad (w), Capt. Samuel Rexinger; 24th Wis., Maj. Carl von Bammach. Brigade loss: k, 30; w, 268; m, 3 = 301. *Second Brigade,* Brig.-Gen. George D. Wagner: 100th Ill., Maj. Chas. M. Hammond; 15th Ind., Col. Gustavus A. Wood, Maj. Frank White (w), Capt. Benjamin F. Hegler; 40th Ind., Lieut.-Col. Elias Neff; 57th Ind., Lieut.-Col. George W. Leonard; 58th Ind., Lieut.-Col. Joseph Moore; 26th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. William H. Young; 97th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Milton Barnes. Brigade loss: k, 70; w, 660 = 730. *Third Brigade,* Col. Charles G. Harker: 22d Ill., Lieut.-Col. Francis Swanwick; 27th Ill., Col. Jonathan R. Miles; 42d Ill., Col. Nathan H. Walworth, Capt. Edgar D. Swain; 51st Ill., Maj. Charles W. Davis (w), Capt. Albert M. Tilton; 79th Ill., Col. Allen Buckner; 3d Ky., Col. Henry C. Dmmlap; 64th Ohio, Col. Alexander McIlvain; 65th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. William A. Bullitt; 125th Ohio, Col. Emerson Opdycke, Capt. Edward P. Bates. Brigade loss: k, 28; w, 269 = 297. *Artillery,* Capt. War-

‡ Temporarily in command of a demi-brigade.

ren P. Edgarton: M, 1st Ill., Capt. George W. Spencer; 10th Ind., Capt. William A. Naylor; G, 1st Mo., Lieut. G. Schueler; I, 1st Ohio, Capt. H. Dilger; G, 4th U. S., Lieut. C. F. Merkle; H, 5th U. S., Capt. F. L. Guenther. **THIRD DIVISION**, Brig.-Gen. Thomas J. Wood.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. August Willich: 25th Ill., Col. Richard H. Nodine; 35th Ill., Lieut.-Col. William P. Chandler; Lieut.-Col. William D. Williams; 32d Ind., Lieut.-Col. Frank Erdelmeyer; 68th Ind., Lieut.-Col. Harvey J. Espy; 8th Kans., Col. John A. Martin; 15th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Frank Askew; 49th Ohio, Maj. Samuel F. Gray; 15th Wis., Capt. John A. Gordou. Brigade loss: k, 46; w, 291; m, 1=338. *Second Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. William B. Hazen: 6th Ind., Maj. Calvin D. Campbell; 5th Ky., Col. William W. Berry (w), Lieut.-Col. John L. Treanor; 6th Ky., Maj. Richard T. Whitaker; 23d Ky., Lieut.-Col. James C. Foy; 1st Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Bassett Langdon (w), Maj. Joab A. Stafford; 6th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Alex. C. Christopher; 41st Ohio, Col. Aquila Wiley (w), Lieut.-Col. Robert L. Kimberly; 93d Ohio, Maj. William Birch (k), Capt. Daniel Bowman (w), Capt. Samuel B. Smith; 124th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. James Pickands. Brigade loss: k, 92; w, 430; m, 7=529. *Third Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Samuel Beatty: 79th Ind., Col. Frederick Knefer; 86th Ind., Col. George F. Dick; 9th Ky., Col. George H. Cram; 17th Ky., Col. Alexander M. Stout; 13th Ohio, Col. Dwight Jarvis, Jr.; 19th Ohio, Col. Charles F. Manderson; 59th Ohio, Maj. Robert J. Vanosdol. Brigade loss: k, 14; w, 160; m, 1=175. *Artillery*, Capt. Cullen Bradley: Ill., Battery, Capt. Lyman Bridges; 6th Ohio, Lieut. Oliver H. P. Ayres; 20th Ohio, Capt. Edward Grosskopf; B, Pa., Lieut. Samuel M. McDowell.

ELEVENTH CORPS, Maj.-Gen. O. O. Howard.

General Headquarters, Independent Co., 8th N. Y. Infantry, Capt. Anton Bruhn.

SECOND DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Adolph von Steinwehr.

First Brigade, Col. Adolphus Buschbeck: 33d N. J., Col. George W. Mindil; 134th N. Y., Col. Allen H. Jackson; 154th N. Y., Col. Patrick H. Jones; 27th Pa., Maj. Peter A. McAloon (m w), Capt. August Reidt; 73d Pa., Lieut.-Col. Joseph B. Taft (k), Capt. Daniel F. Kelly (c), Lieut. Samuel D. Miller. Brigade loss: k, 28; w, 148; m, 108=284. *Second Brigade*, Col. Orland Smith: 33d Mass., Lieut.-Col. Godfrey Rider, Jr.; 136th N. Y., Col. James Wood, Jr.; 55th Ohio, Col. C. B. Gambee; 73d Ohio, Maj. S. H. Hurst. Brigade loss: k, 4; w, 21; m, 4=29.

THIRD DIVISION, Maj.-Gen. Carl Schurz.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Hector Tyndale: 101st Ill., Col. Charles H. Fox; 45th N. Y., Maj. Charles Koch; 143d N. Y., Col. Horace Boughton; 61st Ohio, Col. Stephen J. McGroarty; 82d Ohio, Lieut.-Col. David Thomson. Brigade loss: k, 1; w, 4=5. *Second Brigade*, Col. Wladimir Krzyzanowski: 58th N. Y., Capt. Michael Esenbaux; 119th N. Y., Col. John T. Lockman; 141st N. Y., Col. William K. Logie; 26th Wis., Capt. Frederick C. Winkler. Brigade loss: w, 3. *Third Brigade*, Col. Frederick Hecker: 80th Ill., Capt. James Neville; 82d Ill., Lieut.-Col. Edward S. Salomon; 68th N. Y., Maj. Albert von Steinhausen; 75th Pa., Maj. August Ledig. Brigade loss: k, 1; w, 9=10. *Artillery*, Maj. Thomas W. Osborn: I, 1st N. Y., Capt. Michael Wiedrich; 13th N. Y., Capt. W. Wheeler; K, 1st Ohio, Lieut. Nicholas Sahn.

TWELFTH ARMY CORPS.

SECOND DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. John W. Geary.

First Brigade, Col. Charles Candy, Col. William R. Creighton (k), Col. Thomas J. Ahl: 5th Ohio, Col. John H. Patrick; 7th Ohio, Col. William R. Creighton, Lieut.-Col. Orrin J. Crane (k), Capt. Ernest J. Kreiger; 29th Ohio, Col. William F. Fitch; 66th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Eugene Powell, Capt. Thomas McConnell; 28th Pa., Col. Thomas J. Ahl, Capt. John Flynn; 147th Pa., Lieut.-Col. Ario Pardee, Jr. Brigade loss: k, 25; w, 117=142. *Second Brigade*, Col. George A. Cobham, Jr.: 29th Pa., Col. William Rickards, Jr.; 109th Pa., Capt. Frederick L. Gimber; 111th Pa., Col. Thomas M. Walker. Brigade loss: k, 4; w, 18=22. *Third Brigade*, Col. David Ire-

land: 60th N. Y., Col. Abel Godard; 78th N. Y., Col. Herbert von Hammerstein; 102d N. Y., Col. James C. Lane; 137th N. Y., Capt. Milo B. Eldridge; 149th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Charles B. Randall. Brigade loss: k, 26; w, 151=177. *Artillery*, Maj. J. A. Reynolds: E, Pa., Lieut. J. D. McGill; K, 5th U. S., Capt. E. C. Bainbridge.

FOURTEENTH CORPS, Maj.-Gen. J. M. Palmer.

Escort: L, 1st Ohio Cav., Capt. John D. Barker.

FIRST DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Richard W. Johnson.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. William P. Carlin: 104th Ill., Lieut.-Col. Douglas Hapeman; 38th Ind., Lieut.-Col. Daniel F. Griffin; 42d Ind., Lieut.-Col. William T. B. McIntire; 88th Ind., Col. Cyrus E. Briant; 2d Ohio, Col. Anson G. McCook; 33d Ohio, Capt. James H. M. Montgomery; 94th Ohio, Maj. Rue P. Hutchins; 10th Wis., Capt. Jacob W. Roby. Brigade loss: k, 25; w, 134=159. *Second Brigade*, Col. Marshall F. Moore, Col. William L. Stoughton: 19th Ill., Lieut.-Col. Alexander W. Raffan; 11th Mich., Capt. Patrick H. Keegan; 69th Ohio, Maj. James J. Hanna; 1st Battalion, 15th U. S., Capt. Henry Keteltas; 2d Battalion, 15th U. S., Capt. William S. McManus; 1st Battalion, 16th U. S., Maj. Robert E. A. Crofton; 1st Battalion, 18th U. S., Capt. George W. Smith; 2d Battalion, 18th U. S., Capt. Henry Haymond; 1st Battalion, 19th U. S., Capt. Henry S. Welton. Brigade loss: k, 23; w, 149; m, 2=174. *Third Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. John C. Starkweather: 24th Ill., Col. Geza Mihalotzy; 37th Ind., Col. James S. Hull; 21st Ohio, Capt. Charles H. Vantine; 74th Ohio, Maj. Joseph Fisher; 78th Pa., Maj. Augustus B. Bonnaffon; 79th Pa., Maj. Michael H. Locher; 1st Wis., Lieut.-Col. George B. Bingham; 21st Wis., Capt. Charles H. Walker. *Artillery*: C, 1st Ill., Capt. Mark H. Prescott; A, 1st Mich., Francis E. Hale.

SECOND DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. J. C. Davis. Staff loss: w, 1.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. James D. Morgan: 10th Ill., Col. John Tillson; 16th Ill., Lieut.-Col. James B. Cahill; 60th Ill., Col. William B. Anderson; 21st Ky., Col. Samuel W. Price; 10th Mich., Lieut.-Col. Christopher J. Dickerson. Brigade loss: w, 9. *Second Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. John Beatty: 34th Ill., Lieut.-Col. Oscar Van Tassel; 78th Ill., Lieut.-Col. Carter Van Vleck; 98th Ohio, Maj. James M. Shane; 108th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Carlo Piepho; 113th Ohio, Maj. L. Starling Sullivan; 121st Ohio, Maj. John Yager. Brigade loss: k, 3; w, 17; m, 1=21. *Third Brigade*, Col. Daniel McCook: 85th Ill., Col. Caleb J. Dilworth; 86th Ill., Lieut.-Col. David W. Magee; 110th Ill., Lieut.-Col. E. Hibbard Topping; 125th Ill., Col. Oscar F. Harmon; 52d Ohio, Maj. James T. Holmes. Brigade loss: k, 2; w, 4; m, 5=11. *Artillery*, Capt. William A. Hotchkiss: I, 2d Ill., Lieut. Henry B. Plant; 2d Minn., Lieut. Richard L. Dawley; 5th Wis., Capt. George Q. Gardner.

THIRD DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Absalom Baird.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. John B. Turchin: 82d Ind., Col. Mortou C. Hunter; 11th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Ogden Street; 17th Ohio, Maj. Daniel Butterfield (w), Capt. Benjamin H. Showers; 31st Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Frederick W. Lister; 36th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Hiram F. Duval; 89th Ohio, Capt. John H. Jolly; 92d Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Douglas Putman, Jr. (w), Capt. Edward Grosvenor. Brigade loss: k, 50; w, 231; m, 3=284. *Second Brigade*, Col. Ferdinand Van Derveer: 75th Ind., Col. Milton S. Robinson; 87th Ind., Col. Newell Gleason; 101st Ind., Lieut.-Col. Thomas Doan; 2d Minn., Lieut.-Col. Judson W. Bishop; 9th Ohio, Col. Gustave Kammerling; 35th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Henry V. N. Boynton (w), Maj. Joseph L. Budd; 105th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. William R. Tolles. Brigade loss: k, 19; w, 142; m, 2=163. *Third Brigade*, Col. Edward H. Phelps (k), Col. William H. Hays: 10th Ind., Lieut.-Col. Marsh B. Taylor; 74th Ind., Lieut.-Col. Myron Baker; 4th Ky., Maj. Robert M. Kelly; 10th Ky., Col. William H. Hays, Lieut.-Col. Gabriel C. Wharton; 14th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Henry D. Kingsbury; 38th Ohio, Maj. Charles Greenwood. Brigade loss: k, 18; w, 100; m, 1=119. *Artillery*, Capt. George R. Swallow: 7th Ind., Lieut. Otho

¶ Maj.-Gen. Joseph Hooker, commanding Eleventh and Twelfth Army Corps, had under his immediate command the First Division, Fourth Corps; the Second Division, Twelfth

Corps; portions of the Fourteenth Corps, and the First Division, Fifteenth Corps. Co. K, 15th Ill. Cav., Capt. Samuel B. Sherer, served as escort to Gen. Hooker.

H. Morgan; 19th Ind., Lieut. Robert G. Laekey; 1, 4th U. S., Lieut. Frank G. Smith.

ENGINEER TROOPS, Brig.-Gen. William F. Smith.

Engineers: 1st Mich. Engineers (detachment), Capt. Perrin V. Fox; 13th Mich., Maj. Willard G. Eaton; 21st Mich., Capt. Loomis K. Bishop; 22d Mich. Inf., Maj. Henry S. Dean; 18th Ohio, Col. Timothy R. Stanley. *Pioneer Brigade*, Col. George P. Buell: 1st Battalion, Capt. Charles J. Stewart; 2d Battalion, Capt. Cornelius Smith; 3d Battalion, Capt. William Clark.

ARTILLERY RESERVE, Brig.-Gen. J. M. Brannan. FIRST DIVISION, Col. James Barnett.

First Brigade, Maj. Charles S. Cotter: B, 1st Ohio, Lieut. Norman A. Baldwin; C, 1st Ohio, Capt. Marco B. Gary; E, 1st Ohio, Lieut. Albert G. Ransom; F, 1st Ohio, Lieut. Giles J. Cockerill. *Second Brigade:* G, 1st Ohio, Capt. Alexander Marshall; M, 1st Ohio, Capt. Frederick Schultze; 18th Ohio, Lieut. Joseph McCafferty.

SECOND DIVISION.

First Brigade, Capt. Josiah W. Church: D, 1st Mich., Capt. Josiah W. Church; A, 1st Tenn., Lieut. Albert F. Beach; 3d Wis., Lieut. Hiram F. Hubbard; 8th Wis., Lieut. Obadiah German; 10th Wis., Capt. Yates V. Beebe. *Second Brigade*, Capt. Arnold Sutermeister: 4th Ind., Lieut. Henry J. Willits; 8th Ind., Lieut. George Estep; 11th Ind., Capt. Arnold Sutermeister; 21st Ind., Lieut. W. E. Chess; C, 1st Wis. Heavy, Capt. John R. Davies.

CAVALRY. ☆

Second Brigade (Second Division), Col. Eli Long: 98th Ill., Lieut.-Col. Edward Kitchell; 17th Ind., Lieut.-Col. Henry Jordan; 2d Ky., Col. Thomas P. Nicholas; 4th Mich., Maj. Horace Gray; 1st Ohio, Maj. Thomas J. Patten; 3d Ohio, Lieut.-Col. C. B. Seidel; 4th Ohio (battalion), Maj. G. W. Dobb; 10th Ohio, Col. C. C. Smith.

POST OF CHATTANOOGA, Col. John G. Parkhurst: 44th Ind., Lieut.-Col. Simeon C. Aldrich; 15th Ky., Maj. William G. Halpin; 9th Mich., Lieut.-Col. William Wilkinson.

ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE, Maj.-Gen. William T. Sherman. †

FIFTEENTH CORPS, Maj.-Gen. Frank P. Blair, Jr.

FIRST DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Peter J. Osterhaus.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Charles R. Woods: 13th Ill., Lieut.-Col. Frederick W. Partridge (w), Capt. Geo. P. Brown; 3d Mo., Lieut.-Col. Theodore Meunmaun; 12th Mo., Col. Hugo Wangelin (w), Lieut.-Col. Jacob Kaercher; 27th Mo., Lieut.-Col. John F. Cramer; 27th Mo., Col. Thomas Curly; 29th Mo., Col. James Peckham (w), Maj. Philip H. Murphy; 31st Mo., Lieut.-Col. Samuel P. Simpson; 32d Mo., Lieut.-Col. Henry C. Warmoth; 76th Ohio, Maj. Willard Warner. Brigade loss: k, 33; w, 203; m, 41=277. *Second Brigade*, Col. James A. Williamson: 4th Iowa, Lieut.-Col. George Burton; 9th Iowa, Col. David Carskaddon; 25th Iowa, Col. George A. Stone; 26th Iowa, Col. Milo Smith; 30th Iowa, Lieut.-Col. Aurelius Roberts; 31st Iowa, Lieut.-Col. Jeremiah W. Jenkins. Brigade loss: k, 19; w, 134; m, 2=155. *Artillery*, Capt. Henry H. Griffiths: 1st Iowa, Lieut. James M. Williams; F, 2d Mo., Capt. Clemens Landgraber; 4th Ohio, Capt. George Froehlich.

SECOND DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Morgan L. Smith.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Giles A. Smith (w), Col. Nathan W. Tupper: 55th Ill., Col. Oscar Malmborg; 116th Ill., Col. Nathan W. Tupper, Lieut.-Col. James P. Boyd; 127th Ill., Lieut.-Col. Frank S. Curtiss; 6th Mo., Lieut.-Col. Ira Boutell; 8th Mo., Lieut.-Col. David C. Coleman; 57th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Samuel R. Mott; 1st Battalion, 13th U. S., Capt. Charles C. Smith. Brigade loss: w, 14; m, 2=16. *Second Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Joseph A. J. Lightburn: 83d Ind., Col. Benjamin J. Spooner; 30th Ohio, Col. Theodore Jones; 37th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Louis Von Blessingh; 47th Ohio, Col. Augustus C. Parry; 54th Ohio, Maj. Robert Williams, Jr.; 4th W. Va., Col. James H. Dayton. Brigade loss: k, 10; w, 76=86. *Artillery:* A, 1st Ill., Capt. Peter P. Wood; B, 1st Ill., Capt. Israel P. Ramsey; H, 1st Ill., Lieut. Francis DeGress. Artillery loss: w, 1.

FOURTH DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Hugh Ewing.

First Brigade, Col. John Mason Loomis: 26th Ill., Lieut.-Col. Robert A. Gillmore; 90th Ill., Col. Timothy O'Meara (k), Lieut.-Col. Owen Stuart; 12th Ind., Col. Reuben Williams; 100th Ind., Lieut.-Col. Albert Heath. Brigade loss: k, 37; w, 331; m, 18=386. *Second Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. John M. Corse (w), Col. Charles C. Walcutt: 4th Ill., Maj. Hiram W. Hall; 103d Ill., Col. William A. Dickerman; 6th Iowa, Lieut.-Col. Alexander J. Miller; 46th Ohio, Col. Charles C. Walcutt, Capt. Isaac N. Alexander. Brigade loss: k, 34; w, 201; m, 2=237. *Third Brigade*, Col. Joseph R. Cockerill: 48th Ill., Lieut.-Col. Lucien Greathouse; 97th Ind., Col. Robert F. Catterson; 99th Ind., Col. Alexander Fowler; 53d Ohio, Col. Wells S. Jones; 70th Ohio, Maj. William B. Brown. Brigade loss: w, 3. *Artillery*, Capt. Henry Richardson: F, 1st Ill., Capt. John T. Cheney; I, 1st Ill., Lieut. Josiah H. Burton; D, 1st Mo., Lieut. Byron M. Callender. Artillery loss: w, 2.

SEVENTEENTH ARMY CORPS.

SECOND DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. John E. Smith.

First Brigade, Col. Jesse I. Alexander: 63d Ill., Col. Joseph B. McCown; 48th Ind., Lieut.-Col. Edward J. Wood; 59th Ind., Capt. Wilford H. Welman; 4th Minn., Lieut.-Col. John E. Tontrellotte; 18th Wis., Col. Gabriel Bouck. Brigade loss: w, 4. *Second Brigade*, Col. Green B. Raum (w), Col. Francis C. Deimling, Col. Clark R. Weaver: 56th Ill., Maj. Pinckney J. Welsh (w); 17th Iowa, Col. Clark R. Weaver, Maj. John F. Walden; 10th Mo., Col. Francis C. Deimling, Lieut.-Col. Christian Hoppee, Col. Francis C. Deimling; E, 24th Mo., Capt. William W. McCammon; 80th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Pren Metham. Brigade loss: k, 40; w, 140; m, 24=204. *Third Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Charles L. Matthias (w), Col. Benjamin D. Dean, Col. Jabez Banbury: 93d Ill., Col. Holden Putnam (k), Lieut.-Col. Nicholas C. Buswell; 5th Iowa, Col. Jabez Banbury, Lieut.-Col. Ezekiel S. Sampson; 10th Iowa, Lieut.-Col. Paris P. Henderson; 26th Mo., Col. Benjamin D. Dean. Brigade loss: k, 49; w, 145; m, 121=315. *Artillery*, Capt. Henry Dillon: Ill. Battery, Capt. William Cogswell; 6th Wis., Lieut. Samuel F. Clark; 12th Wis., Capt. William Ziekerick.

Total Union loss: killed, 752; wounded, 4713; captured or missing, 350=5815. Effective strength (est.), 60,000.

THE CONFEDERATE ARMY: General Braxton Bragg.

HARDEE'S CORPS, Lieut.-Gen. William J. Hardee. CHEATHAM'S DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. John K. Jackson.

Jackson's Brigade, Col. C. J. Wilkinson: 1st Ga. (Confederate), Maj. J. C. Gordon; 2d Battalion Ga. Sharpshooters, Lieut.-Col. R. H. Whiteley; 5th Ga., Col. C. P. Daniel; 47th Ga., Lieut.-Col. A. C. Edwards; 65th Ga., Lieut.-Col. J. W. Pearcey; 5th Miss., Maj. J. B. Herring; 8th Miss., Maj. J. F. Smith. Brigade loss not reported. *Walthall's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. E. C. Walthall: 24th

Miss., Col. William F. Dowd; 27th Miss., Col. J. A. Campbell; 29th Miss., Col. W. F. Brantley; 30th Miss., Maj. J. M. Johnson; 34th Miss., Capt. H. J. Bowen. Brigade loss: k, 8; w, 111; m, 853=972. *Moore's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. John C. Moore: 37th Ala., Lieut.-Col. A. A. Green; 40th Ala., Col. J. H. Higley; 42d Ala., Lieut.-Col. Thomas C. Lanier. Brigade loss: k, 9; w, 39; m, 206=254. *Wright's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Marcus J. Wright, Col. John H. Anderson: 8th Tenn., Col. John H. Anderson,

☆ Corps headquarters and the First and Second Brigades and 18th Ind. Battery, of the First Division, at and about Alexandria, Tenn.; Third Brigade at Caperton's Ferry, Tennessee River. First and Third Brigades and Chicago Board of Trade Battery, of the Second Division, at Maysville, Ala.

† General Sherman had under his immediate command the Eleventh Corps, and the Second Division, Fourteenth Corps of the Army of the Cumberland; the Second and Fourth Divisions, Fifteenth Corps, and the Second Division, Seventeenth Corps.

Lieut.-Col. Chris. C. McKinney; 16th Tenn., Col. D. M. Donnell; 28th Tenn., Col. S. S. Stauton; 38th Tenn. (at Charleston, Tenn.), Col. John C. Carter; 51st and 52d Tenn., Lieut.-Col. John G. Hall. Brigade loss: k, 1; w, 11=12. *Artillery Battalion*, Maj. M. Smith: Ala. Battery, Capt. W. H. Fowler; Fla. Battery, Capt. Robert P. McCants; Ga. Battery, Capt. John Seogiu; Miss. Battery, Capt. W. B. Turner. Battalion loss: m, 7.

STEVENSON'S DIVISION, Maj.-Gen. Carter L. Stevenson, Brig.-Gen. John C. Brown (temporarily).

Brown's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. John C. Brown: 3d Tenn., Col. C. H. Walker; 18th and 26th Tenn., Lieut.-Col. W. R. Butler; 32d Tenn., Maj. J. P. McGuire; 45th Tenn. and 23d Tenn. Battalion, Col. A. Searey. Brigade loss: k, 2; w, 35; m, 13=50. *Pettus's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. E. W. Pettus: 20th Ala., Capt. John W. Davis; 23d Ala., Lieut.-Col. J. B. Bibb; 30th Ala., Col. C. M. Shelley; 31st Ala., Col. D. R. Hundley; 46th Ala., Capt. George E. Brewer. Brigade loss: k, 17; w, 93; m, 17=127. *Cumming's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Alfred Cumming: 34th Ga., Col. J. A. W. Johnusou (w), Lieut.-Col. J. W. Bradley; 36th Ga., Lieut.-Col. Alexander M. Wallace (w), Capt. J. A. Griee; 39th Ga., Col. J. T. McConnell (k); 56th Ga., Lieut.-Col. J. T. Slaughter, Capt. J. L. Morgan. Brigade loss: k, 17; w, 156; m, 30=203. *Reynolds's Brigade* (of Buckner's division), Brig.-Gen. Alexander W. Reynolds: 58th N. C., Col. J. B. Palmer; 60th N. C., Maj. James T. Weaver; 54th Va., Lieut.-Col. J. J. Wade; 63d Va., Maj. J. M. French. *Artillery*: Ga. Battery, Capt. Max. Vau Den Corput; Md. Battery, Capt. John B. Rowan; Tenn. Battery, Capt. W. W. Carues; Tenn. Battery, Capt. Edward Baxter.

CLEBURNE'S DIVISION, Maj.-Gen. P. R. Cleburne.

Lowrey's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Mark P. Lowrey: 16th Ala., Maj. F. A. Ashford; 33d Ala., Col. Samuel Adams; 45th Ala., Lieut.-Col. H. D. Lampley; 32d and 45th Miss., Col. A. B. Hardecastle; 15th Battalion Sharpshooters, Capt. T. M. Steger. *Polk's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Lucius E. Polk: 2d Tenn., Col. W. D. Robison (w); 35th and 48th Tenn., Col. B. J. Hill; 1st Ark., Col. J. W. Colquitt; 3d and 5th Confederate, Lieut.-Col. J. C. Cole (m w), Capt. W. A. Brown, Capt. M. H. Dixon. *Liddell's Brigade*, Col. D. C. Govau: 2d, 15th, and 24th Ark., Lieut.-Col. E. Warfield; 5th and 13th Ark., Col. John E. Murray; 6th and 7th Ark., Lieut.-Col. Peter Snyder; 8th and 19th Ark., Lieut.-Col. A. S. Hutchinson. *Smith's Brigade*, Col. Hiram A. Granbury: 7th Tex., Capt. C. E. Talley; 6th, 10th, and 15th Tex., Capt. John R. Kennard; 17th, 18th, 24th, and 25th Tex. (dismounted cavalry), Maj. W. A. Taylor. *Artillery Battalion*, Capt. J. P. Douglas: Ala. Battery (Semple's), Lieut. R. W. Goldthwaite; Ark. Battery (Calvert's), Lieut. T. J. Key; Miss. Battery (Sweet's), Lieut. H. Shannon. Battalion loss: k, 6; w, 16=22. Division loss: k, 62; w, 367; m, 12=441.

WALKER'S DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. States R. Gist.

Gist's Brigade: 8th Ga. Battalion, Lieut.-Col. Z. L. Walters; 46th Ga., Lieut.-Col. W. A. Daniel; 16th S. C., Col. James McCullough; 24th S. C., Col. C. H. Stevens. *Wilson's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Claudius C. Wilson: 1st Ga. Battalion Sharpshooters and 25th Ga., Maj. A. Schaaff; 26th Ga. Battalion, Maj. J. W. Nisbet; 29th and 30th Ga., Maj. Thomas W. Maughan; 66th Ga., Col. J. C. Nisbet. *Maney's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. George E. Maney (w): 4th Confederate, Capt. Joseph Bostick; 1st and 27th Tenn., Col. H. R. Feild; 6th and 9th Tenn., Col. George C. Porter; 41st Tenn., Col. R. Farquharson; 50th Tenn., Col. C. A. Sugg; 24th Tenn. Battalion Sharpshooters, Maj. Frank Maney. *Artillery Battalion*, Maj. Robert Martin: Ga. Battery, Capt. E. P. Howell; Mo. Battery, Capt. H. M. Bledsoe; Ferguson's Battery, Capt. T. B. Ferguson. Division loss: k, 14; w, 118; m, 190=322.

BRECKINRIDGE'S CORPS, Maj.-Gen. John C. Breckinridge.

HINDMAN'S DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. J. Patton Anderson.

Anderson's Brigade, Col. W. F. Tucker: 7th and 9th

Miss., Col. W. H. Bishop; 10th and 44th Miss., Col. James Barr; 41st Miss., —; 9th Battalion Miss. Sharpshooters, Maj. W. C. Richards. *Manigault's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Arthur M. Manigault: 24th Ala., Col. N. N. Davis; 28th Ala., Lieut.-Col. W. L. Butler; 34th Ala., Capt. R. G. Weleh; 10th and 19th S. C., Col. James F. Pressley. *Deas's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Z. C. Deas: 19th Ala., Col. S. K. McSpadden; 22d Ala.; Lieut.-Col. B. R. Hart; 25th Ala., Col. G. D. Johnston; 39th Ala., Lieut.-Col. W. C. Clifton; 50th Ala., Col. J. G. Coltart; 17th Ala. Battalion Sharpshooters, Capt. J. F. Nabers. *Vaughan's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. A. J. Vaughan: 11th Tenn., Lieut.-Col. William Thedford; 12th and 47th Tenn., Col. W. M. Watkins; 13th and 154th Tenn., Lieut.-Col. R. W. Pitman; 29th Tenn., Col. Horace Rice. *Artillery Battalion*, Maj. A. R. Courtney: Ala. Battery, Capt. James Garrity; Dent's Battery, Capt. S. H. Dent; Tex. Battery, Capt. J. P. Douglas. Division loss: k, 76; w, 476; m, 1124=1676.

BRECKINRIDGE'S DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. William B. Bate.

Bate's Brigade, Col. R. C. Tyler (w), Col. A. F. Rudler (w), Lieut.-Col. James J. Turner: 37th Ga., Col. A. F. Rudler, Lieut.-Col. J. T. Smith; 10th Tenn., Maj. John O'Neill; 15th and 37th Tenn., Lieut.-Col. R. D. Frayser; 20th Tenn., Capt. John F. Guthrie; 30th Tenn., Lieut.-Col. James J. Turner; Caswell's Battalion, Lieut. Joel Towers. *Lewis's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Joseph H. Lewis: 2d Ky., Col. James W. Moss; 4th Ky., Lieut.-Col. T. W. Thompson; 5th Ky., Col. H. Hawkus; 6th Ky., Lieut.-Col. W. L. Clarke; 9th Ky., Lieut.-Col. John C. Wickliffe. *Finley's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Jesse J. Finley: 1st and 3d Fla., Lieut.-Col. E. Mashburn; 4th Fla., Lieut.-Col. E. Badger; 6th Fla., Lieut.-Col. A. D. McLean; 7th Fla., Lieut.-Col. T. Ingram; 1st Fla. Cav. (dismounted), Col. G. T. Maxwell. *Artillery Battalion*, Capt. Robert Cobb: Ky. Battery (Cobb's), Lieut. F. J. Gracie; La. Battery, Capt. C. H. Slocomb; Tenn. Battery, Capt. J. W. Mebane. Division loss: k, 44; w, 244; m, 591=859.

STEWART'S DIVISION, Maj.-Gen. Alexander P. Stewart.

Stovall's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Marcellus A. Stovall: 40th Ga., Lieut.-Col. R. M. Young; 41st Ga., Col. W. E. Curtis; 42d Ga., Maj. W. H. Hulsey; 43d Ga., Lieut.-Col. H. C. Kellogg; 52d Ga., Maj. John J. Moore. Brigade loss: k, 5; w, 32; m, 47=84. *Strahl's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Oscar F. Strahl: 4th Tenn., Lieut.-Col. L. W. Finley; 5th Tenn., Col. J. J. Lamb; 19th Tenn., Col. F. M. Walker; 24th Tenn., Col. John A. Wilson; 31st Tenn., Lieut.-Col. F. E. P. Stafford; 33d Tenn., Lieut.-Col. H. C. McNeill. Brigade loss: k, 16; w, 93; m, 150=259. *Clayton's Brigade*, Col. J. T. Holtzclaw: 18th Ala., Maj. Shep. Ruffin; 32d and 58th Ala., Col. Bush. Jones; 36th and 38th Ala., Col. L. T. Woodruff. Brigade loss: k, 21; w, 100; m, 706=827. *Adams's Brigade*, Col. R. L. Gibson: 13th and 20th La., Maj. F. L. Campbell; 19th La., Maj. H. A. Kennedy; 16th and 25th La., Col. D. Gober; 14th La. Battalion Sharpshooters, Maj. J. E. Austin; 4th La. Battalion, Maj. S. L. Bishop. Brigade loss: k, 28; w, 96; m, 233=357. *Artillery Battalion*, Eufula Battery (Oliver's), Lieut. William J. McKenzie; La. Battery, Capt. Charles E. Fenner, Miss. Battery, Capt. T. J. Stanford. Battalion loss: k, 1; w, 6; m, 5=12. *Escort company*, loss: w, 1; m, 1=2.

RESERVE ARTILLERY.

Robertson's Battalion, Capt. Felix H. Robertson: Ala. Battery (Lumsden's), Lieut. H. H. Cribbs; Ga. Battery (Havis's), Lieut. J. R. Duncan; Ga. Battery, Capt. R. W. Anderson; Mo. Battery, Capt. Oberton W. Barret. Battalion loss: k, 1; w, 4; m, 6=11. *Williams's Battalion*, Maj. S. C. Williams: Ala. Battery, Capt. R. Kolb; Jeffress's Battery, Capt. W. C. Jeffress; Miss. Battery (Darden's), Lieut. H. W. Bullen. Battalion loss: w, 2.

CAVALRY: Parts of the 3d, 8th, and 10th Confederate, and 1st, 2d, 4th, and 5th Tenn.

Total Confederate loss: killed, 361; wounded, 2180; captured or missing, 4146=6687.



CONFEDERATE ASSAULT ON FORT SANDERS.

THE DEFENSE OF KNOXVILLE.

BY ORLANDO M. POE, BREVET BRIGADIER-GENERAL, U. S. A.

IT was determined by the Federal authorities to make strenuous efforts during the summer of 1863 to effect permanent lodgments in east Tennessee, both at Chattanooga and Knoxville, not only for the purpose of interrupting railway communication by that route,[‡] but to afford relief to a section where Union sentiments were known to exist to a very considerable extent. It was accordingly arranged that Rosecrans should move from Murfreesboro' against Bragg, while a force should be organized in central Kentucky to move toward Knoxville in coöperation. The latter movement was intrusted to General Burnside, who occupied Knoxville on the 2d of September, 1863, with part of the Twenty-third Corps, and on the 9th received the surrender of the Confederate force under General John W. Frazer at Cumberland Gap.

The greater portion of General Burnside's force was now expected to move down the Valley of the Tennessee to a connection (possibly a junction) with Rosecrans, then at Chattanooga or its vicinity. This involved leaving Knoxville to be held by a small force, and rendered it necessary to fortify the place. Accordingly, as chief engineer, I was instructed to arrange for a garrison of 600 men, intended only to hold the place against a cavalry "dash."

During the enemy's occupation of Knoxville, a very small beginning had been made toward the erection of earth-works. An insignificant line had been thrown up on the hill north-west of the college, and a slight epaulement

[‡]At the beginning of 1863 the Confederates had two lines of railway communication between their eastern and western forces: one by the coast-wise system to Savannah or Augusta, and thence

southward or westward; the other by way of Lynchburgh, Knoxville, and Chattanooga, where it branched toward Memphis and Atlanta. [See also p. 746.]—O. M. P.

on the bluff overlooking the railway station. Neither of these was of use in the construction of our works. The plans for two works were submitted,—one, afterward known as Fort Sanders, on the site of the imperfect work first mentioned; and the other, afterward known as Fort Huntington Smith, on Temperance Hill in East Knoxville. These plans were approved by General Burnside, and work was at once begun by the engineer battalion of the Twenty-third Corps and a small force of negroes, but progressed slowly on account of the difficulty of getting suitable materials. The forts were not entirely completed until after the siege of Knoxville. Meanwhile our lines were extended down the valley toward Chattanooga. By the 18th of September, a battalion of cavalry in the extreme advance reached Cleveland, and the prospect for a junction was good until Chickamauga put an end to further movements in that direction, and Sweetwater became our outpost.

Early in October a force of the enemy under General John S. Williams, coming from the eastward, moved down the railroad to the vicinity of Bull's Gap, and pressed heavily upon our forces in that quarter. With such troops as could readily be concentrated, General Burnside attacked them at Blue Springs on the 10th and drove them well back toward Bristol.

On the 22d of October our outpost at Sweetwater and our reserve at Philadelphia were attacked successfully. Subsequent operations and reconnoissances resulted in the determination to abandon temporarily the Valley of the Tennessee south of Loudon. The troops were all withdrawn and the pontoon-bridge was transferred from Loudon to Knoxville, where General Sanders's cavalry command crossed it to the south side of the river, on the 1st of November. The abandonment of Loudon had in view the occupation of a stronger position on the northern bank of the river from Kingston to Lenoir's, where a pontoon-bridge was to be thrown across the Holston and the line prolonged by the right bank of the Little Tennessee.

On the 13th of November it was ascertained that the enemy had constructed a pontoon-bridge at Huff's Ferry, near Loudon, and were crossing in force to the northern bank of the Tennessee. At the same time General Wheeler, with nearly the whole of his four brigades of cavalry, made a rapid night march and crossed the Little Tennessee with a view to cutting off Sanders's command and occupying the heights opposite Knoxville; or, as stated by Longstreet, "failing in this, to threaten the enemy at Knoxville so as to prevent his concentrating against us before we reached Knoxville." Wheeler was foiled in this attempt, and soon withdrew to the north bank of the river, which he crossed at Louisville. He rejoined Longstreet on the 17th of November, after the latter had fought the battle of Campbell's Station.

Upon learning of Longstreet's movement, General Burnside took personal command of the troops available to oppose him. The operations of our forces during the next few days had for their object to delay the advance of the enemy to enable us to get our trains into Knoxville, and to forward the defensive works at that place, where it had been determined to make a stand.

Longstreet advanced from Loudon in two columns, McLaws's division taking the left road, leading to Campbell's Station, and Hood's division (com-

manded by Jenkins), the one to the right, following the line of the railroad to Lenoir's. The latter soon came in contact with the Federal skirmishers and drove them slowly back, but failed to reach Lenoir's that day. Every effort was made during the night to ascertain Burnside's movements, but his bold and vigilant rear-guard succeeded in completely concealing them. By day-break the whole force was on the road, and when the Confederates advanced they found Lenoir's deserted.

The road upon which Burnside was moving, followed by Jenkins, intersects that along which McLaws was advancing, about a mile south-west of Campbell's Station. It was therefore essential to the safety of his train, if not of his entire command, that Burnside should reach the junction before McLaws. Just before daylight on the 16th of November, Hartranft's division took the advance of Burnside's column from Lenoir's and pushed forward as rapidly as the roads permitted, followed by the trains and by the other troops. McLaws, with full knowledge of the importance of seizing the intersection of the roads, was making every endeavor to get possession before the arrival of Burnside. He was opposed by a small force, but his march, like Hartranft's, was impeded by the mud resulting from heavy rains. It thus became a race for the position. Hartranft won by perhaps half an hour, and, turning west on the Kingston road, quickly deployed his division in such manner as to confront McLaws, and at the same time cover the Loudon road along which our trains were moving.

During the movement from Lenoir's, Burnside's rear-guard, composed of Colonel William Humphrey's brigade, had several sharp encounters with Jenkins's advance, in which Humphrey handled his forces so well as to excite the admiration of both friends and foes, always standing long enough, but never too long.

Scarcely had Hartranft's dispositions been made when McLaws appeared and attacked, but Hartranft steadfastly held his ground until the remainder of our troops and all our trains had safely passed. The trains continued on the road to Knoxville, while the troops were formed in line of battle about half a mile beyond the junction, with Ferrero's division on the right, and White's in prolongation to the left, whereupon Hartranft withdrew from his advanced position and took his place in line on the left of White. A small cavalry force scouted the roads on each flank of the line. About noon Longstreet unsuccessfully attacked our right, and afterward our left center. Later, taking advantage of a wooded ridge to conceal the march, he attempted to turn our left flank with three brigades of Jenkins's division, but our scouts soon discovered and reported the movement. Burnside had determined to retire to a new position about two-thirds of a mile to his rear, and this development but slightly hastened his withdrawal from the first line. The difficult and hazardous undertaking was successfully accomplished in the face of the enemy. All who saw it say that the troops moved with the greatest coolness, deliberation, and precision under a heavy and continuous fire.

McLaws's division promptly advanced to attack the new position, while Jenkins continued his turning movement, but the difficulties of the ground

delayed him until nightfall and stopped his further progress. McLaws attacked and failed to make an impression, and at the close of the action Burnside remained in possession of his own ground until after dark, and then continued his movement to Knoxville, the head of his column appearing there about daybreak next morning, November 17th. He had gained his object and therefore was fairly entitled to claim a victory.

Burnside placed his whole loss in this important affair of Campbell's Station at about 300. Jenkins reported his as 174. It is probable that the losses on both sides, including McLaws's, were about equal.

During the fight Burnside had instructed me to select lines of defense around Knoxville and have everything prepared to put the troops into position as fast as they should arrive. I was well acquainted with the ground, and but little further examination was necessary to enable me to designate, in writing, the proposed location of each organization.

The topographical features of the vicinity of Knoxville give that place decided strength as a military position. [See maps, pp. 636 and 736.] On the northern or right bank of the Holston, a narrow table-land, or ridge, beginning about two miles east of the town, extends down the river to Lenoir's, some 24 miles. This ridge is generally elevated about 150 feet above the river, but with many higher points. Its width at Knoxville is about 1300 yards, and the valley bounding it on the north-west, parallel with the river, is perhaps 50 feet above that stream at the ordinary stage of water. The East Tennessee, Virginia and Georgia railroad is located along the valley, which was almost entirely clear of timber. At short intervals the ridge is cut through by small streams emptying into the Holston, two of which, called First and Second Creeks, run through the town at a distance apart of about one thousand yards. The main portion of Knoxville, as it existed at the time of the siege, occupied that portion of the table-land included between the two creeks, the river and the valley. East Knoxville was situated next east of First Creek, upon an elevation known as Temperance Hill. East of Temperance Hill, and separated from it by a depression in the ridge, is Mabry's Hill, the highest ground on the north side of the Holston within cannon-range of the town. Beyond this the ground, with a few minor elevations, gradually descends to the level of the valley. Flint Hill is immediately upon the bank of the river, south of Temperance Hill. Third Creek, a little more than a mile westward from Second Creek, forms the south-westerly limit of another natural division of the ridge, including the hill north-west from the college. North-westerly from the river are found successive ridges; the most important was occupied by the Confederates, across the valley a mile from our line. South of the Holston the ground rises in a series of prominent points, or knobs, the highest of which is directly opposite Knoxville on the prolongation of Gay street. These knobs form a range, the crest line of which is parallel with the river at an average distance from it of about half a mile, with a wide valley beyond.

On the Knoxville side of the Holston, our line rested upon the river about a quarter of a mile below the mouth of Second Creek, extended from there

at an angle of about 82° with the river for 900 yards to Battery Noble,[‡] then, bending about 50° to the northward, continued a little more than 600 yards to Fort Sanders, where it changed direction about 65° to the eastward, and, overlooking the valley, followed the crest of the bluff, parallel with the general course of the river for some 1600 yards to Battery Wiltsie, opposite the railroad station, including, in this part of the line, Battery Zoellner, between Fort Sanders and Second Creek, Battery Galpin, just east of Second Creek, and Fort Comstock, between Battery Galpin and Battery Wiltsie. From the last named, with a slight change of direction toward the river, the line continued along the crest of the bluff, over Temperance Hill to Mabry's Hill, a distance of 2400 yards, including Battery Billingsley just west of First Creek, Fort Huntington Smith on Temperance Hill, Battery Clifton Lee and Battery Stearman in the depression between Temperance Hill and Mabry's Hill, and Fort Hill on the extreme easterly point of Mabry's Hill. From here it turned sharply to the southward for 1300 yards and reached the river at a ravine about 1000 yards above the mouth of First Creek. A continuous line of infantry cover connected all these positions, and dams were built at the crossing of First and Second Creeks which, by backing the water, formed considerable obstacles, especially in front of Temperance Hill, where the line was parallel with the course of First Creek for 1200 yards, and the pond impassable without bridges.

A short interior line was established from Fort Sanders to Second Creek, near its mouth. This included Fort Byington, built around the college. Another line extended from Temperance Hill to Flint Hill, terminating in Battery Fearn's.

On the south side of the river such of the heights (four in number) as were necessary to the defense were occupied by detached works with extensions for infantry cover, insufficient, however, to make the line continuous, or even approximately so. Fort Stanley was built on the hill directly opposite Knoxville, and a line of ordinary rifle-trenches was carried eastward from it across the Sevierville road and to the adjacent height. The hill nearly opposite the mouth of Second Creek was occupied by Fort Dickerson, and the next one to the westward by Fort Higley.

The arrangements for the defense of the position on the north side of the Holston were necessarily made in the most hurried manner. The earth-works known as Fort Sanders and Fort Huntington Smith, intended for a very different condition of affairs, were so far advanced toward completion when Longstreet appeared before Knoxville, that their use without modification was compulsory. Neither of the plans was what it would have been had the works been designed for parts of a continuous line. Especially was this the case with respect to Fort Sanders, the trace of which was such that under the stress of circumstances its north-western bastion became a prominent salient of the main line, and notwithstanding the measures taken to remedy this objec-

[‡] The several positions along the line were not named until after the lines were established,—Fort Sanders on the 18th of November, and the others

after the siege was raised. All were named after officers who had been killed during the siege or in the operations preceding it.—O. M. P.


As already stated, the head of Burnside's column appeared at Knoxville at daybreak on the 17th of November. It was met near Third Creek, and the organizations were directed to their respective stations, formed upon the lines, and told to dig, and to do it with all their might. By the middle of the forenoon all were hard at work. The locations of but few of the organizations were changed during the siege, and these but slightly.

Except the incomplete forts, Sanders and Huntington Smith, nothing in the way of defensive works had been previously contemplated. Lines of rifle-trenches soon appeared, only to grow rapidly into continuous infantry parapets. Batteries for the artillery were ready in the shortest possible time.

During the night of the 16th of November Sanders had crossed his division of cavalry to the north side of the river and moved out on the Loudon road to cover our forces, approaching from Campbell's Station, until they could get into position and make some progress in the construction of defensive works. Slowly falling back as the enemy advanced on the 17th, he finally made a stand with one brigade of about 700 men under his immediate command, upon a hill just north of the Loudon road, a mile from Fort Sanders and about 800 yards west from where that road crossed Third Creek; while the other brigade (two regiments of mounted infantry), commanded by Colonel C. D. Pennebaker, turned at bay where the Clinton road crossed the ridge about a mile north-west from Fort Sanders.

For the remainder of the 17th these commands stubbornly held their ground, in full view of our lines, the principal Confederate attacks being directed upon the position of Sanders, who kept up a fierce and gallant contest with Longstreet's infantry and Alexander's guns, ceasing only with the darkness. About 11 p. m. General Burnside sent for me, and upon reporting to him at his headquarters at Crozier's house, I found him in conversation with Sanders. He asked me how long it would take to make the works defensible, and was informed that it could be done by noon of the next day, the 18th. Turning to Sanders he asked him if he would maintain his position until that time, and received an assuring promise. Sanders accompanied me to my quarters, where we discussed the matter until after midnight, and then lay down upon the same blanket to get some rest, but before daylight he was called by the guard, and left to join his command.

As day dawned the attacks upon Sanders were renewed, with the evident determination to dislodge him in the shortest possible time. As hour after hour passed, and that cavalry continued to stand against the pressure, it excited the wonder of the rest of our army. The contest was very unequal, and occasionally a few of our men would leave their position behind the piles of fence rails which constituted their only cover, with the apparent intention of retreating. At such critical times Sanders would walk up to the rail piles and stand there erect, with fully half his height exposed to a terrific fire at short range, until every retreating man, as if ashamed of himself, would return to his proper place. He held his ground until noon as he had promised, and then, in accordance with an understanding with me, continued to hold it, intending to do so until actually driven away. At about half-past two he fell, mortally



THE NORTH-WESTERN BASTION OF FORT SANDERS, VIEWED FROM THE NORTH. FROM A WAR-TIME PHOTOGRAPH.

wounded, and the screen which he had so stubbornly interposed between the enemy and our hard-working troops was quickly rolled aside.

Every spadeful of earth turned while Sanders was fighting aided in making our position secure, and he had determined to sacrifice himself if necessary for the safety of the rest of the army. Hence he maintained his position so strenuously, and but for his fall it is possible he would have held it until night, as I sincerely believe he meant to do. His fine presence, soldierly bearing, extreme gallantry, and unvarying courtesy attached to him the incongruous elements composing his command, and enabled him to handle it as he did on this occasion, when its behavior was certainly worthy the commendation it received. The fort in front of which he fell was immediately named after him in commemoration of the service rendered.

Early on the 18th eight or ten of the enemy had established themselves in the upper story of the tower of a brick house which stood about 750 yards beyond Sanders's line, and from this advantageous position greatly annoyed his command by their accurate fire. He sent a request to Benjamin, in Fort Sanders, to try the effect upon these sharp-shooters of a few shots from his 20-pounder Parrotts. The distance was 2500 yards, but Benjamin's gunner put a shot directly through the compartment occupied by the sharp-shooters, badly wrecking it (as was ascertained by examination after the siege), and abating the nuisance. During the whole war I saw no prettier single shot.

By the night of the 18th our infantry trenches on the north side of the river had been made nearly continuous, and our heavier works were well advanced. The enemy's skirmishers pushed up in front of ours, and the siege was fairly on. On the 19th he extended to his left, and during the day threw shells into Knoxville from a battery posted on the Tazewell road, about a mile and a half from our main line. On the 20th the enemy's offensive lines began to appear, his right approaching the river near Armstrong's house just west of Third Creek. From there he extended toward the left across the valley and along the ridge beyond on a line nearly concentric with ours. The earth-works on each side seemed to grow like magic, but we were

apparently doing more digging than they. Indeed, they never constructed any works of consequence east of the Jacksboro' road.


A large brick house, with two log barns, stood within the enemy's skirmish line in front of Fort Sanders, and served as cover for troublesome sharpshooters. Why these buildings were not destroyed by us as we fell back I do not know, but it soon became evident that it must be done now, and the 17th Michigan Infantry was detailed for the purpose. At 9 p.m. the regiment, passing to the rear and left of Fort Sanders, advanced to our skirmish line, where they halted

a few moments to adjust the line, and again moved forward. The enemy soon discovered the movement and opened fire, whereupon our men charged at a run, and quickly gained possession of the buildings; a baking-pan full of warm biscuits in the house indicating the completeness of the surprise. A party of five volunteers under charge of Major F. W. Swift had been

formed to set fire to the buildings. These were effectually fired, and our men were half-way on their return to our lines before the light of the burning buildings revealed the party to the enemy, who then opened a cannonade upon them.

The siege and defensive operations progressed in the usual manner until the 22d, when we received information[↓] that the enemy was constructing a raft at Boyd's Ferry, on the Holston, about six miles above Knoxville by the course of the river, intending to set it adrift in the hope that it would reach our pontoon-bridge and carry it away, thus breaking our communication with the south side. About dark we began stretching an iron cable boom across the river above the bridge, with a view to catching the raft. The cable was about a thousand feet long, formed by linking together all the iron bars we could get, and was borne by wooden floats. Under my personal supervision the boom was completed by 9 o'clock next morning.

On the evening of the 23d the enemy advanced upon our skirmishers in front of Fort Comstock and drove them back, but not until they had set fire to all the buildings in the immediate vicinity. We regained the position next



[↓] John C. Phillips, of Chicago, captain and chief of artillery during the siege, writes to the editors that this information came in the form of a mes-

sage in a bottle sent down the river by a Union woman living near the point where the raft was being constructed.

morning. Nearly due west from Fort Sanders the enemy had advanced his line to within about 600 yards of the fort, and had thrown up a continuous line of infantry trench, with its right resting on the railroad and extending about 300 yards to the left. Early in the morning of the 24th a detail of 169 men of the 2d Michigan Infantry attacked and carried this work. After they had held it for some time without reënforcements, the enemy made a counter-attack in largely increased force, with lamentable results to us, our

men being driven back with a loss of nearly half their number.

Strange as it may seem, this sortie was made without my knowledge, and although I made considerable effort afterward to ascertain who was responsible for it, I never succeeded. It would be difficult to conceive a more ill-advised movement. It would have been proper if we had intended to bring on a general engagement, in which case the sortie should have been supported with our whole force. If such was not the intention, the sortie should not have been made at all. Carried out in the manner it was, the affair was simply murderous. This is strong language, but every word of it is justified by the unneces-

sary loss of about eighty-three of our very best men. The notes which I made at the time show that if I could have found any one to stand sponsor for the order, my condemnation of it would have then been quite as decided as now.

About the same time the enemy crossed the Holston below his lines and unsuccessfully attacked our forces on the south side of the river. He established batteries of rifled guns on the heights nearly opposite the mouth of Third Creek (never occupied by us), distant about 2300 yards from Fort Sanders, rendering it necessary to defilade this work against them.

The reports of a destructive raft being renewed, another boom, 1500 feet long, and made of long timbers fastened together at the ends by fifth chains from the wagon trains, was stretched across the river above the first one.

Prior to our occupation of Knoxville, the enemy had begun the erection of an earth-work, called by them Fort Loudon, on the site afterward occupied by Fort Sanders. A second growth of pines, averaging about five inches in diameter, thickly covered the hillside in front, and were cut down by them, leaving stumps perhaps eighteen inches high. The necessity for using every possible means of obstructing the approach over the sector without fire in front of the north-western bastion of Fort Sanders, included in the area covered by these stumps, was evident to every one, and became more




BRIGADIER-GENERAL WILLIAM P. SANDERS, KILLED AT KNOXVILLE. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

pressing as the probability of an assault at this point grew more apparent. At this time Mr. Hoxie, in charge of the railroad property at Knoxville, informed me that he had a lot of old telegraph wire at the depot which he thought might be of service to us as an obstruction. Its use as a net-work entanglement, by carrying it from stump to stump over the sector without fire referred to, was so obvious that no time was lost in putting it in place. The part it played in causing the repulse was much overrated. Owing to its rusty color, nearly that of the pine litter just under it, and the imperfect light of the foggy morning, it doubtless did have some effect in breaking up the coherency of the assaulting column, and may possibly have detained it long enough to permit the defense to deliver a couple of rounds more, a matter of some consequence.

The wet, foggy, and generally disagreeable weather of the preceding days still continued, when, at about 11 o'clock on the night of the 28th, our picket lines in front of Fort Sanders were attacked with such spirit as to indicate an important movement, and after sharp skirmishing for some length of time were finally carried. This was, in fact, the prelude to an assault upon the main work, and had for its immediate effect to put us on the alert and keep us in readiness for the serious business which we knew was close at hand.

The enemy's arrangements for the assault provided that it be made in two columns, from McLaws's division, directed against the north-west angle of Fort Sanders, the one on the left to be composed of Wofford's brigade, in column of regiments, with the 16th Georgia leading; while the other, formed in like order, was to consist of Humphreys's brigade, led by the 13th Mississippi, and closely followed by three regiments of Bryan's brigade. The attack was to be made with fixed bayonets, without cheering or firing a shot, and the men were to be urged to rush forward with a determination to succeed. The sharp-shooters were to keep up a continuous fire into the embrasures of the fort and along the adjacent works, to prevent the use of artillery against the assaulting force and to disturb the fire of all arms. Anderson's brigade, following the main attack, was to carry the works about a hundred yards to the left, and, in case the assault on Fort Sanders should prove successful, was then to wheel to the left, and, followed by Benning's and Jenkins's brigades, sweep down our lines to the eastward. But if the main attack should fail, Anderson was to wheel to the right and endeavor to carry Fort Sanders from the rear. Kershaw's brigade was to advance to the assault of the works on the right of the fort as soon as it had fallen. The unassigned brigades of McLaws's and Jenkins's divisions, together with the brigades of Bushrod Johnson and Gracie, were to be held in readiness to follow up any success. Thus the plan of assault had been well studied, carefully elaborated, and clearly formulated. The preparations for resisting it were the wire entanglements already described, a slight abatis, the strong profile of Fort Sanders, and the arrangements for both a direct and a cross fire in front of the salient not only from the garrison of the fort itself, but also from the troops occupying the adjacent intrenchments.



THE NORTH-WESTERN BASTION OF FORT SANDERS,
VIEWED FROM THE SOUTH-WESTERN BASTION.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

Fort Sanders was laid out in strict accordance with the rules for constructing bastioned earth-works, but upon shorter exterior lines than were desirable. It was built upon an irregular quadrilateral of which the western side was 95 yards, the northern 125 yards, the eastern 85 yards, and the southern 125 yards; the north-western bastion being traced in the right angle between the first two sides. The western front was completed, and the two adjoining ones had been carried far enough to give us the advantage of their flanking arrange-

ments. The eastern front had been intentionally left open. Provision had been made by *pan-coupés* for an artillery fire along the capitals of the two completed bastions, and a 12-pounder gun had been placed in the one attacked. The trace of the interior crest was so located on the slopes of the hill that when a parade of about forty feet in width had been formed, the undisturbed ground behind it served some of the minor purposes of a traverse. The ditch was made twelve feet wide at the bastion faces, and from six to eight feet in depth, depending upon the accidents of the ground, the average being about seven feet. The result of this location of the interior crest and depth of ditch, was an unusually high relief to the work, especially at the north-western bastion. The scarps were practically vertical, and the berme at the foot of the exterior slope was cut away. The counterscarps were continued until they intersected, and all the material between them and the curtain excavated to the general level of the bottom of the ditch, thus obviating all dead angles. A banquette was formed in the counterscarp at the north-western salient, of sufficient extent for the location of about forty men, whose fire could be delivered in the direction of the capital. In addition to the ordinary flank fire, three 12-pounders were so located in notches in the immediate eastward extension of the northern front as to admit of their firing into the left flank of the assaulting column; and a fire, more or less efficient, could be delivered over the same ground from our intrenchments as far eastward as Battery Zoellner. A similar fire into their front and right flank was obtained from our lines to the southward of Fort Sanders as far as Battery Noble.

The garrison of Fort Sanders at the time of the assault, usually estimated at about 500 men, consisted of Benjamin's and Buckley's batteries and one section of Roemer's (four 20-pounder Parrotts, six 12-pounder Napoleons, and two 3-inch rifled guns), and an infantry force made up of some 120 men of the 79th New York, 75 men of the 29th Massachusetts, 60 men of the 2d Michigan, and 80 men of the 20th Michigan. About forty men of the 2d Michigan, under command of Captain Charles H. Hodskin, occupied the banquette

in the counterscarp salient as long as the position was tenable, and then ran through the ditch to the southward; they entered the fort around the south-eastern angle as they had been instructed to do, and took further part in the defense.

The number actually within the fort at the moment of the supreme struggle and repulse probably did not exceed 440 men. The discrepancy arises from the different ways of reckoning the limits of the fort, due to the open eastern front. The smaller estimate includes only the troops that were within the bastioned trace. Yet some very effective work was done against the assaulting column by the fire coming from the intrenchments beyond the original Fort Sanders, and it has always seemed to me only fair that troops delivering this fire should be counted in estimating the strength of the garrison, in which case the total would be increased to more than three times the number given.

About 6 A. M. on Sunday, November 29th, the enemy opened a heavy artillery fire upon Fort Sanders, to which no reply was made, because our limited supply of ammunition made it necessary to reserve it for use at a more critical moment. The fire continued for about twenty minutes and then slackened, whereupon the columns moved to the assault, and were at once met by all the fire that could be concentrated upon them from our lines. Encountering the wire entanglements, their organization was somewhat disturbed, but the movement was not seriously checked thereby, nor did the slight abatis retard it. Although suffering from the terribly destructive fire to which they were subjected, they soon reached the outer brink of the ditch. There could be no pause at that point, and, leaping into the ditch in such numbers as nearly to fill it, they endeavored to scale the walls. Having no scaling-ladders, a portion of the men, scrambling over the shoulders of their comrades, planted the battle-flags of the 13th and 17th Mississippi and the 16th Georgia upon the parapet, but every man who rallied to them was either killed or captured, and the flags were taken.

Meanwhile those who remained in the ditch found themselves under a deadly flank fire of musketry and canister, supplemented by shells thrown as hand-grenades from inside the fort, without the slightest possibility of returning a blow. Advance and retreat were about equally difficult, and it needed but a very short exposure to convince them that if any were to leave the ditch alive it could only be by the promptest surrender. Those who were able to walk were brought through the ditch to the south-eastern angle and there entered our lines as prisoners. Such of the assaulting forces as had not entered the ditch fell back, at first sullenly and slowly, but flesh and blood could not stand the storm of shot and shell that was poured upon them, and they soon broke in confused retreat.

The assault had been gallantly made, but was repulsed in little more time than is required to describe it. When the result became apparent Longstreet directed the withdrawal of the supporting brigade, but the order did not reach Anderson in time to prevent his troops from pushing on as though the assault had been successful. They swerved, however, somewhat to their left,

and attacked a short distance to the eastward of the designated point, only to meet with as decided, though not so bloody, a repulse.

The assaulting columns were rallied under partial cover some five or six hundred yards from Fort Sanders and there reorganized, but no further open attempt to carry our lines was made.

Many reasons have been assigned for the failure of this assault, and there is some difference of opinion in regard to the matter. Some of those opposed to us, of unquestioned ability and fairness, have attributed it to the warning given us by taking our picket line the night before, the insufficient use of their artillery, and the improper direction taken by two of the columns,

resulting in their intermingling and consequent confusion. The opinion has been confidently expressed that a subsequent assault would have been successful. All this assumes, first, that we were not already vigilant and waiting for the attack; second, that a heavy and continued artillery fire would have greatly damaged and demoralized us; third, that the confusion arising from the convergence of the advancing columns would not have occurred again; fourth, that the works were "very faulty in plan and very easy to take by a properly managed assault"; and last, but not least, that the troops of the enemy were better than ours. The first of these assumptions is erroneous; the second greatly exaggerated; the



BRIGADIER-GENERAL E. P. ALEXANDER, C. S. A.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

third might have been verified, but again might not; the fourth is correct only within the limits and to the extent already explained; and the last has no evidence to sustain it.

No one is more ready and willing than the writer to admit the excellence of the troops that fought us at Knoxville. They had few equals, and I believe no superiors. But in making this admission I do not abate one particle of my confidence in the valor and persistency of those who opposed them. They possessed those qualities in as high degree as General Longstreet's men or any others, and the succession of events had only served to improve their morale. It may fairly be doubted whether any disaster to our arms was imminent.'

Again, the repulse may have been due to the existence of fewer faults in the works than supposed; to the measures adopted by us to remedy the faults

which did exist; to the passive obstacles of wire entanglements, depth of ditch and unusual relief of the parapet; to the enemy's error in deciding it to be unnecessary to provide scaling-ladders for the storming party; and, finally and emphatically, to a sufficient garrison of the coolest, bravest, and most determined men. Each of these reasons seems to me to have contributed its share to the result, and some of them were surely of much graver moment than any of those assigned by the other side.

The successful resistance of the 29th did not lead to any remission of labor on our defenses. Work was continued by the troops with the energy that had characterized their efforts thus far, but the enemy gave little indication of a purpose to do anything further upon their works of attack. On the 1st of December large trains belonging to the enemy were seen moving to the eastward, and again on the 3d and 4th and on the night of the 4th his troops were withdrawn and the siege was raised. We had not yet heard the result of General Grant's operations at Chattanooga.

The signal defeat of Bragg at Missionary Ridge and the happy conclusion of the siege of Knoxville confirmed our hold upon the direct line of communication between the enemy's forces east and west and achieved the permanent relief of the friends of our cause in east Tennessee.

The conduct of the men who stood in the trenches at Knoxville cannot be overpraised. Half starved, with clothing tattered and torn, they endured without a murmur every form of hardship and exposure that falls to the lot of the soldier. The question with them was not whether they could withstand the assaults of the enemy, but simply whether sufficient food could be obtained to enable them to keep their places in the line. That they were not reduced to the last extremity in this regard is due to the supplies sent in by the loyalists of the French Broad settlements, who took advantage of Longstreet's inability to invest the place completely, and under cover of the night-fogs floated down to us such food and forage as they could collect.

¶ "On the morning of December 6th I rode from Marysville into Knoxville, and met General Burnside. . . . We examined his lines of fortifications, which were a wonderful production for the short time allowed in their selection of ground and construction of work. It seemed to me that

they were nearly impregnable. We examined the redoubt named 'Sanders,' where on the Sunday previous three brigades of the enemy had assaulted and met a bloody repulse."—Extract from General Sherman's official report of December 19th, 1863.

LONGSTREET AT KNOXVILLE.

BY E. PORTER ALEXANDER, BRIGADIER-GENERAL, C. S. A.

AFTER the return of the Army of Northern Virginia from Gettysburg, it took position south of the Rapidan River, in the vicinity of Orange Court House, to recuperate from the losses and fatigue of the campaign. We settled ourselves in comfortable camps among the wooded hills, enjoyed better rations than we ever got again, gradually collected horses, recruits, conscripts, and returning sick and wounded, and altogether we felt about as well satisfied with the situation and prospect as we had ever done before. The enjoyment of our pleasant camps and still pleas-

anter rest was suddenly broken, on September 9th, by orders for Hood's and McLaws's divisions of Longstreet's corps, about 11,000 strong, with my battalion of artillery, 23 guns, to go under the personal command of General Longstreet to reënforce Bragg in Georgia.

It was clear that our now, however, adversary, the Army of the Potomac, could not resume the offensive for some months, and there would be ample time to send this force out to enable Bragg to crush Rosecrans, and bring it back to Virginia before it would be needed there. It was the only

occasion during the war, I believe, when the Confederates availed themselves of the possession of the interior and shorter lines, and transferred a force of any magnitude rapidly from the eastern to the western army to meet an emergency, and then to return.

The orders were received September 9th, and the troops were put in motion immediately for Petersburg, whence we were to have railroad transportation to the vicinity of Chattanooga via Wilmington, N. C., and Augusta and Atlanta, Ga. This line at the time was the only one open from Virginia to Georgia, the East Tennessee line, the only other then existing, being held by the enemy at Knoxville. Consequently it was taxed with the entire business of the Confederacy between those States, and that it managed to do it at all has always seemed to me a feat in railroad management deserving great praise. The roads had had but a small business before the war, and their equipment and motive power were light even for those days. The gauges were not uniform, and often the tracks of connecting roads were joined through the cities only by lines of drays, and there was no interchange of cars. There was no manufactory of locomotives in the South, and but one small rolling-mill, at Atlanta, that could make a rail. Yet, in spite of all these drawbacks and the enormous business suddenly thrown upon them, and frequent raids by the enemy, destroying bridges, tearing up tracks, burning ties, and bending and twisting rails, the railroads always came up again smiling, and stuck to the contest as faithfully as did the army.

My battalion brought up the rear, leaving Petersburg September 17th, and arriving at Ringgold, the railroad terminus near Chickamauga, on the 25th. Our artillery was distributed about our lines, the station of my own battalion being on Lookout Mountain, whence we threw shells over the enemy's territory, and fought daily with a vicious little battery in Moccasin Bend, almost directly under us. This battery had nearly buried itself in the ground under high parapets, and fired up at us like a man shooting at a squirrel in a tree. We propped our trails high up in the air to depress the muzzles, and tried to mash our opponents into the earth with solid shot and percussion-shells; but we never hurt them much, and when we left the mountain they were still as lively as ever.

It was at last decided by General Bragg not to attempt to manœuvre Rosecrans out of Chattanooga, but to detach Longstreet and send him up to try to capture Burnside, who was at Knoxville with a force of about 12,000 effective men. On the night of November 4th we withdrew from Lookout Mountain, and the next day marched to Tyner's Station, whence, with Longstreet's two divisions of infantry, Hood's (under Jenkins) and McLaws's, about 10,000 infantry,¹ we were to be taken by rail as far as Sweetwater. The infantry


were sent in advance, and the railroad was so taxed to do this that we were detained at Tyner's until the 10th, and meanwhile nearly starved, as rations had been provided for only half that time.

At length, about noon on the 10th, a train of flat cars came for us and the guns and men were loaded, the horses being sent afoot. It was a cold and windy night, and we suffered a great deal on the open cars. There was a very insufficient water and wood supply on the road, and the troops had to bail water and chop up fence rails for the engine. The journey of only sixty miles occupied the whole afternoon and night. On the 13th we moved from Sweetwater with the infantry and a pontoon-train, and our artillery was reënforced by Leyden's battalion of 12 guns, giving us in all 35. Owing to the scarcity of horses we were compelled to use oxen to haul the caissons.

We encamped near Sweetwater for two days, while secret reconnoissances were made of the enemy's position across the Tennessee River at Loudon, and commissary, quartermaster, and ordnance trains were organized and equipped. On the 13th, Friday, we marched to Huff's Ferry, about two miles by land below Loudon, which point had been selected for our crossing. Everything was kept out of sight of the enemy, and soon after dark some pontoons were carried by hand to the river, a half mile below the ferry, and a party of infantry ferried over, to try to surround and capture the Federal picket which was posted on their side. This part of the programme, however, failed, from the vigilance of the Federal sentries. They all escaped, and probably carried the news to Burnside that we were crossing in force, for early next morning a strong reconnoissance was pushed on us by the enemy as the last of our troops were crossing the pontoon which had been constructed during the night. We drove it back, and organizing a strong advance-guard under Lieutenant-Colonel (afterward General) T. M. Logan, of Hampton's Legion, with Parker's battery of my battalion, we pushed forward vigorously in the effort to bring Burnside to bay and defeat him before he could get back and concentrate behind the fortifications about Knoxville. This he had set out to do as soon as he appreciated the situation, sending his trains ahead and covering them with his whole force. For three days there ensued a sort of running skirmish covering the whole distance to Knoxville, about thirty miles. It was not rapid progress, but the days were short, the roads axle-deep in mud, and a strong rear-guard of the enemy skirmished with us for every hill and wood and stream on the road. Twice—at Lenoir's the first afternoon, the 15th, and at Campbell's Station the next—we seemed to have brought him to bay, and behind our advance-guard our whole force was brought up and formed for attack. But the approach of night prevented an action on both occa-

¹ On p. 709 General Grant speaks of Bragg's grave mistakes in the Chattanooga campaign, "first, in sending away his ablest corps commander, with over 20,000 troops; second, in sending away a division of troops on the eve of battle." The force originally sent with Longstreet included, besides Hood and McLaws, 5000

of Wheeler's cavalry, and these commands were all engaged in the Knoxville campaign. On the 22d of November, two brigades of Buckner's division (Gracie's and Bushrod Johnson's) were sent from Chattanooga and reached Knoxville by the 28th, but were not actively engaged.—EDITORS.



THE NORTH-WESTERN BASTION OF FORT SANDERS, SHOWING THE GROUND OVER WHICH THE CONFEDERATES CHARGED. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

sions, though on the latter we got in a sharp and pretty artillery duel over some nice open ground unusually favorable for it, during which one of our guns, a 20-pounder Parrott, exploded, but fortunately without killing any one. Here we found out that we had opposite to us an old friend, Benjamin's battery of 20-pounder Parrotts, which had been our vis-à-vis at Fredericksburg, where it had pounded us from "Mary Scott's Hill."

The night of the third day, the 17th, Burnside was safe in Knoxville, and we encamped at Hazen's, a short distance off. The next day we began reconnoitering for the best place to assault.

A Federal cavalry brigade, under General W. P. Sanders, held a line of rail breastworks on a hill near the Armstrong house, and interfered seriously with our freedom of motion. Our skirmishers having vainly tried to move them, and artillery ammunition being too scarce for much of a cannonade on a minor point, we got up two of Taylor's Napoleons, so they could not be seen, behind a house which stood about 250 yards from the enemy's line, and asked for two regiments of infantry to charge it as soon as we made an impression. All being ready, the guns were run out from behind the house and opened vigorously with solid shot, being helped also by Moody's 24-pounder howitzers with shrapnel, a short distance to the left. At the close range Taylor made the rails fly at every shot, and the enemy began to desert them

rapidly and run back over the hill. Then the 2d and 3d South Carolina regiments of Kershaw's brigade rose from their cover and dashed at them. Sanders and his officers rallied their men gallantly and brought most of them back to the line, and poured a heavy fire upon the Carolinians. The latter advanced rapidly without returning it until they reached two cedar-trees within thirty yards of the enemy, when they halted, lay down, and opened fire. This was from a misapprehension of their orders, which were not to go farther forward than the enemy's line near the cedar-trees. In three minutes, however, the mistake was appreciated, and, rising with a yell, they dashed upon and carried the rail breastwork, killing and capturing quite a number of the enemy. †

On the 19th, the enemy being now pretty closely confined to the town, we began preparations to assault him. It was first necessary to study his lines and find the most favorable point.

The town had been partly fortified a year before by the Confederates, and the topography being generally favorable to defense, it was not easy to find a weak spot, especially as we were all unfamiliar with the locality, and without even maps of the city.

It soon appeared that there was but one point of the lines which it was possible to assault with any hope of success. That was a fort which had been started by the Confederates under the name

† This action was very sharp for a small affair and was well fought on both sides. When our infantry line halted and lay down, Captain S. Winthrop, of my staff, galloped up to and through them as they rose, and right up to the breastworks. A dozen muskets could be seen blazing at him, and he fell forward on his horse's neck with a bullet through the collar-bone. He had been a captain in Her Majesty's 24th regiment, and came to the Confederacy to get a taste of active service, and on other

occasions than this also fully sustained the reputation of British pluck.

The Federal general, Sanders, was mortally wounded in this skirmish. He was from Mississippi, and I believe was a distant relative of President Davis. We had been intimate at West Point, and had met in San Francisco in 1861, as I was about resigning to cast my fortunes with my native State. We parted with no anticipations of such a meeting.—E. P. A.

of Fort Loudon, and had been finished by the Federals and by them called Fort Sanders. It was upon a hill that fell off to the north-west, so that a large force could be marched under cover and approach within two hundred yards of the fort without being exposed to view or to fire either from the fort or the adjacent lines on either side, which here made an obtuse angle. [See p. 739.]

All of our artillery, thirty-four guns, was posted in the most available positions to fire upon this fort and enfilade the adjacent lines, except four howitzers, which were rigged as mortars to drop shells behind the parapets and to search out spaces sheltered from direct fire. To accomplish this, skids were prepared inclined at an angle of forty-five degrees, one end resting on the ground and the other on a horizontal pole supported about six feet from the ground by forked posts. The axle of the howitzer was run up on these skids, raising the wheels in the air on each side of the skids, and leaving the trail on the ground between them, until the piece had an elevation of about sixty degrees. I had experimented with the arrangement in Virginia, and also at Chattanooga, and found it to work nicely and to give very fair mortar practice. Of course the range was regulated by the charge of powder used. We also rigged up an old flat-boat and made a ferry with some telegraph wire, by which we carried Parker's rifle-guns to the south side of the river and established a battery on a commanding hill, from which we could enfilade the western front of the fort at a range of 2600 yards. All of our guns were protected by earth-works.

These arrangements occupied us closely until Tuesday, the 24th. The attack was ordered to begin at sunrise on the 25th, and was to be made as follows: First, the mortars were to open and get the range by slow and deliberate practice. Next, the direct-fire guns were to do the same. Next, a strong line of sharpshooters was to capture and occupy the enemy's line of rifle-pits in which their pickets were posted, and from these pits, an average distance of 200 yards, maintain a concentrated fire upon the parapet and embrasures of the fort. Next, all thirty of the guns and mortars were to pour a rapid fire into the fort for about a half hour, to dismount its guns and demoralize its garrison, and under cover of this fire and the sharpshooters the storming column, previously massed under shelter, was to advance. As it approached, the guns would shift their fire to the right and left, and the mortars would resume their natural functions as howitzers and limber up and follow the storming column.

On the night of the 24th we learned that Bushrod Johnson's and Gracie's brigades, about 2600 men, were on their way to reinforce us, and would arrive the next night. The attack was accordingly postponed to await their arrival. With them came General Leadbetter, chief engineer to Bragg, who had been stationed at Knoxville and was familiar with its fortifications. Under his advice Longstreet again postponed the attack, and the next day went in person with him to look at the enemy's lines above the town, with a view to making the attack there. On their return Thursday night I was or-

dered to withdraw our guns from the south side of the river, as it was intended to move up above the town and make the assault on Mabry's Hill.

On Friday I accompanied Generals Longstreet, Leadbetter, and others on a careful reconnoissance of this locality with a force of cavalry under General Wheeler, who drove in the enemy's pickets. This reconnoissance convinced every one that an attack in that quarter was impossible. The hill was strongly fortified, the approaches inundated, and there was no cover within a mile for the formation and advance of an assaulting column. It was unanimously decided to go back to the plan of assaulting Fort Sanders, and I was ordered to get the guns back upon the hills across the river early Saturday morning. This was done, but the day turned out rainy and the assault was again postponed until Sunday, the 28th. So General Leadbetter's advent cost us three as valuable days as the sun ever shone upon. Meanwhile a rumor reached us that Bragg had had a severe battle at Chattanooga, and had been defeated and driven back to Dalton.

Late on Saturday afternoon General Longstreet suddenly changed the plan of attack (I believe under advice of General Leadbetter) and ordered that instead of beginning at sunrise, and being preceded by a crushing fire of artillery concentrated on the fort and covered by an enveloping swarm of sharpshooters, a surprise should be attempted just before dawn by the infantry alone. This was a bitter disappointment to the artillery, after so many days spent in preparation. We believe that in daylight, with our aid, the result would have been different.

About 11 o'clock that night our infantry skirmishers were ordered to move forward and capture the enemy's pickets, which was successfully accomplished with a little firing, and our sharpshooters established themselves in the enemy's line of rifle-pits within 150 yards of the fort. But it put the enemy on the alert, and during the rest of the night they fired occasional rounds of canister over our ground. The troops were brought up as soon as the rifle-pits were taken and formed in the sheltered ground in the rear. Those assigned to the storming of the fort were Humphreys's Mississippi brigade, and Bryan's and Wofford's Georgia brigades (the latter under Colonel Ruff), all of McLaws's division. Anderson's Georgia brigade, of Jenkins's division, was to support their left flank. The brigades averaged about one thousand men each.

The night was wretched, the temperature freezing, and a fine mist falling. The troops lay upon their arms without fires and suffered greatly.

At the earliest indication of dawn three signal-guns were fired in rapid succession from different batteries. Their shells were visible like meteors in the air and they exploded over the fort. Instantly the recumbent ranks of gray sprang to their feet and formed for a charge, not so famous in history as Pickett's charge at Gettysburg, and not so inspiring a sight to see, for only the flashes of guns were visible in the dim light, but a charge that illustrated as well as Pickett's or any other ever made those splendid qualities of Longstreet's in-

fantry which made them at once an admiration and a delight to their comrades in the artillery.

For a few minutes about a dozen guns poured a hot fire into the angle of the lines back of the fort, and the success with which they threw their shells about it, even in the dim light, made it all the harder to bear that the plan of attack had been changed and the artillery was not allowed to try its full strength. Then we ceased firing to leave a clear field for the storming column, except a few shots from a battery that could reach the ground in rear of the fort.


Meanwhile the assaulting column formed, advanced to the line of rifle-pits, and then swarmed over them and rushed for the fort. Almost immediately they found themselves in an entanglement of telegraph wires stretched a few inches above the ground and fastened to stumps and stakes. This, however, was quickly broken up, and the men pressed forward rapidly to the ditch around the fort, receiving a severe musketry fire from its parapet and two or three discharges of canister from guns which were able to reach a part of the ground traversed. It was impossible, however, to maintain ranks in this rapid advance, in darkness, over unknown ground with such obstacles, and under so close a fire. It resulted that the three brigades converged in a mass and without order around the north-west bastion. It was here that the ditch was supposed to be easily passable.

On the western face, indeed, it proved to be only about four-and-a-half feet deep, and ordinarily a ditch of that depth would not be a serious obstacle. But that morning the ground was frozen and very slippery, and, in addition, Colonel O. M. Poe, General Burnside's chief engineer, anticipating an assault, had made a very important variation in the ordinary profile of the ditch and parapet. Ordinarily there is left a space of about a foot between the edge of the ditch and the foot of the parapet, which space is called the "berme." [See out, p. 750.]

It will be readily seen that to a man attempting to scale the parapet the berme is a great assistance, giving a foothold whence it is easy to rush up the exterior slope, which cannot be made steeper than forty-five degrees. Here the berme had been entirely cut away. To the right and left of the western face of the bastion the ditch grew deeper until it reached ten feet in places, and the parapet was raised in places by cotton bales. The advance was, of course, checked by the ditch, and the men generally swarmed along the edge, uncertain what

to do, and firing into the embrasures and at such of the enemy as ventured to show their heads over the parapet. This soon silenced the direct fire upon them from the parapet, except an occasional musket raised overhead to the level of the interior crest and fired without aim. The fort was so nearly silenced that looking on from the guns we thought it had surrendered, though some fire continued to come from the left.

Meanwhile many of the officers, color-bearers, and men jumped into the ditch and attempted to scale the parapet. The slippery slopes and the absence of a berme prevented their success in such numbers as to accomplish any result, and the gallant fellows going up one by one were shot down



FORT STANLEY, KNOXVILLE. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.


from the inside as fast as they crowned the parapet. Nowhere in the war was individual example more splendidly illustrated than on that fatal slope and in that bloody ditch.

Some of the battle-flags were planted on the exterior crest and maintained there for some time by a succession of color-bearers. † For fully twenty minutes the men stood around the ditch unable to get at their adversaries, but unwilling to retreat. Lieutenant Benjamin, commanding the artillery within the fort, made hand-grenades of his shells and exploded several within the ditch. Longstreet, seeing the flash of their explosions, and thinking them to be our own shells falling short, ordered the cessation of the slight artillery fire which we had continued to throw on the flanks and beyond the fort. [See note, p. 744.] At last, daylight having succeeded dawn, and further effort being plainly hopeless, the men sulkily withdrew. As the main force fell back Anderson's brigade of Jenkins's division, which was to take up the

† Colonel S. Z. Ruff, 18th Georgia, commanding Wofford's brigade; Colonel H. P. Thomas, of the 16th Georgia; and Colonel Kennon McElroy, 13th Mississippi, were killed, and Lieutenant-Colonel Fiser, 17th Mississippi, lost an arm upon the parapet. Adjutant T. W. Cumming, of the 16th Georgia, penetrated the

fort through an embrasure and was captured inside, assuring his captors that they would all be his prisoners within a few minutes. Lieutenant Munger, of the 9th Georgia, got into another embrasure, and, finding himself alone, emptied a revolver at the gunners and made his escape.—E. P. A.

attack upon the left of the assaulting column only in case of its success, unwilling to see the assault fail without trying it themselves, rushed forward to the ditch. Longstreet endeavored to have them stopped, but was too late. They repeated the scenes of the first attack, and after losing nearly two hundred men they likewise withdrew. The ranks were re-formed, however, close behind the line of the



enemy's rifle-pits, which our sharp-shooters still occupied. It had been a bloody repulse, though occupying but about forty minutes. ¶

Soon after the repulse I heard, with great delight, that Jenkins had asked and obtained permission to make a fresh attempt, for I felt the utmost confidence that a concentrated fire by daylight from our 34 guns and mortars, with 1000 sharp-shooters whom we could shelter within close range, could silence the fort entirely, enabling a storming column to plant ladders, fill the ditch with fascines, and cut footholds in the scarp, so that an overwhelming force might reach the interior. But before arrangements could be made Longstreet received official intelligence of Bragg's disaster and an order to abandon the siege of Knoxville and to move promptly to join Bragg. A renewal of the attack was, therefore, thought inexpedient, and orders were at once given to move all trains to the rear, in preparation for a retreat southward that night.

Under cover of night it was intended that we should abandon the siege and get a good start on our march to join Bragg, but before nightfall we got news from Bragg himself that a large force under Sherman was being moved to intercept us, and that an early junction with him was impossible. Under these circumstances it was finally decided to remain and threaten Knoxville as long as possible, and draw Sherman off from the pursuit of Bragg, and then to retreat northward into east Tennessee. We remained before Knoxville until the night of December 4th.

About noon the next day we encamped at Blain's Cross-roads, having made eighteen miles; that was, I think, about the very worst night march I ever went through. The roads were in fearful

condition, and in the inky darkness and pouring rain neither men nor animals could see. Frequently guns or wagons would be mired so that the column behind would be blocked in the mud until extra teams and men at the wheels could set the column going for a few minutes. Strict orders had been given that the men should not use fence rails for fuel, but that night they were ignored, and miles of fence were fired merely to light up the road.

I recall some incidents illustrating how poorly our army was provided with even prime necessities, although we were in our own country. We were so badly off for horse-shoes that on the advance to Knoxville we stripped the shoes from all the dead horses, and we killed for the purpose all the wounded and broken-down animals, both our own and those left behind by the enemy. During the siege the river brought down to us a number of dead horses and mules, thrown in within the town. We watched for them, took them out, and got the shoes and nails from their feet. Our men were nearly as badly off as the animals—perhaps worse, as they did not have hoofs. I have myself seen bloody stains on frozen ground, left by the barefooted where our infantry had passed. We of the artillery took the shoes off the drivers and gave them to the cannoneers who had to march.

Early in the advance Longstreet gave permission to the men to "swap" shoes with the prisoners whenever any were taken, but each man was strictly required to have something to "swap," and not leave the prisoner barefoot. It was quite an amusing sight (to us) to see a ragged rebel with his feet tied up in a sort of raw beef-hide moccasin, which the men learned to make, come up to a squad of prisoners, inspect their feet, and select the one he would "swap" with. Generally, however, the prisoners took it all very good-humoredly, gayed one another, and swapped jokes also with the swappers. It looked a little rough, but, as one of the victims said, "When a man is captured, his shoes are captured too."

On Sunday the 6th we marched fifteen miles farther, to Rutledge; on the 8th seventeen more, to Mooresburg; and on the 9th nine more, in the direction of Rogersville. Here we remained until the 14th, when we marched back, hoping to be able to surprise and capture a small force of the enemy that had followed us to Bean's Station and had become separated from its support. ¶

We spent the winter between Russellville and Greenville, living off the country, having occasional

¶ Our losses had been 129 killed, 458 wounded, and 226 captured,—total, 813. The enemy's loss inside the fort was, I believe, only about 20.—E. P. A.

¶ Gracie's brigade had quite a sharp engagement here, General Gracie being severely wounded, and Kershaw's and Bushrod Johnson's brigades and two of my batteries were slightly engaged; but darkness came on before we could get a sufficient force into position and line, and under cover of it the enemy retreated. It had been intended to cut off his retreat with a force of cavalry, but the plan miscarried in some way—as plans are always liable to do. Our loss was 290, more than half of

it in Gracie's brigade. This virtually ended the fighting of the campaign, in which our entire losses were 198 killed, 850 wounded, 248 missing,—total, 1296. Burnside's losses were 92 killed, 333 wounded, and 207 missing,—total, 692.—E. P. A.

The Union force at Bean's Station consisted of 4000 cavalry, under General Shackelford, who led the advance of a column commanded by General Parke. Parke, with the infantry, was approaching, and sent a division against Martin's cavalry, preventing the flank movement here referred to as having miscarried.—EDITORS.


expeditions, and alarms enough to destroy most of the comfort of winter-quarters. ☆

In the latter part of March we moved back to Bristol, and in April General Lee sent for us to rejoin him by rail. Reaching Gordonsville on the

☆ We had some of our foraging wagons captured and men killed by the "bushwhackers." The latter were supposed to be guerrilla troops in the Federal service

22d of April, we were once more with the Army of Northern Virginia, just twelve days before it entered the Wilderness and began the death-grapple that was only to end, after eleven months of daily fighting, at Appomattox.

recruited among the people of that section whose sympathies were anti-Confederate. They seldom fought, but they cut off small parties and took no prisoners.—E. P. A.



KNOXVILLE IN 1870. FROM A WATER-COLOR SKETCH.

THE OPPOSING FORCES AT KNOXVILLE, TENN.

November 17th–December 4th, 1863.

For much of the information contained in this list and in similar lists to follow, the editors are indebted (in advance of the publication of the "Official Records") to Brigadier-General Richard C. Drum, Adjutant-General of the Army. K stands for killed; w for wounded; m w for mortally wounded; m for captured or missing; c for captured.

THE UNION ARMY.

ARMY OF THE OHIO — Major-General Ambrose E. Burnside.

NINTH ARMY CORPS, Brig.-Gen. Robert B. Potter.
Escort: 6th Ind. Cav. (4 co's), Col. James Biddle. Loss: k, 1; w, 1; m, 1 = 3.

FIRST DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Edward Ferrero.

First Brigade, Col. David Morrison: 36th Mass., Maj. William E. Draper; 8th Mich., Lieut.-Col. Ralph Ely; 79th N. Y., Capt. William S. Montgomery; 45th Pa., Lieut.-Col. Francis M. Hills. Brigade loss: k, 4; w, 19; m, 6 = 29. *Second Brigade*, Col. Benjamin C. Christ: 29th Mass., Col. Ebenezer W. Peiree; 27th Mich., Maj. William B. Wright; 46th N. Y., Capt. Alphons Serieri; 50th Pa., Maj. Edward Overton, Jr. Brigade loss: k, 15; w, 25; m, 24 = 64. *Third Brigade*, Col. William Humphrey: 2d Mich., Maj. Cornelius Byington (m w), Capt. John C. Ruehl; 17th Mich., Lieut.-Col. Lorin L. Comstock (k), Capt. Frederick W. Swift; 20th Mich., Maj. Byron M. Cutcheon; 100th Pa., Lieut.-Col. Matthew M. Dawson. Brigade loss: k, 18; w, 102; m, 46 = 166. *Artillery*: 34th N. Y., Capt. Jacob Roemer; D, 1st R. I., Capt. William W. Buckley. Artillery loss: w, 2.

SECOND DIVISION, Col. John F. Hartranft.

First Brigade, Col. Joshua K. Sigfried: 2d Md., Col. Thomas B. Allard; 21st Mass., Lieut.-Col. George P. Hawkes; 48th Pa., Maj. Joseph A. Gilmour. Brigade loss: k, 5; w, 27; m, 32 = 64. *Second Brigade*, Lieut.-Col. Edwin Sehall: 35th Mass., Maj. Nathaniel Wales; 11th N. H., Capt. Leander W. Cogswell; 51st Pa., Maj. William J. Bolton. Brigade loss: k, 4; w, 7; m, 3 = 14.

UNATTACHED: E, 2d U. S. Art'y, Lieut. Samuel N. Benjamin.

TWENTY-THIRD ARMY CORPS, Brig.-Gen. Mahlon D. Manson.

General Headquarters: McLaughlin's Ohio Squadron Cav., Maj. Richard Rice; Eng. Battalion, Capt. O. S. McClure.

SECOND DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Julius White. Staff loss: m, 2.

Second Brigade, Col. Marshall W. Chapin: 107th Ill., Lieut.-Col. Francis H. Lowry; 13th Ky., Col. William E. Hobson; 23d Mich., Maj. William W. Wheeler; 111th Ohio, Maj. Isaac R. Sherwood; Ill. Battery, Capt. Edward C. Henshaw. Brigade loss: w, 13; m, 4 = 17.

THIRD DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Milo S. Hascall.

First Brigade, Col. James W. Reilly: 44th Ohio, Maj. Alpheus S. Moore; 100th Ohio, Col. Patrick S. Slevin; 104th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Oscar W. Sterl; D, 1st Ohio Art'y, Lieut. William H. Pease. Brigade loss: k, 2; w, 15; m, 7 = 24. *Second Brigade*, Col. Daniel Cameron: 65th Ill., Lieut.-Col. William S. Stewart; 24th Ky., Col. John S. Hunt; 103d Ohio, Capt. John T. Philpot; Ind. Battery, Capt. Hubbard T. Thomas. Brigade loss: k, 9; w, 97; m, 2 = 108.

RESERVE ARTILLERY, Capt. Andrew J. Konkle: 24th Ind., Capt. Joseph A. Sims; 19th Ohio, Capt. Joseph C. Shields.

Provisional Brigade, Col. William A. Hoskins: 12th

Ky., Maj. Joseph M. Owens; 8th Tenn., Col. Felix A. Reeve. *Tennessee Brigade*, Col. John S. Casement.

CAVALRY CORPS, Brig.-Gen. James M. Shackelford, FIRST DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. William P. Saunders (in w), Col. Frank Wolford. Staff loss: m w, 1.

First Brigade, Col. Frank Wolford, Lieut.-Col. Silas Adams: 1st Ky., Lieut.-Col. Silas Adams; 11th Ky., —; 12th Ky., —; Law's Howitzer Battery, —. Brigade loss: k, 5; w, 9; m, 10 = 24. *Second Brigade*, Lieut.-Col. Emery S. Bond: 112th Ill. (mounted infantry), Maj. Tristram T. Dow; 8th Mich., —; 45th Ohio (mounted infantry), —; 15th Ind. Battery, —. Brigade loss: k, 25; w, 63; m, 64 = 152. *Third Brigade*,

Col. Charles D. Pennebaker: 11th Ky., Col. S. Palace Love; 27th Ky., Lieut.-Col. John H. Ward. Brigade loss: k, 4; w, 12; m, 1 = 17.

SECOND DIVISION.

First Brigade, Col. Israel Garrard: 2d Ohio, Lieut.-Col. George A. Purington; 7th Ohio, —; 2d Tenn. (infantry), —. Brigade loss: m, 5. Total Union loss: killed 92, wounded 394, captured or missing, 207 = 693.

In his official report General Burnside says: "Our force at this time [commencement of the siege] in Knoxville was about 12,000 effective men, exclusive of the new recruits of loyal Tennesseans."

THE CONFEDERATE ARMY.

Lieut.-Gen. James Longstreet. Staff loss: w, 1.

McLAWS'S DIVISION, Maj.-Gen. Lafayette McLaws.

Kershaw's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Joseph B. Kershaw: 2d S. C., Col. John D. Kennedy (w), Lieut.-Col. F. Gaillard; 3d S. C., Col. James D. Nance; 7th S. C., Capt. E. J. Goggans; 8th S. C., Col. J. W. Henagan, Capt. D. McIntyre; 15th S. C., Maj. William M. Gist (k), Capt. J. B. Davis; 3d S. C. Battalion, Lieut.-Col. W. G. Rice. Brigade loss: k, 19; w, 116; m, 3 = 138. *Wofford's Brigade*, Col. S. Z. Ruff (k), Lieut.-Col. N. L. Hutchins, Jr.; 16th Ga., Lieut.-Col. Henry P. Thomas (k); 18th Ga., Capt. John A. Crawford; 24th Ga., Capt. N. J. Dortch; Cobb's (Ga.) Legion, Maj. William D. Conyers; Phillips (Ga.) Legion, Maj. Joseph Hamilton (w); 3d Ga. Battalion Sharpshooters, Lieut.-Col. N. L. Hutchins, Jr. Brigade loss: k, 48; w, 121; m, 81 = 250. *Humphreys's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Benjamin G. Humphreys: 13th Miss., Col. Kennon McElroy (k), Maj. G. L. Donald; 17th Miss., Lieut.-Col. John C. Fiser (w); 18th Miss., Col. Thomas M. Griffin; 21st Miss., Col. W. L. Braudon. Brigade loss: k, 21; w, 105; m, 56 = 182. *Bryan's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Goode Bryan: 10th Ga., Lieut.-Col. Willis C. Holt; 50th Ga., Col. P. McGlashan; 51st Ga., Col. E. Ball; 53d Ga., Col. James P. Simms (w). Brigade loss: k, 27; w, 121; m, 64 = 212.

HOOD'S DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Micah Jenkins.

Jenkins's Brigade, Col. John Bratton: 1st S. C., Col. F. W. Kilpatrick; 2d S. C. Rifles, Col. Thomas Thomson; 5th S. C., Col. A. Coward; 6th S. C. —; Hampton (S. C.) Legion, Col. M. W. Gary; Palmetto (S. C.) Sharpshooters, Col. Joseph Walker. Brigade loss: k, 22; w, 109; m, 5 = 136. *Robertson's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Jerome B. Robertson: 3d Ark., Col. Van H. Manning; 1st Tex., Col. A. T. Rainey; 4th Tex., Col. J. C. G. Key; 5th Tex., Col. R. M. Powell. Brigade loss: k, 9; w, 18; m, 6 = 33. *Law's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. E. McIver Law: 4th Ala., Col. P. D. Bowles; 15th Ala., Col. W. C. Oates; 44th Ala., Col. W. F. Perry; 47th Ala., Col. M. J. Bulger; 48th Ala., Col. James L. Sheffield. Brigade loss: k, 15; w, 69; m, 8 = 92. *Anderson's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. G. T. Anderson: 7th Ga., Col. W. W. White; 8th Ga., Col. John R. Towers; 9th Ga., Col. Benjamin Beck; 11th Ga., Col. F. H. Little; 59th Ga., Col. Jack Brown. Brigade loss: k, 36; w, 186; m, 25 = 247. *Benning's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Henry L. Benning: 2d Ga., Col. E. M. Butt; 15th Ga., Col. D. M. Du Bose; 17th Ga., Col. Wesley C. Hodges; 20th Ga., Col. J. D. Waddell. Brigade loss: k, 1; w, 5 = 6.

ARTILLERY, Col. E. P. Alexander.

Leyden's Battalion, Maj. A. Leyden: Ga. Battery, Capt. Tyler M. Peeples; Ga. Battery, Capt. A. M. Wolhlin; Ga. Battery, Capt. B. W. York. *Alexander's Battalion*, Maj. Frank Huger: La. Battery, Capt. G. V. Moody; Va. Battery, Capt. W. W. Fielding; Va. Battery, Capt. Tyler C. Jordan; Va. Battery, Capt. William W. Parker; Va. Battery, Capt. Osmond B. Taylor; Va. Battery, Capt. Pichignu Woolfolk, Jr. Artillery loss: k, 2; w, 2 = 4.

BUCKNER'S DIVISION, ☆ Brig.-Gen. Bushrod R. Johnson.

Gracie's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Archibald Gracie, Jr.: 41st Ala., Lieut.-Col. T. G. Trimmer; 43d Ala., Col. Y. M. Moody; 59th Ala., Lieut.-Col. J. D. McLennan; 60th Ala., Col. J. W. A. Sanford. Brigade loss: k, 1; w, 1 = 2. *Johnson's Brigade*, Col. John S. Fulton: 17th and 23d Tenn., Lieut.-Col. W. W. Floyd; 25th and 44th Tenn., Lieut.-Col. J. L. McEwen, Jr.; 63d Tenn., Maj. J. A. Aiken. Brigade loss: k, 2; w, 19 = 21.

CAVALRY CORPS, Maj.-Gen. Joseph Wheeler, Maj.-Gen. William T. Martin.

Division commanders: Maj.-Gen. William T. Martin, Brig.-Gen's F. C. Armstrong and John T. Morgan. *Brigade commanders*: Colonels Thomas Harrison, A. A. Russell, C. C. Crews, and George G. Dibrell. *Troops*: Parts of 4th, 8th, 9th, and 11th Tenn., 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, and 6th Ga., 1st, 3d, 4th, 7th, and 51st Ala., 3d Ark., 8th and 11th Tex., and 1st and 8th Confederate regiments, and Wiggins's Battery. Cavalry loss (estimated): k, w and m, 200.

RANSOM'S CAVALRY. †

Jones's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. William E. Jones: 8th Va., Col. James M. Corns; 21st Va., —; 27th Va. Battalion, —; 34th Va. Battalion, Col. V. A. Witcher; 36th Va. Battalion, —; 27th Va. Battalion, —. *Giltner's Brigade*, Col. H. L. Giltner: 16th Ga. Battalion, Maj. E. Y. Clark; 4th Ky., Maj. N. Parker; 10th Ky., Lieut.-Col. Edwin Trimble; 1st Tenn., Col. James E. Carter; 64th Va., Col. Campbell Slemper; Va. Battery, Capt. William N. Lowry.

The total Confederate loss (minus the cavalry, not reported) was 182 killed, 768 wounded, and 192 captured or missing = 1142. The loss in the cavalry is estimated at 250.

The effective strength of the forces under Longstreet's command probably numbered 20,000.

☆ Joined November 26th-28th.

† Joined November 27th-28th.

